Showing papers on "Damages published in 1994"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that in the presence of externalities, market transactions do not fully capture preferences and that collective choice is the more relevant paradigm to the public good nature of pollution.
Abstract: The ability to place a monetary value on the consequences of pollution discharges is a cornerstone of the economic approach to the environment. If this cannot be done, it undercuts the use of economic principles, whether to determine the optimal level of pollution or to implement this via Pigouvian taxes or Coase-style liability rules. Sometimes, the valuation involves a straightforward application of methods for valuing market commodities, as when sparks from a passing train set fire to a wheat field. Often, however, the valuation is more difficult. Outcomes such as reducing the risk of human illness or death, maintaining populations of native fish in an estuary, or protecting visibility at national parks are not themselves goods that are bought and sold in a market. Yet, placing a monetary value on them can be essential for sound policy. The lack of a market to generate prices for such outcomes is no accident. Markets are often missing in such cases because of the nonexcludable or nonrival nature of the damages: for those affected by it, pollution may be a public good (or bad). The public good nature of the damages from pollution has several consequences. It explains, for example, why the damages are sometimes large—only a few people may want to own a sea otter pelt, say, but many may want this animal protected in the wild. It also explains why market prices are inappropriate measures of value. In the presence of externalities , market transactions do not fully capture preferences. Collective choice is the more relevant paradigm. This is precisely what Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947) had in mind when he first proposed the contingent valuation method. Individuals should be interviewed
1,601 citations
Book•
01 Apr 1994
TL;DR: In this article, the basic economics of antitrust and the history and ideology in Antitrust Policy are discussed, as well as the substance of anti-trust policies towards collusion and oligopoly.
Abstract: Policy and Measurement: Basic Economics of Antitrust; History and Ideology in Antitrust Policy; Market Power and Market Definition; The Substance of Antitrust: Antitrust Policy Toward Collusion and Oligopoly; Joint Ventures of Competitors, Concerted Refusals, Patent Licensing, and Rule of Reason; Exclusionary Practices and the Dominant Firm: Basic Doctrine of Monopolization and Attempt; Exclusionary Practices in Monopolization and Attempt Cases; Predatory Pricing; Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers; Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise Contract; Intrabrand Restraints on Distribution; Mergers of Competitors; Conglomerate Mergers; Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act; Antitrust as a Regulatory Institution: Public Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws; Private Enforcement; Damages; Antitrust and the Process of Democratic Government; Antitrust and Federal Regulatory Policy; Antitrust Federalism and the State Action Doctrine; Reach of the Federal Antitrust Laws.
229 citations
TL;DR: Buying Greenhouse Insurance outlines a way to think about greenhouse-effect decisions under uncertainty and describes an insightful model for determining the economic costs of limiting carbon dioxide emissions produced by burning fossil fuels and provides a solid analytical base for rethinking public policy on the farreaching issue of global warming.
Abstract: This book contains an economic analysis of various options in managing a potential global warming problem, arguing that sensible public policy requires balancing benefits and costs. The authors focus on two major questions: what will reductions in emissions buy in terms of reduced environmental damages and what will the price tag be?
126 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed a fee-shifting rule that generates the highest probability of settlement based on the allocation of costs upon the proximity of the court's award to the pretrial announcements.
Abstract: Legal rules for allocating the private costs of civil litigation, or "fee-shifting" rules, provide powerful incentives for settlement. Within the context of a direct-revelation mechanism, the fee-shifting rule that generates the highest probability of settlement bases the allocation of costs upon the proximity of the court's award to the pretrial announcements. This mechanism resembles Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other offer-based rules. In a simple extensive-form game, if the litigants have asymmetric information about the level of damages (probability of prevailing), then Rule 68 increases (decreases) the settlement rate.
125 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a simplified approach based on environmental annuities is proposed to place economic value on lost wetland service flows, where the public can be compensated for past losses in environmental services through the provision of additional services of the same type in the future.
98 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze a settlement and litigation game in which both parties possess private information relevant to the value of a claim, and the plaintiff knows the level of damages, while the defendant knows the probability he will be held liable for those damages.
92 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that when the litigation costs are small, the optimal award is a flat penalty, and when the costs are large, a fine penalty is the optimal penalty.
