Showing papers in "Political Behavior in 2021"
TL;DR: This article examined the extent to which partisan polarization features a willingness to apply dehumanizing metaphors to out-partisans, finding that many partisans dehumanize members of the opposing party, and found that it is most closely related to extreme affective polarization.
Abstract: The affective, identity based, and often negative nature of partisan polarization in the United States has been a subject of much scholarly attention. Applying insights from recent work in social psychology, we employ three novel large-N, broadly representative online surveys, fielded over the course of 4 years, across two presidential administrations, to examine the extent to which this brand of polarization features a willingness to apply dehumanizing metaphors to out-partisans. We begin by looking at two different measures of dehumanization (one subtle and one more direct). This uncovers striking, consistent observational evidence that many partisans dehumanize members of the opposing party. We examine the relationship between dehumanization and other key partisan intensity measures, finding that it is most closely related to extreme affective polarization. We also show that dehumanization “predicts” partisan motivated reasoning and is correlated with respondent worldview. Finally, we present a survey experiment offering causal leverage to examine openness to dehumanization in the processing of new information about misdeeds by in- and out-partisans. Participants were exposed to identical information about a melee at a gathering, with the partisanship of those involved randomly assigned. We find pronounced willingness by both Democrats and Republicans to dehumanize members of the out-party. These findings shed considerable light on the nature and depth of modern partisan polarization.
73 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that individuals who get their news from social media and use social media frequently express more beliefs in some types of conspiracy theories and misinformation and that these relationships are conditional on conspiracy thinking, the predisposition to interpret salient events as products of conspiracies.
Abstract: Numerous studies find associations between social media use and beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation. While such findings are often interpreted as evidence that social media causally promotes conspiracy beliefs, we theorize that this relationship is conditional on other individual-level predispositions. Across two studies, we examine the relationship between beliefs in conspiracy theories and media use, finding that individuals who get their news from social media and use social media frequently express more beliefs in some types of conspiracy theories and misinformation. However, we also find that these relationships are conditional on conspiracy thinking––the predisposition to interpret salient events as products of conspiracies––such that social media use becomes more strongly associated with conspiracy beliefs as conspiracy thinking intensifies. This pattern, which we observe across many beliefs from two studies, clarifies the relationship between social media use and beliefs in dubious ideas.
54 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that partisans who blatantly dehumanize members of the opposing party prefer greater social distance from their political opponents, which is indicative of reduced interpersonal tolerance, and that blatant dehumanization is associated with perceptions of greater moral distance between the parties, which are indicative of moral disengagement.
Abstract: Despite evidence that dehumanizing language and metaphors are found in political discourse, extant research has largely overlooked whether voters dehumanize their political opponents. Research on dehumanization has tended to focus on racial and ethnic divisions in societies, rather than political divisions. Understanding dehumanization in political contexts is important because the social psychology literature links dehumanization to a variety of negative outcomes, including moral disengagement, aggression, and even violence. In this manuscript, I discuss evidence of partisan dehumanization during the 2016 U.S. Presidential campaign and demonstrate how a focus on dehumanization can expose new relationships between moral psychology and partisan identity. Using data from two surveys conducted in October of 2016, I show that partisans dehumanize their political opponents in both subtle and blatant ways. When I investigate the correlates of dehumanization, I find that partisans who blatantly dehumanize members of the opposing party prefer greater social distance from their political opponents, which is indicative of reduced interpersonal tolerance. I also find that blatant dehumanization is associated with perceptions of greater moral distance between the parties, which is indicative of moral disengagement. These results suggest that dehumanization can improve our understanding of negative partisanship and political polarization.
51 citations
TL;DR: This paper examined the extent to which both white outgroup racial resentment and white in-group racial identity matter in contemporary electoral politics, and found that both attitudes were powerfully associated with candidate evaluations in 2012 and early 2016, although white out-group attitudes overshadowed the electoral impact of ingroup racial attitudes by the 2016 general election.
