There is, I think, something ethereal about i —the square root of minus one. I remember first hearing about it at school. It seemed an odd beast at that time—an intruder hovering on the edge of reality.

Usually familiarity dulls this sense of the bizarre, but in the case of i it was the reverse: over the years the sense of its surreal nature intensified. It seemed that it was impossible to write mathematics that described the real world in …

I and i

抗原变异可使得多种致病微生物易于逃避宿主免疫应答。表达在感染红细胞表面的恶性疟原虫红细胞表面蛋白1（PfPMP1）与感染红细胞、内皮细胞、树突状细胞以及胎盘的单个或多个受体作用，在黏附及免疫逃避中起关键的作用。每个单倍体基因组var基因家族编码约60种成员，通过启动转录不同的var基因变异体为抗原变异提供了分子基础。

疟原虫var基因转换速率变化导致抗原变异[英]／Paul H, Robert P, Christodoulou Z, et al//Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

From the Publisher:
A valuable reference for the novice as well as for the expert who needs a wider scope of coverage within the area of cryptography, this book provides easy and rapid access of information and includes more than 200 algorithms and protocols; more than 200 tables and figures; more than 1,000 numbered definitions, facts, examples, notes, and remarks; and over 1,250 significant references, including brief comments on each paper.

Handbook of Applied Cryptography

Resolving the molecular details of proteome variation in the different tissues and organs of the human body will greatly increase our knowledge of human biology and disease. Here, we present a map of the human tissue proteome based on an integrated omics approach that involves quantitative transcriptomics at the tissue and organ level, combined with tissue microarray-based immunohistochemistry, to achieve spatial localization of proteins down to the single-cell level. Our tissue-based analysis detected more than 90% of the putative protein-coding genes. We used this approach to explore the human secretome, the membrane proteome, the druggable proteome, the cancer proteome, and the metabolic functions in 32 different tissues and organs. All the data are integrated in an interactive Web-based database that allows exploration of individual proteins, as well as navigation of global expression patterns, in all major tissues and organs in the human body.

Tissue-based map of the human proteome

Cryptosystem designers frequently assume that secrets will be manipulated in closed, reliable computing environments. Unfortunately, actual computers and microchips leak information about the operations they process. This paper examines specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. We also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.

/pdf/differential-power-analysis-4t7fjmuc7b.pdf

Differential Power Analysis

The Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) is a standardised extension to the mobile authentication infrastructure that enables the provision of security services, such as key establishment, to network applications. In this paper we first show how Trusted Computing can be extended in a GAA-like framework to offer new security services. We then propose a general scheme that converts a simple static password authentication mechanism into a one-time password (OTP) system using the GAA key establishment service. The scheme employs a GAA-enabled user device and a GAA-aware server. Most importantly, unlike most OTP systems using a dedicated key-bearing token, the user device does not need to be user or server specific, and can be used in the protocol with no registration or configuration (except for the installation of the necessary application software). We also give two practical instantiations of the general scheme, building firstly on the mobile authentication infrastructure and secondly on Trusted Computing. The practical systems are secure, scalable, fit well to the multi-institution scenario, and enable the provision of ubiquitous and on-demand OTP services.

/pdf/ubiquitous-one-time-password-service-using-the-generic-n53tftv0ei.pdf

Ubiquitous One-Time Password Service Using the Generic Authentication Architecture

The personal PKI

Many millions of users routinely use Google, Facebook and Microsoft to log in to websites supporting OAuth 2.0 and/or OpenID Connect. The security of OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect is therefore of critical importance. Unfortunately, as previous studies have shown, real-world implementations of both schemes are often vulnerable to attack, and in particular to crosssite request forgery (CSRF) attacks. In this paper we propose a new and practical technique which can be used to mitigate CSRF attacks against both OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect. Index Terms—OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, CSRF

/pdf/mitigating-csrf-attacks-on-oauth-2-0-systems-1m52kyhbpc.pdf

Mitigating CSRF attacks on OAuth 2.0 Systems

According to Hassler (2000), the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) scheme is one of a small number of industry standard means for securing Internet e-commerce communications. Although SET potentially offers a high level of security protection for e-commerce transactions, there have been a number of criticisms of SET, including of its complexity and cost of implementation. These problems have restricted SET implementation and use. However, SET has been continuously improved since it was first released in 1997, including the development of a number of SET extensions. This paper assesses how well SET meets merchant and consumer security requirements. In addition, this paper also analyses criticisms of SET and considers its future in Internet e-commerce security.

The future of SET

Over the last few years, many identity management schemes, frameworks and system specifications have been proposed; however these various schemes and frameworks are typically not interoperable. In this paper we propose an approach to enable interoperation between two of the most prominent identity management schemes, namely the Liberty Alliance Project scheme (specifically the ID-FF LEC Profile) and the Microsoft CardSpace (formerly known as InfoCard) scheme. This integration should enhance interoperability by enabling users to make use of identity management systems even if the system participants are using different schemes. The main advantages and disadvantages of the proposed integration model are also investigated.

Chris J. Mitchell

Papers

Ubiquitous One-Time Password Service Using the Generic Authentication Architecture

The personal PKI

Mitigating CSRF attacks on OAuth 2.0 Systems

The future of SET

A client-side CardSpace-Liberty integration architecture