Showing papers on "Military intelligence published in 2015"

The Learning Curve: MACVs Grasp of Intelligence, PSYOP, and Their Coordination, 1965-1971

Abstract: : This dissertation examines military intelligence, psychological operations (PSYOP), and the coordination between the two at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1965 to 1971 in order to determine the extent to which MACV demonstrated the attributes of a learning organization. The analysis is divided into three phases. The first, from 1965-1967, covers the buildup of US forces in Vietnam. The second examines the years 1968-1969, which include the Tet Offensive and the peak of US military involvement in Vietnam. The third encompasses the years 1970-1971, the period of Vietnamization and the point at which the last US PSYOP forces departed Vietnam. The study analyzes MACVs implementation of intelligence, PSYOP, and their coordination and identifies both successes and failures in MACVs approach to the war in Vietnam.

Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection, Exchange and Analysis

Abstract: In this article we seek to address the emerging role of the European Union (EU) as a security and intelligence actor from the perspective of counter-terrorism Intelligence as a process and product has been strongly promoted by the EU as a useful and necessary tool in the fight against terrorism, radicalization, organized crime and public order problems A range of agencies has been established that collect, analyze and operationalize intelligence in view of strategically defined security threats Examples are Europol and Frontex This article makes an inventory of their roles and competences in the field of intelligence and looks at the list of instruments that encourage the sharing of intelligence between different law enforcement and security agencies Moreover, it is argued in this article that as intelligence becomes more hybrid and as the EU only holds light powers of oversight on ownership and integrity of data, considerable governance challenges lurk around the corner As ‘intelligence’ is usually

Strategic cyber intelligence

Abstract: Purpose – This paper aims to highlight the importance and role of strategic cyber intelligence to support risk-informed decision-making, ultimately leading to improved objectives, policies, architectures and investments to advance a nation or organization’s interests in the cyber domain. Design/methodology/approach – Integration of professional research literature from the fields of intelligence studies, strategy and information/computer security. Findings – Investing in technology, firewalls and intrusion detection systems is appropriate but, by itself, insufficient. Intelligence is a key component. Cyber intelligence emphasizes prevention and anticipation, to focus cybersecurity efforts before an attack occurs (“left of the hack”). Strategic cyber intelligence can substantially reduce risk to the organization’s mission and valued assets and support its due diligence. Originality/value – This paper describes how strategic cyber intelligence can be implemented and used within an enterprise to enhance its ...

Competitive Intelligence for Information Professionals

Abstract: Information professionals should be able to take a proactive role as a strategic partner in their organization's competitive intelligence. Their role needs to focus on the "outside-in" approach, based on their organization's strategic needs and objectives. Competitive Intelligence for Information Professionals explores the role of strategic information and intelligence in organizations, and assesses the values and needs of intelligence in organizations. The book provides guidance on how to work strategically with competitive intelligence, methods for monitoring and analysis and a process-oriented approach. Chapters include discussions on how news monitoring and competitive intelligence interact and how this offers opportunities for cooperation between different departments. Cases from the authors own experiences when working with competitive intelligence in international corporations are also included. Competitive intelligence (CI) is a new area for Information professionalsOffers perspectives on a new trend within the library and information sectorProvides a comprehensive approach to CI

Competitive intelligence: History, importance, objectives, process and issues

Abstract: Competitive intelligence deals with the competitive environment of a company. Several studies have been conducted on competitive intelligence domain but there is no empirical work that gives a complete implemented competitive intelligence solution. This paper presents an overview of competitive intelligence studies and highlights the issues towards developing a complete CI solution. A new conceptual model which details the collection phase and incorporates the anticipation of the competitor decisions is proposed. To better solve the CI problem, the paper proposes to integrate the ability of multi-criteria decision aid methods to manage conflicting criteria in a complex environment, with the ability of artificial intelligence in managing and extracting large amount of technical data/information in such a context.

