Showing papers in "Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1994"
TL;DR: In international disputes, conventional wisdom holds that a state's military threast are more likely to work the more the state is favored by the balance of power or balance of interests.
Abstract: Conventional wisdom holds that in international disputes, a state's military threast are more likely to work the more the state is favored by the balance of power or the balance of interests. Analy...
382 citations
TL;DR: The strongest effect sizes were obtained for the variables of prenegotiation experience, negotiator's orientation, initial position distance, and time pressure, while weak effect sizes for large versus small issues, representation, and visibility of the bargaining process.
Abstract: Effects of eight variables on yielding behavior and time to resolution were evaluated by a meta-analysis of published bargaining experiments reported over a twenty-five year period. The strongest effect sizes were obtained for the variables of prenegotiation experience, negotiator's orientation, initial position distance, and time pressure. Weak effect sizes were shown for large versus small issues, representation, and visibility of the bargaining process. These results challenge the assertion made by Blake and Mouton (1989) that group representation is the most important determinant of competitive behavior in bargaining. Analyses of differences in procedures used in the strongest and weakest effect-size studies in each category suggest a number of conditions under which bargainers are likely to be intransigent. Comparison of the meta-analysis results with those obtained from a simulation where similar variables were combined in scenarios revealed stronger effect sizes for the combined variables both across and within stages of the simulation. Further analyses would elucidate effects of other independent and dependent variables as these are explored in future experimentation.
228 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a formal model of alliances as signals of signals of war is presented. But the model is not perfectly credible, since many countries do not honor their promises in wartime.
Abstract: Alliances are not perfectly credible. Although alliances raise the probability of intervention into war, many allies do not honor their promise in wartime. A formal model of alliances as signals of...
208 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that the presence of joint democracy in dangerous, war-prone dyads has a strong positive effect on the probability of referring interstate disputes to binding third-party settlement, even when controlling for alliance bonds and geographic proximity.
Abstract: The proposition that democracies rarely fight one another has been well-substantiated by empirical research. A prominent explanation for this finding is that shared norms fostered by a democratic political culture promote peaceful conflict resolution. Joint democratic dyads allegedly have a greater propensity than other types of dyads to entrust third parties with judicial competence to settle their disputes. The results from a study of 206 dyadic disputes involving third-party intermediaries support this claim. The presence of joint democracy in dangerous, war-prone dyads has a strong positive effect on the probability of referring interstate disputes to binding third-party settlement, even when controlling for alliance bonds and geographic proximity. In addition, the more a joint democratic dyad is marked by coherent regimes or a rough parity in the distribution of military capabilities, the greater the propensity to refer disputes to binding third-party settlement.
179 citations
TL;DR: This article investigated why some societies have more interpersonal violence (homicide, assault) than others and found that socialization for aggression in boys in late childhood is by far the strongest socialization predictor of higher rates of homicide and assault.
Abstract: This cross-cultural study investigates why some societies have more interpersonal violence (homicide, assault) than others. Multiple regression analysis suggests that socialization for aggression in boys in late childhood is by far the strongest socialization predictor of higher rates of homicide and assault. But why socialize boys for aggression? Other analyses suggest that socialization for aggression is a likely consequence, not a cause, of war. The theory of violence suggested here is that war is the major cause of more homicide/assault. We suggest that the effect of war is mostly indirect, by motivating parents to socialize for aggression. In addition, war may have some direct effect by legitimizing violence. According to the theory suggested here, high rates of homicide/assault are inadvertent (unintended) consequences of the need to produce effective and unambivalent warriors.
149 citations
TL;DR: The authors compare the American and Vietnamese cultures in terms of their emphasis on the collective over the individual and argue that, in fact, these cultures are not as different from the United States with regard to collectivity as they seem.
Abstract: Existing studies of social dilemmas in other cultures report patterns of behavior that are very similar to that of American subjects. This has held even in cultures that are seemingly quite different from the United States in terms of their emphasis on the collective over the individual. We argue that, in fact, these cultures are not as different from the United States with regard to collectivity as they seem. In our study, we contrast the American—the most individualistic of all cultures—with the Vietnamese, an extremely collectivist culture. In the first study, American and South Vietnamese subjects played a number of trials of a public goods or resource dilemma game. The patterns of cooperation among the Americans were typical of most social dilemma studies. The Vietnamese, however, cooperated at an exceptionally high rate. In a second study, subjects were pitted against a variety of preprogrammed strategies that varied as to their toughness. The Americans responded in predictable ways, but the Vietnam...
