Showing papers on "Philosophy of mind published in 2009"
Book•
21 Aug 2009TL;DR: Chemero as mentioned in this paper argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than in computational and representation, and proposes a methodology: dynamical systems theory, which would explain things dynamically and without reference to representation.
Abstract: While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, and cognition without explaining them in terms of mental representation. In this book, Anthony Chemero describes this nonrepresentational approach (which he terms radical embodied cognitive science), puts it in historical and conceptual context, and applies it to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. Radical embodied cognitive science is a direct descendant of the American naturalist psychology of William James and John Dewey, and follows them in viewing perception and cognition to be understandable only in terms of action in the environment. Chemero argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than in terms of computation and representation. After outlining this orientation to cognition, Chemero proposes a methodology: dynamical systems theory, which would explain things dynamically and without reference to representation. He also advances a background theory: Gibsonian ecological psychology, "shored up" and clarified. Chemero then looks at some traditional philosophical problems (reductionism, epistemological skepticism, metaphysical realism, consciousness) through the lens of radical embodied cognitive science and concludes that the comparative ease with which it resolves these problems, combined with its empirical promise, makes this approach to cognitive science a rewarding one. "Jerry Fodor is my favorite philosopher," Chemero writes in his preface, adding, "I think that Jerry Fodor is wrong about nearly everything." With this book, Chemero explains nonrepresentational, dynamical, ecological cognitive science as clearly and as rigorously as Jerry Fodor explained computational cognitive science in his classic work The Language of Thought.
1,562 citations
TL;DR: In the second half of the twentieth century, the traditional problem of other minds was re-focused on special problems with propositional attitudes and how we attribute them to others.
Abstract: In the second half of the twentieth-century, the traditional problem of other minds was re-focused on special problems with propositional attitudes and how we attribute them to others. How do ordinary people, with no education in scientific psychology, understand and ascribe such complex, unobservable states? In different terminology, how do they go about "interpreting" their peers? By charitably presupposing their rationality and assigning them the desires and beliefs that a rational person would have in their circumstances (as Dennett and Davidson proposed)? Many philosophers of mind?perhaps Sellars (1956) was the first? suggested that our grasp of mental states in general and propositional attitudes in particular is based on a folk theory, a set of folk-psychological laws that mediate between stimulus inputs, mental states, and behavioral outputs. Mental states are assigned to others (and even to oneself) by nomological inference from what we know about their observable situation, behavior, and antecedent states. Our grasp of each attitude concept is based on a specific causal or functional role embedded in such a psychological theory. This was the reigning orthodoxy for at least 30 years and arguably still occupies this status in many circles. In the 1980s simulation theory was offered as an alternative to this orthodoxy (Gordon 1986; Heal 1986; Goldman 1989). It proposed that third-person ascription does not proceed by theoretical inference but by the heuristic of projecting oneself into the target's shoes. An attributor creates pretend states intended to correspond to those of the target, feeds them into his own cognitive equipment, and lets it produce an output state, e.g., a belief, decision, or emotion. The outputted state is then ascribed to the target. This resembles the empathetic approach to human understanding that was earlier advocated by theorists of Verstehen, and was trotted out (with little fanfare,
482 citations
12 Nov 2009
TL;DR: The Oxford Handbook of Causation as mentioned in this paper provides an overview of topics related to causation, as well as the history of the causation debate from the ancient Greeks to the logical empiricists.
Abstract: The Oxford Handbook of Causation provides an overview of topics related to causation, as well as the history of the causation debate from the ancient Greeks to the logical empiricists. Causation is a central topic in many areas of philosophy. In metaphysics, philosophers want to know what causation is, and how it is related to laws of nature, probability, action, and freedom of will. In epistemology, philosophers investigate how causal claims can be inferred from statistical data, and how causation is related to perception, knowledge, and explanation. In the philosophy of mind, philosophers want to know whether and how the mind can be said to have causal efficacy, and in ethics, whether there is a moral distinction between acts and omissions and whether the moral value of an act can be judged according to its consequences. In addition, causation is a contested concept in other fields of enquiry, such as biology, physics, and the law. The articles, which are all written by leading experts in the field of causation, provide surveys of contemporary debates, while often also advancing novel and controversial claims.
267 citations
Book•
19 Aug 2009TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose an extension of the thinking-organism approach to the case of cognitive science, which they call the Extended Cognitive Systems Approach (ECS).
Abstract: Preface 1. Introduction: The Mind, the Computer, and the Alternatives 1.1 The Mind as Computer 1.2 The Alternatives: The Varieties of Situated Cognition 1.3 Looking Ahead 1.4 Strategy and Methods 1.4.1 Slaying the Cartesian Beast? 1.4.2 The Scope of Situated Views 1.4.3 Philosophy of Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind 1.5 The Book's Conclusions PART I: THE THINKING ORGANISM 2. Principles of Demarcation 2.1 The Challenge of Demarcation 2.2 Extension-Friendly Principles of Demarcation 2.2.1 The Causal Principle 2.2.2 Epistemic Dependence 2.2.3 Metaphysical Necessity and Sufficiency 2.2.4 Clark and Chalmers's Four Criteria 2.3 The Parity Principle 2.4 Conclusion 3. Cognitive Systems and Demarcation 3.1 The Success of Cognitive Psychology 3.2 The Systems-based View 3.2.1 In Outline 3.2.2 A Technical Elaboration 3.2.3 The Virtues of the Systems-based View 3.3 Two Arguments against the Extended View 3.4 Extension-Friendly Rejoinders 3.4.1 Organism-Centered Cognition 3.4.2 Abstract Properties and Extended Systems 3.4.3 Growing and Shrinking Systems 3.5 The No-Self View 3.5.1 Cognitive Systems without Robust Selves 3.5.2 The No-Self View and Arguments against the Extended Approach 3.5.3 Rejoinder and Response 4. Realization and Extended Cognition 4.1 The Argument from Empirical Success and Methodology, Restated 4.2 Extended Cognition and Realization 4.3 Functionalism and the Causal Constraint on Realization 4.4 The Argument from Causal Interaction 4.4.1 Basic Statement of the Argument 4.4.2 Premise One 4.4.3 Premise Two 4.4.4 Premise Four and Beyond 4.4.5 A Rejoinder and a Rebuttal 4.5 Wide Realization, Total Realization, and Causal Powers 4.5.1 Wilson on Realization 4.5.2 Semantic Externalism and Total Realization 4.5.3 The Role of Relational Properties in Cognitive Science 4.6 Cleaning Up 4.6.1 Socially Embedded Properties and Wide Core Realization 4.6.2 The Single-Neuron Argument 4.6.3 Additional Support PART II: ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXTENDED VIEW 5. Functionalism and Natural Kinds 5.1 The Functionalist Argument 5.2 The Natural-Kinds Argument 5.3 The Empirical Response 5.3.1 Short-Term External Memory? 5.3.2 Cognitive Impartiality 5.4 The Pragmatic Turn 6. Developmental Systems Theory and the Scaffolding of Language 6.1 Causal Spread and Complementary Role 6.1.1 Nontrivial Causal Spread 6.1.2 Environment as Complement 6.2 A Case of Nontrivial Causal Spread: Developmental Systems Theory 6.3 The Most Powerful Transformation: Language-Learning 6.3.1 Linguistic Content and Thought Content 6.3.2 Structural Effects 7. Dynamical Systems Theory 7.1 Dynamical Systems Theory and Cognitive Science 7.2 Dynamical Systems and Extended Cognition: General Patterns of Argument 7.3 Six Kinds of Dynamical-Systems-Based Model 7.3.1 Model-Type One: Historical Grounding 7.3.2 Model-Type Two: Organismically Internal Dynamical Interactions 7.3.3 Model-Type Three: Active External Control 7.3.4 Model-Type Four: Organismic Collective Variables, Extended Realizers 7.3.5 Model-Type Five: Extended Collective Variable, Organismic Separability 7.3.6 Model-Type Six: Extended Order Parameter, No Local Separability 7.4 Evolution, Context-Dependence, and Epistemic Dependence 8. The Experience of Extension and the Extension of Experience 8.1 Cognitive Science and the In-Key Constraint 8.2 The Phenomenology of Smooth Coping 8.2.1 The Argument from Smooth Coping 8.2.2 The Heideggerian Framework 8.2.3 Wheeler's Appeal to Dynamical Systems Theory 8.3 The Sense of One's Own Location 8.4 Control-based Arguments 8.5 Control Simpliciter 8.6 Extended Cognition and Extended Experience PART III: THE EMBEDDED AND EMBODIED MIND 9. Embedded Cognition and Computation 9.1 The Embedded Approach 9.2 Computation, Implementation, and Explicitly Encoded Rules 9.3 Computationalism in Principle and Computationalism in Practice 9.4 Timing, Computationalism, and Dynamical Systems Theory 9.5 Conclusion 10. Embedded Cognition and Mental Representation 10.1 What Is Special about Embedded Representation? 10.1.1 Detailed or Partial? 10.1.2 Context-Dependent and Action-Oriented Representations 10.1.3 Relational and Egocentric Representations 10.2 Atomic Affordance Representations 10.3 Embedded Models and External Content 10.4 Innate Representations and the Inflexibility Objection 10.5 Conclusion 11. The Embodied View 11.1 Preliminaries: Where the Disagreement Is Not 11.1.1 Materialism 11.1.2 Functionalism 11.1.3 Arbitrary Symbols and Embodiment 11.1.4 Abstract Symbols 11.2 The Constraint Thesis 11.3 The Content Thesis 11.3.1 External Content 11.3.2 Content-Determination by Causal Mediation 11.3.3 Narrow Content 11.4 Vehicles, Realizers, and Apportioning Explanation 11.5 The Symbol-Grounding Problem 11.5.1 Symbol-Grounding and Reference 11.5.2 Symbol-Grounding and Narrow Content 12. Summary and Conclusion Works Cited Index
263 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the ontological problems surrounding fictions in science may be particularly difficult, however, and a comparison is also made to ontology problems that arise in the philosophy of mathematics.