The Operational Commander’s Role In Planning And Executing A Successful Campaign

Abstract: : The rise of industrialization coupled with the growth of technology have contributed to creating a complexity to modern warfare that far exceeds the primitive conditions of earlier periods. Defined as the creative use of distributed operations for the purposes of strategy, success at the operational level requires that commanders practice operational art. Although current doctrine recognizes that the operational commander must link theater strategy to tactical operations through operational art, it fails to provide an adequate description of the commander role in campaign planning. Thus, this monograph examines the operational commander's role in planning and executing a successful campaign. The monograph begins by describing how industrialized societies and technology affected the evolution of warfare thus creating a new medium known as operational art.

The value of military intelligence

Abstract: This study evaluates the role of military intelligence in an arms race between two countries. The intelligence apparatus of each country evaluates the rival’s capabilities and intentions, and enhances its military capability by increasing the effectiveness of its own weapon systems and reducing the effectiveness of the rival’s weapon systems. Intelligence superiority also yields an advantage in deterrence and preemption. This study shows the following. (a) Investment in intelligence is much less beneficial for small government budgets, low intelligence efficiency, and a low degree of conservatism on the part of the policy-maker. (b) The expenditure on intelligence increases when intelligence efficiency is low and rising, and decreases when intelligence efficiency is high and rising. (c) Being very conservative may be costly to the country. (d) High-quality human capital substantially improves the country’s security and welfare, particularly when the rivals are engaged in a knowledge race in addition to th...

Contemporary intelligence innovation in practice: enhancing “macro” to “micro” systems thinking via “System of Systems” dynamics

Abstract: Currently, “macro” systems thinking is arguably most evident in intelligence studies. Appearing especially apparent are characterisations of different intelligence architectures, strongly associated with grander-ranging national or central intelligence systems and their associated machinery, even being bounded as intelligence communities. Following on from noteworthy US defence sector developments, which have demonstrable relevance both to and for closely overlapping contemporary intelligence work, more “micro” systems thinking – namely involving intelligence-related “System of Systems” (“SoS”) concepts – is increasingly emergent. For helping to facilitate and better understand contemporary intelligence innovation, SoS constructs and their dynamics are now deserving of being further examined and refined. This includes as they pertain to the conduct of several multifunctional and special operations occurring across the world during an overall era of globalised strategic risk, and as the study and practice ...

Israeli military intelligence’s understanding of the security environment in light of the Arab Awakening

Abstract: The Arab Awakening was a strategic surprise for the Israeli military intelligence (AMAN), but did not cause immediate damage for the security of Israel because of the internal character of events. At an early stage AMAN recognized the general direction of the upheavals, which were more conflicts rather than the establishment of a democratic new order in the Middle East. The Arab Awakening operated as an intervening factor, escalating some of Israel’s major security challenges and de-escalating others. AMAN provided strategic intelligence warnings (of Iran’s military nuclear plan) and actionable intelligence (about Hezbollah’s infrastructure across the Syrian border), but presumed to assess the stability of regimes in a chaotic environment (Egypt, Syria), faced difficulties in monitoring capabilities of new actors (ISIS) and intentions of adversaries (Hamas). Fighting Hamas and Hezbollah, AMAN might subordinate itself to the strategy of deterrence rather than defeating the enemy. AMAN’s chiefs viewed the A...

Signal Corps and Military Intelligence Officer Perceptions of a Multifunctional Branch Merger

Abstract: : How the creation of the Cyber Branch will effect the Signal Corps and Military Intelligence branches is unclear. Budgetary factors are reducing Army end strength and increasing competition for the resources across the Department of Defense. These budgetary forces are likely to drive a search for efficiency. How the Army will transform to confront cyber threats while dealing with budgetary pressures is uncertain. One past solution was multifunctionalization. The multifunctional logistics program started in 1992 to reduce redundancy amongst the logistics branches, eventually becoming the Logistics Branch. Army leaders may view a similar approach to Signal, Military Intelligence and Cyber officer management as a way to reduce redundancy and cost. This research intends to access how Signal and Intelligence officers perceive a multifunctional merger of the Signal, Military Intelligence, and Cyber branches? The officers surveyed view the creation of the Cyber Branch as being positive for the Army. Most respondents would disagree with a merger of the Military Intelligence with any other branch. Conversely the majority of survey participants would support a multifunctional merger of the Signal Corps and Cyber Branch. Based on this research it is recommended that the Army consider a pilot volunteer program similar to the FA90 (Multifunction Logistician) for interested Signal and Cyber officers.

