Book ChapterDOI
Trace-driven cache attacks on AES (short paper)
Onur Aciicmez,Çetin Kaya Koç +1 more
- pp 112-121
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TLDR
This paper presents an efficient trace-driven cache attack on a widely used implementation of the AES cryptosystem, and develops an accurate mathematical model that is used in the cost analysis of the attack.Abstract:
Cache based side-channel attacks have recently been attracted significant attention due to the new developments in the field. In this paper, we present an efficient trace-driven cache attack on a widely used implementation of the AES cryptosystem. We also evaluate the cost of the proposed attack in detail under the assumption of a noiseless environment. We develop an accurate mathematical model that we use in the cost analysis of our attack. We use two different metrics, specifically, the expected number of necessary traces and the cost of the analysis phase, for the cost evaluation purposes. Each of these metrics represents the cost of a different phase of the attack.read more
Citations
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Side-channels beyond the cloud edge: New isolation threats and solutions
TL;DR: A new concept of distributed side-channel attack (DSCA) that is based on coordinating local attack techniques and explores how such attacks can threaten isolation of any virtualized environments such as fog and edge computing.
Book ChapterDOI
A cache trace attack on CAMELLIA
TL;DR: An attack on CAMELLIA is presented, which utilizes cache access patterns along with the differential properties of CameLLIA's s-boxes, which requires power traces from 216 different encryptions.
Book ChapterDOI
Cryptographic side-channels from low-power cache memory
TL;DR: This work introduces a new attack within this class which targets the use of low power cache memories, showing that they permit attack where a more considered design strategy would not.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
TagBleed: Breaking KASLR on the Isolated Kernel Address Space using Tagged TLBs
TL;DR: It is shown that kernel address space isolation is insufficient to harden KASLR against practical side-channel attacks on modern tagged TLB architectures and TagBleed is practical and shows that implementing secure address space isolated requires deep partitioning of microarchitectural resources and a more generous performance budget than previously assumed.
Journal ArticleDOI
Winter is here! A decade of cache-based side-channel attacks, detection & mitigation for RSA
TL;DR: This paper provides a detailed taxonomy of attacks on RSA cryptosystems and discusses their strengths and weaknesses while attacking different algorithmic implementations of RSA, and provides a classification of these attacks based on the source of information leakage.
References
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Book ChapterDOI
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
TL;DR: By carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operalions, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems.
BookDOI
The Design of Rijndael
Joan Daemen,Vincent Rijmen +1 more
TL;DR: This volume is the authoritative guide to the Rijndael algorithm and AES and professionals, researchers, and students active or interested in data encryption will find it a valuable source of information and reference.
Book ChapterDOI
Cache attacks and countermeasures: the case of AES
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe side-channel attacks based on inter-process leakage through the state of the CPU's memory cache, which can be used for cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives that employ data-dependent table lookups.
Proceedings Article
Remote timing attacks are practical
David Brumley,Dan Boneh +1 more
TL;DR: This work devise a timing attack against OpenSSL that can extract private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the local network.
Book ChapterDOI
Cache-collision timing attacks against AES
Joseph Bonneau,Ilya Mironov +1 more
TL;DR: The most powerful attack has been shown under optimal conditions to reliably recover a full 128-bit AES key with 213 timing samples, an improvement of almost four orders of magnitude over the best previously published attacks of this type.