Abstract: Non-actual model systems discussed in scientific theories are compared to fictions in literature. This comparison may help with the understanding of similarity relations between models and real-world target systems. The ontological problems surrounding fictions in science may be particularly difficult, however. A comparison is also made to ontological problems that arise in the philosophy of mathematics.
178 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the nature of mind and the place of mind in the human mind in a natural world, including self, UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS, and PERSONAL IDENTITY.
Abstract: I. THE PLACE OF MIND IN NATURE II. THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNES IN NATURE III. INTENTIONALITY AND THEORIES OF MENTAL CONTENT IV. SELF, UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY V. VARIETY OF MENTAL ABILITIES VI. EPISTEMIC ISSUES
156 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offer an account that satisfies them.
Abstract: This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman.
152 citations
Book•
31 Jan 2009
TL;DR: In this article, Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality are discussed in relation to the notion of the world in view, and a reading of "Lordship and Bondage" in the "Reason" chapter of the Phenomenology is presented.
Abstract: I. Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality * Sellars on Perceptual Experience * The Logical Form of an Intuition * Intentionality as a Relation II. Kantian Themes in Hegel and Sellars * Hegel's Idealism as a Radicalization of Kant * Self-Determining Subjectivity and External Constraint * Sensory Consciousness in Kant and Sellars * Conceptual Capacities in Perception III. Reading Hegel * The Apperceptive I and the Empirical Self: Towards a Heterodox Reading of "Lordship and Bondage" in Hegel's Phenomenology * Towards a Reading of Hegel on Action in the "Reason" Chapter of the Phenomenology * On Pippin's Postscript IV. Sellarsian Themes * The Constitutive Ideal of Rationality: Davidson and Sellars * Why is Sellars's Essay Called "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"? * Sellars's Thomism * Avoiding the Myth of the Given * Bibliography * Credits * Index
134 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that there are no such things as material individuals in the material world and propose an individual-less view of the world called generalism, which they call "generalism".
Abstract: We naturally think of the material world as being populated by a large number of individuals. These are things, such as my laptop and the particles that compose it, that we describe as being propertied and related in various ways when we describe the material world around us. In this paper I argue that, fundamentally speaking at least, there are no such things as material individuals. I then propose and defend an individual-less view of the material world I call “generalism”.
98 citations
Book•
17 Jul 2009TL;DR: Rafopoulos as mentioned in this paper argued that there is a part of visual processes that results in representational states with non-conceptual content; that is, a part that retrieves information from visual scenes in conceptually unmediated, "bottom-up," theory-neutral ways.
Abstract: In Cognition and Perception, Athanassios Raftopoulos discusses the cognitive penetrability of perception and claims that there is a part of visual processes (which he calls "perception") that results in representational states with nonconceptual content; that is, a part that retrieves information from visual scenes in conceptually unmediated, "bottom-up," theory-neutral ways. Raftopoulos applies this insight to problems in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, and examines how we access the external world through our perception as well as what we can know of that world. To show that there is a theory-neutral part of existence, Raftopoulos turns to cognitive science and argues that there is substantial scientific evidence. He then claims that perception induces representational states with nonconceptual content and examines the nature of the nonconceptual content. The nonconceptual information retrieved, he argues, does not allow the identification or recognition of an object but only its individuation as a discrete persistent object with certain spatiotemporal properties and other features. Object individuation, however, suffices to determine the referents of perceptual demonstratives. Raftopoulos defends his account in the context of current discussions on the issue of the theory-ladenness of perception (namely the Fodor-Churchland debate), and then discusses the repercussions of his thesis for problems in the philosophy of science. Finally, Raftopoulos claims that there is a minimal form of realism that is defensible. This minimal realism holds that objects, their spatiotemporal properties, and such features as shape, orientation, and motion are real, mind-independent properties in the world.