Abstract: Over the past two decades, political scientists have demonstrated that racial animus among white Americans is increasingly associated with evaluations of presidential candidates. Like most work on white racial attitudes, these efforts have focused almost exclusively on the out-group attitudes whites possess toward racial and ethnic minorities. Work in social psychology, however, suggests that intergroup attitudes are usually comprised of both an out-group and an in-group component. Nevertheless, political scientists have tended to overlook or dismiss the possibility that whites’ in-group attitudes are associated with political evaluations. Changing demographic patterns, immigration, the historic election of Obama, and new candidate efforts to appeal to whites as a collective group suggest a need to reconsider the full nature and consequences of the racial attitudes that may influence whites’ electoral preferences. This study, therefore, examines the extent to which both white out-group racial resentment and white in-group racial identity matter in contemporary electoral politics. Comparing the factors associated with vote choice in 2012 and 2016, and candidate evaluations in 2018, this study finds that both attitudes were powerfully associated with candidate evaluations in 2012 and early 2016, although white out-group attitudes overshadowed the electoral impact of in-group racial attitudes by the 2016 general election. The results suggest that there are now two independent racial attitudes tied to whites’ political preferences in the contemporary U.S., and understanding the dynamics of white racial animus and white racial identity across electoral contexts continues to be an important avenue for future work.
38 citations
TL;DR: This paper investigated whether the admission preferences of French natives vary based on personal exposure to immigration, as proxied by local demographics and self-reported social contact, and found that French natives who do not frequently interact with immigrants are significantly less favorable toward immigrants from non-western countries, and more favorable towards immigrants from western countries.
Abstract: To what extent does exposure to immigration condition the types of immigrants citizens are willing to admit? Extending the conjoint approach adopted by Hainmueller and Hopkins (Am J Pol Sci 59(3):529–548, 2015), this study investigates whether the admission preferences of French natives vary based on personal exposure to immigration, as proxied by local demographics and self-reported social contact. Methodologically, we propose and apply new methods to compare attribute salience across different subgroups of respondents. We find that although an inflow of immigrants into respondents’ municipalities has a limited influence on how French natives evaluate prospective immigrants, social contact with immigrants matters. Specifically, French natives who do not frequently interact with immigrants are significantly less favorable toward immigrants from non-western countries, and more favorable toward immigrants from western countries. In contrast, natives who report frequent social interactions with immigrants place less weight on nationality as a criterion for immigrant admission. Although scholars have noted an increasing consensus in immigration attitudes across developed democracies, our findings suggest that individual experiences with immigration condition preferences for immigration policy at the national level.
38 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the measurement properties of a multi-item scale that gauges negative partisan identity and compare the power of both types of partisan identity in predicting attitudes towards bipartisanship, political participation, and vote choice.
Abstract: Negative partisanship captures the notion that disdain for the opposing party is not necessarily accompanied by strong in-party attachments. Yet, lack of a theoretical framework as well as measurement issues have prevented researchers from utilizing this consequential concept. I address these concerns in several ways. First, I design and examine the measurement properties of a multi-item scale that gauges negative partisan identity. Second, I demonstrate that—while most Americans display aspects of both negative and positive partisan identity—the two are distinct constructs. Third, I compare the power of both types of partisan identity in predicting attitudes towards bipartisanship, political participation, and vote choice. I thereby demonstrate the distinctive effects of negative and positive partisan identity on a range of political behaviors. The results offer a more nuanced perspective on partisanship and its role in driving affective polarization.
38 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that when given the chance to either harm the outgroup or help the in-group, people tend to choose the latter, and that under situations of symbolic threat to partisan identity, respondents shift gears and opt for harming the out-group as a strategy to defend their political group identity.
Abstract: Recent evidence indicates that partisans discriminate against those from the opposing party. However, it is still unclear whether partisan out-group prejudice reveals a desire for out-group harm or in-group help. We investigate the conditions under which these tendencies arise. Using one observational survey and three survey experiments, we show that when given the chance to either harm the out-group or help the in-group, people tend to choose the latter. Yet while the tendency to help the in-group appears to be primary, we also show that under situations of symbolic threat to partisan identity, respondents shift gears and opt for harming the out-group as a strategy to defend the status of their political group identity. These results add to our understanding of how partisan identity and polarization works in non-elites.
