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For Peer Review
Working for an algorithm: Power asymmetries and agency
in online work settings
Journal:
Administrative Science Quarterly
Manuscript ID
ASQ-16-0322.R4
Manuscript Type:
Original Articles
Methodology Keywords:
Case study, Content analysis, Qualitative methods (general)
Keywords:
.....Power, Algorithms, Online evaluations, Sociomateriality, Agency,
Practice theory
Abstract:
Drawing on interviews with 77 high-performing eBay business sellers,
this article investigates the power asymmetries generated by customer
evaluations in online work settings. Sellers’ accounts revealed a high
degree of sensitivity to negative reviews, which, while infrequent,
triggered feelings of anxiety and vulnerability. These accounts exposed
power asymmetries at two levels: the transactional level between sellers
and customers, and the governance level between sellers and eBay. Our
findings highlight three main mechanisms underlying power asymmetries
in this context. First, online customer evaluations have created a new
form of employee monitoring in which power is exercised through the
construction of visibility gaps between buyers and sellers, and through
an implicit coalition between buyers and the platform owner, who join
together in the evaluation procedures. Second, by mediating and
objectifying relations, algorithms reproduce power asymmetries among
the different categories of actor, thereby constraining human agency.
Third, online customer evaluations prompt sellers to exploit their
practical knowledge of the algorithm to increase their agency. Through
the lived experience of working for an algorithm, our findings contribute
new understandings of power and agency in online work settings.
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/asq
Administrative Science Quarterly
For Peer Review
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Working for an Algorithm: Power Asymmetries and Agency in Online Work Settings
Corentin Curchod
University of Edinburgh Business School
Gerardo Patriotta
Warwick Business School
Laurie Cohen
Nottingham University Business School
Nicolas Neysen
HEC Liège
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Abstract
Drawing on interviews with 77 high-performing eBay business sellers in France and
Belgium, this article investigates the power asymmetries generated by customers’ evaluations
in online work settings. Sellers revealed a high degree of sensitivity to negative reviews,
which, while infrequent, triggered feelings of anxiety and vulnerability. Their accounts
exposed power asymmetries at two levels: the transactional level between sellers and
customers and the governance level between sellers and eBay. Our findings highlight three
main mechanisms underlying power asymmetries in this context. First, online customer
evaluations have created a new form of employee monitoring in which power is exercised
through the construction of visibility gaps between buyers and sellers and through an implicit
coalition between buyers and the platform owner, who join together in the evaluation
procedures. Second, by mediating and objectifying relations, algorithms reproduce power
asymmetries among the different categories of actors, thereby constraining human agency.
Third, online customer evaluations prompt sellers to exploit their practical knowledge of the
algorithm to increase their agency. Through the lived experience of working for an algorithm,
our findings contribute new understandings of power and agency in online work settings.
Keywords: power asymmetries, algorithms, online evaluations, sociomateriality, agency,
practice
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Contemporary work settings increasingly rely on customer reviews—peer-generated
evaluations of products’ and sellers’ quality on third-party platforms (Mudambi and Schuff,
2010). Typically associated with online platforms such as eBay, Amazon, Uber, Airbnb, and
Yelp, these work settings portray new configurations of power that can be characterized by a
number of features. First, in place of traditional dyadic exchanges, customer reviews enact
triadic relationships among the platform operator, buyers, and sellers that generate multiple
accountabilities. Second, these relationships are mediated by algorithmic evaluation
apparatuses that assess performance according to both set metrics (Orlikowski and Scott,
2014) and written feedback (Pavlou and Dimoka, 2006). Third, anonymous customers form
part of an invisible “crowd” that impinges on each individual seller’s profile and reputation
through public online evaluations (Orlikowski and Scott, 2015).
The link between online customer reviews and power is vividly captured in a
comment made to us by a seller of videogames working on eBay:
We eventually realized that there was still a sort of Sword of Damocles hanging over
the big sellers. We’re in a sort of system where we’re not very free. They [eBay]
impose things on us—conditions, customer satisfaction and all that—which become
totally excessive. Today, it’s impossible to be 100% positive, because there’s always
a client who’ll say “terrible service, don’t buy here.” So, it’s difficult to work our
way forward, because our hands are tied.
Online reviews produce a power asymmetry because the parties involved have a differential
ability to take action. In the quote, the asymmetry stems from sellers being simultaneously
accountable to the platform owner, who has the power to impose conditions, and to buyers,
who have the power to post negative reviews and comments online. The metaphor of the
“Sword of Damocles” expresses the imminent risk of sanctions resulting from the
impossibility of fulfilling the ideal norm of 100 percent positive reviews. As a consequence,
sellers see themselves as part of an obscure mechanism of algorithm-generated metrics (“a
sort of system”) that diminishes their agency.
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