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Managerial Incentives and Audit Fees: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry

TLDR
This article examined the relation between audit fees and managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry and found that audit fees are higher when managerial incentives are poor, and that managerial incentives were correlated with audit fees.
Abstract
We examine the relation between audit fees and managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry. Using proxies for managerial incentives based on fund organizational form, advisor compensation, and fund expenses, we find that audit fees are higher when managerial incentives are poor. Our results represent new evidence on the relation between audit fees and managerial incentives.

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RETRACTED: The relationship between audit committees, compensation incentives and corporate audit fees in Pakistan

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the association between audit committees, compensation incentives and corporate audit fees in Pakistan by using the data of fifty firms that are listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), Pakistan during the years of 2007-2011.
Journal ArticleDOI

Size Variables in Audit Fee Models: An Examination of the Effects of Alternative Mathematical Transformations

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the mathematical transformations used for assets of different valuation complexity in audit fee models and find that more complexly valued assets are less likely to follow the traditional log transformation.
Journal ArticleDOI

Asset Liquidity and Mutual Fund Management Fees: Evidence from Closed-End Mutual Funds

TL;DR: In this article, the authors assess whether the liquidity of a closed-end mutual fund's investments is related to the management fee charged by the fund's investment advisor and find a significantly positive relationship between the percentage of level 3 assets (the least liquid securities) and management fees.
Posted Content

Investigating the Relationship between Institutional Ownership and Audit Fees

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the relationship between institutional ownership and audit fees in 50 firms listed in Tehran Stack Exchange and found that there is no meaningful relationship between the two factors.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Does It All Add Up? Benchmarks and the Compensation of Active Portfolio Managers

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined theoretically the use of benchmark portfolios in the compensation of privately informed portfolio managers and found that commonly used benchmark-adjusted compensation schemes are generally inconsistent with optimal risk-sharing and do not lead to the choice of an optimal portfolio for the investor.
Journal ArticleDOI

Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used a new database to describe the composition and compensation of boards of directors of U.S. open-end mutual funds and examined the relation between board structure and the fees charged by a fund to its shareholders.
Journal ArticleDOI

Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter

TL;DR: In this article, operating and stock return results imply that managers that commit fraud likely anticipate large stock price declines if they do not misreport earnings, and the importance of the shape and vesting status of managerial incentive payoffs in providing incentives to commit fraud.
Journal ArticleDOI

Performance Incentive Fees: An Agency Theoretic Approach

TL;DR: In this paper, two types of incentive contracts for mutual fund managers are analyzed and compared and the results show that the "symmetric" contract, while not necessarily eliminating agency costs, dominates the "bonus*" contract in aligning the manager's interests with those of the investor.
Journal ArticleDOI

Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter

TL;DR: This article showed that managers who commit fraud anticipate large stock price declines if they were to report truthfully, which would cause greater losses for managerial stockholdings than for options because of differences in convexity.
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