Biological impact on military intelligence: application or metaphor?

Abstract: Ideas by Statistical Mechanics (ISM) is a generic program to model evolution and propagation of ideas/patterns throughout populations subjected to endogenous and exogenous interactions. The program is based on the author's work in Statistical Mechanics of Neocortical Interactions (SMNI). This product can be used for decision support for projects ranging from diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) factors of propagation/evolution of ideas, to commercial sales, trading indicators across sectors of financial markets, advertising and political campaigns, etc. It seems appropriate to base an approach for propagation of ideas on the only system so far demonstrated to develop and nurture ideas, i.e., the neocortical brain. The issue here is whether such biological intelligence is a valid application to military intelligence, or is it simply a metaphor?

Evaluating the Impact and Value of Competitive Intelligence From The users Perspective - The Case of the National Research Council's Technical Intelligence Unit

Abstract: Understanding and being able to measure and prove the impact and value of intelligence is of significant importance. The objective of this study was to develop an evaluation instrument that the users of intelligence could fill in that could be used to assess both the impact and value of the intelligence they received. Starting with an evaluation instrument based on lists of benefits identified in the competitive intelligence literature, measures of these benefits and client satisfaction/service quality metrics, the study researchers interviewed clients of one large government competitive technical intelligence organization asking them to articulate the benefits they obtained from the intelligence they received and methods for evaluating these benefits. All users of intelligence identified benefits they had received from the intelligence received. Additional benefits beyond those that are in the current literature were identified by those interviewed. In terms of measurement of these benefits, intelligence users (the clients) understood why hard financial type measures for example ROI or dollar impact on performance was important (especially in their organization) they felt that assessing these for the intelligence they received would be difficult but that softer, more subjective measurement such as extent to which the user agrees that the intelligence provided the intended benefit could be used. Additional perceptual based indicators of service quality and customer satisfaction measures were also suggested by intelligence clients. Based on the results of the literature review and interviews, an intelligence evaluation instrument was developed that asks the clients to assess the extent to which they have realized one or more of 27 impacts identified in this study as well as assessing 10 elements of service quality.

Russian Military Intelligence, July 1914: What St. Petersburg Perceived and Why It Mattered

Abstract: Although significant for assessments of war imminence and adversarial warning indicators, military intelligence has figured only sporadically in the immense literature on the July Crisis of 1914. S...

Training Humans for The Human Domain

Abstract: : This monograph offers an outline for educating U.S. and allied service personnel in fundamental human domain skills and argues against their being overlooked in favor of technical solutions. Experience from Afghanistan and Iraq has demonstrated the vital nature of understanding human terrain, with conclusions relevant far beyond counterinsurgency operations in the Islamic world. Any situation where adversary actions are described as irrational demonstrates a fundamental failure in understanding the human dimension of the conflict. It follows that where states and their leaders act in a manner that in the United States is perceived as irrational, this too betrays a lack of human knowledge. The monograph highlights specific elements of psychology, theology, anthropology, sociology, and linguistics as key requirements for the understanding of human terrain, which is necessary for avoiding mirroring projecting Western assumptions onto a non-Western actor and therefore failing correctly to assess the options available to that actor. The monograph argues for stronger Red Team input into planning and decisionmaking. These Red Teams need to be equipped with expert levels of knowledge of all the social sciences discussed as applied to their target subject in order to provide reliable and well-founded simulations of adversary decision processes. But over and above this, familiarity with the same principles should be far more widespread both among junior military personnel engaged in any kind of interaction with human allies or adversaries, and among the senior audience assimilating Red Team input into planning. This is because this input will by its very nature be counterintuitive for individuals not specializing in the region concerned. Commanders will receive advice that appears to make no sense, in isolation from their other data streams and apparently contradicting them.

Truman Smith's Reports on Nazi Militarism: Domestic Political Priorities and U.S. Foreign Policy-Making in Franklin Roosevelt's First and Second Terms

Abstract: Appointed head military attache in Hitler's Berlin in 1935, career U.S. Army officer Truman Smith harbored no illusions about the challenges he faced. As he recalled later in his memoirs: "I saw at firsthand how inadequately organized, staffed, and financed the Military Intelligence Division was. It became clear to me also that Military Intelligence was the orphan branch of the General Staff and the army as a whole and that military attaches lacked prestige and were little regarded or listened to" (26). Despite inadequate support and seemingly insurmountable obstacles to access, Smith produced over the next three years a series of startling yet remarkably accurate reports on the Nazi military buildup that held the potential to influence deeply the course of American military and diplomatic policy Far from achieving their intended influence, however, Smith's reports drew the otherwise obscure military attache into a political maelstrom not of his own making--a tempest that owed much to Smith's association with famed but increasingly controversial American aviator Charles Lindbergh, whose celebrity Smith exploited to gain critical access to Luftwaffe airfields. Amid the heated polemic that swirled about him, the stunningly accurate intelligence information contained in Smith's reports languished in obscurity On detailed examination, the case of Truman Smith demonstrates in a profound manner the ways that domestic political agendas and controversies clouded U.S. foreign policy-making in the years leading up to the Second World War. Although the international order today is fundamentally different from that of the 1930s, Smith's case may also hold important lessons for the early twenty-first-century United States concerning the unforeseen costs of polarization and a political culture in which opposing parties often dismiss even simple factual information put forward by their supposed political enemies. After an accomplished military career leading up to and during World War II, Truman Smith (1893-1970) was seemingly forgotten. His name was seldom mentioned after the war until his memoirs were published posthumously in 1984. Since then, intrigued historians and journalists have sporadically examined his strange story History shows Smith to be an astoundingly successful figure in military intelligence. Though hampered by his lack of rank, Smith first submitted intelligence reports from Germany on the nascent Nazi movement while he was assigned to Berlin as an assistant military attache in 1920-24. From 1935 to 1938, Smith returned to Germany to serve as head military attache. Part of the reason Smith's intelligence efforts were exceptionally insightful and accurate in this vital period was his summer 1936 decision to take advantage of Charles Lindbergh's fame to gain better access to German air facilities. Despite Smith's efforts and his warnings about the German military build-up, his reports were mostly dismissed by the Roosevelt administration. For his efforts, Smith was labeled first an alarmist and later a Nazi sympathizer After serving in combat during World War I, Smith served as a military observer and assistant attache in Berlin from June 1920 to April 1924. In November of 1922, Smith became the first American official to interview Adolf Hitler and subsequently submitted reports on Nazi aims and ambitions that were nearly prophetic, even though he lacked rank and his reports were mostly ignored. He did, however, manage through his 1920-1924 stint in Berlin to forge relationships with German military figures that proved to be invaluable contacts when he returned as head military attache later in his career. His warnings in these early years came, moreover, nearly a decade before other more prominent voices began warning the rest of the world about Hitler's intentions. In the years between 1924 and 1935, Smith held various posts. Most notably, from 1928 to 1932 he served as an instructor at the Fort Benning Infantry School, where General George Marshall was in command. …

Creating National Attraction: Military Intelligence Sharing Building Foreign Military Interdependence

Abstract: : This monograph uses three case studies to exemplify how the presence, or lack of, military intelligence sharing can increase the attractiveness of a state The idea of state attractiveness is predicated on Joseph Nye's definition of attractiveness through soft power and how continued contact can increase the desire for further intelligence sharing The co-creation of a detailed sharing agreement, especially with integrated facilities, appears to significantly increase the desire for continued sharing Ultimately, shared interests are the catalyst for beginning to share intelligence and then continued sharing helps to further drive interests together When states have converging interests they appear more likely to enter into intelligence sharing agreements and the formal agreements have a more profound impact on state attractiveness This study concludes that states build attractiveness through military intelligence sharing due to the repeated cooperative efforts intelligence sharing requires, thereby creating an increasingly interconnected complex system, which amplifies the effects of their cooperation

The Intelligence Gap: What the Multinational Enterprise Can Learn From Government and Military Intelligence Organizations

Abstract: Over the past several decades, companies have spent literally trillions of dollars acquiring the latest technologies and building their internal information processing and analysis capabilities. And yet with all this expenditure of time, money, and effort, large enterprises are still caught off-guard on an almost daily basis because they fail to anticipate critical developments in their competitive environment. This shortcoming can be mitigated by adopting an intelligence mind-set. This article provides an overview of seven specific problems concerning the use of business intelligence in the multinational enterprise (MNE) and discusses the corresponding best practices found in professional intelligence organizations. It closes with some suggestions on implementing those best practices in the MNE. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Advancing “Defence-in-depth”: intelligence and systems dynamics

Abstract: This article aims to encourage the fostering of more systems thinking, and its greater exploitation, within the domain of contemporary intelligence. With particular focus on “micro systems thinking” and with reference to key intelligence processes, such as intelligence analysis, the utility of many systems dynamics within the intelligence context seeks to be further revealed. Through their greater collective harnessing, including up to “System of Systems” (“SoS”) dynamics, and promoting all that they can offer, more sophisticated overarching operational-to-strategic/policy “ends,” notably that of “defence-in-depth,” can be viably further advanced in a sustainable manner into the future. Arguably, a much-needed transformative impact on contemporary intelligence can also be increasingly realised through comprehensively engaging in and with more systems and SoS thinking. Aiding civil protection tasks, crisis management, emergency planners, and civil contingency practitioners likewise gain.

Social media intelligence: opportunities and limitations

Abstract: An important part of the reform of the intelligence community is felt in the opening linked with the widening spectrum of methods and spaces which can be used to collect and analyse dates and information. One of these methods that produce large mutations in the system is connected to the world of social media which proves to be a huge source of information. Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT), the newest member of the family INT's, is undoubtedly a separate domain, a practice rooted in the work of the intelligence community. This paper proposes a general characterization of the most important aspects of Social Media Intelligence, a brand new way for the intelligence community to collect and analyse information for national security purposes (but not only) in the context of the current global challenges. Moreover, the work is focused in identifying the further limitations and opportunities of this practice in the upcoming decade.

Overcoming Intermediary Bias Through the Use of Social Media Intelligence

Abstract: : Intermediaries have long played a significant role for military forces in understanding the population within the operational environment. They have served as a hub where information from the population is collected and processed into intelligence that military forces can use. Inherent to this relationship is that by collecting and processing information for military forces, these intermediaries have allowed personal biases to shape the narrative about the peoples' wants, needs, and desires in the operational environment. The importance of understanding the population and the growth of social media can change that relationship through leveraging social media intelligence. Utilizing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT), military forces can now collect and process information about a population while minimized the ability of intermediaries to affect the narrative.

Military Intelligence and Early Modern Warfare: The Dutch East India Company and China 1622–1624

Abstract: The VOC’s military campaign to gain access to the Chinese market reveals a great deal of reliance on (military) intelligence as a means to reach decisions on the type of military action that was to be taken. A comparison with contemporaneous intra-European wartime practices reveals that the VOC, in this transcultural context of warfare, resorted to many of the same means of intelligence gathering and implementation, revealing an institutional flow between European and Chinese theatres of action. The essential difference, however, was the need to rely on intercultural mediators who could act as agents in the information flow in order to gain the intelligence and assistance the VOC needed. The Chinese Ming Empire was nevertheless able to exert control over intercultural mediators who aided the company. The Ming Empire thus displayed enough political cohesion in the face of European military strength to force the Dutch to conform to its demands. In the end, the Dutch campaign failed because of a lack of grand strategic intelligence, which could only be supplied by the kind of high-level intercultural mediators that the Dutch could not access, and because of the Batavia leadership’s flawed assumption that military pressure was enough to force compliance from the Ming Empire. This flawed assumption stemmed from an erroneous reading of Portuguese successes in gaining access to the Chinese markets and reveals a lack of understanding of the internal political workings of the Chinese bureaucracy, its relationship with Beijing, and its entanglements with powerful local merchants.

