Open AccessPosted Content
Wait a minute! A fast, Cross-VM attack on AES.
TLDR
The results of this study show that there is a great security risk to OpenSSL AES implementation running on VMware cloud services when the deduplication is not disabled.Abstract:
In cloud computing, efficiencies are reaped by resource sharing such as co-location of computation and deduplication of data. This work exploits resource sharing in virtualization software to build a powerful cache-based attack on AES. We demonstrate the vulnerability by mounting Cross-VM Flush+Reload cache attacks in VMware VMs to recover the keys of an AES implementation of OpenSSL 1.0.1 running inside the victim VM. Furthermore, the attack works in a realistic setting where different VMs are located on separate cores. The modified flush+reload attack we present, takes only in the order of seconds to minutes to succeed in a cross-VM setting. Therefore long term co-location, as required by other fine grain attacks in the literature, are not needed. The results of this study show that there is a great security risk to OpenSSL AES implementation running on VMware cloud services when the deduplication is not disabled.read more
Citations
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical
TL;DR: This work presents an effective implementation of the Prime+Probe side-channel attack against the last-level cache of GnuPG, and achieves a high attack resolution without relying on weaknesses in the OS or virtual machine monitor or on sharing memory between attacker and victim.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce controlled channel attacks, a new type of sidechannel attack that allows an untrusted operating system to extract large amounts of sensitive information from protected applications on systems like Overshadow, Ink Tag or Haven.
Journal ArticleDOI
Meltdown: reading kernel memory from user space
Moritz Lipp,Michael Schwarz,Daniel Gruss,Thomas Prescher,Werner Haas,Jann Horn,Stefan Mangard,Paul C. Kocher,Daniel Genkin,Yuval Yarom,Mike Hamburg,Raoul Strackx +11 more
TL;DR: Meltdown as mentioned in this paper exploits side effects of out-of-order execution on modern processors to read arbitrary kernel-memory locations including personal data and passwords, and it does not rely on any software vulnerabilities.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Cache template attacks: automating attacks on inclusive last-level caches
TL;DR: An automated attack on the T-table-based AES implementation of OpenSSL that is as efficient as state-of-the-art manual cache attacks and can reduce the entropy per character from log2(26) = 4.7 to 1.4 bits on Linux systems is performed.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Cross-Tenant Side-Channel Attacks in PaaS Clouds
TL;DR: These attacks are the first granular, cross-tenant, side-channel attacks successfully demonstrated on state-of-the-art commercial clouds, PaaS or otherwise.
References
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds
TL;DR: It is shown that it is possible to map the internal cloud infrastructure, identify where a particular target VM is likely to reside, and then instantiate new VMs until one is placed co-resident with the target, and how such placement can then be used to mount cross-VM side-channel attacks to extract information from a target VM on the same machine.
BookDOI
The Design of Rijndael
Joan Daemen,Vincent Rijmen +1 more
TL;DR: This volume is the authoritative guide to the Rijndael algorithm and AES and professionals, researchers, and students active or interested in data encryption will find it a valuable source of information and reference.
Journal ArticleDOI
Memory resource management in VMware ESX server
TL;DR: Several novel ESX Server mechanisms and policies for managing memory are introduced, including a ballooning technique that reclaims the pages considered least valuable by the operating system running in a virtual machine, and an idle memory tax that achieves efficient memory utilization.
Posted Content
Cache attacks and Countermeasures: the Case of AES.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe side-channel attacks based on inter-process leakage through the state of the CPU's memory cache, which can be used for cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives that employ data-dependent table lookups.
Book ChapterDOI
Cache attacks and countermeasures: the case of AES
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe side-channel attacks based on inter-process leakage through the state of the CPU's memory cache, which can be used for cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives that employ data-dependent table lookups.