Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research

About: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research is a facility organization based out in Mumbai, Maharashtra, India. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Inflation. The organization has 307 authors who have published 1021 publications receiving 18848 citations.

Household's Tobacco Consumption Decisions Evidence from India

Abstract: This article analyses consumption patterns, socio-economic distribution and household choice of a variety of tobacco products across rural and urban India. Using a multinomial logit model, we examine the choice behaviour of a household in deciding whether and which tobacco products to consume. Household-level data covering 120,309 households have been used for this. We find that most forms of tobacco consumption are higher among socially disadvantaged and low-income groups in the country. Variables such as education, sex ratio, alcohol and pan consumption were found to be significant factors determining tobacco consumption habits of Indian households. The effect of some of the factors on the probability of consumption differs for certain types of tobacco products, increasing some and decreasing others. Addictive goods such as alcohol and pan were found to be complementary to tobacco consumption.

Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs

Abstract: We present a dynamic model of subsidized credit provision to examine how asymmetric information exacerbates inefficiency caused by corruption. If a borrower and a corrupt official interact with symmetric information, credit terms can be so designed that corruption will affect only the borrower’s profit, but not repayment. With private information on the borrower’s productivity this result changes. Because of dynamic information rents, the official may induce one type of the borrower to default. The government can improve the repayment rate, but will have to under-provide credit. In contrast, some allowance of default permits a greater supply of credit.

Have Gujarat and Bihar Outperformed the Rest of India? A Statistical Note

Abstract: In the popular and media imagination, fed by economists and columnists, Gujarat and Bihar have both recorded an extraordinary economic performance in the past decade. But a careful analysis shows that Gujarat, always one of the richest states, has done no better than before. In neither industry nor agriculture has its position radically changed. The only dramatic difference has been the emergence of import-dependent and export-oriented petroleum refi ning, which has few linkages with the state economy. As in the past decades, Gujarat’s social development continues to lag behind its economic development. Likewise, Bihar’s position at the bottom of the league has not changed dramatically. Change seems to take place very slowly at the regional level. G ujarat is among the richest states in the country. It contains only 4.9% of the population (2011) but contributes to 7.9% of the total domestic output of all states. Bihar is one of the poorest, with 8.2% of the population and producing 3.0% of the domestic output. 1 Gujarat is highly urbanised with 42.6% of its people living in towns and cities, whereas only 11.3% of Bihar’s population is urban (national average is 31.2%). These states also represent almost the extreme ends of the income distribution among the Indian states, with Gujarat’s per capita income being nearly 4.6 times

'Arranged' Marriage, Education, and Dowry: A Contract-Theoretic Perspective

Abstract: (ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)1.INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUNDDowry is characterised by asymmetry, uncertainty and unpredictability (Srinivas, 1989).This paper provides a framework to explore interconnections among "arranged" marriage, education, and dowry essentially in an incomplete information setting. The hypothesis is that when the quality of the groom is not directly observable, then education level of the groom as well as dowry transacted at the time of marriage, help to screen grooms of different qualities. In equilibrium, different types of grooms select different education-dowry contracts, with higher/better types being associated with both higher education and higher dowry. Hence by imparting to education an Arrow-Spence-Stiglitz (Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1975) kind of screening role, we are able to explain the perverse (positive) relation between education and dowry (which the human capital approach to education, for example, could not, see discussion below). This also has serious policy implications since greater public expenditure on education may then actually exacerbate dowry inflation instead of mitigating the problem, as expected according to the human capital approach. Before we explain the mechanism of the model, we first briefly describe the concepts of 'arranged' marriage, education and dowry, especially in the context of our model.There are broadly two main types of marriage arrangements - "love" marriages that dominate Western nations such as the United States and those in Europe and "arranged" marriages which are dominant in many parts of Asia and Africa (see Penn, 2011 for example). In the former, partners are chosen by each other and relationships are sustained with notions of romantic love culminating in marriage. An arranged marriage on the other hand, is one where parents (rather than prospective spouses themselves) choose marital partners. Arranged marriages so defined remain typical for large parts of the world like India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (see Myers et al., 2005).By the very nature of the procedure, information transmitted between the marital parties about each other is necessarily limited in an arranged marriage setting, relative to love matches where the potential spouses get to mix freely with each other.1 Narayan (1993) aptly speaks of arranged marriages as follows:2More and more, parents entrust the lives and safety of their daughters to families they know very little about; they can gain no information or assurance from common acquaintances, and they will not be close by to look out for their daughters ' welfare. Parents experience the marriage of their daughter as "losing " her to another family....In the Western world, usually men and women can mix freely and date each other before selecting their partners (for instance, see Penn, 2011 for an account in Western Europe). In fact, they can even live together before marrying their partners. Hence information regarding each other is likely to be much more accurate than in many societies where such free mixing is eschewed.3 In contrast to such liberal practices as in the West, stringent social norms in many other parts of the world, allow only 'arranged' marriages where families of the potential bride and the groom meet each other and the marriage.4 Naturally the amount of information that can be gathered about the potential bride/groom is substantially small compared to when couples can meet each other.5Moreover, social pressure is such that marriages are hard to break (see Pothen, 1989 for example). Hence once married the couple is expected to stay together irrespective of how the match turns out to be.6 Hence a spouse, once chosen, remains a life-long partner.7 With virilocality, this means the bride/bridal family makes a decision with quite limited information that is going to affect her for the rest of her life (it affects the groom as well but since the bride goes to live with her in-laws she is likely to be more concerned with the decision). …

Mega External Preferential Trade Agreements and Their Impacts on Indian Economy

Abstract: This study examines the impacts on India of three mega external preferential trading agreements (PTAs) from which the country is excluded using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model combin...