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The Corporate Governance of Banks

TLDR
In this paper, the authors argue that commercial banks pose unique corporate governance problems for managers and regulators, as well as for claimants on the banks' cash flows, such as investors and depositors.
Abstract
The study argues that commercial banks pose unique corporate governance problems for managers and regulators, as well as for claimants on the banks' cash flows, such as investors and depositors The authors support the general principle that fiduciary duties should be owed exclusively to shareholders However, in the special case of banks, they contend that the scope of the fiduciary duties and obligations of officers and directors should be broadened to include creditors In particular, the authors call on bank directors to take solvency risk explicitly and systematically into account when making decisions or else face personal liability for failure to do so

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A Cross-Country Assessment of Bank Risk-Shifting Behavior

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a simple model and test the extent to which information asymmetry between bank owners and depositors induces risk-shifting behavior that allows for higher bank net interest margins.
Journal ArticleDOI

Bank Bonuses and Bail-Outs

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs.
Posted Content

An Institutional Architecture for Meta-Risk Regulation in Irish Banking: Lessons from Anglo Irish Bank’s Minsky Moment

TL;DR: In this paper, the risk management failures within Anglo Irish Bank are mapped, showing that poor internal corporate governance within a Minsky credit cycle can lead to destabilising macroeconomic conditions, which may prolong the effects of a credit-induced downturn.
Journal ArticleDOI

Preaching water but drinking wine? Relative performance evaluation in international banking

TL;DR: In this article, the authors test for evidence of RPE in international banking and pay particular attention to banks that openly disclose its use, finding moderate evidence consistent with RPE for 46 large international banks.
References
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Book

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI

Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity

TL;DR: The authors showed that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits, and showed that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
Journal ArticleDOI

Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
Book

A Monetary History of the United States

TL;DR: The long-awaited monetary history of the United States by Friedman and Schwartz is in every sense of the term a monumental scholarly achievement as discussed by the authors, and the treatment of innumerable issues, large and small, have been brought to bear on the solution of complex and subtle economic issues.
Journal Article

Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors integrate elements from the theory of agency, property rights and finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm and define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the separation and control issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears costs and why and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence.
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