97 citations
TL;DR: This paper proposed a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology, which is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect.
Abstract: The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on “ground level” epistemology.
TL;DR: The life-mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life as discussed by the authors, and the cognitive attitude characteristic of adult human beings is essentially intersubjectively constituted, in particular with respect to the possibility of perceiving objects as detached from our own immediate concerns.
Abstract: The life-mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life. The biggest challenge faced by proponents of this thesis is to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition. We suggest that this apparent 'cognitive gap' between minimal and human forms of life appears insurmountable largely because of the methodological individualism that is prevalent in cognitive science. Accordingly, a twofold strategy is used to show how a consideration of sociality can address both sides of the cognitive gap: (1) it is argued from a systemic perspective that inter-agent interactions can extend the behavioral domain of even the simplest agents and (2) it is argued from a phenomenological perspective that the cognitive attitude characteristic of adult human beings is essentially intersubjectively constituted, in particular with respect to the possibility of perceiving objects as detached from our own immediate concerns. These two complementary considerations of the constitutive role of inter-agent interactions for mind and cognition indicate that sociality is an indispensable element of the life-mind continuity thesis and of cognitive science more generally.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature and also argue that whether or not the future is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
Abstract: In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical commitments (about the nature of consciousness, mind and world) have intruded into definitions.
Abstract: Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical commitments (about the nature of consciousness, mind and world) have intruded into definitions. Similar problems can arise in the way a “conscious process” is defined, potentially obscuring the way that conscious phenomenology actually relates to its neural correlates and antecedent causes in the brain, body and external world. Once a definition of “consciousness” is firmly grounded in its phenomenology, investigations of its ontology and its relationships to entities, events and processes that are not conscious can begin, and this may in time transmute the meaning (or sense) of the term. As our scientific understanding of these relationships deepen, our understanding of what consciousness is will also deepen. A similar transmutation of meaning (with growth of knowledge) occurs with basic terms in physics such as "energy", and "time."
TL;DR: An evaluation of the 2008 Loebner contest finds that the number of entries in the final round was higher than in the previous two contests, but the quality of the entries was lower than in previous contests.
01 Jan 2009
TL;DR: Theory of Mind: The Madness behind the Method A.Costall & I.Leudar 'ToM': A Critical Commentary Continued W.Sharrock & J.Markova Conclusion: ToM Rules, but it is not OK! D.Hutto as mentioned in this paper
Abstract: Introduction: Against 'Theory of Mind' I.Leudar & A.Costall PART I: THEORY AND HISTORY On Historical Antecedents of 'Theory of Mind' I.Leudar & A.Costall Theory of Mind: The Madness Behind the Method A.Costall & I.Leudar 'ToM': A Critical Commentary Continued W.Sharrock & J.Coulter PART II: APPLICATIONS Participants Don't Need Theories: Knowing Minds in Engagement V.Reddy & P.Morris Specifying Interactional Markers of Schizophrenia in Clinical Consultations R.McCabe The Roots of Mindblindness S.Shanker & J.Stieben Who Really Needs a 'Theory' of Mind? E.Williams Do Animals Need a Theory of Mind? M.Bavidge & I.Ground PART III: ALTERNATIVES Closet Cartesianism in discursive psychology W.Sharrock A Dialogical Approach in Psychology: An Alternative to the Dualism of ToM I.Markova Conclusion: ToM Rules, but it is not OK! D.D.Hutto
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the aim of belief can interact with and be weighed against the wider aims of agents in the ways required for it to be a genuine aim.
Abstract: The theory of belief, according to which believing that p essentially involves having as an aim or purpose to believe that p truly, has recently been criticised on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not interact with the wider aims of believers in the ways we should expect of genuine aims. I argue that this objection to the aim theory fails. When we consider a wider range of deliberative contexts concerning beliefs, it becomes obvious that the aim of belief can interact with and be weighed against the wider aims of agents in the ways required for it to be a genuine aim.
