Showing papers on "Moral psychology published in 1997"

Implicit theories and conceptions of morality

Abstract: In this article, the authors propose that individuals' moral beliefs are linked to their implicit theories about the nature (i.e., malleability) of their social-moral reality. Specifically, it was hypothesized that when individuals believe in a fixed reality (entity theory), they tend to hold moral beliefs in which duties within the given system are seen as fundamental. In contrast, when individuals believe in a malleable reality (incremental theory), one that can be shaped by individuals, they hold moral beliefs that focus on moral principles, such as human rights, around which that reality should be organized. Results from 5 studies supported the proposed framework: Implicit theories about the malleability of one's social-moral reality predicted duty-based vs. rights-based moral beliefs.

The moral intelligence of children

Abstract: A study of the ways in which the shared, daily experience between emotionally connected adults and their children can instill moral sense, and teach children to develop moral intelligence through witnessing the conduct of others.

'Moral panic' and moral language in the media

Abstract: This article provides a comprehensive survey of the use of the term «moral panic» from its coinage in 1972 until the present day. It traces the evolution of the term in academic sociology and criminology, its adoption by the media in the mid-1980s and its subsequent employment in the national press. It shows how and why the term changed its meaning, and how far its use in academic discourse affected its use in the media. The article traces the development of «moral panic» in the media, where it was first used pejoratively, then rejected for being pejorative, and finally rehabilitated as a term of approval. It explains why the term developed as it did : how it enabled journalists to justify the moral and social role of the media, and also to support the reassertion of «family values» in the early 1990s. The article concludes by considering the relationship between «moral panic» and moral language in general. This is a more speculative analysis of the term, drawing on the work of moral philosophers and attempting to predict how «moral panic» may develop in the future. «Moral panic», he suggests, is an unsatisfactory form of moral language which may adversely affect the media's ability to handle moral issues seriously

Sources of variation in moral judgment: Toward a model of real-life morality

Abstract: To evaluate the extent to which the models of moral judgment advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and by Gilligan (1982, 1988) are able to account for real-life moral judgment, we investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation. Eighty young adult men and women made moral judgments about two hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas, two real-life antisocial dilemmas, and two real-life prosocial dilemmas. We failed to find any sex differences in moral judgment. Moral stage and moral orientation varied across the three types of dilemma. Kohlberg's dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 4 moral judgments, real-life prosocial dilemmas pulled for care-oriented Stage 3 moral judgments, and real-life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 2 moral judgments. The content of moral judgments was related to their structure. There was a positive relation between stage of moral judgment on Kohlberg dilemmas and on real-life dilemmas. The implications of these findings for a new, more interactional, model of real-life moral judgment are discussed.

Connecting the Ethics of Teaching and Moral Education

Abstract: Increasing societal concern about the perceived decline of moral and ethical values in contemporary life is promoting renewed interest in moral education or character education (Beck, 1990; Chazan, 1985; Cohen, 1995; Jarrett, 1991; Kelsey, 1993; Lickona, 1991; Nucci, 1989; Ryan & McLean, 1987; Spiecker & Straughan, 1988; Wynne & Ryan, 1993). Some argue that the current educational climate has contributed to a culture in which many do not know what a genuinely moral standard is (Delattre & Russell, 1993, p. 24); they believe that by removing such words as right and wrong from the school vocabulary, schools have been values-neutral for so long that our ability to engage students in conversations about moral issues had become rusty. We were not even sure what our role was in the moral education of our students (Gecan & Mulholland-Glaze, 1993, p. 46). Others, exploring the moral and ethical dimensions of schools, claim schooling is a moral endeavor by its very nature (Goodlad, Soder, & Sirotnik, 1990; Jackson, Boostrom, & Hansen, 1993; Kirschenbaum, 1994; Sergiovanni, 1992, 1996; Sockett, 1993). Both groups acknowledge the growing public demand that schools more directly stand for, reflect, and impart valued principles (Cohen, 1995; Lickona, 1991; Wynne & Ryan, 1993). This recognition, accompanied by support for formal character education or not, has been fueled in part by the greater acceptance of the belief that--regardless of our diversity--at root we share a basic morality that includes such virtues as responsibility, respect, trustworthiness, fairness, caring, and civic virtue (Sergiovanni, 1996, p. 123). Strike and Ternasky (1993) identify three areas in education to which ethics apply: deliberation and reflection on educational policy, moral education, and professional ethics. The last area, which Strike and Ternasky describe as the most neglected until recently, provides the focus for the following discussion. In this article, I connect conceptually the professional ethics of teaching and moral education by exploring the function of teacher education to prepare teachers to understand the moral and ethical complexities of their role and thus enable them to reflect ethical actions and decisions in their professional practice. Teachers' practice inevitably has a strong influence on the moral lessons students directly and indirectly acquire in the classroom (Jackson et al., 1993). To be guides for the young in morality and ethics, teachers must understand the complex moral role that they occupy as ethical professionals and appreciate the significance of their own actions and decisions on the students in their care. Moral education is a term applicable to the preparation of future teachers, as much as to children and adolescent students (Bricker, 1993). The recognition that enhanced awareness of teachers of their own ethical practice can be a powerful force on moral education as it evolves in schools. In the following sections, I review briefly recent theoretical attention to the concept of the teacher as moral agent and exemplar; consider the implications of this concept for teacher education, specifically related to a reconceptualization of foundations courses in educational philosophy and policy; explore the case study method to the teaching of applied ethics; and, using examples from my own practice, provide an overview of potential moral and ethical dilemmas in teaching that some preservice teachers identified in their interpretations of professional and practical experiences. The Teacher as Moral Agent and Exemplar Recent educational literature has focused on the teacher's role as fundamentally concerned with the state of moral agency (Fullan, 1993; Grace, 1995; Sergiovanni, 1992, 1996; Sockett, 1990, 1993; Strike & Ternasky, 1993; Strom, 1989). Some argue that the components of teaching as a knowledge endeavor and as a moral enterprise are essentially inseparable and that recognition of this fusion must be central to the conception of the teacher's role (Ball & Wilson, 1996). …

Essai: Business Ethics and Bauman Ethics:

Abstract: This paper relates Zygmunt Bauman's admonitions of the 'bureaucratic mentality' to business ethics. Although I am not in agreement with everything Bauman has to say, I will argue that business ethicists, consultants and others who claim to be able to do the moral thinking for others should take Bauman's worries about the moral autonomy of people working in our organizations very seriously. As long as business ethics does not enhance this moral autonomy but instead proffers a ratio nalized and rule-governed ethics, it may very well undermine the moral nature of people working in organizations.

Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy

Abstract: Acknowledgments Introduction Taking Disagreement Seriously Mapping the Relativist Domain Relativism, Ethnocentrism, and the Decline of Moral Confidence The Empirical Underdetermination of Descriptive Cultural Relativism Cultural Authority, Cultural Complexity, and the Doctrine of Cultural Integration The Perspicuous "Other": Relativism "Grown Tame and Sleek" The Use and Abuse of History History, Ethnography, and the Blurring of Cultural Boundaries Relativism as a "Kind of Historiography"? Moral Debate, Conceptual Space, and the Relativism of Distance Plus ca change...:The Myths of Moral Invention and Discovery Morality and Its Discontents On the Supposed Inevitability of Rationally Irresolvable Moral Conflict Pluralism, Conflict, and Choice On the Alleged Methodological Infirmity of Moral Inquiry Does Pessimism about Moral Conflict Rest on a Mistake? Moral Inquiry and the Moral Life Moral Inquiry as an Interpretive Enterprise The Interpretive Turn and the Challenge of "AntiTheory" A Pyrrhic Victory? Objectivity and the Aspirations of Moral Inquiry Morality and Culture through Thick and Thin The Need for Thick Descriptions of Moral Inquiry Moral Conflict, Moral Confidence, and Moral Openness toward the Future Critical Pluralism, Cultural Difference, and the Boundaries of Cross-Cultural Respect The Strange Career of "Culture" Epilogue Notes Works Cited Index

