Showing papers in "Philosophy Compass in 2007"
TL;DR: Experimental philosophy as discussed by the authors is a movement of analytic philosophers who apply methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions, and it has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thoughtexperiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims.
Abstract: It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement –experimental philosophy– has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions. In this paper, we will introduce two different views concerning the relationship that holds between experimental philosophy and the future of standard philosophical practice (what we call, the proper foundation view and the restrictionist view), discuss some of the more interesting and important results obtained by proponents of both views, and examine the pressure these results put on analytic philosophers to reform standard philosophical practice. We will also defend experimental philosophy from some recent objections, suggest future directions for work in experimental philosophy, and suggest what future lines of epistemological response might be available to those wishing to defend analytic epistemology from the challenges posed by experimental philosophy.
198 citations
TL;DR: Embodied cognition is an approach to cognition that departs from traditional cognitive science in its reluctance to conceive of cognition as computational and in its emphasis on the significance of an organism's body in how and what the organism thinks.
Abstract: Embodied Cognition is an approach to cognition that departs from traditional cognitive science in its reluctance to conceive of cognition as computational and in its emphasis on the significance of an organism’s body in how and what the organism thinks. Three lines of embodied cognition research are described and some thoughts on the future of embodied cognition offered. The embodied cognition research programme, hereafter EC, departs from more traditional cognitive science in the emphasis it places on the role the body plays in an organism’s cognitive processes. Saying more beyond this vague claim is difficult, but this is perhaps not surprising given the diversity of fields ‐ phenomenology, robotics, ecological psychology, artificial life, ethology ‐ from which EC has emerged. Indeed, the point of labelling EC a research programme, rather than a theory, is to indicate that the commitments and subject matters of EC remain fairly nebulous. Yet, much of the flavour of EC becomes evident when considering three prominent directions that researchers in this programme have taken. Before turning to these lines of research, it pays to have in sight the traditional view of cognitive science against which EC positions itself.
164 citations
TL;DR: The point is not at all to question the application of a scientific approach to evidence in medicine, but to indicate a number of areas where philosophers of science can contribute to a proper implementation of exactly that scientific-evidential approach.
Abstract: It is surely obvious that medicine, like any other rational activity, must be based on evidence. The interest is in the details: how exactly are the general principles of the logic of evidence to be applied in medicine? Focussing on the development, and current claims of the ‘Evidence-Based Medicine’ movement, this article raises a number of difficulties with the rationales that have been supplied in particular for the ‘evidence hierarchy’ and for the very special role within that hierarchy of randomized controlled trials (and meta-analyses of the results of randomized controlled trials). The point is not at all to question the application of a scientific approach to evidence in medicine, but, on the contrary, to indicate a number of areas where philosophers of science can contribute to a proper implementation of exactly that scientific-evidential approach.
155 citations
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TL;DR: This paper argued that the norm of assertion is truth, belief, or assertion of what it is reasonable to believe, and that the epistemic requirements for proper assertion need to be satisfied.
Abstract: Recently attention has been paid to the epistemic requirements for proper assertion. The most popular account has been the knowledge account, that we can only properly assert what we know. Others have criticized the knowledge account and argued that the norm of assertion is truth, belief, or assertion of what it is reasonable to believe.
133 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a multiple aspects account of the sense of agency, which is based on higher-order cognitive processes, first-order phenomenal experience, and intentional aspect of action.
Abstract: A review of several theories and brain-imaging experiments shows that there is no consensus about how to define the sense of agency. In some cases the sense of agency is construed in terms of bodily movement or motor control, in others it is linked to the intentional aspect of action. For some theorists it is the product of higher-order cognitive processes, for others it is a feature of first-order phenomenal experience. In this paper I propose a multiple aspects account of the sense of agency.
120 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility and distinguish four possible views about that relation: the standard view, the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it.
