Showing papers on "Rationality published in 1998"

International Norm Dynamics and Political Change

Abstract: Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.

A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997

Abstract: Extensive empirical evidence and theoretical developments in multiple disciplines stimulate a need to expand the range of rational choice models to be used as a foundation for the study of social dilemmas and collective action. After an introduction to the problem of overcoming social dilemmas through collective action, the remainder of this article is divided into six sections. The first briefly reviews the theoretical predictions of currently accepted rational choice theory related to social dilemmas. The second section summarizes the challenges to the sole reliance on a complete model of rationality presented by extensive experimental research. In the third section, I discuss two major empirical findings that begin to show how individuals achieve results that are “better than rational” by building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest. The fourth section raises the possibility of developing second-generation models of rationality, the fifth section develops an initial theoretical scenario, and the final section concludes by examining the implications of placing reciprocity, reputation, and trust at the core of an empirically tested, behavioral theory of collective action.

Emotions and Economic Theory

Abstract: Economists and psychologists who study emotions have worked in near-total isolation from each other. The article discusses some areas in which economists might take account of emotions. After a survey of the main features of emotions as analyzed by psychologists and physiologists, the article discusses three aspects of the relation between emotion and choice. (1) Given that emotions may be intrinsically valuable or instrumentally useful, can one choose to have them? (2) Can emotions supplement rationality in cases where it yields indeterminate prescriptions for choice? (3) When an emotion and self-interest suggest different courses of action, how do they interact to produce a final decision?

Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies In Rationality And Irrationality

Abstract: Preface to the revised edition Preface and acknowledgements Part I. Perfect Rationality: Beyond Gradient-Climbing: 1. Introduction 2. The locally maximizing machine 3. The globally maximizing machine 4. Strategic behaviour in animals and men 5. Functionalist explanation in sociology Part II. Imperfect Rationality: Ulysses and the Sirens: 1. Introduction 2. Towards a definition 3. Pascal 4. Descartes 5. Inconsistent time preferences 6. Endogenous change of preferences 7. Precommitment in animal behaviour 8. Abdication from power 9. Some conclusions and further questions Part III. Problematic Rationality: Some Unresolved Problems in the Theory of Rational Behaviour: 1. Introduction 2. Games without solutions 3. Lexicographic preferences 4. Subjective probability 5. Maximizing, satisficing and natural selection 6. Traditional behaviour and random behaviour 7. Explaining altruism 8. Inconstancy 9. Paradox 10. And so what Part IV. Irrationality: Contradictions of the Mind: 1. Introduction 2. Hate 3. Love 4. Self-deception References Index.

Alchemies of the mind: rationality and the emotions

Abstract: Jon Elster has written a comprehensive, wide-ranging book on the emotions in which he considers the full range of theoretical approaches. Drawing on history, literature, philosophy and psychology, Elster presents a complete account of the role of the emotions in human behaviour. While acknowledging the importance of neurophysiology and laboratory experiment for the study of emotions, Elster argues that the serious student of the emotions can learn more from the great thinkers and writers of the past, from Aristotle to Jane Austen. He attaches particular importance to the work of the French moralists, notably La Rochefoucauld, who demonstrated the way esteem and self-esteem shape human motivation. The book also maintains a running dialogue with economists and rational-choice theorists. Combining methodological and theoretical arguments with empirical case-studies and written with Elster's customary verve and economy, this book has great cross-disciplinary appeal.

Information in Communicative Planning

Abstract: What planners do most is talk and interact; it is through communicative practice that they influence public action. This paper contends that communicative planning requires a new concept of information and how it influences action—namely, a concept of communicative rationality, supplementing instrumental rationality. Drawing on the author's research on the role of information in policy processes, and on Habermas's views of communicative action and rationality, the paper makes three main points. First, information in communicative practice influences by becoming embedded in understandings, practices and institutions, rather than by being used as evidence. Second, the process by which the information is produced and agreed on is crucial and must include substantial debate among key players and a social process to develop shared meaning for the information. Third, many types of information count, other than “objective” information. A concluding note urges planning researchers and educators to put mo...