The Moral Contours of Teacher Education

Abstract: In this article, I describe the nature of and necessity for moral reasoning in everyday life and in programs in teacher education, consider ways teacher educators can consider moral issues with their students, and provide examples of how some educators have incorporated such issues in actual and proposed programs. Exchanges over school issues with moral connotations often focus on controversies such as censorship of books, appropriateness of sex education, or the legitimacy of creationism versus evolutionism. The Christian Coalition, other fundamentalist organizations, and groups with different perspectives have provoked controversies like these. Some recent efforts of the New Right have sought to regain what they perceive as lost intellectual ground, with cultural and ethical repercussions (Bennett, 1989; Cheney, 1988; Wynne, 1987; Wynne & Ryan, 1993). This ground was lost, so the argument goes, because of changes in the canon in higher education; progressive alternatives to more mainstream educational programs in public schools, especially during the 1960s; movements that promoted greater diversity and inclusiveness within the curriculum as well as among students; and a focus on issues of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation in public school and college classrooms. Those with alternative intellectual and political commitments (Asante, 1991,1992; Delpit, 1995; Gates, 1992; hooks; 1994; Kozol, 1991) have, in turn, challenged the perspective and agenda of the New Right. Such debates demonstrate that education is an ethically and politically contested domain, that the articulation of different points of view on basic moral questions is a central element of the educative process (Beyer & Liston, 1996). At the same time, these debates may be misleading, for they tend to be characterized by particularly heated, even inflammatory exchanges, accompanied by shrill, sometimes personalized accusations and counter-accusations that divide people into sides that talk past, rather than to or with, each other. Debates that grab headlines in the local and national media like those between proponents of creationism and evolutionism may hide the fact that value-laden perspectives underlie a good deal of the commonplace in education, and indeed help shape daily school practice. Moral Issues and Moral Reasoning Moral discourse operates on questions or dilemmas resolved neither by reference to empirical realities nor by logical or linguistic analyses, though the latter may clarify the relevant issues involved in moral disagreements. Moral questions arise whenever we ponder what is the right thing to do, or when we are puzzled about competing claims to action and the values on which those claims rest. Moral deliberation is central to daily lives as well as to decisions about social justice; for instance, in issues ranging from how I treat others on a day-to-day basis, to what my obligations are to members of my community, to what public policies will most help the least advantaged members of society. We may disagree about what makes for a good, responsible, or fulfilling life, as well as about the actions most likely contributing to the realization of that life. Discussion of alternative conceptions of the good life may not be commonplace outside some university classrooms and religious institutions, but issues concerning the politics of affirmative action and the legitimacy of capital punishment frequently contain implicit conceptions of what a good or worthwhile life is. Similarly, concrete classroom questions like those concerning which curriculum content should be selected, what student socialization patterns should be reinforced, what pedagogical practices should be emphasized, and when, how, and by whom evaluative activities should be incorporated, must be understood in relation to ideas about what constitutes a good or rewarding life (Beyer & Apple, in press; Macdonald, 1975). …

The Forms and Functions of Real‐life Moral Decision‐making

Abstract: People rarely make the types of moral judgement evoked by Kohlberg's test when they make moral decisions in their everyday lives. The anticipated consequences of real‐life moral decisions, to self and to others, may influence moral choices and the structure of moral reasoning. To understand real‐life moral judgement we must attend to its functions, which, although they occasionally involve resolving hypothetical moral dilemmas like those on Kohlberg's test, more often involve promoting good social relations, upholding favourable self‐concepts and justifying self‐interested behaviour. We argue that a functional model of moral judgement and moral behaviour derived from evolutionary theory may supply a better account of real‐life morality than the Kohlbergian model.

Different Worldviews, Different Morals: America's Culture War Divide.

Abstract: In this article, it is argued that moral reasoning is premised upon more comprehensive worldviews, and it is suggested that moral behaviors in part serve to maintain these worldviews. A worldview is d

The biology and psychology of moral agency

Abstract: Part I. Moral Agency and Scientific Naturalism: 1. Understanding moral agency: what is a scientific naturalist view of moral agency? Part II. The Biological Bases of Moral Agency: 2. Evolution and moral agency: can evolution endow us with moral capacities? 3. Evolution and moral agency: Does Evolution endow us with moral capacities? 4. Developmental biology and psychology and moral agency: how do our biologically-based moral capacities develop? Part III. The Psychological Bases of moral Agency: 5. Behavioral psychology and moral agency: how do we learn to behave morally? 6. Social cognitive psychology and moral agency: how do we learn to act morally? 7. The neurophysiological bases of moral capacities: do the neurosciences have room for moral agents? Part IV. A Scientific Naturalist Account of Moral Agency: 8. The adequacy of moral beliefs, motivations and actions: how can biological and psychological explanations serve as justifications? 9. Moral ontology: what is the ontological status of moral values? Part V. Integrating a Personalistic and Naturalistic View of Agency: 10. The manifest and scientific images of morality: how can we integrate our ordinary and scientifically based views of moral agency?

Identity development in gifted children: Moral sensitivity

Abstract: Starting from an early age, many gifted children show evidence of moral sensitivity. These children tend to care about others, want to relieve pain and suffering or show advanced ability to think about such abstract ideas as justice and fairness. The beginnings of moral sensitivity are found in the development of empathy between child and care‐taking parent. This is also the basis of identity formation and development of the self. This article also includes a discussion of how the phenomenon of asynchrony manifests in moral development of gifted children and the paradigms these children develop to give form to their moral concerns.

Computer Ethics and Moral Methodology

Abstract: In computer ethics, as in other branches of applied ethics, the problem of the justification of moral judgment is still unresolved. I argue that the method which is referred to as “The Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium” (WRE) offers the best solution to it. It does not fall victim to the false dilemma of having to choose either case-based particularist or principle-based universalist approaches to the problem of moral justification. I claim that WRE also provides the best model of practical moral reasoning available for computer ethics. It does not pretend to provide quasi-algorithmic procedures for moral decision-making, but neither does it abandon the regulative ideal of communicative transparency in discursive public justification.

Moral Imagination in Organizational Problem-solving

Abstract: This essay responds to Patricia Werhane’s 1994 Ruffin Lecture address, “Moral Imagination and the Search for Ethical Decision-making in Management,” using institutional theory as an analytical framework to explore conditions that either inhibit or promote moral imagination in organizational problem-solving. Implications of the analysis for managing organizational change and for business ethics theory development are proposed.

The Moral Quest: Foundations of Christian Ethics

Abstract: Voted one of Christianity Today's 1998 Books of the Year! What is ethics? Why should Christians care? Beginning with these basic questions, Stanley Grenz masterfully leads his readers into a theological engagement with moral inquiry. In The Moral Quest he sets forth the basics of ethics, considers the role and methods of Christian ethics in particular, and examines the ethical approaches of the Old Testament, the Gospels and Paul. He introduces the foundational theological ethics of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Luther and the Reformers. And he concludes with an evenhanded discussion of modern and contemporary Christian ethicists, including Albert Ritschl, Walter Rauschenbusch, Karl Barth, James Gustafson, Paul Ramsey, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Martin Luther King Jr., Gustavo GutiÉrrez, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Stanley Hauerwas, Carl F. H. Henry and Oliver O'Donovan. Clear, concise, and well apprised of relevant literature, Grenz (a theologian recognized for the excellence of his own theological and ethical work) provides in this book a first-rate introduction to Christian ethics. The Moral Quest will well serve students, pastors and interested laypersons alike.

Self-Knowledge: Discovery, Resolution, and Undoing

Abstract: This paper is concerned with ways in which some of the special features of selfknowledge relate to somewhat less familiar problems in the moral psychology of the first-person. The discussion is framed, in part, by an examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on Moore’s Paradox, and I want to draw from these remarks some lessons about self-knowledge (and some other self-relations) as well as use them to throw some light on what might seem to be a fairly distant area of philosophy, namely, Sartre’s view of the person as of a divided nature, divided between what he calls the self-as-facticity and the self-as-transcendence. I hope it will become clear that there is not just perversity on my part in bringing together Wittgenstein and the last great Cartesian. One specific connection that will occupy me here is their shared hostility to the idea of theoretical certainty as our model for the authority of ordinary self-knowledge, and their relating of such a theoretical model to specific forms of self-alienation. This, in turn, is related to another concern they share, a concern with the difficulties, philosophical and otherwise, in conceiving of oneself as but one person in the world among others. They share the sense, I believe, that while I recognize that I am a finite empirical being like anyone else, I must also recognize that the inescapable peculiarities of the first-person point of view oblige me to think of myself as both something more and something less than another empirical human being. The aim of this paper, however, is not to draw parallels between these two philosophers, but to develop the outlines of an argument concerning self-knowledge, one which relocates some of its special features nearer to moral psychology than epistemology. But I find I need to draw on both writers to do so.

