Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 2006"

The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment Testing Three Principles of Harm

Abstract: Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not.

Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong

Abstract: Scholars have long argued that moral judgements arise from rational deliberations about what society determines is right and wrong. This has generated the idea that our moral psychology is founded on cultural experience. In the revolutionary MORAL MINDS, Marc Hauser challenges these concepts, showing that this view is illusory and arguing instead that humans have evolved a 'moral instinct', a universal feature of the human mind rather than one informed by gender, education or religion. Combining his own cutting-edge research with cognitive psychology, linguistics, evolutionary biology and economics, Hauser examines his groundbreaking theory in terms of bioethics, religion and law, as well as our everyday lives.

Manipulations of Emotional Context Shape Moral Judgment

Abstract: Recent work in psychology and neuroscience has revealed that moral judgments are often mediated by two classes of brain processes (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). One class, probably reflecting earlier evolutionary development, consists of processes that automatically alter hedonic states in response to specific types of socially relevant stimuli. A second class consists of more domain-general, effortful processes that underlie abilities for abstract reasoning, simulation, and cognitive control. Often, these intuitive and deliberative processes work in unison to foster decisions in accord with the goals of both; goals that are socially adaptive are often congruent with more abstract moral principles. Certain classes of ethical dilemmas, however, require decisions in which the competition between these two systems becomes evident (Greene et al., 2001, 2004). The structure of such dilemmas often requires endorsing a personal moral violation in order to uphold a utilitarian principle. The well-known footbridge dilemma is illustrative. In it, the lives of five people can be saved through sacrificing another. However, the sacrifice involves pushing a rather large man off a footbridge to stop a runaway trolley before it kills the other five. The vast majority of individuals believe it wrong to push him, even though not pushing him will result in a greater number of deaths (Greene et al., 2004; Thomson, 1986). The reason for this seemingly illogical response stems from competition between the emotionally intuitive and deliberative systems. Neuroimaging has revealed that such dilemmas produce increased activation in emotion-related brain centers, as well as in centers normally used for deliberative reasoning; considering personal moral violations, such as inflicting direct harm, elicits prepotent negative reactions that appear designed to inhibit amoral acts (Greene et al., 2001). The infrequent selection of the logically appropriate option in such dilemmas is associated with heightened activation of deliberative centers aimed at cognitive control, suggesting that the automatic negative reaction must be disregarded if a utilitarian judgment is to bemade (Greene et al., 2004). Given these findings, one might expect that the ultimate arbiter of ethical choice for such dilemmas would reside in individuals’ abilities and motivations to engage in controlled analysis. However, the proposed dual-process model of moral judgment suggests another unexamined route by which choice might be influenced: contextual sensitivity of affect. Affective states stand as momentary informational signals regarding the environment and are multiply determined (Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Consequently, environmental factors separate from any potential moral violations might influence affect at the time of judgment. A close temporal contiguity of such affectively stochastic events and the stable negative emotion stemming from a dilemmamight unhinge the direct relation between a dilemmaspecific prepotent emotional response and choice. Simply put, environment-induced feelings of positivity at the time of judgment might reduce the perceived negativity, or aversion ‘‘signal,’’ of any potential moral violation and, thereby, increase utilitarian responding.

Social cognition and moral cognition in bullying: What's wrong?

Abstract: Two different models have been proposed that describe the bully alternatively as a child lacking in social skills [Crick and Dodge, 1994], or as a cold manipulative individual, who leads gangs to achieve personal goals [Sutton et al., 1999a]. The present study examined the performance of 204 8–11-year-olds in a set of stories that assessed understanding of cognitions and emotions, in relation to their Participant Role in bullying. Moreover, children's understanding of moral emotions and proneness to moral disengagement was assessed. Victims showed some difficulties in the social cognition task, whereas bullies did not. Aggressive children, instead, were found to be more ready to show moral disengagement mechanisms, whereas defenders showed higher levels of moral sensibility. Results are discussed in relation to the two models, and the need for further research into empathy and moral cognition of children involved in bullying episodes is highlighted. Aggr. Behav. 32:528–539, 2006. © 2006 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Moral awareness and ethical predispositions: investigating the role of individual differences in the recognition of moral issues.

Abstract: The impact of the role of individual ethical predispositions, preferences for utilitarian and formalistic ideals, on managerial moral awareness was examined in 2 studies. Results suggested that a manager's ethical predispositions influence his or her responses to the characteristics of the moral issue. Both utilitarianism and formalism shaped moral awareness, but formalism demonstrated a greater capacity to do so in that formalists recognized both harm and the violation of a behavioral norm as indicators of the moral issue, whereas utilitarians responded only to harm. These findings provide support for the basic arguments underlying theories of moral development and offer several implications for the study and practice of moral awareness in organizations.

Moral education and character education: their relationship and roles in citizenship education

Abstract: Any democratic society must concern itself with the socialization of its citizens. This begins in childhood, and schools are critical to this process. The interrelations and roles of educating for character (character education, moral education) and educating for citizenship (citizenship education, civic education) are explored, largely in a North American context. It is argued that citizenship education necessarily entails character and moral formation, but this integration is hindered by negative stereotyping between the two fields. In addition, negative stereotyping between the fields of moral education and character education further complicates attempts at synthesis. Through explorations of each of these domains and their similarities and differences, it is concluded that the role of schools in fostering the development of moral citizens in democratic societies necessitates focus on moral development, broader moral and related character development, teaching of civics and development of citizenship s...

The emotional basis of moral judgments

Abstract: Recent work in cognitive science provides overwhelming evidence for a link between emotion and moral judgment. I review findings from psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and research on psychopathology and conclude that emotions are not merely correlated with moral judgments but they are also, in some sense, both necessary and sufficient. I then use these findings along with some anthropological observations to support several philosophical theories: first, I argue that sentimentalism is true: to judge that something is wrong is to have a sentiment of disapprobation towards it. Second, I argue that moral facts are response-dependent: the bad just is that which cases disapprobation in a community of moralizers. Third, I argue that a form of motivational internalism is true: ordinary moral judgments are intrinsically motivating, and all non-motivating moral judgments are parasitic on these.

Virtue in Organizations: Moral Identity as a Foundation for Moral Agency

Abstract: Framing issues of organizational ethics in terms of virtues and moral agency (rather than in terms of rules and ethical behavior) has implications for the way social science addresses matters of morality in organizations. In particular, attending to matters of virtue and moral agency directs attention to the moral identity, or self-concept, of persons, and to the circumstances that influence self-identity. This article develops parallels between philosophical theories of virtue and the concept of moral identity as developed in social cognitive identity theory. Explicating notions of virtue and moral agency in terms of social cognitive identity theory, in turn, helps direct attention to a range of factors—including both organizational and extraorganizational, macro-cultural ones—that can foster or inhibit moral agency in organizations.

Identity, Reasoning, and Emotion: An Empirical Comparison of Three Sources of Moral Motivation

Abstract: Prior research on moral motivation has primarily emphasized moral reasoning and moral emotion; however, identity may also play an important role. Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to examine the relative importance of prosocial identity, prosocial moral reasoning, and empathy in predicting prosocial behavior. The sample included 91 university students, ages 19–35 years (M=21.89; SD=3.01; 80% European American; 65% female). Prosocial identity and empathy, but not prosocial moral reasoning, were positively associated with overall prosocial behavior. Exploratory analyses examined how these three sources of prosocial motivation differentially related to six forms of prosocial behavior. Results suggest the importance of considering the roles of all three sources of moral motivation.

A Framework for the Psychology of Norms

Abstract: Humans are unique in the animal world in the extent to which their day-to-day behavior is governed by a complex set of rules and principles commonly called norms. Norms delimit the bounds of proper behavior in a host of domains, providing an invisible web of normative structure embracing virtually all aspects of social life. People also find many norms to be deeply meaningful. Norms give rise to powerful subjective feelings that, in the view of many, are an important part of what it is to be a human agent. Despite the vital role of norms in human lives and human behavior, and the central role they play in explanations in the social sciences, there has been very little systematic attention devoted to norms in cognitive science. Much existing research is partial and piecemeal, making it difficult to know how individual findings cohere into a comprehensive picture. Our goal in this essay is to offer an account of the psychological mechanisms and processes underlying norms that integrates what is known and can serve as a framework for future research.

Exploring the psychological underpinnings of the moral mandate effect: motivated reasoning, group differentiation, or anger?

Abstract: When people have strong moral convictions about outcomes, their judgments of both outcome and procedural fairness become driven more by whether outcomes support or oppose their moral mandates than by whether procedures are proper or improper (the moral mandate effect). Two studies tested 3 explanations for the moral mandate effect. In particular, people with moral mandates may (a) have a greater motivation to seek out procedural flaws when outcomes fail to support their moral point of view (the motivated reasoning hypothesis), (b) be influenced by in-group distributive biases as a result of identifying with parties that share rather than oppose their moral point of view (the group differentiation hypothesis), or (c) react with anger when outcomes are inconsistent with their moral point of view, which, in turn, colors perceptions of both outcomes and procedures (the anger hypothesis). Results support the anger hypothesis.

Making a Difference with a Discrete Course on Accounting Ethics

Abstract: Calls for the expansion of ethics education in the business and accounting curricula have resulted in a variety of interventions including additional material on ethical cases, the code of conduct, and the development of new courses devoted to ethical development [Lampe, J.: 1996]. The issue of whether ethics should be taught has been addressed by many authors [see for example: Hanson, K. O.: 1987; Huss, H. F. and D. M. Patterson: 1993; Jones, T. M.: 1988–1989; Kerr, D. S. and L. M. Smith: 1995; Loeb, S. E.: 1988; McDonald, G. M. and G. D. Donleavy: 1995]. The question addressed in this paper is not whether ethics should be taught but whether accounting students can reason more ethically after an intervention based on a discrete and dedicated course on accounting ethics. The findings in this paper indicate that a discrete intervention emphasising dilemma discussion has a positive and significant effect on students’ moral reasoning and development. The data collected from interviews suggest that the salient influences on moral judgement development include: learning theories of ethics particularly Kohlberg’s theory of cognitive moral reasoning and development; peer learning; and moral discourse. The implications from the findings in this study suggest that moral reasoning is responsive to particular types of ethics intervention and educators should carefully plan their attempts to foster moral judgement development.

Bad apples in bad barrels revisited: Cognitive moral development, just world beliefs, rewards, and ethical decision-making

Abstract: In this study, we test the interactive effect on ethical decision-making of (1) personal characteristics, and (2) personal expectancies based on perceptions of organizational rewards and punishments. Personal characteristics studied were cognitive moral development and belief in a just world. Using an in-basket simulation, we found that exposure to reward system information influenced managers' outcome expectancies. Further, outcome expectancies and belief in a just world interacted with managers' cognitive moral development to influence managers' ethical decision-making. In particular, low-cognitive moral development managers who expected that their organization condoned unethical behavior made less ethical decisions while high cognitive moral development managers became more ethical in this environment. Low cognitive moral development managers also behaved less ethically when their belief in a just world was high.

Moral reckoning in nursing.

Abstract: Analysis of qualitative data resulted in an original substantive grounded theory of moral reckoning in nursing, a three-stage process. After a novice period, the nurse experiences a stage of ease in which there is comfort in the workplace and congruence of internal and external values. Unexpectedly, a situational bind occurs in which the nurse's core beliefs come into irreconcilable conflict with external forces. This compels the nurse into the stage of resolution, in which he or she either gives up or makes a stand. The nurse then moves into the stage of reflection in which he or she lives with the consequences and iteratively examines beliefs, values, and actions. The nurse tries to make sense of experiences through remembering, telling the story, and examining conflicts. This study sets the stage for further investigation of moral distress. The theory of moral reckoning challenges nurses to tell their stories, examine conflicts, and participate as partners in moral decision making.

An examination of the relationship between ethical work climate and moral awareness

Abstract: This paper draws from the fields of history, sociology, psychology, moral philosophy, and organizational theory to establish a theoretical connection between a social/organizational influence (ethical work climate) and an individual cognitive element of moral behavior (moral awareness). The research was designed to help to fill a gap in the existing literature by providing empirical evidence of the connection between organizational influences and individual moral awareness and subsequent ethical choices, which has heretofore largely been merely assumed. Results of the study provide evidence that ethical work climate (EWC) is a primary predictor of individual moral awareness, and that the influence of social factors often overrides the effects of individual differences in a work group setting. Implications for future research are provided.

Self-Control, Moral Beliefs, and Criminal Activity

Abstract: Criminologists have paid close but independent attention to the role of self-control and moral beliefs in shaping criminal/deviant activity This line of research suggests that (low) self-control relates to antisocial behavior while (high) moral beliefs inhibits it There is good reason to believe, however, that moral beliefs moderate the relationship between self-control and antisocial behavior such that under conditions of high moral beliefs, low self-control does not relate to crime while under conditions of low moral beliefs it does Using data collected from over 300 young adults, we assess this moderation hypothesis with two distinct crimes, one instrumental, the other expressive/retaliatory With one exception, our results provide good support for this moderation hypothesis Future theoretical and research directions are noted

Adolescents' self‐attributed moral emotions following a moral transgression: Relations with delinquency, confidence in moral judgment and age

Abstract: The study investigates adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions following a moral transgression by expanding research with children on the happy-victimizer phenomenon. In a sample of 200 German adolescents from Grades 7, 9, 11, and 13 (M = 16.18 years, SD = 2.41), participants were confronted with various scenarios describing different moral rule violations and asked to judge the behaviour from a moral point of view. Subsequently, participants' strength of self-evaluative emotional reactions was assessed as they were asked to imagine that they had committed the moral transgression by themselves. Results indicate that the intensity of self-attributed moral emotions predicted adolescents' self-reported delinquent behaviour even when social desirability response bias was controlled. Further, as adolescents' metacognitive understanding of moral beliefs developed, self-attributed moral emotions and confidence in moral judgment became more closely associated. No general age-related change in adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions was found. Overall, the study provides evidence for a coordination process of moral judgment and moral emotion attributions that continues well beyond childhood and that corresponds with the more general notion of the formation of a moral self in adolescence.

The moral roots of citizenship: reconciling principle and character in citizenship education

Abstract: It seems often to have been thought that we need to make some kind of theoretical and/or practical choice between (liberal) moral, social and political conceptions of social order and citizenship focused on principles (rights and/or duties) and (communitarian or other) perspectives focused on virtue and character. This essay argues that no such tensions arise on a more universalistic virtue ethical conception of moral formation divorced from communitarian or other attachment to politics of local identity. In the course of making this claim, the paper argues that: (i) no account of social and moral responsibility – and hence of citizenship – could be given in terms of rights alone; (ii) virtue ethics, properly construed, is far from eschewing reference to general principles; (iii) an ethics of virtuous character can be conceived independently of communitarian or other social constructivist perspectives on the source of moral virtues and values. The paper concludes with an exploration of some implications o...

How players manage moral concerns to make video game violence enjoyable

Abstract: Research on video game violence has focused on the impact of aggression, but has so far neglected the processes and mechanisms underlying the enjoyment of video game violence. The present contribution examines a specific process in this context, namely players' strategies to cope with moral concern that would (in real-life settings) arise from violent actions. Based on Bandura's (2002) theory of moral disengagement, we argue that in order to maintain their enjoyment of game violence, players find effective strategies to avoid or cope with the moral conflict related to their violent behaviors in the game world ('moral management'). Exploratory interviews with ten players of violent video games revealed some relevance of moral reasoning to their game enjoyment, and several strategies that help players to 'manage' moral concern. Most importantly, respondents referred to the game-reality distinction and their focus on winning the game when explaining how violent action is a by-product of good performance. Findings are discussed in light of further theorizing on 'moral management' and potential links to the media violence debate.

Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise

Abstract: We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms.

Conceptual Framework Underlying the Development of a Positive Youth Development Program in Hong Kong

Abstract: The conceptual framework governing the development of a positive youth development program in Hong Kong is outlined. Scientific literature on the positive youth development approach, including the argument for paradigm shift from psychopathology to positive youth development, ecological assets, thriving, spirituality, engagement, connectedness, and positive youth development constructs commonly used in youth programs, is reviewed. Based on positive youth development constructs derived from the successful programs, 15 constructs were adopted in the Project P.A.T.H.S. These included bonding, resilience, cognitive competence, social competence, emotional competence, behavioral competence, moral competence, self-determination, self-efficacy, clear and positive identity, spirituality, beliefs in the future, prosocial norms, prosocial involvement, and recognition for positive behavior.

Defining features of moral sensitivity and moral motivation: pathways to moral reasoning in medical students

Abstract: Kohlberg's theory of moral development explores the roles of cognition and emotion but focuses primarily on cognition. Contemporary post‐formal theories lead to the conclusion that skills resulting from cognitive‐affective integration facilitate consistency between moral judgement and moral behaviour. Rest's four‐component model of moral development delineates these skills specifically. The components, moral motivation, moral sensitivity, moral reasoning and moral character, operate as multidimensional processes that facilitate moral development and subsequently promote moral behaviour. The relationships between these components have been relatively unexplored, thereby missing the opportunity to unpack the processes underlying moral growth and development. In this study, moral motivation (spirituality), moral sensitivity (post‐formal skills) and moral reasoning are operationalized to examine the mediational effects of moral sensitivity of medical students. In the complex moral environment of medical stude...

Using dimensions of moral intensity to predict ethical decision-making in accounting

Abstract: Many ethical decisions are based on the intensity of the moral conflict. Embezzling large sums of money is seen as more unethical, by most people, than stealing a pen or a piece of paper from one's workplace. This study examines the importance of the underlying characteristics of moral issues and how they directly affect accounting students' ethical decision-making process (moral sensitivity, moral judgment and moral intentions). A four stage model presented by Rest (1986) and expanded by Jones' (1991) was used to measure the moral decision-making process. The study highlights the results of a sample of 110 accounting majors in a small business college in the USA. The research suggests that moral intensity appeared to have two dimensions: “perceived corporate concern” and “perceived involvement effect”. These dimensions did not significantly predict moral sensitivity. However, when they were combined with moral sensitivity they did significantly predict the students' moral judgment. Likewise, mor...

Moral Functioning as Mediated Action.

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that it is quite useful, both theoretically and empirically, to adopt a socio‐cultural approach to the study of moral development. This entails viewing ‘moral functioning’ as a form of mediated action, and moral development as the process by which persons gradually appropriate a variety of ‘moral mediational means’. Mediated action entails two central elements: an ‘agent’, the person who is doing the acting, on the one hand, and ‘cultural tools’ or ‘mediational means’, the tools, means, or ‘instruments’, appropriated from the culture, and used by the agent to accomplish a given action, on the other. I make this argument drawing on recent work in socio‐cultural psychology, specifically the work of James Wertsch (1998). I also consider the work of both Carol Gilligan (1982) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1981, 1984) as illustrative examples, to show how their respective insights about moral functioning and the process of moral development can be interpreted from, and enriched by, a mediated a...

The Creativity of Everyday Moral Reasoning: Empathy, Disgust, and Moral Persuasion

Abstract: At first glance, morality has nothing in common with creativity. It has long been clear to many philosophers that moral judgment (at least the right kind of moral judgment) is achieved through the careful and consistent application of moral principles. This approach is grounded in a school of thought that has long dominated the study of ethics – one that sees reason as the only proper foundation for moral judgment. In the 20th century, this tradition deeply influenced the study of moral judgment within psychology. The most influential theories of moral development in children, for instance, saw the development of moral judgment as being largely contingent upon the development of cognitive skills – as the quality of reasoning improves, so does the quality of moral judgment. If one holds an exclusively reason-based view of moral judgment, then creativity applies to moral judgment as much as it does to simple arithmetic – not at all. This is because creativity is not rule based, but rule breaking. Creativity is about flexibility and innovation. Creative thinking demonstrates fluency, flexibility, and originality (Torrance, 1959). It is a type of problem solving characterized by its use of novel solutions (Newell, Simon, & Shaw, 1958). If moral reasoning entails the strict application of rules, creativity has nothing to do with it. So why then would a volume devoted to creativity and reasoning include a contribution on moral reasoning? The answer is plain – mounting evidence suggests that an exclusively reason-based view of moral judgment is wrong as a psychological theory. Not because people do not reason at all when they make moral judgments (they most likely reason a great deal; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003), but because other processes are at work as well. There is evidence that everyday moral judgment is a much less rigid, more emotional, and more flexible process than previously described (for reviews, see Haidt, 2001; Pizarro, 2000). As such, there is much more room for creativity in everyday moral judgment than most psychological theories of morality have assumed.