Book ChapterDOI
Trace-driven cache attacks on AES (short paper)
Onur Aciicmez,Çetin Kaya Koç +1 more
- pp 112-121
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TLDR
This paper presents an efficient trace-driven cache attack on a widely used implementation of the AES cryptosystem, and develops an accurate mathematical model that is used in the cost analysis of the attack.Abstract:
Cache based side-channel attacks have recently been attracted significant attention due to the new developments in the field. In this paper, we present an efficient trace-driven cache attack on a widely used implementation of the AES cryptosystem. We also evaluate the cost of the proposed attack in detail under the assumption of a noiseless environment. We develop an accurate mathematical model that we use in the cost analysis of our attack. We use two different metrics, specifically, the expected number of necessary traces and the cost of the analysis phase, for the cost evaluation purposes. Each of these metrics represents the cost of a different phase of the attack.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
A Survey on Cache Timing Channel Attacks for Multicore Processors
Jaspinder Kaur,Shirshendu Das +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the research carried out in three aspects of cache security: cache timing channel attacks, detection techniques of these attacks, and defense mechanisms in details, and discuss the major challenge for mitigation and defense mechanism against these attacks is maintaining the system performance while disabling or avoiding these attacks.
Dissertation
Methods for finding the sources of leakage in cache-timing attacks and removing the profiling phase
TL;DR: An approach to extract simplified cache timing-behavior models analytically and propose to use these generated models instead of a profiling phase to lead the attack to be considered a more realistic threat than the attack originally proposed by Bernstein.
Dissertation
Fuites d'information dans les processeurs récents et applications à la virtualisation
TL;DR: This thesis explores the recent processor microarchitectures and their consequences in terms of information leakage in virtualized environments, and reverse engineering of the complex addressing function of the last-level cache of Intel processors renders the class of cache attacks highly practical.
Book ChapterDOI
Applications and Developments of the Lattice Attack in Side Channel Attacks
TL;DR: This paper systematically analyse the developments of the lattice attacks and its use in side channel attacks, and investigates the lattICE attacks on each algorithms and the way different side channel data is processed by.
Testing Hardware Security Properties and Identifying Timing Channels
TL;DR: This thesis demonstrates that GLIFT can effectively capture timing- channels (where information leaks in the amount of time a computation takes), and provides a method to do hardware security testing and verification for future computing systems.
References
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Book ChapterDOI
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
TL;DR: By carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operalions, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems.
BookDOI
The Design of Rijndael
Joan Daemen,Vincent Rijmen +1 more
TL;DR: This volume is the authoritative guide to the Rijndael algorithm and AES and professionals, researchers, and students active or interested in data encryption will find it a valuable source of information and reference.
Book ChapterDOI
Cache attacks and countermeasures: the case of AES
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe side-channel attacks based on inter-process leakage through the state of the CPU's memory cache, which can be used for cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives that employ data-dependent table lookups.
Proceedings Article
Remote timing attacks are practical
David Brumley,Dan Boneh +1 more
TL;DR: This work devise a timing attack against OpenSSL that can extract private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the local network.
Book ChapterDOI
Cache-collision timing attacks against AES
Joseph Bonneau,Ilya Mironov +1 more
TL;DR: The most powerful attack has been shown under optimal conditions to reliably recover a full 128-bit AES key with 213 timing samples, an improvement of almost four orders of magnitude over the best previously published attacks of this type.