Showing papers on "Counterfactual conditional published in 2018"

Counterfactual Explanations without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the Gdpr

Abstract: There has been much discussion of the “right to explanation” in the EU General Data Protection Regulation, and its existence, merits, and disadvantages. Implementing a right to explanation that opens the ‘black box’ of algorithmic decision-making faces major legal and technical barriers. Explaining the functionality of complex algorithmic decisionmaking systems and their rationale in specific cases is a technically challenging problem. Some explanations may offer little meaningful information to data subjects, raising questions around their value. Data controllers have an interest to not disclose information about their algorithms that contains trade secrets, violates the rights and freedoms of others (e.g. privacy), or allows data subjects to game or manipulate decision-making. Explanations of automated decisions need not hinge on the general public understanding how algorithmic systems function. Even though interpretability is of great importance and should be pursued, explanations can, in principle, be offered without opening the black box. Looking at explanations as a means to help a data subject act rather than merely understand, one can gauge the scope and content of explanations according to the specific goal or action they are intended to support. From the perspective of individuals affected by automated decision-making, we propose three aims for explanations: (1) to inform and help the individual understand why a particular decision was reached, (2) to provide grounds to contest the decision if the outcome is undesired, and (3) to understand what could be changed to receive a desired result in the future, based on the current decision-making model. We assess how each of these goals finds support in the GDPR, and the extent to which they hinge on opening the ‘black box’. We suggest data controllers should offer a particular type of explanation, ‘unconditional counterfactual explanations’, to support these three aims. These counterfactual explanations describe the smallest change to the world that would obtain a desirable outcome, or to arrive at a “close possible world.” As multiple variables or sets of variables can lead to one or more desirable outcomes, multiple counterfactual explanations can be provided, corresponding to different choices of nearby possible worlds for which the counterfactual holds. Counterfactuals describe a dependency on the external facts that lead to that decision without the need to convey the internal state or logic of an algorithm. As a result, counterfactuals serve as a minimal solution that bypasses the current technical limitations of interpretability, while striking a balance between transparency and the rights and freedoms of others (e.g. privacy, trade secrets).

GANITE: Estimation of Individualized Treatment Effects using Generative Adversarial Nets

Abstract: Estimating individualized treatment effects (ITE) is a challenging task due to the need for an individual's potential outcomes to be learned from biased data and without having access to the counterfactuals. We propose a novel method for inferring ITE based on the Generative Adversarial Nets (GANs) framework. Our method, termed Generative Adversarial Nets for inference of Individualized Treatment Effects (GANITE), is motivated by the possibility that we can capture the uncertainty in the counterfactual distributions by attempting to learn them using a GAN. We generate proxies of the counterfactual outcomes using a counterfactual generator, G, and then pass these proxies to an ITE generator, I, in order to train it. By modeling both of these using the GAN framework, we are able to infer based on the factual data, while still accounting for the unseen counterfactuals. We test our method on three real-world datasets (with both binary and multiple treatments) and show that GANITE outperforms state-of-the-art methods.

Interpretable Credit Application Predictions With Counterfactual Explanations

Abstract: We predict credit applications with off-the-shelf, interchangeable black-box classifiers and we explain single predictions with counterfactual explanations. Counterfactual explanations expose the minimal changes required on the input data to obtain a different result e.g., approved vs rejected application. Despite their effectiveness, counterfactuals are mainly designed for changing an undesired outcome of a prediction i.e. loan rejected. Counterfactuals, however, can be difficult to interpret, especially when a high number of features are involved in the explanation. Our contribution is two-fold: i) we propose positive counterfactuals, i.e. we adapt counterfactual explanations to also explain accepted loan applications, and ii) we propose two weighting strategies to generate more interpretable counterfactuals. Experiments on the HELOC loan applications dataset show that our contribution outperforms the baseline counterfactual generation strategy, by leading to smaller and hence more interpretable counterfactuals.

The Possible as a Field of Inquiry.

Abstract: In this editorial I introduce the possible as an emerging field of inquiry in psychology and related disciplines Over the past decades, significant advances have been made in connected areas – counterfactual thinking, anticipation, prospection, imagination and creativity, etc – and several calls have been formulated in the social sciences to study human beings and societies as systems that are open to possibility and to the future However, engaging with the possible, in the sense of both becoming aware of it and actively exploring it, represents a subject in need of further theoretical elaboration In this paper, I review several existing approaches to the possible before briefly outlining a new, sociocultural account While the former are focused on cognitive processes and uphold the old dichotomy between the possible and the actual or real, the latter grows out of a social ontology grounded in notions of difference, positions, perspectives, reflexivity, and dialogue In the end, I argue that a better understanding of the possible can help us cultivate it in both mind and society

It Could Have Been True: How Counterfactual Thoughts Reduce Condemnation of Falsehoods and Increase Political Polarization.

