Open AccessPosted Content
The Corporate Governance of Banks
Jonathan R. Macey,Maureen O'Hara +1 more
TLDR
In this paper, the authors argue that commercial banks pose unique corporate governance problems for managers and regulators, as well as for claimants on the banks' cash flows, such as investors and depositors.Abstract:
The study argues that commercial banks pose unique corporate governance problems for managers and regulators, as well as for claimants on the banks' cash flows, such as investors and depositors The authors support the general principle that fiduciary duties should be owed exclusively to shareholders However, in the special case of banks, they contend that the scope of the fiduciary duties and obligations of officers and directors should be broadened to include creditors In particular, the authors call on bank directors to take solvency risk explicitly and systematically into account when making decisions or else face personal liability for failure to do soread more
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Could “Lehman Sisters” reduce bank risk‐taking? International evidence
TL;DR: In this paper , the impact of board gender diversity on bank risk-taking using a large hand-collected dataset covering 480 commercial banks across 18 developed and 21 developing countries over the period 2007-2016 was examined.
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How does Corporate and Shariah governance influence the default risk: A Mediating role of Risk Committee
TL;DR: In this article , the authors proposed the role risk committee as mediating between the association of ownership, board structure, Shariah governance, and default risk of Islamic banks operating in Pakistan.
Diferencias en el gobierno corporativo de empresas financieras y no financieras en el mercado bursátil español
TL;DR: In this paper, the differences between corporate governance structures of financial and non-financial Spanish listed firms were analyzed using information of the 2004 Annual Corporate Governance Reports issued by 132 firms.
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Companies Act and Corporate Governance in India: Quo Vadis?
Phool Chand,Ashis Taru Deb +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a theoretical framework of corporate governance is derived from incomplete contracts among various stakeholders in a firm and the theoretical framework draws from institutional economics and conceptual framework of Corporate Governance.
References
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Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
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Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
TL;DR: The authors showed that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits, and showed that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
Journal ArticleDOI
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
Book
A Monetary History of the United States
Milton Friedman,Anna J. Schwartz +1 more
TL;DR: The long-awaited monetary history of the United States by Friedman and Schwartz is in every sense of the term a monumental scholarly achievement as discussed by the authors, and the treatment of innumerable issues, large and small, have been brought to bear on the solution of complex and subtle economic issues.
Journal Article
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors integrate elements from the theory of agency, property rights and finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm and define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the separation and control issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears costs and why and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence.