Incentives in ridesharing with deficit control
Dengji Zhao,Dongmo Zhang,Enrico H. Gerding,Yuko Sakurai,Makoto Yokoo +4 more
- pp 1021-1028
TLDR
It is shown that, for this system, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is incentive compatible (IC), individually rational (IR) and efficient (i.e., minimizing cost), but results in a very high deficit, thus requiring large subsidies.Abstract:
This paper proposes a novel market-based system for ridesharing, where commuters are matched based on their declared travel constraints, the number of available seats (which could be zero), and their costs. Based on this information, the system then designates commuters to be either drivers or riders, finds appropriate matches, and calculates rewards for drivers and payments for riders. We show that, for this system, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is incentive compatible (IC), individually rational (IR) and efficient (i.e., minimizing cost), but results in a very high deficit, thus requiring large subsidies. We therefore investigate alternative mechanisms. We first consider mechanisms with fixed prices and show that no such mechanism can be both efficient and IC. Thus, we propose an inefficient IC mechanism but which has deficit control. We then consider a VCG mechanism with two-sided reserve prices. We show that this mechanism is IC and IR for a certain range of reserve prices, and we analyse the deficit bounds and how these can be controlled. We furthermore show that the deficit can be controlled even further by limiting the (costly) detours taken by the drivers when computing the allocations, thereby trading off efficiency and deficit.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
The Economics of Multi-Hop Ride Sharing - Creating New Mobility Networks Through IS
Timm Teubner,Christoph M. Flath +1 more
TL;DR: It is found that multi-hop ride sharing proves competitive against other modes of transportation and has the potential to greatly increase ride availability and city connectedness, especially under high reliability requirements.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Price-aware real-time ride-sharing at scale: an auction-based approach
TL;DR: This work introduces a distributed auction-based framework where each driver's mobile app automatically bids on every nearby request taking into account many factors such as both the driver's and the riders' profiles, their itineraries, the pricing model, and the current number of riders in the vehicle.
Journal ArticleDOI
A Cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach to the Social Ridesharing Problem
TL;DR: This work focuses on the optimisation problem of forming the travellers' coalitions that minimise the travel cost of the overall system, and model the formation problem as a Graph-Constrained Coalition Formation (GCCF) one, where the set of feasible coalitions is restricted by a graph.
Journal ArticleDOI
Mechanism design for first-mile ridesharing based on personalized requirements part I: Theoretical analysis in generalized scenarios
Zheyong Bian,Xiang Liu +1 more
TL;DR: The proposed mechanism is proved to be individual rational, incentive compatible, and price non-negative and to demonstrate the generality of the personalized-requirement-based mechanism that can be adapted into different scenarios.
Journal ArticleDOI
Dynamic ridesharing
Bilong Shen,Yan Huang,Ying Zhao +2 more
TL;DR: This paper formally address the problem of dynamic ridesharing and introduces the solution framework of filter and refine, under which existing state-of-the-art works are summarized, and point out possible research directions and problems needed to be solved.
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TL;DR: Ridersharing's evolution can be categorized into five phases: (1) World War II car-sharing (or carpooling) clubs; (2) major responses to the 1970s energy crises; (3) early organized ridesharing schemes; (4) reliable rideshaying systems; and (5) technology-enabled ridematching as mentioned in this paper.