Showing papers on "Deterrence theory published in 1988"

The calculus of dissent: An analysis of terrorists' choice of targets

Abstract: This article applies formal modeling to study a terrorist group's choice of whether to attack or not, and, in the case of an attack, which of two potential targets to strike. Each potential target individually takes protective measures that influence the terrorists' perceived success and failure, and, hence, the likelihood of attack. For domestic terrorism, a tendency for potential targets to overdeter is indicated. For transnational terrorism, cases of overdeterrence and underdeterrence are identified. We demonstrate that increased information about terrorists' preferences, acquired by the targets, may exacerbate inefficiency when deterrence efforts are not coordinated. In some cases, perfect information may eliminate the existence of a noncooperative solution.

To Bargain or Not To Bargain: That Is The Question

Abstract: We use economic analysis in a simple game-theory framework to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy. From the government viewpoint, we examine both the choice of deterrence expenditure (i.e., expense meant to reduce terrorist logistical success during incidents) and whether to negotiate or not.

Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation

Abstract: This study builds on earlier work on extended (third-party) immediate deterrence. We analyze fifty-eight cases and summarize previous findings that extended deterrence is likely to succeed when the immediate or short-term balance of forces favors the defender, when any previous crisis involving the same adversaries resulted in stalemate rather than clear victory for either, and when the military and diplomatic bargaining process is characterized by tit-for-tat or firm-but-flexible strategies rather than bullying or appeasement. The long-term balance of forces and the defender's possession of nuclear weapons make little difference. We then focus on cases where deterrence has failed and the defender must make a decision whether to fight. The defender is more likely to fight when the short-term balance of forces favors it, when it is bound to the third party by alliance ties or geographic proximity, and when it has followed a firm-butflexible bargaining strategy during the crisis. Generally, these results emphasize the importance of different interests and perspectives of attackers and defenders. Even clear-sighted vision of its own interests may bring war if a state fails to tread a delicate balance between making credible threats and humiliating its adversary.

Game theory and national security

Abstract: Arms races deterrence winding down star wars optimal threats crisis instability verification national security and war, political scientists and mathematicians.

Coercive Capability in Conflict: A Test of Bilateral Deterrence Versus Conflict Spiral Theory

Abstract: This research investigates how the magnitude of coercive power capability affects the use of punitive tactics in an explicit bargaining context. Two theories offer contradictory predictions for equal and unequal power situations. Bilateral deterrence theory predicts that when actors have equal power, higher levels of coercive capability will reduce the frequency of punitive tactics; conflict spiral theory predicts that higher levels of coercive capability will increase the frequency of punitive tactics. Comparing equal with unequal power relationships, bilateral deterrence predicts further that actors will use more punitive tactics under conditions of unequal power, while conflict spiral predicts that they will use fewer punitive tactics under such conditions. These predictions were tested in a two-party bargaining setting which manipulated the magnitude of coercive power available to actors and which allowed them to exchange offers and administer threats and punishments to one another. The results of two experiments support bilateral deterrence theory and generally contradict conflict spiral theory.

The Origins of the Pacific War

Abstract: The Origins of the Pacific War "Whom the Gods would destroy they first make mad," declared Congressman Hamilton Fish on December 8, I94I, the day after infamy. Minutes before, Franklin D. Roosevelt had asked Congress to declare war on the nation that had just launched the "unprovoked and dastardly" attack on Pearl Harbor, and Fish, an ardent isolationist, rose to support the president's request. "The Japanese," he said, "have gone stark, raving mad, and have, by their unprovoked attack committed military, naval, and national suicide."' Although others did not quote the classics, this madness theme was echoed throughout American newspapers that day: "sublime insanity" declared the New York Times; "the act of a mad dog" the Los Angeles Times announced; "an insane adventure that for fatalistic abandon is unsurpassed in the history of the world" argued the Philadelphia Inquirer. In December 1941, most observers agreed with Winston Churchill's statement that, since American military potential vastly outweighed Japan's, the Tokyo government's decision to go to war was "difficult to reconcile . . . with prudence, or even sanity."2 This belief that the Japanese must have been irrational to attack the United States continues to plague our understanding of the origins of the Pacific War and the lessons that modern strategists draw from that tragic occurrence. In the Pentagon, for example, the events of 1941 have inspired the dominant scenario for nuclear war: a lingering concern that can be described as hormephobia, the fear of shock or surprise, has haunted American strategic planning since Pearl Harbor. The nuclear arsenal of the United States has long been postured to respond promptly to an unlikely, peacetime Soviet surprise nuclear attack. Moreover, the increasing dissatisfaction with the policy of deterrence today can,

A predator-prey model of guerrilla warfare

Abstract: Guerrilla warfare has emerged as one of the principal forms of modern warfare. Mutual deterrence, as achieved by the arms race and arms control, has made nuclear warfare not impossible but at least improb able, the major potential initiator of a nuclear war probably being miscalculation, accident, or escalation rather than premeditation or preemption.1 Traditional large-scale warfare, as in the case of both World Wars, is also improbable in view of potential superpower involvement and fear of escalation. What remains are three pos sibilities. First, there are wars confined to a particular region, and without direct superpower involvement, such as the Arab-Israeli wars, the India-Pakistan wars, the Iran-Iraq war, or the Falklands War. Second, there are civil wars such as those in Nigeria and Chad. Third, there are guerrilla wars, such as those in Malaysia, Vietnam, the Sudan, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Afghanistan. The purpose of this paper is to analyze guerrilla warfare by means of a dynamic model.2 The model suggests specific paths for the evolution of such wars and how such wars might be fought or combatted.

Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam : Ideas and Actions

Abstract: : Ultimately, this study is about a smaller Vietnam War than that which is commonly recalled. It focuses on expectations concerning the impact of air power on the ground war and on some of its actual effects, but it avoids major treatment of some of the most dramatic air actions of the war, such as the bombing of Hanoi. To many who fought the war and believe it ought to have been conducted on a still larger scale or with fewer restraints, this study may seem almost perverse, emphasizing as it does the utility of air power in conducting the conflict as a ground war and without total exploitation of our most awe-inspiring technology. Justifications for such a study may take many forms. The simplest is that air power contributed much to lower level conflict. Allowing for the great importance of strategic deterrence, the United States will still face challenges to its own and its allies' interests at far lower levels of conflict. In the context of these likely problems, the Vietnam experience assumes considerable interest.

Deterrence versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star Wars

Abstract: opponent. Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, are derived in this game and illustrated for three different scenarios involving various postulated relationships between the first-strike and second-strike defenses of the players. Unlike the deterrence model, mutual preemption emerges as an equilibrium in the Star Wars Game, underscoring the problem-particularly if defensive capabilities are unbalanced-that deterrence may be subverted by the development of Star Wars. Ramifications of this model for avoiding preemption and preserving crisis stability, especially in superpower relations, are discussed.

MEND: A Nurturing Voice in The Nuclear Arms Debate

Abstract: While the argument about the meaning of nuclear weapons has been fluid and dynamic for the past forty years, it is fair to say that, at the present time, the prevailing definition of the nuclear situation is “deterrence policy.” Some of the fundamental premises of this doctrine are (1) that the Soviets are an unambiguous and non-negotiable threat to U.S. interests, (2) that Soviet expansionism must be contained, and (3) that nuclear weapons are designed to deter the Soviet Union from launching an attack on the United States or its allies. While the deterrence doctrine has obtained a dominant position, it is not the only voice in the nuclear conversation. In this paper, we report on the efforts of “Mothers Embracing Nuclear Disarmament” (MEND), an anti-nuclear group that is attempting to redefine the nuclear situation and reset the parameters of the conversation. MEND is challenging the techno-strategic assumptions of the deterrence doctrine by employing a nurturing discourse that insists mothers share a universal biological and spiritual bond that cuts across political boundaries. We report on the discourse strategies that MEND employs to gain ownership of the nuclear situation, the responses MEND has engendered from competing voices, and the contradictions that are emerging in the group's discourse. In the process, we counter the passive view of language that has predominated in the study of international relations with an essentially constitutive view of the role language plays in political action.

To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the Question

Abstract: We use economic analysis in a simple game-theory framework to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy. From the government viewpoint, we examine both the choice of deterrence expenditure (i.e., expense meant to reduce terrorist logistical success during incidents) and whether to negotiate or not.

Minimal Nuclear Deterrence

Abstract: This article develops a rational theory of minimal nuclear deterrence: What is the minimal amount of weapons needed to maintain a stable balance of power? By searching for the requirements of minimal nuclear deterrence, we hope to gain a better understanding of how to proceed with arms reduction without compromising the value of deterrence.

Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance

Abstract: Introduction Background: Ballistic Missile Defense and Alliance Security Reassessments of Soviet Strategic Defense 1. Soviet BMD Capabilities and Activities Before the ABM Treaty Since the ABM Treaty Overall Soviet BMD Prospects 2. Interpretations of Soviet Behavior "Arms Race" Interactions Bureaucratic Politics A Composite Hypothesis Approval of the ABM Treaty Military Doctrine Force Posture Trends Interpretations and inferences 3. Implications for the Western Alliance Soviet Strategic Priorities Potential Consequences in War Potential Consequences in Peace 4. Soviet Arms Control Diplomacy and the Unlikely Prospect of Breakout Incentives and Inhibitions Regarding Breakout The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative in Soviet Eyes Soviet Arms Control Policy 5. Alliance Reactions: Arms Control and Deterrence Grounds for Western Consensus Continuing Arms Control Efforts Force Posture Improvements Maintaining Stable Deterrence and Alliance Security Notes Index

Intercultural communication between Israel and Egypt: deterrence failure before the Six-Day War

Abstract: Can cultural differences between states affect the chances of success of deterrence strategy? If so, what differences are relevant and how do they influence outcomes? The following paper seeks to suggest some answers to these questions in the context of a discussion of the crisis that preceded the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Different cultures, we learn from the anthropologist, may perceive the world and man's place in the order of things in utterly incommensurate ways. Fundamental concepts like space and time are grasped differently. Values and therefore goals may clash. Tools of communication, both linguistic and non-verbal, vary widely. Further more, members of contrasting cultures are conditioned to behave differently in the whole possible range of human interactions, from meeting and parting to bargaining and resolving conflict. Culture?that inbuilt system of thought, perception, belief and expectation of right conduct shared by a community?is taken in by the indi vidual with his mother's milk and during the long years of childhood. Socialization, an ugly, but apt word, well describes that extended process of learning, formal and informal, by which a society slips the mantle of its way of life over its members. Culture permeates our behaviour and relationships without our necessarily being aware of it. Indeed the profounder an influence, the more likely it is to be taken for granted. In contacts across cultures, therefore, obstacles can arise to harmonious relations and unfettered understanding because of the working of incompatible assumptions which participants are oblivious to and quite unable to overcome. Mis comprehension may arise not simply from unfamiliarity with strange words and gestures but because of the clash of underlying conceptions. In recent years a lively literature has begun to appear which addresses some of the practical problems of communication faced in intercultural contexts, whether by physicians, psychiatrists, social workers or managers of multinational companies. How is one to diagnose an illness when patients from different cultures present their symptoms differently? How is production to be organized in a society without any

Geographers and Nuclear War: Why We Lack Influence on Public Policy

Abstract: Issues of nuclear war and deterrence are inherently geographical, yet our disciplinary literature is either silent on the subject or poorly focused. The result is very little impact on public policy. Through a review of this literature, seven potential research areas are identified: peace education and professional responsibility, environmental effects of nuclear war, post-nuclear landscapes, emergency management, peace movements, societal transformations based on nuclear war preparation, and cartography. I suggest that there are two reasons why the discipline's contribution to the public policy debates on this issue has been so small: the lack of a comprehensive geographic theory to explain the impact of nuclear war and the fragmentation of the discipline. Geography's greatest strength is its ability to focus on a wide range of interdisciplinary theories and analytical techniques and apply these to the understanding of specific regions or areas. Concentrating on the effects of nuclear war and wa...

Fateful Visions: Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe

Abstract: In the nuclear age, how can we create a safer world. Can we lessen the threat of nuclear war by renouncing our thirty-year policy of deterrence as peacekeeper. And if we can't, what is the long-term future of deterrence. In the post-Reykjavik political climate, where the potential for major changes in superpower relations calls for a thorough reexamination of deterrence, numerous ''alternative worlds'' have been advocated as blueprints for reducing or eliminating the risks of nuclear war. This book examines ten of the most influential alternatives - ranging from the adoption of new defense technologies to unilateral disarmament and world federalism. Each proposal is analyzed in terms of five variables: the structure of the international system; the process of international interaction; the domestic politics of the nations involved; nuclear technology; and nonnuclear technology.