Abstract: An injurer undertakes precautions to reduce both the probability and the severity of an accident. The damages that the victim suffers are privately observed, and will be verified at a cost if the case is litigated. While finely tuned damage awards induce the injurer to take appropriate precautions ex ante, they increase the probability that the litigants will disagree about the case, and thereby aggravate the settlement process. Flat damage awards reduce the level of costly litigation, but lead to underinvestment in precautions. We show that when the litigation costs are small the optimal award is finely tuned to the actual damages, and when litigation costs are large the optimal award is a flat penalty. Applications to scheduled damages and workers' compensation are discussed.
78 citations
TL;DR: The extent of damages, the efficiency with which facilities are brought back on-line, and the effectiveness of marketing to advertise the destinations in a natural disaster is a major determinant of tourism recovery after a disaster as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Tourism recovery after a natural disaster depends on the extent of damages, the efficiency with which facilities are brought back on-line, and the effectiveness of marketing to advertise the destin...
64 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed an alternative approach that integrates legal concepts of public trust, economic definitions of compensation, and scientific approaches to restore natural resource damages based on a definition of restoration as resource-based compensation.
Abstract: To date, methods for determining compensation for spill-related natural resource damages have focused on the monetary value of resources damaged by a spill or scientific analyses of resource restoration. This paper suggests an alternative approach that integrates legal concepts of public trust, economic definitions of compensation, and scientific approaches to restoration. The approach is based on a definition of restoration as resource-based compensation-a remedy for damages wherein alternative restoration actions are identified that provide "equally valued" resources as those lost due to the spill. This provides an explicit balancing between the benefits obtained from restoration and losses due to the spill to assure that the public is made whole. The least costly alternative that makes the public whole is selected as the cost effective alternative.
60 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used experimental markets to investigate the potential effects of three liability regimes on the issue of damage sharing in auditing firms and their partners, and provided insights into the effects of various damage-sharing regimes on strategy choices.
Abstract: In this study we use experimental markets to investigate some potential effects of three liability regimes that differ on the issue of damage sharing. In the first, termed an auditor (verifier) negligence regime, the verifier is liable if negligent and only he pays damages. In the second, called the proportionate liability regime, a manager (seller) and a verifier are proportionately liable, given certain actions, and both have sufficient wealth to pay damages. The third regime is also a proportionate liability regime, but only verifiers pay damages because sellers lack the wealth to pay their share. The basic design modifies that used in Dopuch and King [1992] to investigate the effects of negligence and strict liability regimes. Our results complement theirs by providing insights into the effects of various damage-sharing regimes on strategy choices and wealth distribution. One of the ongoing debates of auditors' legal liability is the extent to which auditing firms and their partners should be held jointly and
55 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the prevailing tendency for concentration through merger often damages representative effectiveness while yielding few administrative benefits, and propose a framework for analysis of a range of co-operative relationships between unions which yield administrative benefits.
Abstract: The article looks at effectiveness in union organization. Following Child et al. (1973), it describes the necessary conditions for both administrative and representative effectiveness. Administratively effective unions focus on an organizable job territory, control costs and avoid competition. Representative effectiveness is defined by the degree of employer dependence, the balance of services and the degree of centralization. We argue that the prevailing tendency for concentration through merger often damages representative effectiveness while yielding few administrative benefits. The article concludes by offering a framework for analysis of a range of co-operative relationships between unions which yield administrative benefits.
01 Jan 1994
TL;DR: Ellickson et al. as mentioned in this paper conducted a field investigation into the exact type of dispute that Coase [1960] invoked in the Parable of the Farmer and the Rancher and found that, contrary to the Coasean Parable, variations in law virtually never affected how neighbors determined responsibility for cattle trespass.
