Showing papers on "Counterfactual conditional published in 1998"

An Axiomatic Characterization of Causal Counterfactuals

Abstract: This paper studies the causal interpretation of counterfactual sentences using a modifiable structural equation model It is shown that two properties of counterfactuals, namely, composition and effectiveness, are sound and complete relative to this interpretation, when recursive (ie, feedback-less) models are considered Composition and effectiveness also hold in Lewis's closest-world semantics, which implies that for recursive models the causal interpretation imposes no restrictions beyond those embodied in Lewis's framework A third property, called reversibility, holds in nonrecursive causal models but not in Lewis's closest-world semantics, which implies that Lewis's axioms do not capture some properties of systems with feedback Causal inferences based on counterfactual analysis are exemplified and compared to those based on graphical models

Close-call counterfactuals and belief-system defenses: I was not almost wrong but I was almost right.

Abstract: Drawing on samples of professional observers of world politics, this article explores the interrelations among cognitive style, theoretical outlook, and reactions to close-call counterfactuals. Study 1 demonstrated that experts (especially high scorers on a composite measure of need for closure and simplicity) rejected close-call counterfactuals that redirected history when these counterfactuals undermined a preferred framework for understanding the past (the "I-was-not-almost-wrong" defense). Study 2 demonstrated that experts (especially high scorers on need for closure and simplicity) embraced close-call counterfactuals that redirected history when these counterfactuals protected conditional forecasts from refutation (the predicted outcome nearly occurred—so "I was almost right"). The article concludes by considering the radically different normative value spins that can be placed on

Defensive Pessimism and Optimism: The Bitter-Sweet Influence of Mood on Performance and Prefactual and Counterfactual Thinking

Abstract: Three studies demonstrated that manipulated moods influence the prefactual (alternative preoutcome predictions) and counterfactual (alternative postoutcome “what might have beens”) mental simulations of defensive pessimists and optimists. In Study 1, negative moods induced more upward (better than expected) prefactuals, and defensive pessimists performed best under such conditions; optimists performed best under induced positive moods, after which they used little prefactual thinking. In Studies 2 and 3, manipulated moods again influenced the strategies of defensive pessimists and optimists. In Study 2, optimists responded with more downward (worse than actuality) counterfactuals, suggesting attempts at mood repair. In Study 3, defensive pessimists and optimists each coped effectively by using preferred mental simulation strategies; both groups rebounded on a second task from poor performances on a first task.

A Methodology for the Study of Historical Counterfactuals

Abstract: Counterfactual reasoning is a component in much historical and political research. A proposal for exploring counterfactuals is elaborated, based on philosophical work on modal logic and possible worlds semantics. It is proposed that phenomena have essences which are unchanging in all possible worlds and that counterfactual analysis consists of making inferences about the contingent properties of these phenomena. Essential properties can be expressed as contingent relations bound, in different counterfactual situations, to different contingent properties. This methodology is applied to counterfactual explorations of a particular phenomenon: the “winnability” of high-level United States foreign policy recommendations. In two cases, the question is asked of whether “harder line” U.S. policies regarding Vietnam would have been adopted. Using the methodology elaborated in the first half of the article, it is found that as early as 1961, recommendations for the overt use of U.S. ground combat troops could have been accepted.

Time-Symmetrized Quantum Theory, Counterfactuals, and `Advanced Action'

Abstract: Recent authors have raised objections to the counterfactual interpretation of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule of time symmetrized quantum theory (TSQT). I distinguish between two different readings of the ABL rule, counterfactual and non-counterfactual, and confirm that TSQT advocate L. Vaidman is employing the counterfactual reading to which these authors object. Vaidman has responded to the objections by proposing a new kind of time-symmetrized counterfactual, which he has defined in two different ways. It is argued that neither definition succeeds in overcoming the objections, except in a special case previously noted by Cohen and Hiley. In addition, a connection is made between TSQT and Price's concept of `advanced action', which further supports the special case discussed.

Freedom, Causation, and the Consequence Argument

Abstract: The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: you have reason to consider defending a counterfactual theory of causation.

Local Theories of Causation and the a Posteriori Identification of the Causal Relation

Abstract: The need to find an intrinsic characterization of what makes a relation between events causal arises not only in ‘local’ theories of causation like Salmon's process theory but also in ‘global’ approaches like Lewis' counterfactual theory. According to the localist intuition, whether a process connecting two events is causal should depend only on what goes on between the events, not on conditions that hold elsewhere in the world. If such intrinsic characterizations could be found, an identification of the causal relation in the actual world (though not in other possible worlds) with physical processes may be feasible (the ‘a posteriori identification’). I consider recent proposals made for intrinsic characterizations of causality and conclude that none of them is able to deliver the intended result.

