Dichotomy for voting systems
TLDR
In this article, it was shown that every scoring-protocol election system having two or more point values assigned to candidates other than the favorite is NP-complete to manipulate, i.e., having @?{@a"i|2|2==2-is a voting system that cannot be manipulated in polynomial time.About:
This article is published in Journal of Computer and System Sciences.The article was published on 2007-02-01 and is currently open access. It has received 127 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Cardinal voting systems & Voting.read more
Citations
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When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate
TL;DR: This article characterize the exact number of candidates for which manipulation becomes hard for the plurality, Borda, STV, Copeland, maximin, veto, plurality with runoff, regular cup, and randomized cup protocols and shows that for simpler manipulation problems, manipulation cannot be hard with few candidates.
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Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
TL;DR: Among systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, Copeland voting is the first natural election system proven to have full resistance to constructive control and vulnerability results for microbribery are proven via a novel technique involving min-cost network flow.
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Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the ability of an election's chair to prevent a particular candidate from winning an election, through such mechanisms as voter/candidate addition/suppression/partition, ensuring that a candidate (equivalently, alternative) does not win.
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AI’s War on Manipulation: Are We Winning?
TL;DR: An overview of more than two decades of work that studies computational complexity as a barrier against manipulation in elections is provided.
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How hard is bribery in elections
TL;DR: This work obtains both polynomial-time bribery algorithms and proofs of the intractability of bribery, and results show that the complexity of bribery is extremely sensitive to the setting.
References
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Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that any non-dictatorial voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation, i.e., an individual can manipulate a voting scheme if, by misrepresenting his preferences, he secures an outcome he prefers to the "honest" outcome.
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Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
TL;DR: In this paper, the strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, nonnegative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Rank aggregation methods for the Web
TL;DR: A set of techniques for the rank aggregation problem is developed and compared to that of well-known methods, to design rank aggregation techniques that can be used to combat spam in Web searches.
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The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
TL;DR: A voting rule is exhibited that efficiently computes winners but is computationally resistant to strategic manipulation, showing how computational complexity might protect the integrity of social choice.