33 citations
TL;DR: The role of partisanship in American’s willingness to follow government recommendations during the Bush and Obama administrations is studied, finding that presidential co-partisans are more likely to believe that vaccines are safe and morelikely to vaccinate themselves and their children than presidential out-partisan.
Abstract: This article studies the role of partisanship in American's willingness to follow government recommendations. I combine survey and behavioral data to examine partisans' vaccination rates during the Bush and Obama administrations. I find that presidential co-partisans are more likely to believe that vaccines are safe and more likely to vaccinate themselves and their children than presidential out-partisans. Depending on the vaccine, presidential co-partisans are 4-10 percentage points more likely to vaccinate than presidential out-partisans. Using causal mediation analysis, I find that this effect is the result of partisans' differing levels of trust in government. This finding sheds light on the far-reaching role of partisanship in Americans' interactions with the federal government.
27 citations
TL;DR: This article showed that the average voter is more likely than not to vote for the co-partisan candidate until that candidate takes dissonant stances on four or more salient issues, and that public opinion minimally constrains politicians.
Abstract: While partisan cues tend to dominate political choice, prior work shows that competing information can rival the effects of partisanship if it relates to salient political issues. But what are the limits of partisan loyalty? How much electoral leeway do co-partisan candidates have to deviate from the party line on important issues? We answer this question using conjoint survey experiments that characterize the role of partisanship relative to issues. We demonstrate a pattern of conditional party loyalty. Partisanship dominates electoral choice when elections center on low-salience issues. But while partisan loyalty is strong, it is finite: the average voter is more likely than not to vote for the co-partisan candidate until that candidate takes dissonant stances on four or more salient issues. These findings illuminate when and why partisanship fails to dominate political choice. They also suggest that, on many issues, public opinion minimally constrains politicians.
26 citations
TL;DR: This article found that partisanship strongly influences roommate selection, even in the presence of non-political but politically-correlated information, such as roommates' perceived levels of political interest.
Abstract: Research shows the increasing tendency of partisan considerations to influence decisions outside the context of politics, including residential choice. Scholars attribute this tendency to affective distaste for members of the other party. However, little work has investigated the relative influence of political and nonpolitical factors in these situations—and it has not sufficiently ruled out alternative explanations for these phenomena. Do people mainly choose to socially avoid members of the other party for political reasons, or is partisanship simply perceived to be correlated with relevant nonpolitical considerations? In some settings, political affiliation may serve primarily as a cue for other factors. As a result, studies that manipulate partisanship but fail to include other individuating information may exaggerate partisanship’s importance in these decisions. To address this shortcoming, I assess the impact of political and nonpolitical considerations on roommate selection via conjoint analysis. I find that partisanship strongly influences this social decision even in the presence of nonpolitical-but-politically-correlated individuating information. Partisan preferences are also moderated by roommates’ perceived levels of political interest. Finally, other social traits do matter, but how they matter depends on partisanship. Specifically, partisans report increased willingness to live with counter-stereotypic out-partisans. This suggests that partisan social divides may be more easily bridged by individuals with cross-cutting identities.
25 citations
TL;DR: This article found evidence that valid retrospective warnings of misleading news can help individuals discard erroneous information, although the corrections are weak, and when informative news is wrongly labeled as inaccurate, these false warnings reduce the news’ credibility.