Abstract: This research demonstrates how counterfactual thoughts can lead people to excuse others for telling falsehoods. When a falsehood aligned with participants' political preferences, reflecting on how it could have been true led them to judge it as less unethical to tell, which in turn led them to judge a politician who told it as having a more moral character and deserving less punishment. When a falsehood did not align with political preferences, this effect was significantly smaller and less reliable, in part because people doubted the plausibility of the relevant counterfactual thoughts. These results emerged independently in three studies (two preregistered; total N = 2,783) and in meta- and Bayesian analyses, regardless of whether participants considered the same counterfactuals or generated their own. The results reveal how counterfactual thoughts can amplify partisan differences in judgments of alleged dishonesty. I discuss implications for theories of counterfactual thinking and motivated moral reasoning.

Interpretable Credit Application Predictions With Counterfactual Explanations

Abstract: We predict credit applications with off-the-shelf, interchangeable black-box clas-sifiers and we explain single predictions with counterfactual explanations. Coun-terfactual explanations expose the minimal changes required on the input data to obtain a different result e.g., approved vs rejected application. Despite their effectiveness , counterfactuals are mainly designed for changing an undesired outcome of a prediction i.e. loan rejected. Counterfactuals, however, can be difficult to interpret , especially when a high number of features are involved in the explanation. Our contribution is twofold: i) we propose positive counterfactuals, i.e. we adapt counterfactual explanations to also explain accepted loan applications, and ii) we propose two weighting strategies to generate more interpretable counterfactuals. Experiments on the HELOC loan applications dataset show that our contribution outperforms the baseline counterfactual generation strategy, by leading to smaller and hence more interpretable counterfactuals.

Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals: A study of truth conditionality and minimal change

Abstract: Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint.

Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non-Triviality

Abstract: This paper outlines a non-reductive counterfactual account of grounding along interventionist lines, and uses the account to argue that taking grounding seriously requires ascribing non-trivial truth-conditions to a range of counterpossible counterfactuals. This result allows for a diagnosis of a route to scepticism about grounding, as deriving at least in part from scepticism about non-trivial counterpossible truth and falsity.

Intervening on structure

Abstract: Some explanations appeal to facts about the causal structure of a system in order to shed light on a particular phenomenon; these are explanations which do more than cite the causes X and Y of some state-of-affairs Z, but rather appeal to “macro-level” causal features—for example the fact that A causes B as well as C, or perhaps that D is a strong inhibitor of E—in order to explain Z. Appeals to these kinds of “macro-level” causal features appear in a wide variety of social scientific and biological research; statements about features such as “patriarchy,” “healthcare infrastructure,” and “functioning DNA repair mechanism,” for instance, can be understood as claims about what would be different (with respect to some target phenomenon) in a system with a different causal structure. I suggest interpreting counterfactual questions involving structural features as questions about alternative parameter settings of causal models, and propose an extension of the usual interventionist framework for causal explanation which enables scientists to explore the consequences of interventions on “macro-level” structure.

Why do I think and talk about it? Perceived functions and phenomenology of episodic counterfactual thinking compared with remembering and future thinking.

Abstract: People revisit situations from their past and imagine what could have happened had the situation played out differently. This form of hypothetical thinking is known as episodic counterfactual thinking. The reasons why people engage in episodic counterfactual thinking have not been examined in the same context with remembering the past and imagining the future. We addressed this gap, by focusing on the perceived functions and phenomenological characteristics of the most important episodic counterfactuals compared with episodic memories and future projections in younger adults. We base our analyses on four categories of functions previously identified for past events: reflective, social, generative, and ruminative. The reflective and social functions dominated across all events, with the reflective function being most pronounced for future projections, potentially suggesting a close connection between future projections and self-regulation and/or identity formation. Counter to predictions, the ruminative function was not rated higher for episodic counterfactuals than for other events; however, ratings of ruminative function showed unique correlations with the emotional intensity and involuntary remembering for episodic counterfactuals. Overall, these results suggest that episodic counterfactuals are used for self-reflection and social sharing more than they are used for rumination and generative concerns.