The Elusive Consensus

Abstract: The prospects for realizing dramatic improvements in NATO’s conventional capabilities do not appear auspicious from the perspective of enduring political and emerging economic and demographic trends. The main issues in the contempoary conventional defence debate echo concerns first heard 20 years ago. As in the past, there is little interest on either side of the Atlantic in expanding the size of conventional forces, and the dwindling manpower pool may preclude such a move, yet adding more brigades to Allied armies would be one of the best ways to improve conventional deterrence. Restraints on governmental spending throughout the Alliance will almost certainly limit the amount of resources available for military improvements, and will require difficult trade-offs to be made in formulating defence budgets. In developing its conventional defences, the Alliance will also have to confront new challenges from the Warsaw Pact on both the political and military fronts. While the East will also have to cope with resource constraints and demographic changes, Warsaw Pact military forces are likely at least to keep pace with NATO in their sophistication, effectiveness and size.

A blueprint for radical weapons cuts

Abstract: Deterrence has prevented the use of nuclear weapons so far, and this will continue to be necessary until someone identifies a path to the elimination of these weapons and persuades the nuclear powers to take that path. Mr. Garvin feels there is, however, an interim goal: to replace the 50,000 existing nuclear weapons with 1000 long-range, strategic weapons in the US armory, a similar number for the Soviet Union, and perhaps 200 each for Great Britain, France, and China. An appropriate plan for US weapons he notes, would be to base 400 warheads in the form of single-warhead small ICBMs in soft (vulnerable) silos; 400 warheads divided among 50 small submarines, each carrying eight small single-warhead SLBMs; and 200 warheads carried on 100 aircraft as air-launched cruise missiles, two per aircraft. Each warhead, including the reentry vehicles for a strategic ballistic missile, could weigh no more than 300 kilograms; the warhead maximum yield would be held by the weight limit to about half a megaton. Any lower yield would be permitted, including the impossibility of variable-yield weapons, such as exist at least in the US inventory. The reduction of British, French, and Chinese weapons - to judge by the announcedmore » plans of the first two nations - is clearly necessary if the superpowers are to undertake the proposed 95% reductions. 2 references« less

Arms races and the opportunity for peace

Abstract: We model the evolution of international conflict as a game of sequential decisions and show that arms races are neither necessary nor sufficient for peace or war. Peaceful intentions are not adequate to insure peace, even when both rivals wish to avoid violence. Peaceful intentions together with complete information are sufficient for peace. A preference for forcefully pursuing foreign policy goals also is not sufficient to preclude the peaceful resolution of disputes, and this is true even if there is complete information. In some circumstances, the absence of an arms race can precipitate violence, even giving the military advantage to a nation that unilaterally stopped getting ready for a war it would initiate. Finally, we also show that empirical research is likely to be biased in favor of the hypothesis that deterrence leads to peace.

Mad Dogs and Englishmen: British Rearmament, Deterrence, and Appeasement, 1934-35:

Abstract: Historical accounts of appeasement have underestimated the British government's attempts to develop a comprehensive strategy of deterrence, one that resembles recent theories of conventional deterrence. The decisions of 1934-35 to increase British armaments were based on these assumptions: that appeasement and military deterrence were compatible in a dual policy of conciliating and confining Germany and Japan; that the attainment of adequate levels of peacetime strength constituted the best deterrent, although the simultaneous demonstration of force and the will to rearm might restrain the dictators. While British defense policy had not anticipated the possibility of conflict with Italy, the British used a show of force in the Mediterranean in 1935 both to protect their interests and to support the League of Nations against Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. The failure either to prevent or to limit Italian aggression in this crisis convinced most British policymakers that threatening force before completing r...

Extended Deterrence with Nuclear Weapons: How Necessary, How Acceptable?

Abstract: Most policy and normative problems with nuclear weaponry arise in the context of extended deterrence; that is, deterrence of attacks on friends or allies of a nuclear power. This article reviews the history and contradictions of post-World War II Western extended deterrent strategy, considers the sources of differences and similarities in the perspectives of the American and West German Catholic bishops on these matters, presents a logical schema of types of deterrent situations, discusses some systematic historical evidence that suggests the utility of nuclear weapons for many of these situations is often exaggerated, and, after reviewing alternative strategies, suggests a role for a very limited “countercombatant” nuclear strategy.