Entre nous : on thinking-of-the-other

Abstract: Translator's Acknowledgements Author's Preface 1. Is Ontology Fundamental? 2. The I and the Totality 3. Levy-Bruhl and Contemporary Philosophy 4. A Man-God? 5. A New Rationality: On Gabriel Marcel 6. Hermeneutics and the Beyond 7. Philosophy and Awakening 8. Useless Suffering 9. Philosophy, Justice, and Love 10. Nonintentional Consciousness. 11. From the One to the Other: Transcendence and Time 12. The Rights of Man and Good Will 13. Diachrony and Representation 14. The Philosophical Determination of the Idea of Culture 15. Uniqueness 16. Totality and Infinity. Preface to the German Edition 17. Dialogue on Thinking-of-the-Other 18. "Dying for..." 19. The Idea of the Infinite in Us 20. The Other, Utopia, and Justice Notes Index.

A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism

Abstract: The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability are invariably less accurate than they could be otherwise. The first task can be accomplished once we realize that the accuracy of systems of partial beliefs can be measured on a gradational scale that satisfies a small set of formal constraints, each of which has a sound epistemic motivation. When accuracy is measured in this way it can be shown that any system of degrees of belief that violates the axioms of probability can be replaced by an alternative system that obeys the axioms and yet is more accurate in every possible world. Since epistemically rational agents must strive to hold accurate beliefs, this establishes conformity with the axioms of probability as a norm of epistemic rationality whatever its prudential merits or defects might be.

On the Pragmatics of Communication

Abstract: edited by Maeve Cooke Jurgen Habermas's program in formal pragmatics fulfills two main functions. First, it serves as the theoretical underpinning for his theory of communicative action, a crucial element in his theory of society. Second, it contributes to ongoing philosophical discussion of problems concerning meaning, truth, rationality, and action. By the "pragmatic" dimensions of language, Habermas means those pertaining specifically to the employment of sentences in utterances. He makes clear that "formal" is to be understood in a tolerant sense to refer to the rational reconstruction of general intuitions or competences. Formal pragmatics, then, aims at a systematic reconstruction of the intuitive linguistic knowledge of competent subjects as it is used in everyday communicative practices. His program may thus be distinguished from empirical pragmatics--for example, sociolinguistics--which looks primarily at particular situations of use.This anthology brings together for the first time, in revised or new translation, ten essays that present the main concerns of Habermas's program in formal pragmatics. Its aim is to convey a sense of the overall purpose of his linguistic investigations while introducing the reader to their specific details, in particular to his theories of meaning, truth, rationality, and action.

The New Dialectic: Conversational Contexts of Argument

Abstract: Because developments in informal logic have been based, for the most part, on idealized and abstract models, the tools available for argument analysis are not easily adapted to the needs of everyday argumentation. In this book Douglas Walton proposes a new and practical approach to argument analysis based on his theory that different standards for argument must apply in the case of different types of dialogue. By refining and extending the existing formal classifications of dialogue, Walton shows that each dialogue type, be it inquiry, negotiation, or critical discussion, has its own set of goals. He goes on to demonstrate that an argument can best be evaluated in terms of its contribution, positive or negative, to the goals of the particular dialogue it is meant to further. In this way he illustrates how argument can be brought into the service of many types of dialogue, and thus has valuable uses that go well beyond the mere settling of disputes and differences. By reaching back to the Aristotelian roots of logic as an applied, practical discipline and by formulating a new framework of rationality for evaluating arguments, Douglas Walton restores a much-needed balance to argument analysis. This book complements and extends his Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory (University of Toronto Press, 1996).

Truth and Progress: Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality

Abstract: In a report from Bosnia, David Rieff said, “To the Serbs, the Muslims are no longer human. … Muslim prisoners, lying on the ground in rows, awaiting interrogation, were driven over by a Serb guard in a small delivery van.” This theme of dehumanization recurred when Rieff said: A Muslim man in Bosansi Petrovac … [was] forced to bite off the penis of a fellow-Muslim. … If you say that a man is not human, but the man looks like you and the only way to identify this devil is to make him drop his trousers – Muslim men are circumcised and Serb men are not – it is probably only a short step, psychologically, to cutting off his prick. … There has never been a campaign of ethnic cleansing from which sexual sadism has gone missing. The moral to be drawn from Rieff s stories is that Serbian murderers and rapists do not think of themselves as violating human rights. For they are not doing these things to fellow human beings, but to Muslims. They are not being inhuman, but rather are discriminating between true humans and pseudo-humans. They are making the same sort of distinction the Crusaders made between humans and infidel dogs, and Black Muslims make between humans and blue-eyed devils. The founder of my university was able both to own slaves and to think it self-evident that all men were endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights. This was because he had convinced himself that the consciousness of blacks, like that of animals, “participates more of sensation than of reflection.”