146 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors formalize and extend Putnam's conjecture that greater domestic constraints can be a bargaining advantage in international negotiations by means of a more realistic model of negotiator behavior.
Abstract: This article attempts to formalize and extend Putnam's conjecture that greater domestic constraints can be a bargaining advantage in international negotiations by means of a more realistic model of negotiator behavior. Unlike her counterpart in Putnam, the negotiator in my model has a direct interest, not coincident with those of her domestic constituents, in the bargaining outcome. She also has more leeway in domestic bargaining in that not all domestic constituents have veto power. The results of the analysis show that the relationship between the negotiator's domestic constraints and the bargaining outcome is more complex than Putnam's analysis suggests. The negotiator can be either better or worse off under greater domestic constraints. The conditions under which these different outcomes result depend on the distribution of political power between the negotiator and domestic constituents.
128 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors modeled the conflict between terrorists and governments in a setting of asymmetric information, where the government is initially uncertain about the level of resources available to a terrorist group for use in violent attacks.
Abstract: This article studies conflicts between terrorists and governments in a setting of asymmetric information. The government is initially uncertain about the level of resources available to a terrorist group for use in violent attacks. The conflict is modeled as a signaling game where the magnitude of terrorist attacks serves as a signal of terrorist resources. With complete information, optimal government retaliation depends nontrivially on terrorist resources. With asymmetric information, this provides terrorists with an incentive to convey the message that resources are large in an attempt to soften government retaliation. Thus equilibrium attack levels of high resource terrorist groups must be distorted upward if they are to convey any information to the government. In addition, we consider equilibria where attacks are uninformative of terrorist resources, but where the government softens its retaliation. In either case the government suffers under asymmetric information. We examine how varying the flexib...
110 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the causal relationship between economic growth and defense spending in 77 developing countries using Granger-causality tests using annual time series data for each of the 77 countries.
Abstract: This article investigates the causal relationship between economic growth and defense spending in 77 developing countries. The study employs Granger-causality tests using annual time series data for each of the 77 countries to analyse the presence and direction of causality between the two variables. The results indicate that the relationship between economic growth and defense spending cannot be generalized across countries. It may depend, among other things on the sample period of study and the level of socioeconomic development of the country concerned.
83 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of friendship on expectations of pricing in personal business transactions were examined and it was shown that without discussion, friends agree on prices for commodities, whereas strangers do not.
Abstract: A laboratory study examined effects of friendship on expectations of pricing in personal business transactions. Friends expect to pay more but charge less for a variety of commodities than do strangers. Remarkably, without discussion, friends agree on prices for commodities, whereas strangers do not. The result was replicated in a second study and extended to other commodities. The effect may be due to cognitive scripts for transactions with friends.
75 citations
TL;DR: This article examined interindividual-intergroup discontinuity in the context of three different generalizations of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) and found that interindividual intension is correlated with group discontinuity.
Abstract: The present research involved an examination of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity in the context of three different generalizations of the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG). (Interindividual-int...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the conditions under which such influence attempts succeed, drawn from the attributes of the influence attempt, the recipient, the interaction of the recipient and supplier, the supplier, and the systemic environment.
Abstract: One justification for U.S. arms transfers is that the United States can manipulate its arms exports to make the recipients of American aid comply with American wishes. This article explores the conditions under which such arms influence attempts succeed. Sixteen potential determinants are discussed, drawn from the attributes of the influence attempt, the recipient, the interaction of the recipient and supplier, the supplier, and the systemic environment. A data set of 191 American arms influence attempts from 1950 to 1992 is presented. Using logit analysis, the variables are tested against the outcome—success or failure—of the influence attempt. Successful influence attempts are more likely when the United States used promises or rewards, focused on altering the recipient's foreign policy, made the attempt on civilian regimes, supplied more of the recipient's arms, and made attempts in the first half of the cold war era, when the United States was generally more powerful.
TL;DR: In the post-Vietnam Cold War environment, two dimensions (cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism) came to characterize the foreign policy beliefs of American leaders and the mass public as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In the post-Vietnam Cold War environment, two dimensions—cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism—came to characterize the foreign policy beliefs of American leaders and the mass public. Although grounded in Cold War concepts and challenges, evidence from opinion polls in the transitional period to a post-Cold War world suggests that the cooperative and militant faces of internationalism persist. Furthermore, because they parallel realism and idealism, as competing orientations toward global problems, the two dimensions and the fourfold typology of foreign policy beliefs they define may help to understand the intersection of attitudes toward traditional security issues and the welfare issues that may dominate future global and national agendas. Preliminary evidence is used to probe the argument that hard-liners on national security issues will evince nationalistic and protectionist sentiments on environmental and trade issues. Contrariwise, accommodationists on security issues are hypoth...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the relationship between alliance formation and general deterrence in regional rivalries under complete and incomplete information and found that general deterrence succeeds under complete information unless the potential attacker is stronger than the target and values the stakes highly, and the potential ally would never intervene.
