Showing papers in "Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory in 2012"

An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance

Abstract: Collaborative governance draws from diverse realms of practice and research in public administration. This article synthesizes and extends a suite of conceptual frameworks, research findings, and practice-based knowledge into an integrative framework for collaborative governance. The framework specifies a set of nested dimensions that encompass a larger system context, a collaborative governance regime, and its internal collaborative dynamics and actions that can generate impacts and adaptations across the systems. The framework provides a broad conceptual map for situating and exploring components of cross-boundary governance systems that range from policy or programbased intergovernmental cooperation to place-based regional collaboration with nongovernmental stakeholders to public-private partnerships. The framework integrates knowledge about individual incentives and barriers to collection action, collaborative social learning and conflict resolution processes, and institutional arrangements for cross-boundary collaboration. It is presented as a general framework that might be applied to analyses at different scales, in different policy arenas, and varying levels of complexity. The article also offers 10 propositions about the dynamic interactions among components within the framework and concludes with a discussion about the implications of the framework for theory, research, evaluation, and practice.

Setting the Table: How Transformational Leadership Fosters Performance Information Use

Abstract: The article offers a theory of how leadership affects the implementation of management reforms. The central premise of this theory is that leadership can have important but easyto-miss indirect effects on organizational factors that shape reform outcomes. To test this question, we examine how transformational leadership influences the implementation of performance reforms, using performance information use as a dependent variable. Previous research suggests that leadership can affect how performance information is used among employees but underspecifies the theoretical mechanisms by which this influence occurs. This article develops a theoretical model that proposes that transformational leaders ‘‘set the table’’ for performance information use via a positive but indirect effect on two mediating factors, goal clarity and organizational culture. A structural equation model using selfreported performance information use as a dependent variable provides empirical evidence consistent with our theory.

Contracting or Public Delivery? The Importance of Service, Market and Management Characteristics

Abstract: Analysis of local government contracting decisions typically focuses on transactions costs related to service characteristics, especially asset specificity and difficulty of contract management. This analysis expands the focus to include market characteristics (competition), citizen characteristics (public interest in the service delivery process), and place characteristics (metro status and public management) and finds these are the more important factors. A 2007 survey of US city managers’ rankings of 67 services by transactions costs, competition, and citizen interest is combined with a 2007 national survey of city managers’ sourcing decisions (direct public, intergovernment cooperation, for-profit and nonprofit contracting). Multinomial logit models of service delivery sourcing choice find that metro status and competition are key explanatory variables. Intergovernmental cooperation represents an important public market alternative when contract management is difficult and competition is low. For profit contracting is less common when citizen interest is high and competition is low. Governments with professional managers appear more effective in addressing these broader transactions costs of citizen interests, political and labor opposition, and market management.

The Tangled Web: Unraveling the Principle of Common Goals in Collaborations

Abstract: This article addresses a “goals paradox” that suggests that both congruence and diversity in organizations’ goals influence success in collaboration. Using extensive empirical data, we develop a framework that portrays goals as an entangled, dynamic, and ambiguously hierarchical web of variously perceived, higher- and lower-level goals that can be characterized across six dimensions: level, origin, authenticity, relevance, content, and overtness. We then explore the paradox in terms of the framework and so propose a much elaborated theoretical understanding of it. This provides theoretical and practical understanding relevant to management and governance in and of collaboration.

Treating Policy Brokers Seriously: Evidence from the Climate Policy

Abstract: The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) pays special attention to ‘‘so-called’’ policy brokers when explaining policy change. However, this prominent policy approach neither clearly defines who the policy brokers are nor identifies under which institutional rules they have an influence on policy processes and outputs. This article thus formulates two theoretical hypotheses that complement the ACF and then proceeds to undertake the first empirical testing of these hypotheses within the Swiss climate policy (1990–2008). The empirical results show that, in the case under investigation, the strategic interest-based behavior of two policy brokers (i.e., one public administration and one political party), as well as two institutionalized veto points (i.e., optional referendum and parliamentary committee), are crucial factors explaining policy brokers’ influence on policy process and change.

Change-Oriented Organizational Citizenship Behavior in Public Administration: The Power of Leadership and the Cost of Organizational Politics

Abstract: Using a well-grounded theory of organizational citizenship behavior, this study attempts to extend the meaning of the good soldier syndrome beyond its common boundaries of the business sector. We follow Bettencourt's (2004) conceptualization and model of change-oriented organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) to explain why and how public employees engage in activities targeted at changing and improving the public work environment and its job processes even when no formal rewards are offered in return. We extend Bettencourt's model and demonstrate its usefulness and contribution to public administration organizations, focusing especially on leadership behavior, leader-member exchange relations, and perceptions of organizational politics in public agencies. A field study of 217 public personnel in a large public health care organization yields interesting findings, demonstrating the uniqueness of change-oriented OCB over classical OCB measures (individual and organizational), the general positive effect of leadership on OCB and the moderating effect of perceptions of politics in this relationship. Implications of the findings are developed and discussed in the context of modern public administration.

Keeping the Lights On: How Government Funding Concerns Drive the Advocacy Agendas of Nonprofit Homeless Service Providers

Abstract: Human service nonprofits have historically played an important role in advocating on behalf of the vulnerable populations that they serve. Growth in privatization has led many scholars and practitioners to wonder if increased dependence on government funds would compromise this role. The objective of this study is to explore the relationship between government funding and advocacy participation, goals, and tactics through a qualitative investigation of advocacy involvement in the field of homeless services. Results demonstrate that having government funding is associated with managers being highly motivated to participate in advocacy in the hopes of solidifying funding relationships. As a result, advocacy goals are focused primarily on brokering resources and promoting the organization rather than substantive policy change or client representation. Furthermore, in order to be perceived as a legitimate partner to government, organizations reject confrontational methods and advocate as insiders. Overall, these findings indicate perceptions about advocacy may need to shift as increased reliance on government funding has made advocacy participation and participation in collaborative governance virtually indistinguishable.

Accountability in Higher Education: Exploring Impacts on State Budgets and Institutional Spending Patterns

Abstract: Some argue that the public sector should employ greater use of objective, quantitative measures of organizational outcomes so that political leaders and the general public are better able to evaluate the performance of public agencies. Critics, however, contend that performance based accountability policies are often limited in their capacity to inuence the budgetary process or eectively impose topdown controls on administrative actors. Despite these concerns, performance based accountability regimes have become increasingly prevalent throughout government. One area where this debate has recently become salient is higher education, where there are several initiatives, at both the state and federal levels, to link institutional funding with student outcomes. Using data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Source (IPEDS), this paper investigates whether these performance funding policies have inuenced state budgets or resource allocation priorities at public colleges and universities. Results indicate that performance funding policies have not had substantial impacts on either state budgets or university spending patterns.

Evidence-Based Practice and the Use of Information in State Agency Decision Making

Abstract: The contemporary policy environment makes persistent demands on agency officials to use the best information available when making decisions about policies, programs, and practices. State and federal legislation calls on agencies to incorporate evidence-based practices (EBP) in their programs. Using data from a 2008 survey of state agency directors, we examine the extent to which state government agencies draw upon various sources of information to guide their decisions about programmatic operations. Our findings reveal the extent to which agencies rely on, or weight, sources of scientific studies and formal evaluations compared to other sources. Factor analysis identifies patterns of agency information use, providing a basis for further exploring agency differences in information consultation that underlie development of new policies and programs in the vein of EBP.

Public Participation, Procedural Fairness, and Evaluations of Local Governance: The Moderating Role of Uncertainty

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to test whether the use of public participation by a local government increases perceptions of procedural fairness among the public and to propose an explanation for why fairness is a strong predictor of satisfaction with governmental decisions. To do this, we draw on the uncertainty management model to hypothesize that indications of procedural fairness can increase public support for government and its decisions and that fairness effects are greater for individuals who are more uncertain (less knowledgeable) about the governmental body in question. To test the hypothesis, we embedded an experiment in a survey of the public that was used by a local government to inform its budgetary decisions. The results provide support for the notion that governmental use of public input does increase perceptions of governmental fairness and that, in turn, perceptions of fairness have stronger relationships with overall governmental assessments for those who are relatively uncertain about a governmental institution.

