Journal ArticleDOI
An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy
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For example, this article argued that the private sector is a self-regulating mechanism and that any government action beyond maintenance of law and order is "interference" with it rather than an intrinsic part of it.Abstract:
IN SPITE of the tremendous importance of government decisions in every phase of economic life, economic theorists have never successfully integrated government with private decision-makers in a single general equilibrium theory. Instead they have treated government action as an exogenous variable, determined by political considerations that lie outside the purview of economics. This view is really a carry-over from the classical premise that the private sector is a self-regulating mechanism and that any government action beyond maintenance of law and order is "interference" with it rather than an intrinsic part of it.2 However, in at least two fields of economic theory, the centrality of government action has forced economists to formulate rules that indicate how government "should" make decisions. Thus in the field of public finance, Hugh Dalton states:read more
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Explaining collective action with rational models
David Goetze,Peter F. Galderisi +1 more
TL;DR: This paper showed that a model in which subjects are presumed to trade off benefits to self with benefits to others provides a better explanation of actual contributing behavior than either the rational egoist or collective welfare models, but still explains only a small amount of the individual variance in contributing behavior.
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Why a clean politician supports dirty politics: A game-theoretical explanation for the persistence of political corruption
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the incentives of both the corrupt and clean politicians not to adopt a fully effective reform targeting political corruption in a repeated political competition among two career politicians, and they show that when the level of political corruption is high, neither politician does so in a Nash Equilibrium.
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Calhoun's constitutional economics
TL;DR: This article argued that Calhoun's early nationalism was a reaction against the operation of multiple vetoes in the legislative process, requiring near unanimity to pass legislation, and proposed an alternative form of unanimity, the concurring majority, as the appropriate corrective.
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The Intellectual Legacy of Gordon Tullock
TL;DR: Tullock is one of the world's leading economists and has made contributions to constitutional political economy, public choice, bureaucracy, the law, and bio-economics as mentioned in this paper.
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Electoral Competition with Uncertainty Averse Parties
TL;DR: The authors show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse, which is a generalization of the classical median voter result.