01 Sep 2009
TL;DR: In this article, the authors claim that the cumulative force of various empirical data and conceptual considerations makes it more reasonable to accept than to deny that many animals are self-aware, and that intentional actions that involve doing them suggest at least some rudimentary awareness of oneself as persisting through time.
Abstract: This chapter claims that the cumulative force of various empirical data and conceptual considerations makes it more reasonable to accept than to deny that many animals are self-aware. It considers studies focusing on animals' preferences. In the philosophy of mind, desires and beliefs are classified as propositional attitudes, mental states that take propositions or sentences as their objects. Desires to do certain things and intentional actions that involve doing them suggest at least some rudimentary awareness of oneself as persisting through time. Strengthening the case for intentional action, and therefore for bodily self-awareness, is evidence of more sophisticated behaviors in animals involving planning, complex problem-solving, and/or tool use. Like intentional action involving a plan, fear requires some awareness that one will continue into the future. Since Gordon Gallup's pioneering experiments, self-recognition with mirrors has often been cited as evidence of self-awareness in animals.
Book•
19 Dec 2009TL;DR: In this paper, a collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years, together with a view of perception, knowledge, and consciousness.
Abstract: This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years. The two areas combine to lay the groundwork for a naturalistic philosophy of mind. The fifteen essays focus on perception, knowledge, and consciousness. Together, they show the interconnectedness of Dretske's work in epistemology and his more contemporary ideas on philosophy of mind, shedding light on the links which can be made between the two. The first section of the book argues the point that knowledge consists of beliefs with the right objective connection to facts; two essays discuss this conception of knowledge's implications for naturalism. The next section articulates a view of perception, attempting to distinguish conceptual states from phenomenal states. A naturalized philosophy of mind, and thus a naturalized epistemology, is articulated in the third section. This collection will be a valuable resource for a wide range of philosophers and their students, and will also be of interest to cognitive scientists, psychologists, and philosophers of biology.
TL;DR: This article explore a non-restrictive version of the dialectical model of assertion, which treats assertion as constituted by its role in the game of giving and asking for reasons, and argue that the nonrestrictionive dialectical perspective can accommodate various linguistic phenomena commonly taken to support the restrictive model.
Abstract: Alston, Searle, and Williamson advocate the restrictive model of assertion, according to which certain constitutive assertoric norms restrict which propositions one may assert. Sellars and Brandom advocate the dialectical model of assertion, which treats assertion as constituted by its role in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Sellars and Brandom develop a restrictive version of the dialectical model. I explore a non-restrictive version of the dialectical model. On such a view, constitutive assertoric norms constrain how one must react if an interlocutor challenges one’s assertion, but they do not constrain what one should assert in the first place. I argue that the non-restrictive dialectical perspective can accommodate various linguistic phenomena commonly taken to support the restrictive model.1
TL;DR: The story of how Perrin established the reality of atoms and molecules has been a staple in realist philosophy of science writings (Wesley Salmon, Clark Glymour, Peter Achinstein, Penelope Maddy, …). But as discussed by the authors argue that how this story is told distorts both what the work was and its significance, and draw morals for the understanding of how theories can be or fail to be empirically grounded.
Abstract: The story of how Perrin’s experimental work established the reality of atoms and molecules has been a staple in (realist) philosophy of science writings (Wesley Salmon, Clark Glymour, Peter Achinstein, Penelope Maddy, …). I’ll argue that how this story is told distorts both what the work was and its significance, and draw morals for the understanding of how theories can be or fail to be empirically grounded.
TL;DR: In this paper, the intentionality of emotions is treated as a sui generis ontology, as on a par with the intentions of desires and cognitions, but in no way reducible to them.
Abstract: My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. In this paper, I argue for the sui generis approach.
TL;DR: A review of recent work in the area of embodied cognitive science and explore the approaches each takes to the ideas of consciousness, computation and representation can be found in this article, and the current relationship between orthodox cognitive sciences and the study of mental disorder, and consider the implications that the embodied trend could have for issues in psychopathology.
Abstract: The past twenty years have seen an increase in the importance of the body in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. This ‘embodied’ trend challenges the orthodox view in cognitive science in several ways: it downplays the traditional ‘mind-ascomputer’ approach and emphasizes the role of interactions between the brain, body, and environment. In this article, I review recent work in the area of embodied cognitive science and explore the approaches each takes to the ideas of consciousness, computation and representation. Finally, I look at the current relationship between orthodox cognitive science and the study of mental disorder, and consider the implications that the embodied trend could have for issues in psychopathology.