Abstract: This article studies the relationship between alliance formation and general deterrence in regional rivalries. In a game-theoretic model under complete information, an alliance is formed only when the potential ally would not intervene without one and would always intervene with one. General deterrence succeeds under complete information unless the potential attacker is stronger than the target and values the stakes highly, and the potential ally would never intervene. When incomplete information is added to the game, alliances are sometimes formed even when the potential ally's behavior would be unaffected by the alliance. Additionally, general deterrence under incomplete information sometimes fails because of the potential attacker's mistaken beliefs about the probability that the target would win or the potential ally would intervene. The model is illustrated by examining the conflict between Israel and its rivals, Egypt and Syria, taking into account the role of the United States as Israel's potential...
TL;DR: The authors argue that a multilateral agreement may achieve what an equivalent series of bilateral agreements cannot, and they use examples from the Marshall Plan to illustrate the logic of this result, which has implications for other substantive topics, such as most favored-nation clauses in trade agreements, the theory of hegemonic stability, analysis of the European Economic Community, the politics of linkage, and the study of multilateralist norms.
Abstract: There is a remarkable consensus among scholars of international relations that bilateral cooperation is easier to achieve than multilateral cooperation. This essay proposes a formal model to show that this is incorrect, because a multilateral agreement may achieve what an equivalent series of bilateral agreements cannot. The author explores formally several different enforcement mechanisms, suggesting that the argument is robust. Throughout the essay, the author uses examples from the Marshall Plan to illustrate the logic of this result. The argument has implications for other substantive topics, such as most-favored-nation clauses in trade agreements, the theory of hegemonic stability, analysis of the European Economic Community, the politics of linkage, and the study of multilateralist norms.
TL;DR: In this paper, the supply of a public good that can be privately produced at costs smaller than the benefits is analyzed without a coordinating mechanism, and the selection of a volunteer poses a social dilemma.
Abstract: We analyze the supply of a public good that can be privately produced at costs smaller than the benefits Without a coordinating mechanism, the selection of a volunteer poses a social dilemma By varying two conditions, we obtain four scenarios First, we distinguish whether or not players observe each other's behavior Under the condition that behavior is observed, strategies involve timing decisions, namely how long to wait before volunteering, hoping that someone else volunteers first, but incurring costs for delayed production If behavior cannot be observed, players effectively choose simultaneously, and rational players will either volunteer immediately or not at all Second, we distinguish complete information with respect to the costs and benefits of the other players from incomplete information For each of the four scenarios, we discuss a game theoretic model that assumes (ex ante) symmetrical costs and benefits Remarkably, the probability that a player volunteers may increase with the degree o
TL;DR: In this article, repeated interaction in integroup conflict was studied in the context of two team games: the intergroup public goods (IPG) game and the intra-group prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game.
Abstract: Repeated interaction in integroup conflict was studied in the context of two team games: the intergroup public goods (IPG) game and the intergroup prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game. The results reveal (a) a main effect for game type; subjects were twice as likely to contribute toward their group effort in the IPG game than in the IPD game, and (b) a Game-Type × Time interaction; subjects contributed less over time in the IPD game while continuing to contribute at about the same rate in the IPG game. The second finding supports the hypothesis that subjects learn the structure of the game and adapt their behavior accordingly and is compatible with a simple learning model, which assumes that choices that have led to good outcomes in the past are more likely to be repeated in the future. A reciprocal cooperation hypothesis, which assumes that players make their choices contingent on the earlier choices of the other players, received little support.
TL;DR: The main result is that more sophisticated behavior of self-seeking automata compensates for the absence of partially centralized control, and cooperation is established more rapidly when more information is available to the automata.