Abstract: In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent’s moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent’s causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view ‐ the view I argue for ‐ is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. According to this view, although moral responsibility does not require causation, causation still grounds moral responsibility.
90 citations
TL;DR: A wide range of discussions throughout the humanities and social sciences include claims that various phenomena are "socially constructed" as mentioned in this paper, and much of this work remains interesting and provocative within a broadly naturalist and realist framework.
Abstract: A wide range of discussions throughout the humanities and social sciences include claims that various phenomena are “socially constructed.” Many academics associate “social constructionism” with the so-called “science wars” in which social constructionism is identified with some sort of radical anti-realism about reality in general, or the findings of science in particular. But the move to radical anti-realism is only one way to develop the central idea of constructionism – that human decision and human culture exert profound and often unnoticed influence – and much of this work remains interesting and provocative within a broadly naturalist and realist framework. Here the author reviews and explores a variety of constructionist claims, including the plausible suggestion that social constructionist hypotheses have special purchase in discussions of human kinds.
87 citations
TL;DR: The authors distinguish three different concepts of causation: the scientific concept, or causal structure, is the subject of recent work in causal modeling, the folk attributive concept has been studied by philosophers of law and social psychologists, and the metaphysical concept is the one that metaphysicians have attempted to analyze.
Abstract: I distinguish three different concepts of causation: The scientific concept, or causal structure, is the subject of recent work in causal modeling. The folk attributive concept has been studied by philosophers of law and social psychologists. The metaphysical concept is the one that metaphysicians have attempted to analyze. I explore the relationships between these three concepts, and suggest that the metaphysical concept is an untenable and dispensable mixture of the other two.
76 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors survey the central factual motivation of conventional implicatures, arguing that it is loosely unified by the idea that conventional implicas contribute a separate dimension of meaning.
Abstract: Grice coined the term ‘conventional implicature’ in a short passage in ‘Logic and conversation’. The description is intuitive and deeply intriguing. The range of phenomena that have since been assigned this label is large and diverse. I survey the central factual motivation, arguing that it is loosely unified by the idea that conventional implicatures contribute a separate dimension of meaning. I provide tests for distinguishing conventional implicatures from other kinds of meaning, and I briefly explore ways in which one can incorporate multiple dimensions of meaning into a single theory.
71 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the maximal consistent combinations of these desiderata and compare their relative advantages and disadvantages are presented, in view of notorious semantic paradoxes such as the Liar paradox.
Abstract: This article outlines what a formal theory of truth should be like, at least at first glance. As not all of the stated constraints can be satisfied at the same time, in view of notorious semantic paradoxes such as the Liar paradox, we consider the maximal consistent combinations of these desiderata and compare their relative advantages and disadvantages.
68 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a non-technical introduction to the decision-theoretic program, and a sketch of the current state of the debate is provided, followed by a controversial suggestion by David Deutsch that decision theory can solve the problem.
Abstract: The Everett (many-worlds) interpretation of quantum mechanics faces a prima facie problem concerning quantum probabilities. Research in this area has been fast-paced over the last few years, following a controversial suggestion by David Deutsch that decision theory can solve the problem. This article provides a non-technical introduction to the decision-theoretic program, and a sketch of the current state of the debate.
TL;DR: The authors examines the role of understanding in scientific explanation and concludes that the seductive, phenomenological sense of understanding is often viewed as a cue of genuine understanding. But few seriously consider what understanding is, or what the cues are when we have it.
Abstract: Philosophers agree that scientific explanations aim to produce understanding, and that good ones succeed in this aim. But few seriously consider what understanding is, or what the cues are when we have it. If it is a psychological state or process, describing its specific nature is the job of psychological theorizing. This article examines the role of understanding in scientific explanation. It warns that the seductive, phenomenological sense of understanding is often, but mistakenly, viewed as a cue of genuine understanding. The article closes with a discussion of several new paths of research that tie the psychology of scientific explanation to cognate notions of learning, testimony, and understanding.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present the central issues and strategies in the contemporary moral realism debate and discuss four different faces of moral realism: semantic, ontological, metaphysical and normative.