Abstract: Fact-checking and warnings of misinformation are increasingly salient and prevalent components of modern news media and political communications. While many warnings about political misinformation are valid and enable people to reject misleading information, the quality and validity of misinformation warnings can vary widely. Replicating and extending research from the fields of social cognition and forensic psychology, we find evidence that valid retrospective warnings of misleading news can help individuals discard erroneous information, although the corrections are weak. However, when informative news is wrongly labeled as inaccurate, these false warnings reduce the news’ credibility. Invalid misinformation warnings taint the truth, lead individuals to discard authentic information, and impede political memory. As only a few studies on the tainted truth effect exist, our research helps to illuminate the less explored dark side of misinformation warnings. Our findings suggest general warnings of misinformation should be avoided as indiscriminate use can reduce the credibility of valid news sources and lead individuals to discard useful information.
TL;DR: The authors examined the racial resentment scale for differential item functioning by level of adherence to ideological principles using the 1992, 2004, and 2016 American National Election Studies and found that responses to some of the items are, indeed, affected by ideology.
Abstract: Though most scholars of race and politics agree that old-fashioned racism largely gave way to a new symbolic form of racism over the course of the last half century, there is still disagreement about how to best empirically capture this new form of racism. Racial resentment, perhaps the most popular operationalization of symbolic racism, has been criticized for its overlap with liberal-conservative ideology. Critics argue that racially prejudiced responses to the items that compose the racial resentment scale are observationally equivalent to the responses that conservatives would provide. In this manuscript, I examine the racial resentment scale for differential item functioning (DIF) by level of adherence to ideological principles using the 1992, 2004, and 2016 American National Election Studies. I find that responses to some of the racial resentment items are, indeed, affected by ideology. However, the problem is largely confined to 2016 and more egregious with respect to ideological self-identifications than adherence to ideological principles. Moreover, even after correcting for DIF, the racial resentment scale serves as a strong predictor of attitudes about racial issues.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that unions increase their members' political knowledge through direct information provision and workplace discussion of politics, and they conclude that unions' capacity to reduce knowledge gaps and foster a more politically informed electorate.
Abstract: Labor unions have long been important political actors, mobilizing voters, shaping their members’ attitudes, and influencing representation and economic inequality. However, little is known regarding unions’ influence on political knowledge. In this paper, I argue that unions increase their members’ political knowledge through two mechanisms: direct information provision and workplace discussion of politics. I use data from recent national election surveys and a matching technique, showing that union members, particularly those with less formal education, who face higher costs in seeking out political information, are significantly more politically knowledgeable than their non-union counterparts and better informed about where political parties and candidates stand on the issues. I conclude by discussing unions’ capacity to reduce knowledge gaps and foster a more politically informed electorate.
TL;DR: This paper examined the feedback effects of controversial police use of force against minority civilians, and found that controversial cases of police use-of-force against minority citizens have become a ubiquitous feature of news headlines, and videos of these interactions between citizens and government actors have placed them in the public sphere.
Abstract: Controversial cases of police use of force against minority civilians have become a ubiquitous feature of news headlines, and videos of these interactions between citizens and government actors have placed them in the public sphere. In this paper, we examine the feedback effects of these publicized incidents. Using a unique survey-experiment implemented in 2019, we demonstrate that controversial police use of force against minority civilians prompts strong emotional reactions, increases support for body-cameras, changes beliefs about excessive force, and alters attitudes toward law enforcement. Notably, our design allows us to examine the effects of both text-based news stories and videos pulled from two real-world use of force cases, one lethal and one non-lethal. This study has important implications for public opinion, feedback effects, and perceptions of law enforcement.
TL;DR: The authors found that individuals are more likely to identify with the party in which they believe their group is well represented, a finding which clarifies the role of party image shifts in constructing partisanship, the limits of the culture war motif, and the importance of social perception in shaping beliefs about party representation.
Abstract: While groups have been central to thinking about partisan identity and choices, there has been surprisingly little attention paid to the role of perceptions of the group composition of the parties. We explore this critical linking information in the context of religious groups, some of the chief pivots around which the parties have been sorting. Using three national samples, we show that perceptions of the religious group composition of the parties are often biased—evangelicals overestimate the presence of evangelicals within the Republican Party and the irreligious within the Democratic Party. The key finding is that individuals are far more likely to identify with the party in which they believe their group is well represented—a finding which clarifies the role of party image shifts in constructing partisanship, the limits of the culture war motif, and the importance of social perception in shaping beliefs about party representation.
