Showing papers in "Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory in 2006"
TL;DR: Using agency and stewardship theories, the authors examined how public administrators manage contracting relationships with nonprofit organizations and found that the manner in which nonprofits are managed evolves over time from a principal-agent to a principalsteward relationship but with less variance than the theories would suggest.
Abstract: Using agency and stewardship theories, this study examines how public administrators manage contracting relationships with nonprofit organizations. Interviews were conducted with public and nonprofit managers involved in social services contract relationships at the state and county level in New York State. The use of trust, reputation, and monitoring as well as other factors influence the manner in which contract relationships are managed. The findings suggest that the manner in which nonprofits are managed evolves over time from a principal-agent to a principal-steward relationship but with less variance than the theories would suggest. This results in part from the contextual conditions that include the type ofservice, lack ofmarket competitiveness, and managementcapacity constraints. Theintergovernmental environment in which social services are implemented and delivered presents complex challenges for public managers responsible for managing contract relationships. The findings from this study document those challenges and the corresponding management practices used with nonprofit contractors.
761 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that contemporary democracies are involved in another round in a perennial debate and ideological struggle over what are desirable forms of administration and government: that is, a struggle over institutional identities and institutional balances.
Abstract: This article questions the fashionable ideas that bureaucratic organization is an obsolescent, undesirable, and non-viable form of administration and that there is an inevitable and irreversible paradigmatic shift towards marketor network-organization. In contrast, the paper argues that contemporary democracies are involved in another round in a perennial debate and ideological struggle over what are desirable forms of administration and government: that is, a struggle over institutional identities and institutional balances. The argument is not that bureaucratic organization is a panacea and the answer to all challenges of public administration. Rather, bureaucratic organization is part of a repertoire of overlapping, supplementary, and competing forms coexisting in contemporary democracies, and so are market-organization and network-organization. Rediscovering Weber’s analysis of bureaucratic organization, then, enriches our understanding of public administration. This is in particular true when we (a) include bureaucracy as an institution, not only an instrument; (b) look at the empirical studies in their time and context, not only at Weber’s ideal-types and predictions; and (c) take into account the political and normative order bureaucracy is part of, not only the internal characteristics of ‘‘the bureau.’’ MAKING SENSE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Is ‘‘bureaucracy’’ an organizational dinosaur helplessly involved in its death struggle? Is it an undesirable and nonviable form of administration developed in a legalistic and authoritarian society and now inevitably withering away because it is incompatible with complex, individualistic, and dynamic societies? Are, therefore, the term bureaucracy and the theoretical ideas and empirical observations associated with it, irrelevant or deceptive when it comes to making sense of public administration and government in contemporary democracies? Or are the mobilization of antibureaucratic sentiments and the claim that it is time to say good-bye to bureaucracies and bureaucrats just another round in a perennial debate and ideological struggle over what desirable forms of administration and government are—that An earlier version of this article was presented as a keynote speech at the Ninth International Congress of Centro Lationoamericano de Administracion Para el Desarrollo (CLAD) on State and Public Administration Reform, Madrid, 4 November 2004. The original version will be printed in Spanish in Revista del CLAD Reforma y Democracia (Caracas). I thank H. George Frederickson, Robert E. Goodin, Morten Egeberg, James G. March, Jon Pierre, Christopher Pollitt, R. A. W. Rhodes, Ulf I. Sverdrup, and Hellmut Wollmann for constructive comments. Address correspondence to the author at j.p.olsen@arena.uio.no. doi:10.1093/jopart/mui027 Advance Access publication on March 1, 2005 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory a 2005 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc.; all rights reserved. JPART 16:1–24
641 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that government employees are more likely to volunteer for charity and donate blood than for-profit employees are, while no difference is found among public service and private employees in terms of individual philanthropy.
Abstract: Research generally indicates that public employees ‘‘talk the talk,’’ but do they also ‘‘walk the walk’’ of the public service motive (PSM)? Are public service employees more likely than others to engage in public service activities? The behavioral implications of PSM are addressed by studying the involvement in charitable activities of public, nonprofit, and private workers. Using data from the 2002 General Social Survey, multivariate logistic regression models are estimated to examine self-reported gifts of time, blood, and money to charitable organizations. It is found that government employees are more likely to volunteer for charity and to donate blood than for-profit employees are. Additionally, nonprofit workers are also more likely than their for-profit counterparts to volunteer. However, no difference is found among public service and private employees in terms of individual philanthropy. These findings generally lend support for the hypothesis that PSM is more prominent in public service than in private organizations, especially as it pertains to government personnel.
519 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors evaluate the impact of citizen panels, citizen charters, new types of participation, and other forms of participatory participation on decision-making in the Netherlands.
Abstract: Initiatives to encourage and stimulate the involvement of citizens but also various societal organizations in decision making can be seen in a wide variety of European countries. Citizen panels, citizen charters, new types of participation, and other forms are being used to increase the influence of citizens on decision making and to improve the relation between citizens and elected politicians. In the Netherlands a lot of local governments have experimented with interactive decision making that is enhancing the influence of citizens and interest groups on public policy making. The main motives to involve stakeholders in interactive decision making are to diminish the veto power of various societal actors by involving them in decision making, improve the quality of decision making by using the information and solutions of various actors, and bridge the perceived growing cleavage between citizens and elected politicians. In this article six cases are evaluated. The cases are compared on three dimensions: the nature and organization of participation, the way the process is managed (process management), and the relation with formal democratic institutions. These organizational features (in terms of both formal organization and actual performance) are compared with the results of the decision-making processes in the six cases. The article shows that the high expectations of interactive decision making are not always met. It also shows that managing the interactions—called process management in network theory—is very important for achieving satisfactory outcomes.
371 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a study of performance management practices in four functions across four European Union member states (Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) is presented, focusing on how and to what extent performance indicators influenced the top management of the agencies concerned and the degree to which performance data were used by ministries as steering instruments.
Abstract: This article reports a study of performance management practices in four functions across four European Union member states (Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The focus is on how and to what extent performance indicators influenced the top management of the agencies concerned and the degree to which performance data were used by ministries as steering instruments. The research uses a historical institutionalist perspective combined with a model that identifies primary task characteristics as a source of significant variation. Thus the design explores both the influence of task characteristics (through contrasts among the four different functions) and embedded national system characteristics (through contrasts among the four countries). I show that both primary task characteristics and national system characteristics had some of the theoretically predicted effects on the management regimes. Equally, however, certain general tendencies embraced all countries and most functions. These include, first, the incremental growth of more sophisticated performance indicator systems and, second, the feebleness of ministries in developing performance-based strategic steering.
348 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on specific characteristics of public sector organizations that increase or limit interdepartmental knowledge sharing and propose three types of organization-specific coordination mechanisms directly influence knowledge sharing between departments.
Abstract: Public sector organizations are mainly knowledge-intensive organizations, and to exploit their knowledge, effective knowledge sharing among the different departments is required. We focus on specific characteristics of public sector organizations that increase or limit interdepartmental knowledge sharing. Three types of organization-specific coordination mechanisms directly influence knowledge sharing between departments. Organizations are also characterized by members' social identification and trust, which in the absence of power games are assumed to create a knowledge-sharing context. Data are collected by a questionnaire survey in the public sector. The sample consists of 358 cooperative episodes between departments in more than 90 different public sector organizations. Structural equation modeling reveals the importance of lateral coordination and trust. The combination of power games and informal coordination seems to be remarkably beneficial for knowledge sharing. Furthermore, compared with other public sector organizations, government institutions have organizational characteristics that are less beneficial for knowledge sharing.
334 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explain how the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) can be used as a theoretical basis for understanding political context via a stakeholder analysis, which widens the attention of policy analysts toward subsystem-wide dynamics with multiple actors who are motivated by their beliefs, structure their relationships into advocacy coalitions, and try to influence policy through utilizing multiple resources and venues.