A Formal Analysis of Relevance

Abstract: We investigate the notion of relevance as it pertains to ‘commonsense’, subjunctive conditionals. Relevance is taken here as a relation between a property (such as having a broken wing) and a conditional (such as birds typically fly). Specifically, we explore a notion of ‘causative’ relevance, distinct from ‘evidential’ relevance found, for example, in probabilistic approaches. A series of postulates characterising a minimal, parsimonious concept of relevance is developed. Along the way we argue that no purely logical account of relevance (even at the metalevel) is possible. Finally, and with minimal restrictions, an explicit definition that agrees with the postulates is given.

The Impact of Personality on the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Analysis

Abstract: The end of the Cold War is examined with respect to the impact of Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, and their respective foreign secretaries. This discussion yields an approach to the systematic examination of counterfactual questions about the impact of political actors on historical outcomes.

David Lewis on indicative and counterfactual conditionals

Abstract: It may seem hard to imagine an argument more decisive than this, but, in fact, without considerable further argument not provided by Lewis, it does not establish what it is intended to establish. The argument is directed against the view, briefly alluded to, that indicative and counterfactual conditionals do not differ in their structure as conditionals, but differ only in giving different indications concerning the truth value of the antecedent, i.e., indicative conditionals express no commitment concerning the truth value of the antecedent whereas counterfactuals express a commitment to the falsehood of the antecedent.2 Lewis holds that this view cannot be correct because it is possible to find pairs of conditionals which are otherwise the same except that one is indicative, the other counterfactual, where the indicative conditional is probably true, but the counterfactual conditional may well be false. If that is right and Lewis's specimen pair of conditionals is intended to show that it is right then, as Lewis concludes, there must be more to the difference

Spatial Mental Models in Counterfactual Thinking About What Might Have Been

Abstract: The mental model theory predicts that deductions that require multiple models to be kept in mind are more difficult than deductions that require a single model. The model theory has been corroborated in the primary domains of deduction, including spatial inference. I will describe an extension of the model theory from factual thinking to counterfactual thinking about what might have been. The extension of the model theory is based on the premise that thinking about matters of fact and thinking about matters of possibility are based on the same sorts of mental representations and processes. The model theory of counterfactual thinking therefore predicts that the generation of counterfactual scenarios is more difficult when the factual situation requires multiple models to be kept in mind than when it requires a single model. I will report the results of an experiment that tests this model theory of counterfactual thinking. The experiment examines the way in which people alter spatial aspects of scenarios when they think about counterfactual alternatives. The results show that people make richer mutations to the single factual model required for a determinate description when they generate a counterfactual alternative to it. In contrast, they make less rich mutations to the multiple factual models required for an indeterminate description when they generate a counterfactual alternative to it. The implications of these results are discussed for a general theory of spatial thinking.

Space-time counterfactuals

Abstract: A definition is proposed to give precise meaning to the counterfactual statements that often appear in discussions of the implications of quantum mechanics. Of particular interest are counterfactual statements which involve events occurring at space-like separated points, which do not have an absolute time ordering. Some consequences of this definition are discussed.

Bayesian Subjunctive Conditionals for Games and Decisions

Abstract: The theory of rational decision has always been implicitly involved with subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals. “If I were to do A, this would happen; if I were to do B that would happen. ” When I have done A, I use the counterfactual: “If I had done B, the outcome would have been worse. ” Counterfactuals are handled so smoothly in decision theory and game theory that they are hardly ever explicitly discussed except in cases where they cause problems. For many philosophers, Newcomb’s paradox was such a critical case (See Gibbard and Harper (1978)). In game theory, questions about beliefs off the equilibrium path in extensive form games and related issues of backward and forward induction provoked explicit discussion of counterfactuals (See Aumann (1995), Bicchieri (1988), Binmore (1987), Harsanyi and Selten (1988), Reny (1993), Stalnaker (1994), (forthcoming)). Where subjunctive conditionals cause problems, we need an explicit theory. What theory should we use? There is the selection function semantics of Stalnaker (1968) based on the idea of “most similar possible world in which the antecedent is true”, and related theories of Woodruff (1969), Lewis (1973), Pollock (1976), Nute (1980), which relax some of Stalnaker’s assumptions.

Dudman and the Plans of Mice and Men

Abstract: V.H. Dudman has argued that a better semantic account of the conditional emerges from placing grammar ‘in the driver's seat’. His account of their grammar identifies two main categories, which differ from those postulated by traditional theorists, and which he claims correspond to two very different and deep-rooted styles of thought. I show that it is unlikely that a perfect match exists between styles of thought and grammatical categories in the way that Dudman postulates. I consider arguments by Dale and Edgington in this context. More importantly, however, I also show that even if there were a perfect match, Dudman's account would still obscure semantic similarities between ‘if’-sentences which are arguably of greater importance than the ones he highlights. This, I suggest, has implications extending far beyond Dudman's work.