Nuclear Strategizing: Deterrence and Reality

Abstract: Nuclear Strategizing Strategy and Control in the Nuclear Age Nuclear Scientism and Nuclear Strategism Deterrence, Rationality, and Nuclear Weapons De-Escalation and War Termination Missile Defense: Rationality or Escapism Deterrence Rationality and Political Consistency Expected and Unexpected Wars Nuclear Surprise Arms Conrol and U.S. Nuclear Strategy Force and Policy in the Nuclear Age

The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars: The Origins of World War II in Europe: British Deterrence Failure and German Expansionism

Abstract: The Origins of World War II in Europe: British Deterrence Failure and German Expansionism Explanations of the origins of World War II tend to emphasize either deliberate, if failed, choices or inexorable processes. The first view indicts Adolf Hitler's aggrandizing choices and preference for violence, and questions the judgment and strategy of the appeasers, personified, correctly or not, by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. The second view broadens the focus, pointing to secular changes in relative power between states; to the relation between states' commitments and their ability to uphold and protect them; and to domestic, economic, and cultural dynamics that individually, or in combination, predisposed the situation to conflict. Attention to both dimensions is necessary to appreciate Britain's strategy as the central axis of diplomacy and rivalry with Germany in the 1930s and to distill the "lessons" of the origins of the war.

Extended Deterrence, No First Use, and European Security

Abstract: The extension in extended deterrence occurs in two dimensions: the extension of nuclear deterrence to cover threats to one’s allies as well as to one’s own country; and its extension to cover non-nuclear as well as nuclear threats. This paper focuses mainly on the second of these dimensions — that is, on the idea that threatening to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack is a legitimate and effective means of deterring such attacks.

Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe

Abstract: This book is covering the following topics; Nuclear weapons in Europe: Tactical and intermediate-range weapons; no first use of nuclear weapons in Europe; Alternatives to nucleus deterrence in Europe; Crisis management and war avoidance in Europe; Conventional arms, arms control, and the nuclear threshold to domestic political context.

Trust, Deterrence, Realism, and Nuclear Omnicide

Abstract: The antagonism between the two major nuclear powers is a continuing cause of concern. This is especially so since possession of the bomb no longer serves as a deterrent to one's antagonist. Now there is fear of the 'first strike" and the pressure to forestall it by possessing the power to strike before the enemy can. The United States stresses the need to develop a defensive screen behind which the U.S.S.R. can only surmise that it could be attacked with impunity. It then sees no alternative but to escalate its weaponry to overcome any such advantage. The obvious end result is a further destabilized world which is brought closer to nuclear annihilation. It is incorrect now to speak of a nuclear exchange as "a war. " The destruction would be so complete that there could be no victor and no opportunity for recovery in any foreseeable time period. In fact, an exchange of but 6,000 nuclear bombs could all but destroy the universe. The destruction of life would be so thorough that only the term "nuclear omnicide" would be applicable. The fact that no amount of effort seems to deflect the major powers from their course is patently unrealistic. In both countries, but mainly in the United States, there are those in places of influence who intentionally generate distrust among the public by various techniques. It is this distrust which permitted "deterrence" to seem to make sense, which has forestalled a more realistic approach and which has made omnicide an acceptable risk. This paper stresses most particularly that trust is the key to a solution of our dilemma. Without trust we are bound to stumble on without success. We must find techniques and means of generating trust among the mass of people to counteract the constant encouragement of distrust and to expose the methods by which distrust is promoted.

Deterrent Intentions Revisited

Abstract: There is a venerable argument for the immorality of nuclear deterrence which first gained philosophical prominence in the early 1960s, was sustained subsequently by a number of writers, and has figured in various more public objections to deterrence.1 In what follows I examine and reject a recent influential critique of it. The argument belongs to a class of moral considerations that I call "internalist" because they address themselves to the character of the agent and the character of his act rather than to more extrinsic issues of the longer term consequences of what is done or contemplated.2 The internalist argument raises an objection to the intention which it finds embodied in deterrent policy. It asks what our policies commit us to doing in the event of deterrence failure and answers that we now conditionally intend the violation of the deepest moral constraints of just war theory, namely, those of noncombatant immunity and proportionality. The argument then characterizes this intention as seriously immoral by appeal to what has been called the "wrongful intentions principle" (hereafter, WIP), which plausibly holds that if it is wrong to do X it is wrong to intend it.3 Hence nuclear deterrence is seriously immoral. There are a variety of critical reactions to the argument which I shall not consider here, such as the objection that states cannot properly

Are nuclear and nonnuclear war related

Abstract: : Report analyzes relationship of nuclear and non-nuclear warfare during the actual conduct of a war in either the conventional or nuclear stage and the relationship relative to deterrence and strategy.