Book•
31 Jan 2009
TL;DR: In this article, Brandom and Dreyfus discuss the notion of knowledge and the internal in the philosophy of mind and the external world, as well as the relation between knowledge and knowledge in the context of making it explicit.
Abstract: I. Ancient Philosophy * Falsehood and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist * Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle's Ethics * Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle * Incontinence and Practical Wisdom in Aristotle II. Issues in Wittgenstein * Are Meaning, Understanding, etc., Definite States? * How Not to Read Philosophical Investigations: Brandom's Wittgenstein III. Issues in Davidson * Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism * Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism * Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective IV. Reference, Objectivity, and Knowledge * Evans's Frege * Referring to Oneself * Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity * The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument V. Themes from Mind and World Revisited * Experiencing the World * Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind VI. Responses to Brandom and Dreyfus * Knowledge and the Internal Revisited * Motivating Inferentialism: Comments on Chapter 2 of Making It Explicit * What Myth? * Response to Dreyfus * Biography * Credits * Index
TL;DR: In this paper, a new analysis of knowledge-wh as a special kind of de re knowledge is proposed, and it is shown that anti-reductionists hold that "s knows-wh" is reducible to ''s knows that p, as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-clause''.
Abstract: Reductionists about knowledge-wh hold that “s knows-wh” (e.g. “John knows who stole his car”) is reducible to “there is a proposition p such that s knows that p, and p answers the indirect question of the wh-clause.” Anti-reductionists hold that “s knows-wh” is reducible to “s knows that p, as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-clause.” I argue that both of these positions are defective. I then offer a new analysis of knowledge-wh as a special kind of de re knowledge.
TL;DR: The notion of primitive agency was introduced in action theory by as mentioned in this paper, where the main objective is to rough out primitive agency and connect primitive agency to natural norms, and make some remarks on how natural norms apply once primitive agency is linked with an agent's perceptually identified goals.
Abstract: My main objective in this paper is to rough out a notion of primitive agency. A secondary objective is to connect primitive agency to natural norms, and to make some remarks on how natural norms apply once primitive agency is linked with an agent’s perceptually identified goals. Both of these objectives bear on primitive antecedents of the higherlevel types of agency that we as philosophers tend to be most interested in—intentional agency, norm-guided agency, deliberative agency, morally responsible agency, intellectual agency, and so on. I believe that by setting these higher levels of agency in a broader, more generic framework, we gain insight into them. For present purposes, I will not defend this belief. What I have to say here in action theory is closely connected to parallel but more extensive work that I have done on perception. One of the main points of the work on perception is to distinguish between mere sensory capacities and sensory-perceptual capacities. Broadly speaking, this distinction marks where representational mind begins. The distinction hinges on perception’s having representational content with accuracy conditions and with perception’s involving a certain type of objectification, exhibited paradigmatically in perceptual constancies. Perceptual constancies are capacities systematically to represent a given particular entity or specific property, relation, or kind as the
Book•
01 Oct 2009
TL;DR: In this article, nine chapters on the philosophy of normativity are presented, focusing on epistemology, normative ethics, meta-ethics, mind and action, and epistemic and affective regions of thought.
Abstract: This book comprises nine chapters on the philosophy of normativity. On one broad construal level, the normative sphere concerns norms, requirements, oughts, reasons, reasoning, rationality, justification, and value. These notions play a central role in both philosophical enquiry and everyday thought; but there remains considerable disagreement how to understand normativity — its nature, metaphysical and epistemological bases — and how different aspects of normative thought connect to one another. As well as exploring traditional and ongoing issues central to our understanding of normativity — especially those concerning reasons, reasoning, and rationality — the chapters develop new approaches to and perspectives within the field. Notably, they make a timely and distinctive contribution to normativity as it features across each of the practical, epistemic, and affective regions of thought, including the important issue of how normativity as it applies to action, belief, and feeling may (or may not) connect. In doing so, the chapters engage topics in the philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, normative ethics, and metaethics.
TL;DR: Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades as discussed by the authors, and there are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated, and much work in this area remains to be done.
Abstract: Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism and reaches the following conclusions. Computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidence for testing computational theories comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant too. Computationalism comes in many versions, which continue to guide competing research programs in philosophy of mind as well as psychology and neuroscience. Although our understanding of computationalism has deepened in recent years, much work in this area remains to be done.