When Competitive Intelligence Meets Geospatial Intelligence

Abstract: Given current economic uncertainties, organizations need to efficiently generate new knowledge and incorporate it into their products and services. In this regard, competitive intelligence provides such strategic knowledge to support the creation of competitive advantages. Part of the knowledge created by competitive intelligence concerns the geographical components forming the basis of geospatial analysis. This study sought to identify, among some 40 competitive analytical methods, those that may be enhanced by geospatial intelligence capabilities. To this end, the authors identified the key subject area of each competitive analytical method and the key spatial analysis operations with geospatial intelligence capability, and then they identified those with a strong potential for providing more strategic knowledge when used in combination. They provide various case scenarios to support their propositions. The results demonstrate that geospatial intelligence may leverage competitive intelligence by more efficiently highlighting business opportunities.

Knowledge Element-Based Competitive Intelligence Analytics Serving for SWOT Situation Assessment

Abstract: Competitive intelligence is regarded as one of the most important strategic assets for business, which can help firms to evaluate competitive environment, grasp opportunities, gain advantages and cope with disadvantages and crisis. In the era of big data, managers pay more attention on competitive intelligence analysis aiding for business decision-making than ever before. This paper attempts to explore a competitive intelligence analytics method for SWOT situation assessment, which not only solve the division problem of intelligence collection and intelligence service for decision-making, but also make it possible for implicit intelligence mining based on knowledge element. This study is seen as a first attempt to build an operational prototypal system of competitive intelligence analysis based on knowledge element from the perspective of SWOT assessment. Experiment results verified the feasibility and validity of this study.

ISIS and Social Media: The Combatant Commander's Guide to Countering ISIS's Social Media Campaign

Abstract: Terrorism and threats/Counterterrorism; Technology/Information technology; Law and justice/Civil liberties; Intelligence/Intelligence gathering; Military/Defense policy and doctrine

Discusiones en torno al rol asignado a la inteligencia militar en la Argentina contemporánea

Abstract: The purpose of this research article is to probe the power given by the Argentine State to Military Intelligence. The main goal of the assignment involved inquiring about the role played by the Military Intelligence within the scope of the national strategic management. For purposes thereof, research was indicted assessing the existing degree of compatibility between the general strategic appraisal managed by the Argentinean political management (which can be described as 'pacified' in inter-state terms) and the special budget allocation among the different components of the National Armed Forces to the benefit of Military Intelligence. In the scope of methodology, a comparative analysis study was done, comparing quantitative information taken from national budgets (local and regional ones) and some interviews to intelligence military and civil staff were carried out in order to establish the interpretation of outstanding events by member of Intelligence Services. The final outcome of this research has led to pose a hypothesis for the purpose of historically determining and understanding a set of events which have been taken into account: the Argentine State is carrying out illegal domestic intelligence activities using of the structure of the Military Intelligence in order to fulfill their goals.

Toward an inclusive understanding of technology intelligence: a literature review

Abstract: Purpose – The aim of this paper is to promote the authors' understanding of technology intelligence by responding to two questions: What is technology intelligence? How is it accomplished? Design/methodology/approach – To respond to the two main questions about technology intelligence in this paper, the authors have studied relevant academic, peer-reviewed journals and books using the literature databases of Google Scholar, Sciencedirect, Inderscience, Wiley and Emerald Insight. They have used few selection criteria to choose papers and books for inclusion in their study. Findings – Enhancing the authors' understanding of the technology intelligence concept by responding to the two main questions (What is technology intelligence? How is it accomplished?), classifying the main studies in the field of technology intelligence and several practical and theoretical implications are the findings in this paper. Practical implications – A number of practical implications related to technology intelligence structu...