Why Study National Systems and National Styles of Innovation

Abstract: Many consider that product specialization reflects variations in factor proportions rather than in the knowledge base, but to focus purely on resource allocations would result in stagnant economic development. Therefore a vibrant economy is one where innovation takes place. This shifts the focus of attention away from rational decision-making to learning and recognition that the future has an uncertain outcome. Learning involves four institutional components: the time horizon of the agents, the role of trust, the actual mix of rationality, and the way authority is expressed. Research shows a strong correlation between specialization in trade and specialization in the knowledge base. The National Systems of Innovation approach concludes that important parts of the knowledge base are tacit and emerge from routine basic learning-by-doing, using and -interacting rather than from science and technology search activities. A sociological system approach is functional and deterministic, whereas an innovation styl...

Biases in the interpretation and use of research results.

Abstract: The latter half of this century has seen an erosion in the perceived legitimacy of science as an impartial means of finding truth. Many research topics are the subject of highly politicized dispute; indeed, the objectivity of the entire discipline of psychology has been called into question. This essay examines attempts to use science to study science: specifically, bias in the interpretation and use of empirical research findings. I examine theory and research on a range of cognitive and motivational mechanisms for bias. Interestingly, not all biases are normatively proscribed; biased interpretations are defensible under some conditions, so long as those conditions are made explicit. I consider a variety of potentially corrective mechanisms, evaluate prospects for collective rationality, and compare inquisitorial and adversarial models of science.

Observations on modernity

Abstract: Preface 1. Modernity in contemporary society 2. European rationality 3. Contingency as modern society's defining attribute 4. Describing the future 5. The ecology of ignorance Notes.

Rational action theory for sociology

Abstract: Rational action theory (RAT) is not a highly unified intellectual entity. In the first part of the paper, varieties of RAT are distinguished in terms of three criteria: i.e. according to whether they (i) have strong rather than weak rationality requirements; (ii) focus on situational rather than procedural rationality; (iii) claim to provide a general rather than a special theory of action. In the second part, these same criteria are applied in a consideration of which version of RAT holds out most promise for use in sociology.

Truth and progress

Abstract: Introduction Part I. Truth and Some Philosophers: 1. Is truth a goal of inquiry?: Donald Davidson vs. Crispin Wright 2. Hilary Putnam and the relativist menace 3. John Searle on realism and relativism 4. Charles Taylor on truth 5. Daniel Dennett on intrinsicality 6. Robert Brandom on social practices and representations 7. The very idea of human answerability to the world: John McDowell's Version of Empiricism 8. Anti-sceptical weapons: Michael Williams vs. Donald Davidson Part II. Moral Progress: Towards more Inclusive Communities: 9. Human rights, rationality, and sentimentality 10. Rationality and cultural difference 11. Feminism and pragmatism 12. The end of Leninism, Havel and social hope Part III. The Role of Philosophy in Human Progress: 13. The historiography of philosophy: four genres 14. The contingency of philosophical problems: Michael Ayers on Locke 15. Dewey between Hegel and Darwin 16. Habermas, Derrida and the functions of philosophy 17. Derrida and the philosophical tradition.

Behavioral Finance and Its Implications for Stock-Price Volatility

Abstract: An increasing number of academic and professional articles are being published about research on and potential applications of behavioral finance. This article offers a more complete picture of the origin, content, and rationale behind this emerging area of study than previously presented. In the process, the traditional dominance in finance of the economic concepts of subjective expected utility and rationality are discussed. In addition, the article argues that the newer theories of chaos and adaptive decision making, which have a place in behavioral finance, can help explain the puzzle of stock-price volatility.

Rationality and Power

Abstract: The Aalborg Project may be interpreted as a metaphor of modern politics, modern administration and planning, and of modernity itself. The basic idea of the project was comprehensive, coherent, and innovative, and it was based on rational and democratic argument. During implementation, however, when idea met reality, the play of Machiavellian princes, Nietzschean will to power, and Foucauldian rationality-as-rationalization resulted in the fragmentation of the project.

Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Making

Abstract: The main objectives of this paper are: (i) To give a pithy, opinionated summary of what has been learned about bounded rationality in individual decision making from experiments in economics and psychology (drawing on my 1995 Handbook of Experimental Economics chapter); and (ii) mention some promising new directions for research which would be included if that chapter were written today.

Virtualism : a new political economy

Abstract: ion in western economic practice, James G. Carrier the triumph of economics - or, "rationality" can be dangerous to your reasoning, Ben Fine abstraction, reality and the gender of "economic man", Julie Nelson development and structural adjustment, Philip McMichael cash for quotas - disputes over the legitimacy of an economic model of fishing in Iceland, Agnar Helgason and Gisli Palsson the transnational capitalist class, Leslie Sklair virtual capitalism - the globalization of reflexive business knowledge, Nigel Thrift conclusion, Daniel Miller.

Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law

Abstract: Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler wish to use the insights of behavioral economics to improve economic analysis of law, which they believe to be handicapped by its commitment to the assumption that people are rational.1 The editors of the Review have asked me to comment on JST's paper, no doubt because of my identification with rational-choice economics. Since JST complain with some justice that economists and economically minded lawyers do not always make clear what they mean by "rationality," let me make clear at the outset what I mean by the word: choosing the best means to the chooser's ends. For example, a rational person who wants to keep warm will compare the alternative means known to him of keeping warm in terms of cost, comfort, and other dimensions of utility and disutility, and will choose from this array the means that achieves warmth with the greatest margin of benefit over cost, broadly defined. Rational choice need not be conscious choice. Rats are at least as rational as human beings when rationality is defined as achieving one's ends (survival and reproduction, in the case of rats) at least cost. No doubt my definition lacks precision and rigor. But it is good enough to indicate the difference in approach between rational-choice economics and behavioral economics.

Collaborative Reasoning: Evidence for Collective Rationality

Abstract: Reasoning may be defined as a deliberate effort to coordinate inferences so as to reach justifiable conclusions. Thus defined, reasoning includes collaborative as well as individual forms of cognitive action. The purpose of the present study was to demonstrate a circumstance in which collaborative reasoning is qualitatively superior to individual reasoning. The selection task, a well known logical hypothesis-testing problem, was presented to 143 college undergraduates—32 individuals and 20 groups of 5 or 6 interacting peers. The correct (falsification) response pattern was selected by only 9% of the individuals but by 75% of the groups. The superior performance of the groups was due to collaborative reasoning rather than to imitation or peer pressure. Groups typically co-constructed a structure of arguments qualitatively more sophisticated than that generated by most individuals. The results support Piagetian and Habermasian views of peer interaction as a locus of rational social processes.

In search of the good: narrative reasoning in clinical practice.

Abstract: Based on ethnographic work among North American occupational therapists, I compare two forms of everyday clinical talk. One, "chart talk," conforms to normative conceptions of clinical rationality. The second, storytelling, permeates clinical discussions but has no formal status as a vehicle for clinical reasoning. I argue that both modes of discourse provide avenues for reasoning about clinical problems. However, these discourses construct very different clinical objects and different phenomena to reason about. Further, the clinical problems created through storytelling point toward a more radically distinct conception of rationality than the one underlying biomedicine as it is formally conceived. Clinical storytelling is more usefully understood as a mode of Aristotle's "practical rationality" than the technical rationality of modern (enlightenment) conceptions of reasoning.

The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition:

Abstract: Rational choice theory constitutes a vigorous and contentious voice within political science. Recent political trends suggest its limitations, however, as well as the utility of alternative approaches to the study of politics. This article explores the ability of rational choice theory to address these forms of politics and the possibility of combining it with alternative approaches. Our goal is twofold. First, we provide insight into rational choice theory’s relationship with cultural modes of analysis and the former approach’s limitations. Second--and contrary to much of the literature--we suggest that rational choice and cultural analysis approaches are complementary rather than mutually exclusive and antagonistic.

Neoliberalism as a political rationality: Australian public policy since the 1980s

Abstract: Since the 1980s a remarkable transformation has occurred in the rationale that informs public policy in Australia. This transformation reflects a fundamental change in the way national economies and populations are conceived by policy-makers, and has led to the emergence of new strategies of governance as a consequence. We argue that this change of direction in Australian public policy may be best thought of as a specific neoliberal 'political rationality'. The first section of the paper outlines changes in conceptions of the economy and subjectivity which are associated with neoliberalism as a political rationality. The second part of the paper examines the articulation and implementation of neoliberalism in Australia over the last couple of decades.