Abstract: There is a growing recognition that public policy controversies are driven more by value differences than by technical deficiencies. Unfortunately, we have yet to develop, test, and refine systematic approaches for understanding political systems. In this article I explain how the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) can be used as a theoretical basis for understanding political context via a stakeholder analysis. An ACF stakeholder analysis widens the attention of policy analysts toward subsystem-wide dynamics with multiple actors who are motivated by their beliefs, structure their relationships into advocacy coalitions, and try to influence policy through utilizing multiple resources and venues. I illustrate an ACF approach to stakeholder analysis in a scientifically contentious political conflict over the establishment of marine protected areas in California. I conclude with a summary of contributions to the ACF literature and the strengths and limitations of conducting an ACF stakeholder analysis.
322 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a middle-range theory to connect the dots, beginning with disparate sources in the polity influencing organizational goal ambiguity, which in turn is expected to increase managerial role ambiguity.
Abstract: This article is a systematic effort to study a key theoretical question from the vantage point of public sector organizational behavior. Most political science models, with a primary interest in democratic control of bureaucracy, study the political influence on the bureaucracy from an agency theory perspective. Organization behavior literature, on the other hand, is focused largely on the study of individual-level phenomena in private organizations and does not incorporate political context as part of explanatory models. This article proposes a middle-range theory to "connect the dots," beginning with disparate sources in the polity influencing organizational goal ambiguity, which in turn is expected to increase managerial role ambiguity. An empirical test, using data collected from a national survey of managers working in state human service agencies, supports this theoretical model. We find that certain types of political influence have an impact on organizational goal ambiguity, which in turn has a direct effect in increasing role ambiguity and also an indirect effect in increasing role ambiguity through organizational structure.
300 citations
TL;DR: The authors compared decision making in a tax-supported general purpose governmental agency with that done by a business firm selling to a market, using a simulation to capture differences in the preferences and practices of mid-level managers working in the two sectors.
Abstract: Public and private sector decision making is studied with an experiment. The study compares decision making in a tax-supported general purpose governmental agency with that done by a business firm selling to a market, using a simulation to capture differences in the preferences and practices of mid-level managers working in the two sectors. The simulation calls for participating managers to assess the risk and prospect of adopting budgets tailored to match each sector. A cognitive culture that stresses analysis, speculation, bargaining, or networking is employed to fashion a budget appropriate for a public and a private sector organization, each with a controversial and a noncontroversial budget amount. The literature on public/private differences was consulted to make predictions, suggesting that public sector managers would favor bargaining and networking and private sector managers would favor analysis and speculation. The cognitive style literature suggests that managers favor budgets constructed with an approach that is consistent with their preferred cognitive style and see less risk in the choice, except in a public setting where risk would be unaffected. The study finds that private sector managers are more apt to support budget decisions made with analysis and less likely to support them when bargaining is applied. Public sector managers are less likely to support budget decisions backed by analysis and more likely to support those that are derived from bargaining with agency people.
254 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors conduct a test of direct interest group influence by analyzing an original data set composed of 1,444 interest group comments in reaction to forty federal agency rules and conclude that those who voice their preferences during the notice and comment period rulemaking are often able to change government policy outputs to better match their preferences.
Abstract: Issue Section: Articles © The Author 2005. Published by Oxf ord University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rig hts reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oupjournals.org . You do not currently have access to this article. Download all figures Students of politics have identified a variety of actors who appear to influence the federal bureaucracy's implementation of public policy, including Congress, the president, and interest groups. These lines of research, however, have often portrayed interest groups as actors with indirect influence (who, for example, work through or with Congress), rather than assessing the direct influence of interest groups on bureaucratic policy outputs. I conduct a test of direct interest group influence by analyzing an original data set composed of 1,444 interest group comments in reaction to forty federal agency rules. I find, contrary to the expectations of the extant literature, that the formal participation of interest groups during rulemaking can, and often does, alter the content of policy within the “fourth branch” of government. I conclude that those who voice their preferences during the notice and comment period rulemaking are often able to change government policy outputs to better match their preferences.
240 citations
TL;DR: The authors show that strategy content is a subset of generally accepted management functions in public organizations and that strategy can be separated out from other elements of management for a distinguishable assessment of its impact on organizational performance.
