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The Corporate Governance of Banks

TLDR
In this paper, the authors argue that commercial banks pose unique corporate governance problems for managers and regulators, as well as for claimants on the banks' cash flows, such as investors and depositors.
Abstract
The study argues that commercial banks pose unique corporate governance problems for managers and regulators, as well as for claimants on the banks' cash flows, such as investors and depositors The authors support the general principle that fiduciary duties should be owed exclusively to shareholders However, in the special case of banks, they contend that the scope of the fiduciary duties and obligations of officers and directors should be broadened to include creditors In particular, the authors call on bank directors to take solvency risk explicitly and systematically into account when making decisions or else face personal liability for failure to do so

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A Influência de Variáveis de Governança Corporativa na Estrutura de Capital em Empresas do Setor Bancário Listadas na Bovespa

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate a relacao entre composicao do conselho de administracao, recompensa de executivos a partir da concessao de participacao nos lucros da empresa (custo de agencia), ambas variaveis do modelo de governanca corporativa, with a composicaos da estrutura de capital of empresas brasileiras do setor bancario.
Book ChapterDOI

Pay Structures in European Banks

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide an understanding of trends in executive compensation and establish a connection between ongoing policy reforms and executive pay structures in European banks, and contrast the regulatory approach followed in the US to that in Europe.
Journal ArticleDOI

Identifying Monetary Policy Rules for Sri Lanka

TL;DR: In this paper, monetary policy of Sri Lanka using policy reaction functions over the period of 1996:Q1 to 2014:Q2, where the Central Bank followed a monetary targeting framework in the conduct of monetary policy.
Posted ContentDOI

Why solvency regulation of banks fails to reach its objective

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a critique of solvency regulation such as imposed on banks by Basel I and II, which can run counter their stated objective, which may also be true of Basel III.
References
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Book

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI

Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity

TL;DR: The authors showed that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits, and showed that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
Journal ArticleDOI

Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.
Book

A Monetary History of the United States

TL;DR: The long-awaited monetary history of the United States by Friedman and Schwartz is in every sense of the term a monumental scholarly achievement as discussed by the authors, and the treatment of innumerable issues, large and small, have been brought to bear on the solution of complex and subtle economic issues.
Journal Article

Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors integrate elements from the theory of agency, property rights and finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm and define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the separation and control issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears costs and why and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence.
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