Imagining Counterfactual Worlds in Autism Spectrum Disorder

Abstract: Two experiments are presented that explore online counterfactual processing in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) using eye-tracking. Participants' eye movements were tracked while they read factual and counterfactual sentences in an anomaly detection task. In Experiment 1, the sentences depicted everyday counterfactual situations (e.g., If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been dry/wet when she arrived home). Sentences in Experiment 2 depicted counterfactual versions of real world events (e.g., If the Titanic had not hit an iceberg, it would have survived/sunk along with all the passengers). Results from both experiments suggest that counterfactual understanding is undiminished in adults with ASD. In fact, participants with ASD were faster than Typically Developing (TD) participants to detect anomalies within realistic, discourse-based counterfactuals (Experiment 1). Detection was comparable for TD and ASD groups when understanding could be grounded in knowledge about reality (Experiment 2), though the 2 groups used subtly different strategies for responding to and recovering from counterfactual inconsistent words. These data argue against general difficulties in global coherence and complex integration in ASD. (PsycINFO Database Record

Counterfactual thinking in cooperation dynamics.

Abstract: Counterfactual Thinking is a human cognitive ability studied in a wide variety of domains. It captures the process of reasoning about a past event that did not occur, namely what would have happened had this event occurred, or, otherwise, to reason about an event that did occur but what would ensue had it not. Given the wide cognitive empowerment of counterfactual reasoning in the human individual, the question arises of how the presence of individuals with this capability may improve cooperation in populations of self-regarding individuals. Here we propose a mathematical model, grounded on Evolutionary Game Theory, to examine the population dynamics emerging from the interplay between counterfactual thinking and social learning (i.e., individuals that learn from the actions and success of others) whenever the individuals in the population face a collective dilemma. Our results suggest that counterfactual reasoning fosters coordination in collective action problems occurring in large populations, and has a limited impact on cooperation dilemmas in which coordination is not required. Moreover, we show that a small prevalence of individuals resorting to counterfactual thinking is enough to nudge an entire population towards highly cooperative standards.

Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics

Abstract: It has recently been argued that indeterminacy and indeterminism make most ordinary counterfactuals false. I argue that a plausible way to avoid such counterfactual skepticism is to postulate the existence of primitive modal facts that serve as truth-makers for counterfactual claims. Moreover, I defend a new theory of ‘might’ counterfactuals, and develop assertability and knowledge criteria to suit such unobservable ‘counterfacts’.

Mental contrasting of counterfactual fantasies attenuates disappointment, regret, and resentment

Abstract: Negative emotions elicited by positive counterfactuals about an alternative past—“if only” reconstructions of negative life events—are functional in preparing people to act when opportunities to restore the alternative past will arise. If the counterfactual past is lost, because restorative opportunities are absent, letting go of the negative emotions should be the better solution, sheltering people from feelings of distress. In six experimental studies, the self-regulation strategy of mental contrasting (Oettingen, European Review of Social Psychology 23:1–63, 2012) attenuated the negative emotions elicited by positive fantasies about a lost counterfactual past, specifically, disappointment, regret and resentment. Mental contrasting (vs. relevant control conditions) led people to feel less disappointed when evaluating their lost counterfactual past compared with their current reality, indicating reduced commitment to the lost counterfactual past (Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4), and it attenuated post-decisional regret and resentment (Studies 5 and 6). These findings held when participants were induced to focus on lost counterfactual pasts for which they were responsible (Studies 4 and 5), for which they blamed another person (Study 6), or for which they deemed no one responsible (Studies 2 and 3). The findings are relevant for building interventions that help people to come to terms with their lost counterfactual past.

The effects of counterfactual attacks on the morality and leadership of different professionals

Abstract: . Past research has offered contrasting results regarding the effects of attacks on social judgments. In three experiments, we investigated the effects of counterfactual (“If only…”) and non-counterfactual attacks on the morality versus leadership of politicians versus entrepreneurs. First, participants rated morality as the most desirable, but least typical dimension of politicians, and leadership as the most desirable and most typical dimension of entrepreneurs (Study 1). Then, counterfactual attacks led to poorer evaluation of the attacked target and better evaluation of the attacking source as compared to non-counterfactual attacks, especially when counterfactuals were focused on the most desirable dimension for the professional category of the attacked target (Study 2). Similar results emerged when the typicality of the attacked dimension was manipulated (Study 3). Discussion focuses on the higher success of attacks on desirable personality dimensions and of counterfactual attacks as compared...