Abstract: Miles and Snow, among others, argue that strategy content is an important influence on organizational performance. Their typology, applied recently to public organizations in the United Kingdom, divides strategic actors into four general types: prospectors, defenders, analyzers, and reactors. This article begins by integrating work on strategy content or strategic management into the O'Toole-Meier formal theory of public management. This study shows that strategy content is a subset of generally accepted management functions in public organizations. The article then proceeds to test the strategic management concepts in a large, multiyear sample of public organizations. The results show that strategy can be separated out from other elements of management for a distinguishable assessment of its impact on organizational performance. Unlike the predictions of Miles and Snow and the empirical findings of Boyne and Walker, however, we find that the defender strategy is the most effective for the primary mission of the organization and that the prospector and reactor strategies work best in regard to the goals of the more politically powerful elements of the organization's environment.
TL;DR: This article found that the extent of performance improvement is influenced positively by the presence of a target, which is consistent with the view that clear and quantified strategic priorities lead to better organizational outcomes.
Abstract: Theories of rational planning suggest that organizational performance improves if targets for future achievements are set. We test this proposition using panel data for 147 English local education authorities between 1998 and 2003. The dependent variables in the analysis are exam results for school pupils. We find that, controlling for other variables, the extent of performance improvement is influenced positively by the presence of a target. Thus, the results are consistent with the view that clear and quantified strategic priorities lead to better organizational outcomes.
Abstract: It is important for public administration researchers and practitioners to understand how citizens form satisfaction judgments regarding local government services. A prior study by Van Ryzin (2004) found strong support for an expectancy disconfirmation model of citizen satisfaction, which focuses on the gap between performance and expectations. This model has been tested for decades in studies of private sector customer satisfaction, yet it is little known and applied in the field of public administration. The present study seeks to replicate the Van Ryzin (2004) results, which were based on a telephone survey in New York City, using a nationwide sample and a much different survey methodology, namely, an online, self-administered survey of a national panel. In addition, this study tests the sensitivity of the results to two alternative measures of disconfirmation (or the gap between performance and expectations). Results using subtractive disconfirmation confirm the basic expectancy disconfirmation model, but results using perceived disconfirmation do not, calling into question the policy and management implications of the prior study. It is important for public administration researchers and practitioners to understand better the process citizens use to form overall satisfaction judgments about the quality of local government services. A previous study by Van Ryzin (2004), using data from a telephone survey in New York City, found strong support for an expectancy disconfirmation model of this process. This model has been developed conceptually and tested empirically for several decades in research on customer satisfaction with private sector goods and services (Anderson and Sullivan 1993; Bearden and Teel 1983; Cardozo 1965; Churchill and Suprenant 1982; Erevelles and Leavitt 1992; Oliver 1980, 1997; Tse and Wilton 1988; Yi 1990), yet it has not been applied before to citizen satisfaction with local government services. A growing number of local governments in the United States use citizen surveys to measure the outcomes of their service provision efforts and to obtain feedback from their ‘‘customers’’ (Hatry et al. 1992; Miller and Miller 1991a; Miller and Miller Kobayashi 2000; Webb and Hatry 1973). The International City/County Management Association (2002), the National Academy of Public Administration (1999), and the Government Accounting Standards Board (2005) all have recommended that local governments
TL;DR: In this paper, a model of organizational, programmatic, and community influences on the size and scope of interorganizational networks for social service delivery was developed and applied to an empirical study of service delivery networks in the Family Preservation Program in Los Angeles County.
Abstract: Local social service agencies throughout the world have begun encouraging or requiring social service providers to form community-based networks for the delivery of publicly funded social services. Little is known, however, about the nature of the resulting networks. In this article we develop a model of organizational, programmatic, and community influences on the size and scope of interorganizational networks for social service delivery. We then apply this theoretical framework to an empirical study of service delivery networks in the Family Preservation Program in Los Angeles County. Our findings suggest that the availability of potential partners in the community, the scope of required services, and the ethnic homogeneity of the client population are key determinants of network size. We develop the implications of the results for theories of partnership formation and for more effective management of network formation processes.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide evidence that sector-based differences within a network matter because the differences provide strategic opportunities and constraints for managers involved in coordinating mixed-sector networks, and they provide a framework that reviews and situates current conceptions about network coordination within a passive-to-active continuum of managerial approaches.