Abstract: Informal interactions can spontaneously generate complex institutions No one consciously desgins a society's language, etiquette, or cultural traditions Because a market economy is a classic illustration of a complex spontaneous institution, economists should be especially appreciative of what nonhierarchical forces can accomplish Regrettably, however, many scholars working in law-and-economics have assumed that only governments can produce the rules through which a society governs itself According to this "legal centralist" perspective, private ordering cannot begin until the sovereign has specified property rights My recent book, Order Without Law (Ellickson [1991]), challenges this view I am gratified that its publication has prompted the editors of this journal to solicit reviews from a distinguished panel of commentators This summary of the book's main themes is designed to provide a backdrop for their remarks In his watershed article, The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase [1960] inadvertently abetted legal centralism in law-and-economics In developing his renowned Parable of the Farmer and the Rancher, Coase [1960] envisioned that the legal system would determine whether or not a farmer would be entitled to recover damages for cattle trespass Order without Law demonstrates that this seemingly innocent assumption is almost certainly incorrect in any rural area in which neighbors repeatedly interact The first half of the book recounts the results of a field investigation into the exact type of dispute that Coase [1960] invoked in his Parable The setting was rural Shasta County, California, a jurisdiction selected because in some portions of its territory stockmen are strictly liable for cattle trespass, while in other portions they are typically not liable at all If the Coasean Parable were realistic, these legal variations would affect the starting points of interneighbor bargaining to resolve a trespass incident The field study revealed that, contrary to the Parable, variations in law virtually never affected how neighbors determined responsibility for cattle trespass Residents of rural Shasta County regard the legal system as an inappropriate institution for the resolution of animaltrespass incidents With rare exceptions, most aspire to be "good neighbors" In their eyes, a good neighbor would not use the legal system, which is relatively costly and politicized, to resolve a minor
TL;DR: The intuition behind this result is straightforward: insolvency truncates the penalties that are borne by tort defendants, thus creating an externalized social production cost as mentioned in this paper, which can be seen as a form of social justice.
Abstract: The intuition behind this result is straightforward: insolvency truncates the penalties that are borne by tort defendants, thus creating an externalized social production cost. For analyses which have explored or employ this reasoning, see Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. Legal Stud. 689 (1985); Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 Rand J. Econ. 271 (1984); Steven Shavell, The Judgmentproof Problem, 6 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 45 (1986); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987); T. Randolph Beard, Bankruptcy and Care Choice, 21 Rand J. Econ. 626 (1990); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Apportioning Damages among Potentially Insolvent Actors, 19 J. Legal Stud. 617 (1990); and A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies among Individuals, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 618 (1991). In general, tort claims are considered debts that can be discharged in either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Some of the more celebrated examples of product failures which have resulted in firm bankruptcy include the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES), the Dalkon Shield, and Johns Manville's asbestos products. For discussion of such cases, see Mark Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 846 (1984). Hazardous products clearly have the potential to create massive litigation costs. W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability (1991), documents 275,000 asbestos, 210,000 Dalkon Shield, and 125,000 Agent Orange cases. In the environmental arena, many firms have been bankrupted by liabilities that dwarf their assets, including petroleum underground storage tank operators, landfillers, and firms deemed responsible for Superfund cleanups.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the role of nonconvexities in externality control from a policy perspective, and show that nonconsvexity can arise from a number of sources and can significantly alter the optimal solution to an external problem.
TL;DR: In this article, a probit model of the decision to adopt no-fault from 1971 through 1976 is developed and estimated using cross-state data from 1970, and separate equations are estimated for restrictions on tort liability and the enactment of compulsory personal injury protection (PIP) coverage.
Abstract: Introduction Sixteen states enacted auto insurance no-fault laws from 1971 through 1976 that generally contained two key features: (1) the purchase of first-party coverage for medical expenses and loss of income for drivers and passengers, known as personal injury protection (PIP), was made compulsory; and (2) tort liability of negligent drivers was limited.(1) The purchase of liability insurance for actions not affected by tort limitations also was made compulsory. Three other states enacted laws during this period that made PIP and liability coverage compulsory without limiting tort liability.