Abstract: This article explains for a general philosophical audience the central issues and strategies in the contemporary moral realism debate. It critically surveys the contribution of some recent scholarship, representing expressivist and pragmatist nondescriptivism (Mark Timmons, Hilary Putnam), subjectivist and nonsubjectivist naturalism (Michael Smith, Paul Bloomfield, Philippa Foot), nonnaturalism (Russ Shafer-Landau, T. M. Scanlon) and error theory (Richard Joyce). Four different faces of ‘moral realism’ are distinguished: semantic, ontological, metaphysical and normative. The debate is presented as taking shape under dialectical pressure from the demands of (i) capturing the moral appearances; and (ii) reconciling morality with our understanding of the mind and world.
TL;DR: The role of language processing research in the shaping of a theory of implicature is considered, and an empirical overview of pertinent current work in real-time language production and comprehension is provided.
Abstract: Grice’s notion of conversational implicature requires that speaker meaning be calculable on the basis of sentence meaning, and presumptions about the speaker’s adherence to cooperative principles of conversation and the ability of the hearer to work out the speaker’s meaning. However, the actual real-time consideration of cooperative principles by both the hearer and speaker runs up against severe temporal constraints during language processing. This article considers the role of language processing research in the shaping of a theory of implicature, and provides an empirical overview of pertinent current work in real-time language production and comprehension.
TL;DR: In this paper, a survey of the ways in which decision-making is usually construed in philosophy, economics and psychology is presented, along with a review of important findings in neuroeconomics.
Abstract: This article introduces and discusses from a philosophical point of view the nascent field of neuroeconomics, which is the study of neural mechanisms involved in decision-making and their economic significance. Following a survey of the ways in which decision-making is usually construed in philosophy, economics and psychology, I review many important findings in neuroeconomics to show that they suggest a revised picture of decision-making and ourselves as choosing agents. Finally, I outline a neuroeconomic account of irrationality.
TL;DR: The authors survey philosophical literature on the topic of what, if anything, makes a person's life meaningful, focusing on systematic texts that are written in English and that have appeared in the last five years.
Abstract: In this article I survey philosophical literature on the topic of what, if anything, makes a person's life meaningful, focusing on systematic texts that are written in English and that have appeared in the last five years. My aims are to present overviews of the most important, fresh, Anglo-American positions on meaning in life and to raise critical questions about them worth answering in future work.
TL;DR: The authors distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism and suggest that the most plausible externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy of mind.
Abstract: Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy of mind, whereas the more radical and interesting versions of externalism are quite difficult to support.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors illustrate their central elements and criticize their weak empirical foundations and conclude that combining empirical evidence with theoretical reflection constitutes the way forward in the philosophy of social science.
Abstract: Ontological debates have always been prominent in the philosophy of social science. Philosophers have typically conceived of such debates as pre-scientific attempts to reform social scientific practice, rather than as post-scientific reflections on a firm body of scientific knowledge. Two celebrated contemporary research programs in social ontology – collective intentionality and evolutionary game theory – also follow this approach. In this paper I illustrate their central elements and criticize their weak empirical foundations. I finish by reviewing some work that combines empirical evidence with theoretical reflection, and suggest that it constitutes the way forward in the philosophy of social science.
TL;DR: One of the most significant disputes in early modern philosophy was between the moral rationalists and the moral sentimentalists as discussed by the authors, in which the rationalists held that morality originated in reason alone and the sentimentalists argued that it originated at least partly in sentiment.
