Georgetown University Law Center

About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Public health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.

A Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax Can Be Structured to Comply with World Trade Organization Rules

Abstract: This paper briefly outlines alternative approaches to enacting a destination-based cash flow tax that are more clearly compatible with the World Trade Organization rules than the approach that has previously been described in the literature. The first structural alternative involves expanding the universe of businesses subject to the tax by clearly defining both the base of the new U.S. business tax and its tax nexus requirement as domestic consumption, and thereafter treating foreign importers and other sellers equivalently, rather than imposing a deduction disallowance or an import tax. The second alternative involves adopting a business activities tax, and then enacting a business-level incentive for encouraging employment that is as a legal matter separate from the tax. Either approach avoids the key World Trade Organization concerns.

Lex: A Study on Medieval Terminology for Religion

Abstract: Medieval Christian authors frequently employ the Latin word lex and its vernacular cognates to mean something akin to the modern notion of “religion.” Like a religion, a lex was the collection of observances that marked a particular people-group, such as Christians or Muslims. This article examines the category of lex in its historical context revealing both its similarities and differences from modern “religion.” It will argue that the category of lex was inseparable from larger Christian ideas about society, human nature, and political order. A revised version of this working paper was later published in the Journal of Religious History 42 (2019)

Future Oversight of Recombinant DNA Research: Recommendations of an Institute of Medicine Committee

Abstract: The National Institutes of Health (NIH) established the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) in 1974 in response to public concerns about the safety of manipulating genetic material through recombinant DNA. The accumulation of 40 years of experience with gene transfer research has led to a better understanding of the risks. Yet, as gene transfer research has matured, the complexity of the overall regulatory environment has remained. Gene transfer research continues to be subjected to multiple layers of review: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), institutional review boards, institutional biosafety committees, and the RAC. It is within the context of overlapping regulatory authority and improved scientific understanding and social acceptance that the NIH commissioned the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to assess whether gene transfer research continues to warrant additional oversight.The overarching goal of the IOM was to ensure patient safety and the ethical conduct of research, while not subjecting scientists to unnecessary regulatory burdens, which can impede or delay scientific exploration and medical innovation. The IOM Committee recommended that the RAC should review individual protocols only if other regulatory authorities could not adequately do so, and the study meets one of the following criteria: (1) the protocol uses a new vector, genetic material, or delivery methodology representing a first-in-human experience; (2) the protocol relies on preclinical safety data obtained using a new preclinical model system of unknown and unconfirmed value; or (3) the protocol involves a vector, gene construct, or method of delivery associated with possible toxicities that are not widely known.Gene transfer research no longer stands alone as the only human application of an emerging technology that could benefit from additional oversight. Consequently, the IOM Committee recommended that the NIH Director charge a standing or new committee to examine the need for additional or different oversight for clinical applications of emerging novel technologies.

Can a Good Person be a Good Prosecutor in 2018

Abstract: Revisiting the question posed by Abbe Smith in 2001: Can one simultaneously be a good person and a good prosecutor?

Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia

Abstract: This article argues that conflicting analytical strains run through the Supreme Court's recent majority opinions in the area of state sovereign immunity. The "supremacy" strain stresses that, despite the Eleventh Amendment, the states remain obligated to comply with federal law, and that the Constitution envisions the "necessary judicial means" to enforce these obligations against the state. These means include suits by the federal government, private suits for injunctive relief, and suits seeking damages from state officials in their individual capacities. Thus, according to the supremacy strain, state sovereign immunity is unimportant because it merely bars unnecessary means of enforcing the federal obligations of the states. The "state sovereignty" strain, on the other hand, emphasizes that state sovereign immunity is a vital and fundamental principle of federalism and hence, for example, cannot be evaded through mere pleading maneuvers. Both analytical strains are evident in the recent opinion in Alden v. Maine. This article describes the two analytical strains and argues that the conflict between them may be coming to a head in the Court's doctrine concerning abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. The recent abrogation cases suggest that an abrogation of state sovereign immunity is valid only if it is "genuinely necessary." If so, and if state sovereign immunity does not bar the "necessary judicial means" for assuring state compliance with federal law, then it would appear that an abrogation of state sovereign immunity would never be valid. The increasing prominence of the state sovereignty strain in the Court's decisions suggests that the Court may be poised to narrow the alternative remedies that until now have provided the "necessary judicial means" for assuring state compliance with federal law, substituting a congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. This article concludes that such a move would be problematic because, among other things, it would deny "necessary judicial means" of enforcing valid federal laws placing obligations on the states pursuant to Article I.