(2) No state has adopted no-fault since 1976. The District of Columbia adopted a no-fault law in 1983, but it was repealed in 1986. Nevada repealed its no-fault law in 1979. Pennsylvania repealed its limitation on tort liability in 1984 but maintained compulsory PIP coverage. A subsequent change in Pennsylvania law allowed consumers to choose tort limitations in exchange for a premium discount on liability coverage. New Jersey also modified its original mandatory tort restrictions to allow consumer choice. Despite the failure of no-fault auto insurance to spread to additional states since 1976, the subject remains of considerable interest, especially the concept of allowing consumers to choose no-fault. No-fault is often viewed as a means of reducing the cost of auto insurance. The policy debate parallels discussion in the early 1970s, when no-fault was commonly advertised as a desirable means of reducing costs. Several states included mandatory premium cuts in their no-fault laws. In addition to reducing costs and helping to make coverage more affordable, proponents of no-fault argue that the substitution of first-party medical coverage for third-party liability coverage is advantageous because it reduces dispute resolution costs and payments for general damages (pain and suffering). No-fault also leads to faster payment for losses. Opponents of no-fault argue that limitations on tort liability lead to more accidents and unfairly benefit negligent drivers. They also question whether no-fault is capable of significantly reducing premiums. The literature on no-fault is massive and goes back at least 60 years. The modern economic literature generally has focused on two issues: whether tort limitations have affected the frequency and severity of accidents and/or claims (e.g., Landes, 1982; Zador and Lund, 1986; and Cummins and Weiss, 1989, 1992) and whether no-fault laws have led to significantly lower premiums (e.g., Smith, 1989; Cummins and Weiss, 1991; Johnson, Flanigan, and Winkler, 1992; also see Carroll et al., 1991).(3) Analyses of the former issue provide only weak evidence that limitations on tort liability have affected accident frequency and severity. Analyses of the effect of no-fault on premiums provide mixed results. Consistent with intuition, the overall results suggest that no-fault laws with weak tort limitations combined with large PIP coverage limits increase costs, but that strong tort limitations can reduce total costs, especially if PIP coverage limits are modest. Thus, no-fault laws have the potential to help control auto insurance costs if strong tort limitations are politically feasible (e.g., Cummins and Tennyson, 1992; Harrington, 1991). This article focuses on a different issue: the decision by state legislatures to enact no-fault laws. The article considers the possible influences of levels and growth rates in insurance costs and the effects of no-fault laws on low-income households, medical care providers, insurers, and attorneys. A probit model of the decision to adopt no-fault from 1971 through 1976 is developed and estimated using cross-state data from 1970.(4) Separate equations are estimated for restrictions on tort liability and the enactment of compulsory PIP coverage. Holding other variables constant, the estimation results suggest: (1) the probability of adopting no-fault was higher in states with more rapid growth in auto liability insurance costs; (2) states with greater numbers of physicians per capita, a measure of the strength of the medical care community, were more likely to adopt no-fault; and (3) states with greater numbers of attorneys per capita were less likely to adopt no-fault laws with restrictions on tort liability. …
01 Jan 1994
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the validity of transfers of monetary estimates from existing studies to value site-specific environmental effects of new fuel cycle investments and found that the transfer of recreation value estimates underestimate the damages to recreation activities.
Abstract: Rational use of energy demands that the market prices incorporate the full marginal social costs of the investment in and utilisation of energy The EC/US study “External costs of fuel cycles”, has developed the impact-pathway damage function approach for monetary valuation of the environmental and health damages of fuel cycles This paper examines the validity of transfers of monetary estimates from existing studies to value site-specific environmental effects of new fuel cycle investments Results from a recent Contingent Valuation study of hydro power development in Norway show that transfer of recreation value estimates underestimate the damages to recreation activities Since there are no protocols for how benefit transfers should be performed, it is recommended that benefit transfers are accompanied by sensitivity analysis in future fuel cycle analyses
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the special challenges which the package holiday poses for the legal system and conclude that developments in the law nationally and internationally on consumer protection, stricter liability, non-excludable warranties, class actions and damages for disappointment will eventually spell the end of the traditional package brochure and force the adoption of more advanced information technology.
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In the process of choosing new generation sources, dirtier technologies are handicapped relative to cleaner technologies through the use of "adders" which are meant to measure damages as mentioned in this paper, but the damage costs are left at the planning stage; they are not included in electricity rates.
Abstract: State public utility commissions are developing programs to reduce emissions from electric generation facilities. Programs call for minimizing the total cost of meeting future demands for power, where pollution damages are part of the total cost. In the process of choosing new generation sources, dirtier technologies are handicapped relative to cleaner technologies through the use of "adders" which are meant to measure damages. However, the damage costs are left at the planning stage; they are not included in electricity rates. This practice coupled with standard rate setting procedures may lead to inferior outcomes.
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present the results of a survey that was mailed to the personnel directors of 200 public and private colleges and universities to assess the use of software piracy policies; the rationale behind the establishment of such policies; and the types, degree, and history of policy enforcement activities.