Abstract: One of the most significant disputes in early modern philosophy was between the moral rationalists and the moral sentimentalists. The moral rationalists – such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, and John Balguy – held that morality originated in reason alone. The moral sentimentalists – such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume – held that morality originated at least partly in sentiment. In addition to other arguments, the rationalists and sentimentalists developed rich analogies. The most significant analogy the rationalists developed was between morality and mathematics. The most significant analogy the sentimentalists developed was between morality and beauty. These two analogies illustrate well the main ideas, underlying insights, and accounts of moral phenomenology the two positions have to offer. An examination of the two analogies will thus serve as a useful introduction to the debate between moral rationalism and moral sentimentalism as a whole.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss how different conceptions of consciousness may influence the search for the neural correlates of consciousness, including the distinctions between access and phenomenal consciousness and between conscious states and unified conscious fields, as well as phenomenological conceptions.
Abstract: The science of consciousness begins with the search for the neural correlates of consciousness. I explain this notion and give examples of research in the field. I then discuss how different conceptions of consciousness may influence the search for the neural correlates. This includes the distinctions between access and phenomenal consciousness, and between conscious states and unified conscious fields, as well as phenomenological conceptions. Finally, I discuss what finding the neural correlates may imply for the metaphysics of consciousness, in particular for the theory that conscious states are identical to brain states.
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TL;DR: The authors provide a general overview of some of the current debates on their proper answers as well as a pair of slightly more detailed investigations into two issues of special interest in the recent literature devoted to these topics.
Abstract: Are there any non-composite objects? Are there any objects every part of which is composite? Are items of either kind even possible? What would they be like? Of what significance would they be? How best can we come to have reasonable beliefs about the answers to these inquiries? Such questions – about the actuality and possibility, the analysis and significance, the methodology and epistemology of simples and pieces of gunk – have been center stage in recent contemporary analytic metaphysics. The following article provides a general overview of some of the current debates on their proper answers as well as a pair of slightly more detailed investigations into two issues of special interest in the recent literature devoted to these topics.
TL;DR: The distinction between analytic and synthetic truths has played a major role in the history of philosophy, but it was challenged by Quine and others in the 20th century, and the distinction's coherence and importance is now controversial as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The distinction between analytic and synthetic truths has played a major role in the history of philosophy, but it was challenged by Quine and others in the 20th century, and the distinction's coherence and importance is now controversial. This article traces the distinction's historical development and summarises the major arguments against it. Some post-Quinian accounts are discussed, and the article closes with a list of five challenges which any contemporary account of the distinction ought to meet.
TL;DR: Derrida's early reluctance to spell out political implications of deconstruction gave way during the course of the 1980s to a series of analyses of political concepts and issues as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Derrida's early reluctance to spell out political implications of deconstruction gave way during the course of the 1980s to a series of analyses of political concepts and issues. This article identifies the principal intellectual strategies of Derrida's political engagements and provides a detailed account of his concept of ‘democracy to come’. Finally, it suggests several points of contact between Derrida and recent liberal political philosophy, as well as some areas in which deconstructive analyses require further refinement if fruitful exchange is to occur.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors outline the view called scientific cognitivism, which has been central in recent discussions of nature aesthetics, and assess two important arguments for this view, including the relationship between nature and art and the relevance of ethical considerations to the aesthetic appreciation of nature.
Abstract: The aesthetics of nature is a growing sub-field of contemporary aesthetics. In this article, I outline the view called ‘Scientific cognitivism’, which has been central in recent discussions of nature aesthetics. In assessing two important arguments for this view, I outline some recent thinking about key issues for the aesthetics of nature, including the relationship between nature and art and the relevance of ethical considerations to the aesthetic appreciation of nature.
TL;DR: The laws-of-biology debate has attracted much attention in the last few years as mentioned in this paper, with the focus shifting away from the question of whether there are laws of biology and toward offering good accounts of explanation(s) in the biological sciences.