Counterfactual antecedent falsity and the epistemic sensitivity of counterfactuals

Abstract: Why do utterances of counterfactual conditionals typically, but not universally, convey the message that their antecedents are false? I demonstrate that two common theoretical commitments–commitment to the existence of scalar implicature and of informative presupposition—can be supplemented with an independently motivated theory of the presuppositions of competing conditional alternatives to jointly predict this information when and only when it appears. The view works best if indicative and counterfactual conditionals have a closely related semantics, so I conclude by undermining two familiar arguments for a nonunified semantics of indicative and counterfactual conditionals.

The similarity approach strikes back: Negation in counterfactuals

Abstract: The meaning of counterfactual conditionals is standardly described using the similarity approach (Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1973). This approach has recently been challenged by Ciardelli et al. (2018). They argue that the similarity approach is in principle unable to account for the meaning of counterfactuals with an antecedent consisting of a conjunction embedded under a negation (¬(p^q)). Ciardelli et al. (2018) dismiss the approach on these grounds and offer an alternative. The main goal of the present paper is to defend the similarity approach against this attack. I will argue that the problem that underlies the observations in Ciardelli et al. 2018 is more general and not solved by the solution they offer. I will furthermore argue, against Ciardelli et al. (2018), that the cause of the problem is not the similarity approach, but the interaction of negation with the meaning of counterfactual conditionals. The paper will conclude with a first outline of a solution for the problem, which still uses the similarity approach, but combines it with an alternative semantics for negation.