Abstract: INTRODUCTION The U.S. Trade Representative's office "has estimated losses to U.S. software development due to inadequate copyright protection to be approximately $4.1 billion a year" (United States, 1990:5).(1) The primary reason for this staggering loss is the widespread proliferation of software piracy. One federal agency indicates, that for every legally purchased copy of a computer program, there exists at least one Illegal copy (United States, 1990). The rampant software piracy phenomenon persists despite the passage of a flurry of federal (17 U.S.C. Sections 1-511) and state laws that make the illegal copying of computer software punishable by severe penalties and damage awards. Despite these enunciated legal penalties, many employees continue to make illegal copies of software for both professional and personal use. Unfortunately, many organizations do not know how to respond to the software piracy crisis because copyright is often misunderstood (Franklin, 1989). The purpose of this article is to present the results of a survey that was mailed to the personnel directors of 200 public and private colleges and universities to assess (1) the use of software piracy policies; (2) the rationale behind the establishment of such policies; and (3) the types, degree, and history of policy enforcement activities. Based on the survey results in conjunction with established copyright and employment law, the authors identify organizational benefits (litigation-shielding) and risks (litigation-exposure) that currently exist in the presence of software piracy policy. Additionally, the survey results were tabulated and analyzed in the context of the existing personnel and copyright environment in order to derive recommendations for action on the part of the organization to avert legal disaster. BACKGROUND Previous statutory and case law indicate that an organization (private or public) could be liable for an employee's actions that injure a third party under two primary doctrines: (1) indirectly liable, under the doctrine of respondent superior(2) and (2) directly liable, when third parties are injured by an employee's negligence (Hames, 1988). In order for negligence to be a basis for legal action, four elements must exist (Hames, 1988:788): [T]he employer must owe a legal duty or obligation to conform to a certain standard of conduct in order to protect the third party against reasonable risks; the employer must breach this duty; the breach of this duty must be proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the third party; and the third party must suffer actual losses or damages. Software piracy lawsuits founded on employer negligence hold that employer directly liable due to the employer's breach of the duty to protect the third-party software vendor against illegal software copying. Such a duty might exist when the employer has knowledge that employees are predisposed to copy computer programs illegally and the employer fails to take effective steps to protect the software vendor's copyright. Although it has been conceded that enforcement of copyright infringement against individuals is often too costly to pursue (Wilson, 1984), civil and criminal lawsuits against organizations are on the rise (Straub and Collins, 1990). One of the largest suits, in terms of compensatory and punitive damages being sought, was Louis Development's $10 million suit against Rixon, Inc. for making unauthorized copies of Lotus 1-2-3 and distributing them to its branch offices (Clevenger, 1988). This suit was eventually settled out of court for an undisclosed amount. More recent examples of infringement settlements in which the amounts are known are Parametrix Corporations's $350,000 settlement and Davy McKee Corporation's settlement for $300,000 (Feldman, 1881). This increased vigilance in software copyright enforcement has not ignored the academic community. Public institutions of higher learning became particularly susceptible to such lawsuits by the enactment of the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act on November 15, 1990 (Pub. …
01 Jan 1994
TL;DR: A multiple systems cascade is presented to illustrate how multiple mechanisms could act together to produce a variety of effects of fetal alcohol-induced brain damage.
Abstract: General etiologic categories related to possible mechanisms of fetal alcohol-induced brain damage are explored. Possible general mechanisms include alterations in protein synthesis, prostaglandins, gangliosides, hypoxia and free radical damage. A multiple systems cascade is presented to illustrate how multiple mechanisms could act together to produce a variety of effects.
Posted Content•
TL;DR: This article showed that up-front payments can play a crucial role in providing efficient investment incentives when contracts are incomplete, which can eliminate the overinvestment effect identified by Rogerson [1984] and Shavell [1980] when courts use an expectation damage remedy.
Abstract: This paper shows that up-front payments can play a crucial role in providing efficient investment incentives when contracts are incomplete. They can eliminate the overinvestment effect identified by Rogerson [1984] and Shavell [1980] when courts use an expectation damage remedy. This method extends to complex contracting situations if parties combine up-front payments with what we call 'Cadillac' contracts (contracts for a very high quality or quantity). This combination provides efficient investment incentives in complex contracting problems when an expectation damage remedy is accompanied by a broad duty to mitigate damages. This indicates that an expectation remedy is well-suited to multidimensional, but one-sided, investment problems, in contrast to specific performance, which Edlin and Reichelstein [1993] showed is well-suited to two-sided, but unidimensional, investment problems.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that proportionate liability can provide incentives for auditors to take greater effort than joint and several liability, even though the auditors face a higher level of liability.
