When is the Risk of Cooperation Worth Taking? The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a Game of Multiple Motives
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In this article, the authors explain the degree of cooperation by a combination of four motives: efficiency, conditional cooperation, fear and greed, and explain why players cooperate in the prisoner's dilemma with personality.Abstract:
This experimental article helps to understand the motives behind cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. It manipulates the pay-off in case both players defect in a two-player, one-shot prisoner’s dilemma and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of four motives: efficiency, conditional cooperation, fear and greed. All motives are significant but some become only significant if one controls for all remaining ones. This seems to be the reason why earlier attempts at explaining choices in the prisoner’s dilemma with personality have not been successful.read more
Citations
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Heuristics guide the implementation of social preferences in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma experiments
TL;DR: In this article, heuristics guide the implementation of social preferences in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma experiments, and the results show that social preferences can be used to guide the execution of social preference.
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Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiments
TL;DR: Evidence is presented that cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner's Dilemma is a result of social preferences guided by simple decision heuristics, rather than the rational examination of payoffs assumed by most social preference models.
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Social surplus determines cooperation rates in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma
TL;DR: This study provides evidence on how cooperation rates vary across payoff parameters in the Prisoner's Dilemma, using four one-shot games that differ only in the payoffs from mutual cooperation.
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Theory of mind and decision science: Towards a typology of tasks and computational models.
Tessa Rusch,Tessa Rusch,Saurabh Steixner-Kumar,Prashant Doshi,Michael L. Spezio,Michael L. Spezio,Jan Gläscher +6 more
TL;DR: It is suggested there to be an increase in ToM engagement and multiplexing as social cognitive decision-making tasks become more interactive and uncertain and it is argued that computational models of valuation and beliefs follow these dimensions to best allow researchers to effectively model sophisticated ToM-processes.
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Group size effects and critical mass in public goods games
TL;DR: A two-treatment empirical study where subjects play a Public Goods Game with a Critical Mass, such that the return for full cooperation increases linearly for early contributions and then stabilizes after a critical mass is reached.
References
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