Disposition ascriptions as suppositions

Abstract: Dispositions involve an apparent conditionality, where this conditionality somehow relates behaviors with dispositional properties. That is, when describing dispositions, it is common to use ‘if, then’ type constructs. These conditional expressions usually involve the manifestation of a behavior in response to an associated stimulus. These conditional and behavioral features, while seemingly indispensable to our understanding of dispositionality have proven difficult to account for. There are well known objections to extant analyses of dispositions in terms of conditionals. What’s more, any account of dispositions appealing to counterfactuals is subject to familiar objections to counterfactual conditionals and their associated metaphysical costs. The metaphysical costs associated with analyses of dispositions in terms of counterfactual conditionals are particularly unattractive to those who endorse a certain strong kind of positivist empiricism. In this thesis I explore the possibility of giving an account of dispositions in terms of Dorothy Edgington’s (1986) suppositionals, rather than in terms of standard material and counterfactual conditionals which are usually involved in conditional analyses of dispositions. The result is an account that captures the apparent conditionality of dispositions and their behaviors while avoiding both the standard counterexamples to these existing analyses and their associated metaphysical costs. As such, this suppositional account of dispositions may be of interest to those who endorse a certain strong kind of positivist empiricism. The structure of the thesis is as follows: In Chapter 2, I present a selective review of the relevant literature. I outline the way in which dispositions are related to, or perhaps imply, behaviors, and describe the origin of attempts at capturing this relationship in terms of conditionals. I present this overview in a way that suggests there is an interesting analogy between attempts at understanding the conditionality of dispositions in terms of observable behaviors and behaviorist approach to mental states. I begin with Rudolf Carnap’s (1936, 1956) early attempts at accounting for dispositions in observational, extensional terms and argue that while there is something obviously correct about understanding dispositions in terms of observable behaviors, this straightforward, empirically robust behaviorist approach to dispositions generates a number of serious problems, both analytic and epistemic. In Chapter 3, I set out the standard modes in which evidence of observable behavior is taken to motivate conditional accounts of dispositions. I outline the now commonly discussed Simple Conditional Analysis of dispositions; a framework that analyses dispositionality in terms of material and counterfactual conditionals. I then discuss some of the standard counterexamples to that analysis, and related analyses, in order to motivate a rejection of, or at very least a healthy suspicion of, the Simple Conditional Analysis, its variants and sophistications. I then introduce Edgington’s (1986) arguments against indicative conditionals in capturing the way in which we make use of apparently conditional (if, then) structures in natural language. I demonstrate that the four assumptions that Edgington argues must be adopted by anyone who claims that indicative conditionals capture common conditional locutions are especially representative of the reasoning involved in the standard counterexamples to conditional analyses of dispositions. Given that Edgington’s arguments are mostly against indicative conditionals as a means of capturing natural language conditional locutions, and that the Simple Conditional Analysis crucially departs from Carnap’s analysis insofar as it incorporates a counterfactual conditional, (a semantics for which was not available to Carnap), my claim is not that Edgington’s arguments constitute a good reason for rejecting the Simple Conditional Analysis. Rather, I argue that each of the four assumptions discussed by Edgington are presupposed by any account that is subject to the standard counterexamples to the Simple Conditional Analysis. If these assumptions are not made, regardless of the type of conditional involved in the analysis, the standard counterexamples will not follow. I conclude that an account not presupposing these assumptions could, by contrast, present a plausible alternative to extant analyses, such as the Simple Conditional Analysis. In Chapter 4, I advance an account of dispositions in terms of Edgington’s suppositionals. In doing so I propose that a conditional analysis actually implies at least 3 distinct conditional claims. The Simple Conditional Analysis incorporates 3 elements: a stimulus condition S, a manifestation condition M, and what Bird (2009) calls a covert disposition ascription D. I argue that upon the supposition of any pairing of these three elements, an inference is licensed to the third, and that these inferences capture the bulk of our ordinary use of dispositional language. The three inferences, and so the three activities we carry out with dispositional language, are a predictive inference, an evidential inference, and an inference to the best explanation. This explains our normal reasoning involving dispositions, the intuition that dispositions involve some sort of conditionality, and the intuition that dispositions somehow involve, imply, or are implied by behaviors, without also appealing to counterfactual conditionals, and so without taking on their metaphysical costs. In Chapter 5, having presented the suppositional account, I turn from the subject of how e get from our folk practices involving dispositions, to the sorts of metaphysical commitments that beliefs in dispositions entail. I do this by presenting a variety of functionalism about dispositions. In doing so, I largely follow the sort of ‘Canberra Plan’ approach that is endorsed by David Lewis (1970, 1972). I argue that the ordinary platitudes, delivered by our folk understanding of physical objects and phenomena associated with a certain disposition, fix the reference of the associated dispositional concept. It is then a matter for empirical disciplines, such as the sciences or even our common interactions with the physical world, to determine whether or not the thing to which those platitudes have referred, actually exists or not. This can be understood as a sort of realizer functionalism, according to which the dispositional property is identified with its realizer, rather than its role, but differs from some other accounts insofar as the realizer is a token property, in virtue of which it plays the functional role, and that similar token properties are of the same dispositional type (whether this can actually be called functionalism is open to debate. Just as Lewis (1999, p.307) is unsure as to whether or not he is a functionalist, so too am I). In Chapter 6, I provide both a defense and an elaboration of my suppositional account, partly using Michael Fara’s (2005) account of dispositions in terms of what he calls ‘habituals’ as something of a foil. I respond to the potential criticism that in dispensing with counterfactual conditionals, and the possible world semantics with which they are associated, my account is not able to accommodate the sorts of antecedent assumptions of ‘normal conditions’ which often accompany disposition ascriptions. In response, I argue that the suppositional account allows for the inclusion of whatever antecedent suppositions one wishes to include in their suppositions concerning dispositions. These antecedent suppositions will be largely determined by the beliefs that one has concerning the disposition in question, combined with relevant context and circumstances surrounding the dispositional behavior. This suppositional account has the advantage of retaining the empirical attractiveness of early, extensional, accounts of dispositions while also retaining much of the expressive power of the later counterfactual accounts. In addition, it better captures our folk understanding of and use of dispositional concepts, and avoids the standard counterexamples to extant conditional analyses of dispositions.

Prioritised ceteris paribus logic for counterfactual reasoning

Abstract: The semantics for counterfactuals due to David Lewis has been challenged by appealing to miracles. Miracles may skew a given similarity order in favour of those possible worlds which exhibit them. Lewis responded with a system of priorities that mitigates the significance of miracles when constructing similarity relations. We propose a prioritised ceteris paribus analysis of counterfactuals inspired by Lewis’ system of priorities. By analysing the couterfactuals with a ceteris paribus clause one forces out, in a natural manner, those possible worlds which do not satisfy the requirements of the clause, thus excluding miracles. If no world can satisfy the ceteris paribus clause in its entirety, then prioritisation is triggered to select worlds that maximise agreement on those things which are favoured most.