Economics as a Moral Science

Abstract: This insightful book offers an original approach to the moral philosophy and economics of Adam Smith. The author proposes new ways of linking Smith’s moral theories to his economics, stressing that for Smith, a moral science of economics is not a contradiction in terms, and that moral questions actually lie at the heart of positive and normative economic analysis.

Is Nietzsche a political thinker

Abstract: Nietzsche claimed to be a political thinker in Ecce Homo and elsewhere. He constantly compared his thought with other political theorists, chiefly Rousseau, Kant and Mill, and he claimed to offer an alternative to the bankruptcy of Enlightenment liberalism. It is worthwhile re‐examining Nietzsche's claim to offer serious criticisms of liberal political philosophy. I shall proceed by setting out seven criteria for serious political thought: understanding of material need; procedural justification; liberty and its worth; racial, ethnic and religious difference; gender and family; justice between nations; and moral psychology. I shall argue polemically that on the first six issues Nietzsche has nothing to offer, but that on the seventh, moral psychology, he makes a profound contribution. Serious political theory, however, needs to forget about Nietzsche and turn to those thinkers he found so boring ‐ the liberal Enlightenment thinkers.

The Virtue Approach to Moral Education: Some Conceptual Clarifications

Abstract: There is a lot of talking and writing on virtues and education nowadays. In spite of this, a clear and convincing account of the defining characteristics of the virtue approach to moral education is still lacking. This paper suggests and discusses three different definitions of such an approach. With reference to each definition it is examined whether the virtue approach can be distinguished from other main perspectives on moral education, in particular from the so-called cognitive-developmental approach (including the just community approach). It is argued that only the definition that refers to an ethics of virtue will have the required differentiating capacity. Consequently, only on the basis of this definition can the virtue approach be regarded as a qualitatively new development in research on moral education.

Smith on Moral Fetishism

Abstract: According to internalism about moral judgements there is an interesting conceptual connection between an agent's making a moral judgement and that agent's motivation. The externalist denies this and claims that any interesting connection between moral judgements and motivation is contingent.1 The resolution of this dispute has important consequences. For whereas the internalist can construe moral judgements either as noncognitive states like desire or as cognitive states like belief, the externalist is committed to construe moral judgements as cognitive states like belief.2 A vindication of externalism would therefore lend support to those who believe in the possibility of some kind of moral reality. In his book The Moral Problem and in a recent issue of this journal, Michael Smith claims to refute any theory which construes the relationship between moral judgements and motivation as contingent and rationally optional. He claims that no such theory is able to account for the platitude that a good and strong-willed person is reliably motivated in accordance with her moral judgements.3 More specifically, the claim is that although the externalist may provide a reliable link between the moral judgements and motivations of some individual, the only link at his disposal is a basic moral motive to do what is right, where this is read de dicto. But, so Smith argues, we can read off from the platitudes that are definitional of moral discourse that this self-consciously moral motive makes for moral fetishism and not for moral goodness.4 Good people care about what is right, where this is read de re, not de dicto. He calls this a reductio of externalism.

Moral regulation : A reformulation

Abstract: Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer introduced the concept of moral regulation to contemporary sociological debate in their historical sociology of English State formation, The Great Arch (1985). In their work they fuse Durkheimian and Foucauldian analysis with a basic Marxist theory. However, this framework gives too limited a perspective to their analysis. I suggest that moral regulation should not be seen as a monolithic project, as merely action by and for the State, nor as activity by the ruling elite only. It should be seen as a form of social control based on changing the identity of the regulated. Its object is what Weber calls Lebensfuhrung, which refers to both the ethos and the action constituting a way of life. The means of moral regulation are persuasion, education, and enlightenment, which distinguishes it from other forms of social control. Analyzing the social relations of moral regulation provides a useful perspective on this form of social action.

Teaching Right and Wrong: Moral Education in the Balance.