Abstract: "An Analysis of Auditor Liability Rules" shows that proportionate liability can provide incentives for auditors to take greater effort than joint and several liability, even though the auditors face a higher level of liability under the joint and several liability regime. The model's contributions are its explicit incorporation of comparative negligence theory in the liability regimes, so that auditors' actions affect their share of damages, and its recognition that joint and several liability differs from proportionate liability only when one defendant is insolvent. The main insight from this representation is that the incentive provided by making auditors' share of the damages depend on their effort (hereafter the "comparative negligence incentive") disappears under joint and several liability when the auditee is insolvent, since then the auditor must pay all the damages, regardless of the action chosen. The paper shows that proportionate liability actually provides more incentive than joint and several liability whenever the "comparative negligence incentive" (which is absent in the joint and several regime) is stronger than the incentive provided by the higher level of liability in the joint and several regime. As a result, auditors choose a lower level of effort under joint and several liability than they would with proportionate liability. This is an important insight to the extent that previous arguments and theories have failed to recognize how incentives depend on the "comparative negligence incentive" as well as the level of liability. By and large, conference discussion focused on three main topics: (1) the modeling strategy adopted, (2) the primary issue in the proportionate
Book•
01 Aug 1994
TL;DR: In 1992, hurricanes Andrew and Iniki devastated portions of Florida, Louisiana, and Hawaii causing over $35 billion in damages and the loss of 38 lives as discussed by the authors, the most costly natural disaster in the history of the U.S. The dollar damages resulting from the Hurricanes of 1992 were six times those caused by Hurricane Hugo in 1989.
Abstract: In 1992, Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki devastated portions of Florida, Louisiana, and Hawaii causing over $35 billion in damages and the loss of 38 lives. Hurricane Andrew, which accounted for $32 billion of the damages, has been called the most costly natural disaster in the history of the U.S.. During the same year, Typhoon Omar caused over $0.5 billion in damages on the U.S. territory of Guam. The dollar damages resulting from the Hurricanes of 1992 were six times those caused by Hurricane Hugo in 1989. These proceedings, Hurricanes of 1992 , contains papers presented at a conference in Miami, Florida, December 1-3, 1993 dealing with Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, and Typhoon Omar. The papers were selected to represent a broad cross-section of interests related to civil engineering and wind storms. Topics presented include: 1) Wind speeds and wind loads; 2) risk assessment; 3) insurance; 4) damage assessment; 5) building codes; 6) building code implementation and enforcement; 7) coastal structures; 8) manufactured, residential, and commercial structures; 9) essential facilities; and 10) lifelines.
Posted Content•
TL;DR: It is not possible to ascertain from the decided cases involving civil rights violations that any fixed standard for measurement of damages has been evolved, and the criteria applied in other tort actions have simply not been used.
Abstract: It is not possible to ascertain from the decided cases involving civil rights violations that any fixed standard for measurement of damages has been evolved, and the criteria applied in other tort actions have simply not been used. It is unfortunate, but perhaps true, that when judges and juries who are not members of minority groups attempt to call upon their own experiences to measure and fix the amount of damages in civil rights cases, not having had a comparable experience, they operate in a vacuum
TL;DR: In this paper, the range and scope of compensatory remedies for breach of the equitable duty of confidence is examined, and the term "damages" is sometimes used generically to describe these remedies which are several and different from one another in certain respects.
Abstract: Protection of confidential information has two main juridical bases, contract and equity. Where the defendant is or was the employee or agent of the plaintiff he may be subject to an express or implied contractual duty not to use the latter’s confidential information without his consent Other defendants who receive such information knowing or believing it to be confidential, either from the plaintiff himself or a thiid party, may be subject to an equitable duty of like kind The purpose of this article is to examine the range and scope of compensatory remedies for breach of the equitable duty of confidence. The term ‘damages’ is sometimes used generically to describe these remedies which are several and different from one another in certain respects? albeit difficult to pinpoint exactly.