TL;DR: This paper found evidence that voter backlash against violence is more significant than both scholars and politicians tend to assume, and that backlash can diminish the electoral advantages that violence provides, highlighting the often underappreciated costs of violence as an electoral tactic and the role that elite misperceptions can play in its persistence.
Abstract: Why do politicians use violence as an electoral tactic, and how does it affect voting behavior? Theories of election-related violence focus on the electoral benefits such violence is said to provide, relying on the assumption that when parties and candidates employ violence, they do so based on an accurate assessment of its relative costs and benefits. Far less attention has been paid to the costs of violence as an electoral tactic, including the potential for voter backlash against it. This study provides evidence that voter backlash against violence is more significant than both scholars and politicians tend to assume. Moreover, that backlash can diminish the electoral advantages that violence provides. Combining survey experiments with Kenyan voters and observational data on violence and election outcomes, I find compelling evidence for broad-based voter backlash against violence that undermines its effectiveness as an electoral tactic. At the same time, data from parallel survey experiments and qualitative interviews with Kenyan politicians demonstrate that they underestimate the extent to which violence diminishes their support among voters. The results highlight the often underappreciated costs of violence as an electoral tactic and the role that elite misperceptions can play in its persistence.
TL;DR: The authors found that exposure to refugees during the 2015 refugee crisis predicts anti-refugee voting and sentiment in Hungary, and that the far-right opposition gained votes in these settlements in subsequent parliamentary elections.
Abstract: How does exposure to refugees influence political behavior? We present evidence from Hungary, a country with widespread anti-immigration attitudes, that short term exposure during the 2015 refugee crisis predicts anti-refugee voting and sentiment We code exposure to refugees at the settlement level using reports from state media, an independent online news site, and an online social media aggregator Settlements through which refugees traveled showed significantly higher anti-refugee voting in a national referendum in 2016 The effect decreases sharply with distance Using a difference-in-differences model, we find that the far-right opposition gained, while the governing right-wing party lost votes in these settlements in subsequent parliamentary elections This suggests incumbents are punished by voters skeptical of immigration regardless of their policy position Survey data supports this finding of a competition among right-wing parties, as individuals in exposed settlements are more fearful of immigrants and support restrictive policies only if they identify as right-wing
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors identify the characteristics that make a politician "authentic" and propose a survey battery aimed at measuring perceptions of the authenticity of political candidates, finding that candidate authenticity is an important trait that should be taken into account by future research.
Abstract: In recent electoral contests, political observers and media outlets increasingly report on the level of “authenticity” of political candidates. However, even though this term has become commonplace in political commentary, it has received little attention in empirical electoral research. In this study, we identify the characteristics that we argue make a politician “authentic”. After theoretically discussing the different dimensions of this trait, we propose a survey battery aimed at measuring perceptions of the authenticity of political candidates. Testing our measure using data sets from different countries, we show that the answers to our items load on one latent concept that we call “authenticity”. Furthermore, perceptions of candidate authenticity correlate strongly with evaluations of political parties and leaders, and with vote intention, while they are empirically distinguishable from other traits. We conclude that candidate authenticity is an important trait that should be taken into account by future research.
TL;DR: The authors conducted conjoint and vignette survey experiments to examine the effects of candidate gender and gender-and leadership-congruent political platforms on voter support and found evidence of bias against female candidates among voters, particularly among respondents who hold patriarchal gender norms.