Abstract: Morality is supposedly in decline; teachers and adults supposedly unaware of their own moral convictions. Standards of behaviour are reputed to be falling, communities to be in crisis, children no longer to know the difference between right and wrong. Journalists, politicians and government advisors have all joined in the debate, so renewing the sense of urgency for moral education in our schools and homes. Yet the current debate too often oversimplifies and distorts the nature of morality, reducing it to a matter of conformity and rigid rules, and ignoring the complexity of values in this multicultural society. We want children to behave in a responsible and caring way but how can they be taught to do so, particularly when prominent adults set such a poor example? This volume tackles the key issues in moral education in a style accessible to professional educators and general readers. Problems in moral education are explored, taking into account the real contexts of people's lives today. The book deepens and broadens the terms of discussion of morality and draws conclusions to guide the practice of moral education. Contributors include Nigel Blake, Joseph Dunne, Mary Midgley, Anthony Skillen and Bill Williamson.

Beyond Altruism: Identity-Construction as Moral Motive in Political Explanation

Abstract: This article explores conceptual issues pertaining to the role of moral motivation in political explanation. Employing data drawn from long interview with political activists from across the spectrum of American politics, I criticize both rational actor models and so-called “dual” motivational theories, that focus on altruism as the primary moral motive in politics, in contrast to the narrow focus on a certain conception of self-interest. Against both of these approaches, I offer an identity-construction approach to moral motives in politics. This model focuses on the complex interweaving of self and moral motives, and in particular focuses on the concerns political activists have for what kind of person they are and what kind of life they are living. These types of concerns are both moral and self-regarding, and therefore defy the dichotomy between self- and other-regarding at the heart of both rational actor and “dual” motivation accounts of moral motives.

The invention of autonomy: Themes in the history of modern moral philosophy

Abstract: Kant invented the conception of morality as autonomy. I use the notion of invention as Kant himself did in an early remark. “Leibniz thought up a simple substance” he said, “which had nothing but obscure representations, and called it a slumbering monad . This monad he had not explained, but merely invented; for the concept of it was not given to him but was rather created by him.” Autonomy, as Kant saw it, requires contracausal freedom; and he believed that in the unique experience of the moral ought we are “given” a “fact of reason” that unquestionably shows us that we possess such freedom as members of a noumenal realm. Readers who hold, as I do, that our experience of the moral ought shows us no such thing will think of his version of autonomy as an invention rather than an explanation. Those with different views on freedom and morality may wish that I had called this book The Discovery of Autonomy . We can probably agree that Kant's moral thought is as hard to understand as it is original and profound. Systematic studies from Paton and Beck to the present have greatly improved our critical grasp of his position. In this book I try to broaden our historical comprehension of Kant's moral philosophy by relating it to the earlier work to which it was a response.

Some thoughts on Kohlberg's hierarchy of moral reasoning and its relevance for accounting theories of control

Abstract: Kohlberg's hierarchy of moral reasoning has been widely used to assist accounting students in rationalizing the essence of hypothesized moral dilemmas as well as their own moral reasoning towards those dilemmas. This article adopts an analytical approach towards Kohlberg's moral hierarchy, reviewing some of the significant criticisms which have been levelled against the assumptions upon which the hierarchy is based. However, even Kohlberg's critics acknowledge the strengths of the framework and this article moves on to consider Kohlberg's work in terms of the assumptions about human behaviour and moral reasoning which are both explicit and implicit within many accounting theories of control. The article concludes that the moral reasoning and behaviour assumed of both those who are subject to accounting controls and those who effect these controls is at the lower levels of Kohlberg's hierarchy. Accounting and its associated technologies are argued to act as a constraining and limiting influence upon indivi...

Schiller's Critique of Kant's Moral Psychology: Reconciling Practical Reason and an Ethics of Virtue

Abstract: Mention of the name of Friedrich Schiller among both critics and defenders of Kant's moral philosophy has most often been with reference to the well known quip: “Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure. Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person.“ “Sure, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely, And then with aversion to do what your duty enjoins you.'' This attention, however, has served to obscure the fact that Schiller truly intended his remark as a joke, representing a serious, if understandable, misinterpretation of Kantian morality. Though Schiller's various attempts to articulate a theory of moral motivation include important divergences from Kant's account, they represent a response to a set of problems that arise in the context of Kantian moral theory. As such, they may be of greatest interest to moralists who are working within the Kantian tradition. In this paper, I clarify certain points of Schiller's critique of Kant's account of moral motivation and place them in the context of his broader project of reconciling Kantianism and an ethics of virtue.