Abstract: Collective behavior of N players in a social dilemma game is simulated by automata exhibiting cooperative behavior. In his models of simple biological systems, Tsetlin assumed minimum information available to the players. The automata in this study were somewhat more sophisticated, using Markov strategies in their interactions. The authors investigated relationships between information received by the automata and the emergence of cooperation in a simulated evolution process. In some ways, this approach is similar to that of Axelrod. However, instead of determining the most successful strategy, the authors seek surviving strategies in a social dilemma environment. Previous results showed that cooperation could be established asymptotically under partially centralized control. In this model there is no such control. The main result is that more sophisticated behavior of self-seeking automata compensates for the absence of such control. Moreover, cooperation is established more rapidly when more information...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate whether there is an optimal ratio of a state's own arms to its allies' arms, by comparing it to a corporation's ratio of debt to equity in its capital structure.
Abstract: If a state can choose between arming itself (by extracting resources from its domestic constituents) or seeking allies who will pledge military resources to that state, does there exist an optimal ratio of its own arms to its allies' arms? This question is pursued by analogy with a corporation's ratio of debt to equity in its capital structure. Classical finance theory suggests two propositions which, if applicable to alliances, imply that there is no optimal ratio, but allies will expect greater returns from the alliance if the ratio rises. Recent theories in finance imply that the arms to allies ratio does matter and should decrease in response to increases in either the domestic costs associated with arming or the riskiness of the state's military situation. These propositions are tested using Correlates of War (COW) data. The results do not support the classical arguments as to the irrelevance of the arms to allies ratio and suggest that this measure of military capital structure responds to risk.
TL;DR: In a large fraction of all cases where a state faces an immediate military threat, it chooses to respond without resorting to the threat, display, or use of military force.
Abstract: In a large fraction of all cases where a state faces an immediate military threat, it chooses to respond without resort to the threat, display, or use of military force. We seek to account for this...
TL;DR: The authors studied the impact of crisis management strategies, stress, and groupthink conditions on the integrative complexity of British decision makers in 10 decision-making episodes during two Anglo-German crises in 1938 and 1939.
Abstract: This study addresses the impact of crisis management strategies, stress, and groupthink conditions on the integrative complexity of British decision makers in 10 decision-making episodes during two Anglo-German crises in 1938 and 1939. A systematic random sample of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's statements during British cabinet deliberations in the intragovernmental arena and British messages to Germany in the intergovernmental arena during the acute phase of each crisis was scored for integrative complexity. An ANOVA of integrative complexity for crisis, arena, and episode demonstrated a significant independent relationship between strategy and integrative complexity plus a significant interaction effect between strategy and arena on integrative complexity. There were also significant differences in Chamberlain's integrative complexity between early and later episodes of the Polish conflict in the intragovernmental arena; no significant differences occurred between episodes in either arena during ...
TL;DR: The ability to cumulate and compare findings from laboratory experiments is impeded by the wide variety of designs employed in these studies and by the different incentive characteristics embedded in them.
Abstract: The ability to cumulate and compare findings from laboratory experiments is impeded by the wide variety of designs employed in these studies and by the different incentive characteristics embedded ...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors tested the hypothesis that partisanship influences judgments of fairness and trustworthiness in the mediation of social conflict and found that partisans used favorableness of the proposals to judge the trustworthiness of the third party, independent of evenhandedness of the proposal.
Abstract: This study tested the hypothesis that partisanship influences judgments of fairness and trustworthiness in the mediation of social conflict. Subjects evaluated third party proposals for resolving the conflict in Jerusalem. A2×2×4 factorial design examined (1) partisanship of the subject, either partisan (pro-Israeli) or nonpartisan (neutral); (2) content bias of third party proposals, where the substance of the proposal was either (a) pro-Israeli or (b) evenhanded; and (3) source bias, where the third party was labeled as being (a) pro-Israeli, (b) pro-Palestinian, (c) neutral, or (d) of unknown persuasion. Analyses of judgments of fairness and third party trustworthiness indicated differences between partisan and nonpartisan subjects in self-serving bias and underlying dynamics in judgments. Partisans used favorableness of the proposals to judge the trustworthiness of the third party, independent of evenhandedness of the proposal, whereas evenhandedness was the criterion for nonpartisans. Nonpartisans tr...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors apply to South Asia a theory of armament that he developed in the context of the superpowers' arms rivalry, and find that India and Pakistan are found to have matched high levels of armaments with low levels and vice versa.