Abstract: Although female political representation in the Arab world has nearly doubled in the last decade, little is known about how voters in the region view female politicians and their political platforms, particularly in a new democracy like Tunisia. We conduct original conjoint and vignette survey experiments to examine the effects of candidate gender and gender- and leadership-congruent political platforms on voter support. Building on role congruity theory, we find evidence of bias against female candidates among voters, particularly among respondents who hold patriarchal gender norms. Additionally, we find that all respondents are more likely to prefer candidates who emphasize security issues rather than women’s rights. Overall, our study suggests that female candidates who emphasize issues congruent with stereotypes of political leadership, such as security, can increase voter support, though respondents also reward male candidates who appeal to leadership congruent issues.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that hostile sexism and racial resentment play an important and somewhat underappreciated role in American elections through their influence on voter turnout and engagement with political campaigns, and find evidence of these divergent effects on the political mobilization of white voters using the 2016 American National Election Study.
Abstract: We argue that hostile sexism and racial resentment play an important and somewhat underappreciated role in American elections through their influence on voter turnout and engagement with political campaigns. The effects of these attitudes are not straightforward but depend on partisanship. We evaluate whether high levels of racial resentment and hostile sexism cross-pressure Democratic partisans, resulting in lower levels of political participation. We further consider whether high levels of racial resentment and hostile sexism bolster participation among Republicans. We find evidence of these divergent effects on the political mobilization of white voters using the 2016 American National Election Study. The results support our expectations and suggest that cuing resentment-based attitudes was an important strategy for engaging voters in the 2016 presidential campaign and will likely play an important role in future campaigns as well.
TL;DR: This article found that young adults who expect to do worse than their parents in the future are more likely to locate themselves at the extreme ends of the ideological scale, and they explored to what extent expected intergenerational downward mobility correlates with right-wing and left-wing selfplacement.
Abstract: In recent decades, and especially since the economic crisis, young people have been finding it more difficult to maintain or exceed the living standards of their parents. As a result, they increasingly expect socioeconomic downward mobility. We study the influence of such a pessimistic view on political attitudes, assuming that it is not so much young adults’ current economic status, but rather their anxiety concerning a prospective socioeconomic decline that affects their ideological positions. Drawing on data from a survey among young adults aged 18–35 in eleven European countries, we explore to what extent expected intergenerational downward mobility correlates with right-wing and left-wing self-placement. We find that young adults who expect to do worse than their parents in the future are indeed more likely to locate themselves at the extreme ends of the ideological scale.
TL;DR: The authors found that the contemporary effects of newspapers on representative-specific awareness are one-half to one-third estimates from earlier eras, and that newspapers remain an important contributor to political awareness in a changing media landscape.
Abstract: Shrinking audiences and political coverage cutbacks threaten newspapers’ ability to inform the public about politics. Despite substantial theorizing and widespread concern, it remains unclear how much the public can learn from these struggling news sources. I link measures of the newspaper-produced information environment with large-scale surveys that capture the public’s awareness of their member of Congress. This shows the contemporary effects of newspapers on representative-specific awareness are one-half to one-third estimates from earlier eras. Despite this decline newspapers remain an important contributor to political awareness in a changing media landscape, even for those with limited political interest. These results establish broader scope conditions under which the public can learn from the media environment.
TL;DR: The authors showed that race and ethnic group memberships condition the impact of gender, religion, region, and social class on policy attitudes, partisanship, and vote choice in the United States.
Abstract: Individuals are members of multiple social groups (race, class, religion, etc.). Intersectionality theory contends we cannot understand the influence of a group in isolation because group identities interact to influence outcomes collectively. This assertion challenges the typical approach in the political behavior literature, which assumes the effects of group memberships are additive. In this paper, I correct this shortcoming. I test how racial and ethnic group memberships condition the impact of gender, religion, region, and social class on policy attitudes, partisanship, and vote choice. Using pooled ANES (2000–2016) and the 2016 CMPS data, I show that these group memberships’ effects are conditional upon race and ethnicity. They shape Whites, Blacks, Latinos, and Asians’ political attitudes in diverse and, in some cases, opposite ways. The results imply that behavioral studies must be careful not to assume that group identities are additive instead of interactive. I conclude that quantitative scholars should account for the interactions of group identities in theoretical and empirical models.