State/Industry Medicine Pricing Agreements, Cost Savings and Counterfactuals: the Case of Ireland

Abstract: Ireland’s Minister for Health claimed cumulative savings of €600 million for the 2016-2020 framework agreement with the Irish Pharmaceutical Healthcare Association. These savings are estimated using an implausible counterfactual of no agreement, since multiannual State/industry agreements are longstanding, while, since 2013, the State has powers to set medicine prices. A better counterfactual is the status quo: replicating the 2012-2015 agreement and extending its term for one year. This alternative counterfactual results in estimated cumulative savings of only €290 million. Greater transparency and more prudent choice of comparator for savings estimates would provide confidence in the estimates and more accurately demonstrate the likely savings that will be achieved.

Subjunctive conditional probability

Abstract: There seem to be two ways of supposing a proposition: supposing “indicatively” that Shakespeare didn’t write Hamlet, it is likely that someone else did; supposing “subjunctively” that Shakespeare hadn’t written Hamlet, it is likely that nobody would have written the play. Let P(B//A) be the probability of B on the subjunctive supposition that A. Is P(B//A) equal to the probability of the corresponding counterfactual, A □→B? I review recent triviality arguments against this hypothesis and argue that they do not succeed. On the other hand, I argue that even if we can equate P(B//A) with P(A □→B), we still need an account of how subjunctive conditional probabilities are related to unconditional probabilities. The triviality arguments reveal that the connection is not as straightforward as one might have hoped.

Causal Modeling with Probabilistic Simulation Models.

Abstract: Recent authors have proposed analyzing conditional reasoning through a notion of intervention on a simulation program, and have found a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic of conditionals in this setting. Here we extend this setting to the case of probabilistic simulation models. We give a natural definition of probability on formulas of the conditional language, allowing for the expression of counterfactuals, and prove foundational results about this definition. We also find an axiomatization for reasoning about linear inequalities involving probabilities in this setting. We prove soundness, completeness, and NP-completeness of the satisfiability problem for this logic.

Interactive Narratives, Counterfactual Thinking and Personality in Video Games

Abstract: Interactive narratives in video games allow players to experience a variety of storyline pathways, inviting players to think about alternative choices that might lead to different outcomes. These branching story structures can induce counterfactual thinking, the process of forming mental representations of past events to imagine alternative outcomes. Video games can be used to track and analyze behaviors during gameplay that are indicative of cognitive processes. As a gameplay analytics approach to assessing such behaviors, video games afford the measurement of factors that may influence those behaviors. Little is known about how personality influences the use of counterfactuals. As such, the focus of the present study was to investigate the effect of the Big Five personality traits (i.e., agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extraversion, and intellect) on in-game behaviors indicative of counterfactual thinking (CFT). Participants (N = 132) played an interactive, narrative-based video game twice. In-game behaviors indicative of CFT (i.e., changes in answer choices across gameplays) were coded and analyzed to determine whether they were dependent on participants’ in-game experiences (i.e., outcomes and valence of answer choices) and individual differences (i.e., personality dimensions). The outcome of failure and the valence of answer choices in the first gameplay had significant effects on CFT. The results also indicated a significant interaction between the outcome of the first gameplay and conscientiousness in their effect on CFT. Implications for these findings are discussed.

A logic for the natural language conditional

Abstract: Ordinary speakers intuitively assign truth-values to conditional utterances in everyday conversation, but, despite the general ease with which this occurs, it is notoriously difficult to give an ac

Counteridenticals and dream reports: A unified analysis

Abstract: Counteridenticals are counterfactual conditional sentences whose antecedent clauses contain an identity statement, e.g. If I were you, I’d buy the blue dress. Here, we argue that counteridenticals are best analyzed along the lines of dream reports. After showing that counteridenticals and dream reports exhibit striking grammatical and perceptual parallels, we suggest an analysis of counteridenticals with Percus and Sauerland’s (2003) analysis of dream reports. Following their proposal, we propose to make use of concept generators, realized as centered worlds. To this end, we argue that the presence of if licenses the presence of an imagine-operator, which constitutes the attitude the antecedent clause ‘x be-PAST y’ is taken under; The speaker predicates, in the imagine mode, the consequent property to his/her imagined self. To capture the different degrees of identification between the subject and the predicate of the identity statement of counteridenticals’ antecedents observed in the literature, we incorporate Percus and Sharvit’s (2014) notion of asymmetric be into the analysis. This proposal has several advantages over existing analyses (Lakoff, 1996; Kocurek, 2016) of counteridentical meaning, as it both explains the different degrees of identification observed for counteridenticals and correctly predicts the parallels between counteridenticals and dream reports.