The Consequences of Presidential Patronage for Federal Agency Performance

Abstract: In this article, we examine the relationship between presidential patronage and federal agency performance. Using Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) management scores for 1,016 federal programs during the Bush Administration, we compare the performance of federal programs administered by appointees from the campaign or party against programs run by other appointees or career professionals. We introduce new means of overcoming the shortcomings of PART scores in order to make reliable inferences from this measure of federal program performance. We find that federal programs administered by appointees from the campaign or party earn lower PART scores than programs run by other appointees or by career executives. We conclude that although appointing persons from the campaign or party provides presidents an important source of political capital and arguably improves accountability, it also has costs for agency performance. When presidents reward campaign staff or political supporters with federal jobs does this hurt management performance? From very early in President Obama’s tenure, critics have charged that appointments to some key positions as close as the White House and as far away as ambassadorships were made more for political or campaign support than demonstrated competence (Nakamura 2009; Weisman and Hayashi 2009). President Obama, like presidents before him, appears to be using some plum jobs to reward supporters and the politically connected. President Bush was similarly criticized for his appointments of persons like Michael Brown (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]), Julie Myers (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), and David Safavian (Office of Federal Procurement Policy) to key jobs in the administration despite scant credentials (Eggen and Hsu 2005; Smith and Schmidt 2005; Tumulty, Thompson, and Allen 2005). Yet, presidents generally defend these appointments as appropriate, arguing that they conform to historical norms, have a general (though not specific) competence, and that their proximity to the A previous version of this article was presented at the 2010 annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, January 7–10. We thank Camille Burge, Josh Clinton, Gabe Horton, and Karen Hult for valuable assistance and feedback on this project. Address correspondence to the author at david.e.lewis@vanderbilt.edu. doi:10.1093/jopart/mur010 Advance Access publication on May 16, 2011 a The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com president can compensate for a lack of credentials. For example, the White House recently defended the appointment of John Roos as Ambassador to Japan, arguing that President Obama had always said some ambassadorial picks would be political, that Roos would work closely with the President, and that he was very accomplished. The White House did not make any reference to expertise in Japanese history, culture, or politics or knowledge of the important foreign policy questions facing the region. Cases like these raise the important question of what impact campaign or political supporters have on performance when they receive political appointments. Congress and the press severely criticized Brown for his role in FEMA’s flawed response to Hurricane Katrina and provided further evidence that the skills necessary to win campaigns are distinct from those required to govern. Yet, presidents frequently maintain that what some appointees lack in demonstrated credentials, they make up for in general competence and a close connection to the president. Indeed, the connections and experience that come with work for the campaign or party may provide executives precisely what is needed for them to do their job well. An important component of agency leadership is political work such as strategic planning, policy making, and building relationships with key stakeholders (Maranto 2008). It is also possible that appointees with few credentials are appointed to precisely those jobs where very little specific expertise is required (Lewis 2009). In ambassadorships, for example, it is often career deputies who do most of the serious foreign policy work. In this article, we examine the relationship between appointees chosen for campaign or political experience and federal management performance. Using 1,016 Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) scores—numerical measures of federal program performance used during the Bush Administration—we compare the performance of federal programs administered by appointees from the campaign or party against programs run by other appointed or career executives. We introduce new ways of accounting for shortcomings in the PART scores themselves in order to make reliable inferences from this measure of federal program performance. We find that federal programs administered by appointees from the campaign earn the lowest PART scores, followed by programs directed by other appointees, and programs administered by career professionals. We conclude that although choosing appointees from the campaign or party has important political benefits for parties and presidents, its persistence in American democracy also has deleterious consequences for federal management performance. PATRONAGE, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, AND MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE A number of excellent works describe the different factors that explain presidential appointment decisions such as loyalty, competence, and patronage but also sociodemographic characteristics, geography, relations with Congress, and interest group lobbying (see, e.g., Heclo 1977; Light 1995; Mackenzie 1981). Recent work has particularly emphasized loyalty and, to a lesser extent, competence as the key factors in presidential selection (Edwards 2001; Moe 1985; Weko 1995). This increased presidential control of the process 1 In fact, some argue that wealth can improve ambassadorial performance since many embassies are underfunded (Maranto 2005, 110-11). 220 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal Agenda Building and Blocking during Agency Rulemaking

Abstract: Scholars generally agree that interest groups are active and at times influential during the notice and comment period of regulatory policymaking (or ‘‘rulemaking’’). But current research often ignores the agenda setting that may take place during the pre-proposal stage of rulemaking. During proposal development, interest groups may lobby to: (1) influence the content of proposed regulations or (2) block items from the regulatory agenda altogether. This article focuses on ex parte lobbying—‘‘off the public record’’ conversations in which lobbyists share policy and political information with regulators—during the preproposal stage of rulemaking. I assess the importance of ex parte influence with data from a content analysis of government documents drawn from seven federal government agencies and a telephone survey of interested parties. Overall, the findings provide the first empirical confirmation that ‘‘off the record’’ lobbying can, and at times, does matter to regulatory content changes during a stage of the American policymaking process that is often overlooked by scholars and the public: the pre-proposal stage of agency rulemaking.

What Drives Entrepreneurial Orientation in the Public Sector? Evidence from Germany's Federal Labor Agency

Abstract: Along with the introduction of private sector management tools, public servants are expected to act more entrepreneurially-as public managers. However, research lacks quantitative evidence on what drives entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in this context. Our article examines the antecedents of department-level EO in public sector organizations. By integrating different research streams into one study, we combine partly opposing discourses. This deductive study develops and empirically tests hypotheses on antecedents identified from private sector corporate entrepreneurship literature and from the current debate on new public management and public value management. It uses data from 250 middle managers of Germany's Federal Labor Agency to do so. Contrary to expectations, the influence of management support, work discretion, and resources is only limited. Furthermore, a focus on key performance indicators and goal ambiguity does not seem to impede EO. Instead, a multitude of expectations, middle managers' localism, and position tenure have the greatest impact on department-level EO. As a result, this study provides insights into the strong role of antecedents outside of administration. The article concludes with a discussion of implications for both theory and practice.

Organizational Red Tape: A Measurement Experiment

Abstract: Multiple public administration survey research projects have asked respondents to assess the level of red tape in their organizations. Many of these surveys use the following questionnaire item: If red tape is defined as “burdensome rules and procedures that have negative effects on the organization’s effectiveness,” how would you assess the level of red tape in your organization. Unfortunately, no research has tested the ways in which the language used in this item may bias responses. This research uses data from a 2010 national survey of 2500 local government managers in the United States to test three variations of the Organizational Red Tape scale, investigating whether or not there is variation in perceived organizational red tape based on the question wording. The findings from this research contribute to the red tape literature by providing empirical evidence that the definition used in the Organizational Red Tape scale, a commonly used questionnaire item in public administration research, influences responses about red tape perceptions.

Overcoming Negative Media Coverage: Does Government Communication Matter?

Abstract: Public administration scholars often note that government should engage in more effective external communication to improve citizen trust and maintain political legitimacy. An important part of the belief is that more effective communication can lead to more favorable media coverage that ultimately shapes citizen trust in government. However, the link between government communication and media coverage remains empirically untested. Through a survey of 881 government and business communicators, this study tests the relationship between external communication activities and media coverage. The study shows that government organizations report being less likely to have favorable news coverage than their private counterparts, but most government organizations do report that their media coverage is favorable. Moreover, the results show that active media interaction, organizational support for communication, and adequate communication budget are associated with reporting more favorable coverage. In comparison, a different set of variables, except adequate communication budget, are found to affect whether business organizations report having more favorable media coverage.

Political Influence on Street-Level Bureaucratic Outcome: Testing the Interaction between Bureaucratic Ideology and Local Community Political Orientation

Abstract: A basic principle of good government is that politics should be restricted to the input side, whereas the bureaucracy should operate independently of political considerations. However, 10 previous ...

Bureaucratic Effectiveness and Influence in the Legislature

Abstract: An extensive literature explores the correlates of bureaucratic influence in the implementation of public policy. Considerably less work, however, has investigated the conditions under which bureaucratic actors influence legislative outcomes. In this article, we develop the argument that effectiveness should be a key determinant of bureaucratic influence in the legislative process and identify a set of institutional characteristics that may facilitate or constrain this relationship. We test these expectations in an analysis of legislator perceptions of bureaucratic influence over legislative outcomes in the 50 US states. The results suggest that the impact of bureaucratic effectiveness on the influence of the bureaucracy over legislative outcomes is greater in states with legislative term limits, united governments, and fragmented executive branches.

Effects of Managers’ Work Motivation and Networking Activity on Their Reported Levels of External Red Tape

Abstract: This study brings together two perspectives on managers’ reported levels of red tape. The work motivation perspective explains how managers’ characteristics, such as work engagement (alienation) or commitment, affect their reported levels of red tape. The external control perspective explains how managers’ feedback relations with external actors and organizations reduce miscommunications and conflicts between multiple sources of rules, regulations, and procedures. Hypotheses are derived about the effects of managers’ levels of work engagement, commitment to the organization, and networking activity with external actors and organizations on their levels of reported red tape. The hypotheses are simultaneously tested on a cross-sectional data set of Dutch primary school principals with information about their reported levels of externally generated general red tape (n = 792) and personnel red tape (n = 787). The results of the analyses suggest that work engagement reduces and commitment increases reported levels of red tape. Networking activity with national government is associated with high levels of reported general red tape and personnel red tape. Networking activity with local government and interest organizations in the labor relations domain are associated with low levels of reported personnel red tape. Finally, commitment moderates the effect of networking with national government on general red tape and the effect of networking with interest organizations on personnel red tape. These results are discussed with reference to the two perspectives on red tape.