TL;DR: This paper developed a theory about, and used unique nationally-representative survey data to estimate, two manifestations of victimhood: an egocentric one entailing only perceptions of one's own victimhood, and one focused on blaming "the system".
Abstract: Despite growing recognition among journalists and political pundits, the concept of victimhood has been largely ignored in empirical social science research. In this article, we develop a theory about, and use unique nationally-representative survey data to estimate, two manifestations of victimhood: an egocentric one entailing only perceptions of one’s own victimhood, and one focused on blaming “the system.” We find that these manifestations of victimhood cut across partisan, ideological, and sociodemographic lines, suggesting that feelings of victimhood are confined to neither “actual” victims nor those partisans on the losing side of elections. Moreover, both manifestations of victimhood, while related to candidate support and various racial attitudes, prove to be distinct from related psychological constructs, such as (collective) narcissism, system justification, and relative deprivation. Finally, an experiment based on candidate rhetoric demonstrates that some political messaging can make supporters feel like victims, which has consequences for subsequent attitudes and behavior.
TL;DR: This article examined whether within-subject shifts against the travel ban lasted over an extended period of time, and found that individual-level opinions, once they shifted against the ban, remained fairly stable one year later.
Abstract: On January 27, 2017, President Trump signed executive order 13769, which denied citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries entry into the United States. Opposition to what was termed the “Muslim ban” quickly amassed, producing sudden shifts to the information environment and to individual-level preferences. The present study examines whether within-subject shifts against the ban lasted over an extended period of time. Evidence from a three-wave panel study indicates that individual-level opinions, once they shifted against the ban, remained fairly stable one year later. Analysis of a large corpus of cable broadcast transcripts and newspaper articles further demonstrates that coverage of the ban from February 2017 to January 2018 did not dissipate, remained largely critical, and lacked any significant counter-narratives to potentially alter citizens’ preferences once again. Our study underscores the potential of capturing the dynamics of rapid attitudinal shifts with timely panel data, and of assessing the durability of such changes over time. It also highlights how mass movements and political communication may alter and stabilize citizens’ policy preferences, even those that target stigmatized groups.
TL;DR: The authors demonstrate that gender-based resentment motivated Leave votes in the EU referendum through perceptions of discrimination against men, among men using novel survey measures, and demonstrate the distinct nature of perceptions of prejudice towards men in comparison with discrimination towards women.
Abstract: Despite a relationship between gender and support for populist causes in cross-national research, including in the 2016 US Presidential election, the role of gender has been missing in analysis of support for Brexit, most likely because women and men showed no average aggregate-level differences in voting Leave or Remain This misses an important explanation for Britain’s vote to leave the European Union We demonstrate how gender-based resentment motivated Leave votes in the EU referendum through perceptions of discrimination against men, among men Using novel survey measures, we demonstrate (i) the distinct nature of perceptions of discrimination towards men in comparison with discrimination towards women; (ii) the sociological sources of perceptions that men are discriminated against; and (iii) the role of these perceptions in Brexit support Our findings reveal that the Brexit referendum provided an opportunity to express broader social grievances than have, to date, been identified as relevant The paper therefore offers a novel contribution to understanding the cultural backlash behind Britain’s vote to leave the EU, and by so doing, insight into the potential for gender-based backlash effects in elections where gender isn’t significantly primed, unlike the 2016 US presidential election where gender was a major political focus
TL;DR: This paper found that partisan media bias of a news-story is expressed in the manner that different news outlets cover the same political story within the same timeframe relative to one another, and that partisan bias finds its strongest expression in the types of news products that the news outlets emphasize on their front-page and in the sizing of articles.
Abstract: Integrating scholarship from several fields of study, this paper proposes a new model for understanding how partisan bias operates and how to measure its effects. We chart the factors that influence partisan bias over news production within news organizations that are simultaneously constrained and conditioned by factors of market competition, context considerations and journalistic norms. We argue that partisan media bias of a news-story is expressed in the manner that different news outlets cover the same political story within the same timeframe relative to one another. We find that description bias is a key parameter that is intertwined with selection bias mechanisms that highlight and downplay news items according to their content. We illustrate how partisan media coverage occurs in the context of a major political protest in Israel. We employ a dataset consisting of 1556 news products from all major newspapers. We find that partisan bias finds its strongest expression in the types of news products that the news outlets emphasize on their front-page and in the sizing of articles. These mechanisms of partisan bias can be generalized in the study of partisan bias in other types of news outlets.