Abstract: The author applies to South Asia a theory of armament that he developed in the context of the superpowers' arms rivalry. The empirical findings are consistent with the results for the superpowers' case: India and Pakistan are found to have matched high levels of armaments with low levels and vice versa. Such results are analytically similar to empirical evidence on alliances showing that states, including India and Pakistan, often ally with the stronger against the weaker side. In both cases the evidence contradicts conventional wisdom on power balancing, internal and external, respectively. The authors' theory explains this otherwise anomalous phenomenon: states use strength not just as an indicator of capability but also of intentions: given the same amount of hostile behavior, weak states appear more aggressive than strong ones. Hence, if states worry about intentions more than about power, they would be attracted to stronger states precisely because of their strength, not despite it.
TL;DR: In this article, four criteria for characterizing social norms in both cooperative and non-cooperative games are introduced, which are hybrid of von Neumann and Morgenstern's notion of stability and Greenberg's theory of social situations.
Abstract: This article introduces four criteria for characterizing social norms in both cooperative and noncooperative games. The criteria are hybrids of von Neumann and Morgenstern's notion of stability and Greenberg's theory of social situations. When applied to the three-player prisoner's dilemma, these criteria illustrate that Nash and strong Nash equilibrium behavior do not rule out the possibility of unilateral defection as a social norm. We conclude with a new type of equilibrium behavior that induces coalition building and leads to social norms that rule out unilateral defection and allow for cooperation.
TL;DR: The notion has taken hold that international affairs have somehow now become especially tumultuous, unstable, and complex as mentioned in this paper, and five techniques have been applied: the past has been simplified, a Eurocentric bias has been introduced, definitions have been changed, standards have been raised, and problems previously considered to be comparatively minor have been elevated in perceived importance.
Abstract: As the major problems that have bedeviled the world over the last half century have been resolved, the quest for things to worry about has continued unabated. The notion has taken hold that international affairs have somehow now become especially tumultuous, unstable, and complex. To arrive at such a conclusion, five techniques have been applied: the past has been simplified, a Eurocentric bias has been introduced, definitions have been changed, standards have been raised, and problems previously considered to be comparatively minor have been elevated in perceived importance.
TL;DR: This paper presented a model suggesting that international conflicts escalate to violence when countries express higher levels of power motive imagery, and exaggerate levels of perceived power motive in the media, leading to increased violence.
Abstract: We present a model suggesting that international conflicts escalate to violence when countries (a) express higher levels of power motive imagery, (b) exaggerate levels of perceived power motive ima...
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that if prisoners implicate their interrogators and play what is called a "transformation" strategy, they raise the cost to the authority of conducting the purge.
Abstract: Stalin's Great Terror was one of history's most massive political purges. In its form, the Terror resembled a one-shot, n-person prisoner's dilemma game. Although the Terror could not have been sustained if prisoners cooperated, most prisoners defected against one another, as the model would predict. Yet the record of the Terror also demonstrated that in a mass purge there exists a wider strategy set than that of the prisoner's dilemma game. Using an illustrative case and a generalized model of purges, it is shown that if prisoners implicate their interrogators and play what is called a “transformation” strategy, they raise the cost to the authority of conducting the purge. In fact, the authority has no consistent best response to the transformation, and the purge should not be sustainable for long thereafter. The Great Terror was apparently limited by employment of this transformation. Limitations on the formation and use of such a strategy are also considered.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors assess the impact of the Community Relations Program (CRP) in local authorities in Northern Ireland and find that despite its modest resources, some real achievements are detected during its 4-year period of operation.
Abstract: Although much attention is paid to the high profile political initiatives aimed at tackling the seemingly intractable problems of Northern Ireland, little has been written about the United Kingdom government's strategy to achieve equality of opportunity and equity of treatment across the two communities at grassroots level. This article selects one initiative—the community relations programme in local authorities—as part of a broader thrust by government to improve equality and equity, and assesses its impact. The research uses comparative survey data gathered in 1989 and 1993 to detect whether attitudes on fair employment, prejudice, and tolerance between Catholics and Protestants have changed in councils participating in the initiative. Despite the programme's modest resources, some real achievements are detected during its 4-year period of operation.
TL;DR: In this paper, a two-stage, two-person, simultaneous-demand bargaining game with Harsanyi's "risk dominance" principle and mixed-strategy equilibrium was investigated.
Abstract: This article reports on an experiment concerned with a two-stage, two-person, simultaneous-demand bargaining game. The focus of analysis is on a prediction for concession behavior in the second-stage game provided by Harsanyi's “risk dominance” principle, which is at odds with the prediction provided by the mixed-strategy equilibrium in the second-stage game. The results of the experiment provide support for the risk dominance prediction, with concessions occurring according to the prediction in 78% of eligible cases, thus outperforming the mixed-strategy equilibrium as a predictor of concession behavior.