Abstract: This article serves as an introduction to the laws-of-biology debate. After introducing the main issues in an introductory section, arguments for and against laws of biology are canvassed in Section 2. In Section 3, the debate is placed in wider epistemological context by engaging a group of scholars who have shifted the focus away from the question of whether there are laws of biology and toward offering good accounts of explanation(s) in the biological sciences. Section 4 introduces two relatively new pieces of science – metabolic scaling theory and ecological stoichiometry – that have not been topics of much discussion by philosophers but are relevant because they have at least some of the hallmarks of laws of nature. Section 5 concludes by pointing out that discovering laws of biology, if any there be, will not necessarily answer the questions raised by the debate in the first place: we will still want to know how biology compares to other sciences, how to characterize its systems and processes, and whether accounts in terms of laws always usually constitute adequate explanations in various sciences.
TL;DR: Phenomenology is widely credited with being one of the major movements in twentieth-century philosophy as mentioned in this paper, and the ongoing strength of phenomenology as a force within contemporary philosophy.
Abstract: Phenomenology is widely credited with being one of the major movements in twentieth-century philosophy. This article attempts to explain the ongoing strength of phenomenology as a force within the contemporary philosophy. It has two parts. The first part outlines the distinctive outlook of phenomenological philosophy. The second part explores a number of key theses that summarily characterise phenomenological inquiries as such. The aim is to provide a clear overview of what it means to explore questions or approach philosophical problems phenomenologically.
TL;DR: The objection Hobbes raises in the voice of the Fool against his own argument is, apparently, that it is sometimes rational to break a covenant as mentioned in this paper, which is at odds with some of his own views.
Abstract: The objection Hobbes raises in the voice of the Fool against his own argument is, apparently, that it is sometimes rational to break covenant. Hobbes's answer is puzzling, both because it seems implausible and also because it seems at odds with some of his own views. This article reviews several strategies critics have taken in trying to show that Hobbes's answer is more plausible than it seems and one attempt to show that the Fool's objection concerns the action of breaking covenant only indirectly.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that nonnaturalism is better viewed as a theoretical stance, rather than a position, and critically engage with three recent arguments for moral non-naturalism offered by Shafer-Landau, Kit Fine, and Jean Hampton.
Abstract: Despite having occupied a peripheral position in contemporary metaethics, moral nonnaturalism has recently experienced a revival of sorts. But what is moral nonnaturalism? And what is there to be said in favor of it? In this article, I address these two questions. In the first place, I offer an account of what moral nonnaturalism is. According to the view I propose, nonnaturalism is better viewed not as a position, but as a theoretical stance. And, second, I critically engage with three recent arguments for moral nonnaturalism offered by Russ Shafer-Landau, Kit Fine, and Jean Hampton, respectively.
TL;DR: Feminist legal theory has undergone some significant changes over the past thirty years as mentioned in this paper, from liberal and radical feminism through to postmodernism, including debates surrounding culture and religion, the relationship of sex and sexuality scholarship to feminist research, and the position of women within transitional societies.
Abstract: Feminist legal theory has undergone some significant changes over the past thirty years. This article provides an introductory overview of feminist legal theory, from liberal and radical feminism through to postmodernism. It outlines some of the major current issues within feminist legal thought, notably debates surrounding culture and religion, the relationship of sex and sexuality scholarship to feminist research, and the position of women within transitional societies.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors uncover a latent harmony and consistency in the two men's material value ethics, and consider the possibility of its recovery for contemporary virtue ethics, in which trust, utility, friendship, or even the Aristotelian virtues are considered.
Abstract: Although Max Scheler (1874–1928) and Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950) were contemporaries and wrote under the influence of the phenomenological movement, the large differences between their initiatives and achievements in philosophy resulted in scholars rarely reading them together. However, they shared one major concept in ethics, that of material value ethics. This ethics is (1) non-formal, and involves a profound criticism of Kantian ethical formalism, and (2) is founded in a phenomenology of the values themselves, that its, the content, available in intuition, of such values as trust, utility, friendship, or even the Aristotelian virtues. The present article seeks to uncover a latent harmony and consistency in the two men's material value ethics, and considers the possibility of its recovery for contemporary virtue ethics.