TL;DR: This article explored the effect of race and race-related information on the willingness to donate to the homeless and support government efforts to address the issue of homelessness, and found significant effects of deservingness information on expressions of sympathy and support for government effort to address homelessness.
Abstract: What will motivate citizens to support efforts to help those in need? Charitable organizations seeking support for their cause will often use the story of a specific individual to illustrate the problem and generate support. We explore the effectiveness of this strategy using the issue of homelessness. Specifically, we examine the role that the race of beneficiaries featured in a message, and the inclusion of deservingness cues highlighting external attributions for an individual’s homelessness have on willingness to donate to the homeless and support government efforts to address homelessness. Utilizing two experiments with a nationally representative probability sample and an online opt-in quota sample, we find significant effects of deservingness information on expressions of sympathy, and on support for government efforts to address homelessness when viewing individuals from one’s own racial group. Direct effects on charitable giving are inconsistent across studies, with modest evidence that deservingness cues are associated with donation behavior in one. We also uncover interesting heterogeneity in how individuals react to a message about the homeless based on their predispositions. We discuss the implications for those utilizing this messaging strategy.
TL;DR: This article conducted a large-n longitudinal analysis employing survey and observational data from every two-party congressional race over a 12-year period (2006-2018) and connect individual-level theory and evidence with aggregate-level results.
Abstract: Are female candidates less likely than male candidates to attract votes or win elections? We conduct a large-n longitudinal analysis employing survey and observational data from every two-party congressional race over a 12-year period (2006–2018) and connect individual-level theory and evidence with aggregate-level results. We demonstrate that candidate gender significantly influences congressional vote-choice and election outcomes. Holding other variables constant, we show that male Republican and male independent voters are significantly less likely to vote for female Democratic candidates, but do not assess a similar penalty on female Republican candidates. Perceived ideological distance does not explain the lack of support for female Democrats—however, variation in candidate quality does: Female Democratic candidates can attract the support of male Republican and male independent voters when they have a qualifications advantage, but are penalized when they are merely “as qualified.” At the aggregate-level, female Democratic candidates with a qualifications advantage are as likely as males to win elections; but are significantly less likely than males to win when qualifications are held constant. The proportion of male Republicans and male independents in a district determines the extent of the penalty, with women’s electoral prospects declining as this proportion increases. Women can win, but they need to be highly qualified and strategic about the races in which they emerge. These findings contribute to our understanding of the micro- and macro-level factors that shape women’s electoral fortunes; and advance the goal of representational equality by helping candidates and campaigns concentrate their efforts on the most winnable voters and districts.
TL;DR: This paper explored the extent to which urban and rural identities exist above and beyond other factors like party and race, and whether they are consequential for the ways in which people evaluate the political and non-political world.
Abstract: As the American political landscape becomes increasingly divided along urban–rural lines, it raises the prospect of deepening social identities that are tied to one’s community-type. As community-type becomes an important social identity, it can lead to favoritism of one’s community in-group, or denigration of one’s community out-group. We explore the extent to which urban and rural identities exist above and beyond other factors like party and race, and whether they are consequential for the ways in which people evaluate the political and non-political world. Using national survey data, we demonstrate that people in both urban and rural locations hold beliefs that are consistent with a community-type social identity that is independent of other factors which are correlated with the urban–rural divide. We use two different experiments to assess the consequences of this identity, finding that there are distinct effects in the political arena when allocating government resources, and in the non-political world when judging hypothetical job applications. These effects are generally smaller in magnitude than other factors, such as partisanship, but suggest that community-type identities are important in politics.