Journal ArticleDOI
Voluntary voting: Costs and benefits
Vijay Krishna,John Morgan +1 more
TLDR
This work compares voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information, and finds that voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting when voting is costless and economizes on costs.About:
This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory.The article was published on 2012-11-01. It has received 92 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Cardinal voting systems & Sincere voting.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Turnout and power sharing
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare turnout under proportional power-sharing electoral systems and winner-take-all elections and find that if the two parties have relatively equal support, turnout is higher in a winner-to-all system; the result is reversed when there is a clear underdog.
Journal ArticleDOI
Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections
Vijay Krishna,John Morgan +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence and show that when voting is voluntary and costly, the outcome of a large election is always first-best.
Journal ArticleDOI
Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections
Vijay Krishna,John Morgan +1 more
TL;DR: The authors studied a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence and showed that when voting is voluntary and costly, the outcome of a large election is always first-best.
Journal ArticleDOI
If You Mobilize Them, They Will Become Informed: Experimental Evidence that Information Acquisition Is Endogenous to Costs and Incentives to Participate
TL;DR: In this article, a field experiment integrates an intensive mobilization treatment into a panel survey conducted before and after a city-wide election and the results suggest institutions that encourage participation not only increase voter turnout but also motivate citizens to become more politically informed.
Journal ArticleDOI
A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs☆
TL;DR: A unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known political preferences and costs of voting shows that for small electorates, members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher probability than do those in the majority, but the majority is strictly more likely to win the election.
References
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Book
An Economic Theory of Democracy
TL;DR: Downs presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work on voting and turnout as discussed by the authors, particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote.
Journal Article
Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma
TL;DR: Turnout in U.S. voter turnout is especially low, but, measured as percent of voting-age population, it is also relatively low in most other countries.
Journal ArticleDOI
Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1996
TL;DR: Turnout in U.S. voter turnout is especially low, but, measured as percent of voting-age population, it is also relatively low in most other countries as mentioned in this paper.
Journal ArticleDOI
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
TL;DR: The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred as discussed by the authors.
Posted Content
The Swing Voter's Curse
TL;DR: In this article, the existence of a swing voter's curse is demonstrated: less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless, and the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another.