Open AccessPosted Content
The Corporate Governance of Banks
Jonathan R. Macey,Maureen O'Hara +1 more
TLDR
In this paper, the authors argue that commercial banks pose unique corporate governance problems for managers and regulators, as well as for claimants on the banks' cash flows, such as investors and depositors.Abstract:
The study argues that commercial banks pose unique corporate governance problems for managers and regulators, as well as for claimants on the banks' cash flows, such as investors and depositors The authors support the general principle that fiduciary duties should be owed exclusively to shareholders However, in the special case of banks, they contend that the scope of the fiduciary duties and obligations of officers and directors should be broadened to include creditors In particular, the authors call on bank directors to take solvency risk explicitly and systematically into account when making decisions or else face personal liability for failure to do soread more
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The Complementarity of Regulatory and Internal Governance Mechanisms in Banks
Hervé Alexandre,Karima Bouaiss +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors demonstrate that double discipline acts in a complementary manner, while the literature shows a substitution of discipline from regulation and internal discipline, and they also show that these governance mechanisms, both internal and external, help explain appropriately the simultaneous influence between financial performance, risk-taking and level of capital of French banks.
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Bank mergers, equity risk incentives, and CEO stock options
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the risk-incentive effect of CEO stock options in the banking industry and found that stock options may be effective in mitigating the agency problem of Jensen and Meckling wherein managers take too little risk on behalf of shareholders.
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Dancing with giants: Contextualizing state and family ownership effects on firm performance in the Gulf Cooperation Council
TL;DR: In this paper, the effect of state and family blockholders as well as their possible interaction on financial firm performance in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries was theoretically and empirically analyzed.
Posted Content
Board characteristics and firm performance: evidence from palestine
TL;DR: In this article, the authors assess the relationship between the Return on Assets and Board Characteristics (Board independence, Board meeting, Board size, Board expertise, Company size and Company year of incorporation).
References
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Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
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Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
TL;DR: The authors showed that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits, and showed that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
Journal ArticleDOI
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
Book
A Monetary History of the United States
Milton Friedman,Anna J. Schwartz +1 more
TL;DR: The long-awaited monetary history of the United States by Friedman and Schwartz is in every sense of the term a monumental scholarly achievement as discussed by the authors, and the treatment of innumerable issues, large and small, have been brought to bear on the solution of complex and subtle economic issues.
Journal Article
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors integrate elements from the theory of agency, property rights and finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm and define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the separation and control issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears costs and why and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence.