Open AccessPosted Content
The Corporate Governance of Banks
Jonathan R. Macey,Maureen O'Hara +1 more
TLDR
In this paper, the authors argue that commercial banks pose unique corporate governance problems for managers and regulators, as well as for claimants on the banks' cash flows, such as investors and depositors.Abstract:
The study argues that commercial banks pose unique corporate governance problems for managers and regulators, as well as for claimants on the banks' cash flows, such as investors and depositors The authors support the general principle that fiduciary duties should be owed exclusively to shareholders However, in the special case of banks, they contend that the scope of the fiduciary duties and obligations of officers and directors should be broadened to include creditors In particular, the authors call on bank directors to take solvency risk explicitly and systematically into account when making decisions or else face personal liability for failure to do soread more
Citations
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Gender equality on board and banks’ earning management: Achieving SDG in Southeast Asia’s Corporation
TL;DR: In this article, the influence of gender equality on earnings management of banks in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand stock exchanges was analyzed using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) method.
The impact of gender diversity on shareholder wealth: Evidence from European bank M&A
Fixing Bankers' Pay in Europe: Governance, Regulation and Disclosure
TL;DR: In this paper, an analysis of disclosure behavior by Europe's largest banks is conducted using criteria based on the European Commission's Recommendations, focusing on the role of disclosure as a remedy for solving the weaknesses in the design of pay contracts and governance structures.
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Corporate Governance in the Banking Sector (Empirical Study on the Effect of Separating Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Positions on Financial Performance)
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate and explore the effect of separation the positions of CEO and Chairman on the financial performance of banks in Egypt and find that good corporate governance enhances real investments.
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Board of directors and bank performance: beyond agency theory
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined 54 listed and unlisted banks from 2005 to 2010 and found that the presence of outside directors on the board and the leadership duality had no statistical impact on performance.
References
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Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
TL;DR: The authors showed that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits, and showed that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
Journal ArticleDOI
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
Book
A Monetary History of the United States
Milton Friedman,Anna J. Schwartz +1 more
TL;DR: The long-awaited monetary history of the United States by Friedman and Schwartz is in every sense of the term a monumental scholarly achievement as discussed by the authors, and the treatment of innumerable issues, large and small, have been brought to bear on the solution of complex and subtle economic issues.
Journal Article
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors integrate elements from the theory of agency, property rights and finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm and define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the separation and control issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears costs and why and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence.