Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 2003"

Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for caring and Justice.

Abstract: Empathy and Moral Development represents the life’s work of Professor Hoffman, integrating over 30 years of research with information and ideas gleaned from the psychological and social development theories of the last century. Starting with biblical concepts of sin and guilt and drawing on the germinal theories of historical figures such as Rousseau, Freud and Piaget, the author also discusses Kohlberg’s theory and modifications by later followers. The first chapter begins with a brief overview of the previous and current theories and the historical sources for the book, giving clear definitions and outlining the theory to follow. Each of the seven sections of the book expands on important key concepts introduced earlier. There are frequent references to and review of the previously discussed material. The first section of the book explains the “innocent bystander” model that has been used for decades to explore human moral development. Concepts from animal arousal and behavior models are linked with human infant research on early affective and cognitive development. The research quoted is illustrative and extensive. The section ends with a discussion of the differences between empathy, guilt, sympathy and injustice. Parts Two and Three introduce the concept of guilt and how parental discipline interacts with a child’s cognitive skills to guide moral development. This first half of the book could have been expanded further through the use of more examples and further exploration of how genetics and innate brain processes contribute to the development of empathy. Hoffman also seemed to emphasize the psychosocial aspects over the behavioral cognitive and genetic aspects, but it is a good review of the field to date. The second half of the book is very interesting. The examples given are more current, complete and involved. The author shines as he discusses his integration of existing theory and research into a comprehensive model. He sketches a brief picture of different types of guilt, and a theoretical hierarchy. He expands on his assertion that both parental discipline and peer interaction are necessary for the development of guilt and morality. His collected statistics on parental discipline and its effects on children’s moral development are impressive. He explains why empathy can operate in some situations and can be overwhelmed in others, even when the individuals involved are highly empathic (i.e. therapist burnout). Numerous examples are given of how guilt and empathy are motivators for human action, especially prosocial and “altruistic” actions. In light of the events of September 11, 2001, Hoffman’s concepts explain much of the individual and social group actions which followed. Section Four of the book asks the question “Is Empathy Enough” to explain moral action. Types of bias which may affect empathy and moral action are examined. Empathy’s self-destructive and self-limiting qualities are explored and integrated in Darwinian fashion. Hoffman states that a morality based on empathy alone would not be fair in large mixed or larger human groups and would lead to bias and conflict. To live together peaceably, Hoffman insists that empathy must be embedded in moral principles, the subject of the fifth part of the book. Hoffman shows how empathy (affect) becomes linked or bonded to moral principles (of cognitive and social origin) as the person develops. The synthesis is used powerfully to explain the perpetuation of social attributes of caring and justice in western society. Useful definitions of key concepts in justice research are included. Parts six and seven of the book are the slimmest and cover culture, wherein issues of the universal applicability of the key concepts are examined, and intervention, which hopefully can someday be expanded into its own volume. A few directions in designing empathic training for use in young offenders and other children at risk are given, but not in the kind of depth currently desperately needed in the field. The book is well organized in its scant 300 pages and set up as a graduate course. It is an easy book from which to learn. It would make an ideal text and makes for a brilliant discussion overall, as it presents the author’s theory that will, no doubt, form the basis for future research and intervention in this area.

Moral Realism: A Defence

Abstract: I REALISM AND ITS CRITICS II MORAL METAPHYSICS III MORAL MOTIVATION IV MORAL REASONS V MORAL KNOWLEDGE

Moral identity and the expanding circle of moral regard toward out-groups.

Abstract: This article examines moral identity and reactions to out-groups during intergroup conflict. Four studies suggest that a highly self-important moral identity is associated with an expansive circle of moral regard toward out-group members (Study 1) and more favorable attitudes toward relief efforts to aid out-group members (Study 2). Study 3 examines moral identity and national identity influences on the provision of financial assistance to out-groups. Study 4 investigates the relationship between moral identity and (a) the willingness to harm innocent out-group members not involved in the conflict and (b) moral judgments of revenge and forgiveness toward out-group members directly responsible for transgressions against the in-group. Results are discussed in terms of self-regulatory mechanisms that mitigate in-group favoritism and out-group hostility.

Moral Development and Reality: Beyond the Theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman

Abstract: Foreword - Daniel K. Lapsley Preface 1. Introduction Social Perspective-Taking and the Moral Point of View The Right and the Good: The Moral Domain Introducing Chapters Two Through Nine 2. "The Right" and Moral Development: Fundamental Themes of Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Approach Early-Childhood Superficiality Beyond Centrations and Superficial Judgment Stages of Moral Reciprocity Assessing Stages of Immature and Mature Moral Judgment Concluding Comment 3. Kohlberg's Theory: A Critique and New View Background Kohlberg's Overhaul of Piaget's Phases Adult Moral Development in Kohlberg's Theory A New View of Lifespan Moral Judgment Development Conclusion 4. "The Good" and Moral Development: Hoffman's Theory The Empathic Predisposition Modes of Empathic Arousal Empathy and Cognitive Development: Stages of Empathic Distress The Empathic Predisposition, Cognition, and Affective Primacy The Empathic Predisposition, Socialization, and Moral Internalization Conclusion and Critique 5. Moral Development, Moral Sef-Relevance, and Prosocial Behavior Prosocial Behavior: A Rescue Individual Differences in Prosocial Behavior Conclusion: Two Spurious "Moral Exemplars" 6. Understanding Antisocial Behavior Limitations of Antisocial Youth A Case Study 7. Treating Antisocial Behavior The Mutual Help Approach The Psychoeducational or Skills Training Approach Evaluation of the Equip Program Perspective-Taking for Severe Offenders 8. Beyond the Theories: A Deeper Reality? Two Case Studies A Deeper Reality? Moral Insight and Inspiration Conclusion 9. Conclusion The Issue of Moral Motivation Moral Perception and Reality References Index Appendix About the Author

From neural 'is' to moral 'ought': what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology?

Abstract: Many moral philosophers regard scientific research as irrelevant to their work because science deals with what is the case, whereas ethics deals with what ought to be. Some ethicists question this is/ought distinction, arguing that science and normative ethics are continuous and that ethics might someday be regarded as a natural social science. I agree with traditional ethicists that there is a sharp and crucial distinction between the 'is' of science and the 'ought' of ethics, but maintain nonetheless that science, and neuroscience in particular, can have profound ethical implications by providing us with information that will prompt us to re-evaluate our moral values and our conceptions of morality.

Morals and the human brain: A working model.

Abstract: Morality has been at the center of informal talks and metaphysical discussions since the beginning of history. Recently, converging lines of evidence from evolutionary biology, neuroscience and experimental psychology have shown that morality is grounded in the brain. This article reviews the main lines of investigation indicating that moral behavior is a product of evolutionary pressures that shaped the neurobehavioral processes related to the selective perception of social cues, the experience of moral emotions and the adaptation of behavioral responses to the social milieu. These processes draw upon specific cortical-subcortical loops that organize social cognition, emotion and motivation into uniquely human forms of experience and behavior. We put forth a model of brain-behavior relationships underlying moral reasoning and emotion that accommodates the impairments of moral behavior observed in neuropsychiatric disorders. This model provides a framework for empirical testing with current methods of neurobehavioral analysis.

Moral Stress: synthesis of a concept

Abstract: The aim of this article is to describe the synthesis of the concept of moral stress and to attempt to identify its preconditions. Qualitative data from two independent studies on professional issues in nursing were analysed from a hypothetical-deductive approach. The findings indicate that moral stress is independent of context-given specific preconditions: (1) nurses are morally sensitive to the patient's vulnerability; (2) nurses experience external factors preventing them from doing what is best for the patient; and (3) nurses feel that they have no control over the specific situation. The findings from this analysis are supported by recent research on stress in the workplace but differ that the imperatives directing work are moral in nature. Stress researchers have found that persons who experience that they have no control over their work situation and at the same time experience high demands may be prone to cardiovascular diseases. An important question raised by this study is whether moral stress should be recognized as a health risk in nursing. Further research is required in order to generate intervention models to prevent or deal with moral stress.

Moral cognition and its neural constituents.

Abstract: Identifying the neural mechanisms of moral cognition is especially difficult. In part, this is because moral cognition taps multiple cognitive sub-processes, being a highly distributed, whole-brain affair. The assumptions required to make progress in identifying the neural constituents of moral cognition might simplify morally salient stimuli to the point that they no longer activate the requisite neural architectures, but the right experiments can overcome this difficulty. The current evidence allows us to draw a tentative conclusion: the moral psychology required by virtue theory is the most neurobiologically plausible.

A Longitudinal Analysis of Personal Values Socialization: Correlates of a Moral Self- Ideal in Late Adolescence

Abstract: There has been considerable study of the development of moral reasoning in adolescence within the cognitive–developmental paradigm, but less empirical attention to the development of moral valuing and motivation. In a two-year longitudinal study, we examined the correlates of high-school students’ endorsement of explicitly moral values as ideals for the self. Those who reported being involved in community helping activities at age 17 were subsequently more likely to increase their relative emphasis on the importance of prosocial moral values for themselves. As predicted, an authoritative family parenting style was associated with more parent–adolescent value agreement in general (regarding both moral and non-moral values). Particularly for males, reports of greater parent monitoring and strictness were associated with more emphasis on moral values for the self. This relation between parental strictness and males’ self-ideals was mediated over time by perceived stronger emphases on moral values by both parents and friends. These findings suggest the potential utility of studying moral motivation to help understand prosocial development in adolescence.

The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making

Abstract: We critically review the mushrooming literature addressing the neural mechanisms of moral cognition (NMMC), reaching the following broad conclusions: (1) research mainly focuses on three inter-related categories: the moral emotions, moral social cognition, and abstract moral reasoning. (2) Research varies in terms of whether it deploys ecologically valid or experimentally simplified conceptions of moral cognition. The more ecologically valid the experimental regime, the broader the brain areas involved. (3) Much of the research depends on simplifying assumptions about the domain of moral reasoning that are motivated by the need to make experimental progress. This is a valuable beginning, but as more is understood about the neural mechanisms of decision-making, more realistic conceptions will need to replace the simplified conceptions. (4) The neural correlates of real-life moral cognition are unlikely to consist in anything remotely like a "moral module" or a "morality center." Moral representations, deliberations and decisions are probably highly distributed and not confined to any particular brain sub-system. Discovering the basic neural principles governing planning, judgment and decision-making will require vastly more basic research in neuroscience, but correlating activity in certain brain regions with well-defined psychological conditions helps guide neural level research. Progress on social phenomena will also require theoretical innov- ation in understanding the brain's distinctly biological form of computation that is anchored by emotions, needs, drives, and the instinct for survival.

Conceptions of moral, social-conventional, and personal events among Chinese preschoolers in Hong Kong.

Abstract: Sixty-one Chinese preschoolers from Hong Kong at 2 ages (Ms = 4.36 and 6.00 years) were interviewed about familiar moral, social-conventional, and personal events. Children treated personal events as distinct from moral obligations and conventional regulations. Children judged the child as deciding personal issues, based on personal choice justifications, whereas children judged parents as deciding moral and conventional issues. With age, children granted increased decision-making power to the child. In contrast, children viewed moral transgressions as more serious, generalizably wrong, and wrong independent of authority than other events, based on welfare and fairness. Punishment-avoidance justifications for conventional events decreased with age, whereas conventional justifications increased. Young Chinese preschool children make increasingly differentiated judgments about their social world.

A Defense of the Common Morality

Abstract: Phenomena of moral conflict and disagreement have led writers in ethics to two antithetical conclusions: Either valid moral distinctions hold universally or they hold relative to a particular and contingent moral framework, and so cannot be applied with universal validly. Responding to three articles in this issue of the Journal that criticize his previously published views on the common morality, the author maintains that one can consistently deny universality to some justified moral norms and claim universality for others. Universality is located on the common morality and nonuniversality in other parts of the moral life, called "particular moralities." The existence of universal moral standards is defended in terms of: (1) a theory of the objectives of morality, (2) an account of the norms that achieve those objectives, and (3) an account of normative justification (both pragmatic and coherentist).

Account episodes in family discourse: the making of morality in everyday interaction:

Abstract: This article investigates account episodes in Italian family dinner conversations and illustrates how sequential patterns and participation are organized in terms of preferences indexical of moral ...

Zones of Consensus and Zones of Conflict: Questioning the "Common Morality" Presumption in Bioethics

Abstract: Many bioethicists assume that morality is in a state of wide reflective equilibrium. According to this model of moral deliberation, public policymaking can build upon a core common morality that is pretheoretical and provides a basis for practical reasoning. Proponents of the common morality approach to moral deliberation make three assumptions that deserve to be viewed with skepticism. First, they commonly assume that there is a universal, transhistorical common morality that can serve as a normative baseline for judging various actions and practices. Second, advocates of the common morality approach assume that the common morality is in a state of relatively stable, ordered, wide reflective equilibrium. Third, casuists, principlists, and other proponents of common morality approaches assume that the common morality can serve as a basis for the specification of particular policies and practical recommendations. These three claims fail to recognize the plural moral traditions that are found in multicultural, multiethnic, multifaith societies such as the United States and Canada. A more realistic recognition of multiple moral traditions in pluralist societies would be considerable more skeptical about the contributions that common morality approaches in bioethics can make to resolving contentious moral issues.

Institutional Context and Auditors' Moral Reasoning: A Canada-U.S. Comparison

Abstract: This paper compares the moral reasoning of 363 auditors from Canada and the United States. We investigate whether national institutional context is associated with differences in auditors' moral reasoning by examining three components of auditors' moral decision process: (1) moral development, which describes cognitive moral capability, (2) prescriptive reasoning of how a realistic accounting dilemma ought to be resolved and, (3) deliberative reasoning of how a realistic accounting dilemma will be resolved. Not surprisingly, it appears that institutional factors are more likely to be associated with auditors' deliberative reasoning than their prescriptive reasoning in both countries. Additionally, our findings suggest that the national institutional context found in the United States, which has a tougher regulatory and more litigious environment, appears to better encourage auditors to deliberate according to what they perceive is "the ideal" judgment as compared to the Canadian context. We then discuss the implications of these findings for regulators and for ethics research.

Maternal power assertion in discipline and moral discourse contexts: commonalities, differences, and implications for children's moral conduct and cognition

Abstract: Parental power assertion is traditionally studied in the behavioral domain--discipline triggered by the child's immediate misbehavior--but rarely in the cognitive domain--parent-child discussions of the child's past misbehavior. Maternal power assertion was observed in "do" and 'don't" discipline contexts from 14 to 45 months and in the context of mother-child discourse about a recent misbehavior at 56 months. Mothers' use of power cohered across the "do," 'don't," and discourse contexts, but its implications were domain specific. Power assertion in the 'don't" discipline context predicted behavioral outcomes (more moral conduct at 56 and 73 months, less antisocial conduct at 73 months) but not cognitive outcomes (moral cognition at 56 and 73 months). Power assertion in the discourse context predicted less mature moral cognition but not moral or antisocial conduct. Mothers' high Neuroticism predicted more power assertion in all three contexts. Child effects were examined.

Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition

Abstract: In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts is a comprehensive examination of what a plausible moral science would look like.Casebeer begins by discussing the nature of ethics and the possible relationship between science and ethics. He then addresses David Hume's naturalistic fallacy and G. E. Moore's open-question argument, drawing on the work of John Dewey and W. V. O. Quine. He then proposes a functional account of ethics, offering corresponding biological and moral descriptions. Discussing in detail the neural correlates of moral cognition, he argues that neural networks can be used to model ethical function. He then discusses the impact his views of moral epistemology and ontology will have on traditional ethical theory and moral education, concluding that there is room for other moral theories as long as they take into consideration the functional aspect of ethics; the pragmatic neo-Aristotelian virtue theory he proposes thus serves as a moral "big tent." Finally, he addresses objections to ethical naturalism that may arise, and calls for a reconciliation of the sciences and the humanities. "Living well," Casebeer writes, "depends upon reweaving our ethical theories into the warp and woof of our scientific heritage, attending to the myriad consequences such a project will have for the way we live our lives and the manner in which we structure our collective moral institutions."

Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence

Abstract: In our everyday lives we struggle with the notions of why we do what we do and the need to assign values to our actions. Somehow, it seems possible through experience and life to gain knowledge and understanding of such matters. Yet once we start delving deeper into the concepts that underwrite these domains of thought and actions, we face a philosophical disappointment. In contrast to the world of facts, values and morality seem insecure, uncomfortably situated, easily influenced by illusion or ideology. How can we apply this same objectivity and accuracy to the spheres of value and morality? In the essays included in this collection, Peter Railton shows how a fairly sober, naturalistically informed view of the world might nonetheless incorporate objective values and moral knowledge. This book will be of interest to professionals and students working in philosophy and ethics.

The Effect of Context on Moral Intensity of Ethical Issues: Revising Jones's

Abstract: Jones's (1991) issue-contingent model of ethical decision making posits that six dimensions of moral intensity influence decision makers' recog- nition of an issue as a moral problem and subsequent behavior. He notes that "organizational settings present special challenges to moral agents" (1991, p. 390) and that organizational factors affect "moral decision making and behavior at two points: estab- lishing moral intent and engaging in moral behavior" (1991, p. 391). This model, however, minimizes both the impact of organizational setting and organizational factors on these experiences of ethical issues. In this theory, context is modeled as affecting the moral intent and behavior of the actor rather than directly affecting the issue's moral intensity. Here we look specifically at the effect of context on the moral intensity of ethical issues through a phenomenolog- ical study. Our results indicate that in certain envi- ronments, context may be critical in affecting the moral intensity of ethical issues. Thus, researchers should consider it more fully when assessing these issues' moral intensity.

The Effect of Context on Moral Intensity of Ethical Issues: Revising Jones's Issue-Contingent Model

Abstract: Jones's (1991) issue-contingent model of ethical decision making posits that six dimensions of moral intensity influence decision makers' recognition of an issue as a moral problem and subsequent behavior. He notes that "organizational settings present special challenges to moral agents" (1991, p. 390) and that organizational factors affect "moral decision making and behavior at two points: establishing moral intent and engaging in moral behavior" (1991, p. 391). This model, however, minimizes both the impact of organizational setting and organizational factors on these experiences of ethical issues. In this theory, context is modeled as affecting the moral intent and behavior of the actor rather than directly affecting the issue's moral intensity. Here we look specifically at the effect of context on the moral intensity of ethical issues through a phenomenological study. Our results indicate that in certain environments, context may be critical in affecting the moral intensity of ethical issues. Thus, researchers should consider it more fully when assessing these issues' moral intensity.

The Moral Development of Child Soldiers: What Do Adults Have to Fear?

Abstract: Responding to concerns expressed by adults living in war zones and in postconflict societies, this article explores the evidence concerning whether children's moral de-velopment is seriously disrupted by their participation in armed conflict. It begins by defining some of the key issues in the debate and discussing how the child development and war literatures frame these issues. It emphasizes that there is a shortage of systematic empirical research in this area, and makes a case for further enquiry into the contextual influences in children's moral learning and for a particular focus on the specific environmental challenges associated with involvement in combat. The article concludes by questioning the view of young former combatants as moral reprobates, and arguing the need for a reconceptualization of both childhood and child development.

Corporate Versus Individual Moral Responsibility

Abstract: There is a clear tendency in contemporary political/legal thought to limit agency to individual agents, thereby denying the existence and relevance of collective moral agency in general, and corporate agency in particular. This tendency is ultimately rooted in two particular forms of individualism – methodological and fictive (abstract) – which have their source in the Enlightenment. Furthermore, the dominant notion of moral agency owes a lot to Kant whose moral/legal philosophy is grounded exclusively on abstract reason and personal autonomy, to the detriment of a due recognition of the socio-historical grounds of moral social conduct.

Reasoning with Moral Conflicts

Abstract: 1I ntroduction Let us say that a normative conflict is a situation in which an agent ought to perform an action A, and also ought to perform an action B, but in which it is impossible for the agent to perform both A and B. Not all normative conflicts are moral conflicts, of course. It may be that the agent ought to perform the action A for reasons of personal generosity, but ought to perform the action B for reasons of prudence: perhaps A involves buying a lavishgift for a friend, wh ile B involves depositing a certain amount of money in the bank. In general, our practical deliberation is shaped by a concern witha variety of morally neutral goods—not just generosity and prudence, but any number of others, such as etiquette, aesthetics, fun— many of which are capable of providing conflicting reasons for action. I mention these ancillary values in the present setting, however, only to put them aside. We will be concerned here, not with normative conflicts more generally, but precisely with moral conflicts—situations in which, even when our attention is restricted entirely to moral reasons for action, it is nevertheless true that an agent ought to do A and ought to do B, where it is impossible to do both. It is often argued that moral conflicts, defined in this way, simply cannot occur, that they are impossible. The justifications offered for this conclusion fall into two broad categories. Some writers contend that, although there might be normative conflicts more generally, the possibility of specifically moral conflicts is ruled out by the special nature of moral reasons. Arguments along these lines generally proceed by identifying as genuinely moral reasons for action only those supported by some particular moral theory— usually a Kantian or utilitarian theory—that itself rules out the possibility of conflicts. Alan Donagan, for example, argues against moral conflicts in his [1984] and [1993] by advancing a kind of rationalist theory, developed

The Cultural Construction of Moral and Civic Identities

Abstract: In this article, we explore the intertwining of moral identity and the social and cultural context. First, we review existing research on moral identity that has considered the role of social others and the cultural environment. Then we pose questions to further research in this area and offer a 3-level framework with which to understand how the cultural world influences moral identity development. Central to this framework is an analysis of the cultural practices within which moral identities develop, as well as the institutional contexts that support these practices and the social interactions that comprise them. Finally, we illustrate the components of framework using examples of data from 2 studies-1 focused on how an inner city Muslim school worked to foster the moral identities of students and the other on the development of civic identities among urban teens in a community action program.

Individual, Social and Organizational Sources of Sharing and Variation in the Ethical Reasoning of Managers

Abstract: A growth in consumer and media ethical consciousness has resulted in the need for organizations to ensure that members understand, share and project an approved and unified set of ethics. Thus understanding which variables are related to sharing and variation of ethical reasoning and moral intent, and the relative strength of these variables is critical. While past research has examined individual (attitudes, values, etc.), social (peers, significant others, etc.) and organizational (codes of conduct, senior management, etc.) variables, it has focused on their influence on the individual – and not on their role in relation to patterns of group sharing and variation in an organization. Introduced as a new methodology to study ethics, microcultural analysis stipulates that to explain patterns of sharing and variation, one must understand how individual, social and organizational variables influence sharing and variation. Key hypotheses predict that managers who share in individual, social or organizational determinants will be more likely to share in ethical reasoning and moral intent. Qualitative and quantitative research supports the key hypotheses, finding social ties, personal moral intensity, Machiavellianism, locus of control and codes of ethics as significant determinants. Individuals who share in these determinants are more likely to share in ethical reasoning and moral intent. Additionally, regression analysis reveals social ties and personal moral intensity to be the strongest determinants. Based on these results, managerial recommendations focus on a holistic approach, manipulating these three determinants to cultivate a unified code of ethics within an organization.

An overview of the relationship between moral reasoning and offending

Abstract: Through research it has been established that there is a relationship between level of moral reasoning and offending behaviour, with offenders generally reasoning at less mature levels than non-off...

Varieties of Moral Issue and Dilemma: A Framework for the Analysis of Case Material in Business Ethics Education

Abstract: This paper builds on a number of ideas concerning the nature, management and representation in case studies, of moral issues and dilemmas as experienced by people in organisations. Drawing on some cases used in teaching business ethics, and utilising a checklist of questions derived from the more general theoretical analysis, suggestions are offered regarding the contributions which such cases can make in developing students' understanding and potential for performative competence in real life situations. The distinction between issues and dilemmas is emphasised, and different types of issue are identified. The status of self-interest as an issue, and as contributory to personal dilemmas, is given particular attention. The paper also addresses the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive attributes required by individuals if they are to deal with such situations. Within the cognitive category attention is paid to the contribution of ethical and other theory, and to the need for moral imagination and judgement.

The Enron Scandal and the Neglect of Management Integrity Capacity

Abstract: The nature, value, and neglect of integrity capacity by managers and the adverse impacts that Enron executive practices have had on a range of stakeholders are delineated. An explanation is given on how moral competence in management practice is addressed by each dimension of the management integrity capacity construct (process, judgment, development, and system) and how Enron executive practices eroded each dimension. Specifically addressed is how behavioral and moral complexity can be utilized to balance the competing values of management and ethics theories to reduce the likelihood of future Enron‐like managerial malpractice. Finally, three positive action steps are recommended to improve managerial integrity capacity and remedies are proposed for victimized Enron stakeholders.