Autonomous Agencies and Perceptions of Stakeholder Influence in Parliamentary Democracies

Abstract: This article examines the following question: How do independent agencies within parliamentary democracies perceive the influence of various political principals and societal stakeholders in their environment on their strategic and policy decisions? This question is examined through an extension of the theory and methodology of Waterman, Rouse, and Wright for 213 Dutch agencies. We find that agencies perceive their parent minister as their primary principals. This implies that the relationship between politicians and agencies in the Netherlands fit the model of dyadic principal agency relationship. By contrast, we find no support for the existence of horizontal network type of relationships between agencies and governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders in their environment. We also find, remarkably, that agency officials in the Netherlands apply the same categories for distinguishing between their principals as the US agency officials in the study of Waterman, Rouse, and Wright. Este articulo examina la siguiente pregunta: En democracias parlamentarias ?como perciben las agencias independientes la influencia tanto de los principales politicos como de las entes sociales de interes dentro de su entorno, sobre sus decisiones estrategicas y politicas? Esta pregunta es examinada en 213 agencias neerlandesas a traves de una extension de la teoria y metodologia empleada por Waterman, Rouse y Wright. Descubrimos que las agencias perciben su ministro matriz como su principal mas importante Esto implica que la relacion entre los politicos y sus agencias en los Paises Bajos cuadran con el modelo de la relacion diadica de principal-agente. Por el contrario, no descubrimos evidencia que existan relaciones horizontales del tipo red entre las agencias y los entes, gubernamentales y no gubernamentales, que tienen algun tipo de interes dentro del entorno de la agencia. Tambien descubrimos, increiblemente, que los funcionarios de las agencias en los Paises Bajos emplean las mismas categorias para distinguir entre sus principales como lo hacen los funcionarios de las entidades estadounidenses en el estudio de Waterman, Rouse y Wright. Translations by Claudia N. Avellaneda, University of North Carolina Charlotte and Nicolai Petrovsky, University of Kentucky

Does Civil Service Reform Affect Behavior? Linking Alternative Personnel Systems, Perceptions of Procedural Justice, and Complaints

Abstract: Current literature on civil service reform lacks any studies that examine how these reforms impact employee behavior. The research presented here links the presence of alternative personnel systems and perceptions of procedural justice in 2005 to the rates at which complaints were filed in 2006 in the federal government, after controlling for the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Among the findings, agencies with alternative personnel systems exhibit lower complaint rates as compared to those with traditional personnel systems. Additionally, indicators of perceptions of procedural justice exhibit a curvilinear relationship with complaint rates; as perceptions of procedural fairness increase, the rate of complaints initially increases and then decreases. Finally, ADR does not appear to influence complaint rates.

Agency Performance and Executive Pay in Government. An Empirical Test

Abstract: Public management reform has drawn inspiration from principal agent theory and private management, and a favored reform strategy has been civil service reform that strongly recommends pay-for-performance. The hypothesis tested in this paper is that the incentive effect will improve public sector management. The basis is the performance management system introduced in Danish central government where access to both performance and pay data provides us with unique behavioral data. The system combines performance contracts with executive contracts for agency heads, who in this way can earn a bonus based on agency performance. We find no support for the hypothesis and discuss the result against principal agent theory, private sector experience, and bureaucratic theory.

Race and Gender Bias in Three Administrative Contexts: Impact on Work Assignments in State Supreme Courts

Abstract: Do certain types of administrative processes better inhibit race and gender prejudices that may surface in the public workplace? We compare the effects of three distinct administrative settings on race, gender, and other biases in the workload assignments of state supreme court justices—important public policy making settings that have been understudied in public administration. In particular, we model the extent to which majority opinion– writing assignment processes exhibit prejudice in states that use randomized assignments, rotated assignments, or fully discretionary assignments, respectively. Our findings confirm that administrative process matters. We use theories of status characteristics and administrative oversight to explain the relationship between administrative context and workload assignment patterns. Based on data from all 50 states, we discover that prejudice exists but that certain administrative processes serve better than others to suppress race and gender biases.