Abstract: This article presents an analysis of different network coordination strategies. The article extends network management scholarship by integrating sector-based differences within a theoretical framework encompassing extant conceptions of network management. Even as the emergent field of network management scholarship advances, current research tends to generalize network management approaches based on assumptions that organizations behave similarly within a network regardless of whether the organizations are governmental, nonprofit, or commercial. Consequently, existing research does not fully account for whether sector-based differences have implications for network management. This article provides evidence that sector-based differences within a network matter because the differences provide strategic opportunities and constraints for managers involved in coordinating mixed-sector networks. This article makes several contributions to network management scholarship. First, this article provides a framework that reviews and situates current conceptions about network coordination within a passive-to-active continuum of managerial approaches. Sectoral differences are situated and integrated within this framework. Second, this article provides an empirically based investigation of a quasi-natural experiment that examines sector-based differences in mixed-sector workforce development networks in Boston. The article's findings suggest that integrating sector-based orientations within a passive-to-active network managerial continuum helps clarify and categorize the strategic options and trade-offs that managers may consider in coordinating multisectoral networks.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine citizens' perceptions of organizational politics and ethics in public administration systems and examine the relationship between these perceptions and several key outcomes of modern bureaucracy such as satisfaction with services, trust in governmental institutions, and the resulting voice orientations and actions by the public.
Abstract: In recent decades organizational politics (OP) has become a growing field of interest in managerial studies. To date, the major scholarly effort has been dedicated to the exploration of intraorganizational politics based on employees' perceptions. However, one of the important aspects of this phenomenon is the way in which it is viewed by the external organizational environment-by customers, clients, and as far as governmental agencies are concerned, by the general public as well. This article examines citizens' perceptions of organizational politics and ethics in public administration systems. It focuses on the relationship between these perceptions and several key outcomes of modern bureaucracy such as satisfaction with services, trust in governmental institutions, and the resulting voice orientations and actions by the public (i.e., political efficacy, political participation). The data for the study were gathered from a half decade's worth of national surveys in Israel. The results point to meaningful direct and indirect relationships between organizational politics and ethics in the public sector, satisfaction, trust, and voice orientation. The article ends with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the findings and suggestions for future studies.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors model the introduction of published Comprehensive Performance Assessments of local authorities in England, which make summary information about performance available to voters, as a "shock" to the relationship between voters and incumbents.
Abstract: Publishing performance information about local public services, an increasing trend in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, matters politically because it has an effect on incumbent local governments' electoral support. Voters are able to use performance information to punish or reward incumbents in the elections that follow their publication, which may fill a gap in the chain of accountability between voters and governments. We model the introduction of published Comprehensive Performance Assessments of local authorities in England, which make summary information about performance available to voters, as a "shock" to the relationship between voters and incumbents. Controlling for an unpublicized measure of performance change over time, change in the local tax level, change in local economic conditions, and whether the local incumbent is the party of the incumbent government at the national level, we find negativity bias. Incumbents in local authorities in the "poor" performance category experience a substantial reduction in aggregate vote share at the election following publication, but there is no similarly sized reward for those in the highest performance category.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors employ a novel statistical strategy to examine the determinants of turnover intention in government service and find that functional and friendship solidary preferences are important determinants for turnover intention.
Abstract: This study employs a novel statistical strategy to examine the determinants of turnover intention in government service. To appropriately measure a main determinant of turnover intention - functional preferences - I estimate an ordinal item response model using data from the Federal Human Capital Survey. The sample is selected to facilitate an important comparison: the Internal Revenue Service has undergone significant performance-based pay reforms for supervisors, but not for non-supervisors, while the and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, also a subunit of the U.S. Treasury, has not. Inferential models of turnover intention reveal among other things that functional and friendship solidary preferences are important determinants of turnover intention, but increased accountability is associated with greater turnover among subordinates. IRS supervisors, who face paybanding, are significantly less likely to consider leaving than their counterparts in the OCC, who do not face such incentives.
TL;DR: A critical political history of management reformism, reviewing efforts to reorganize the public welfare provision by applying new public management models to old public bureaucracy problems, is presented in this paper, which considers the dynamics of bureaucratic discretion and reform not only as a problem of public management but as part of the contested politics of social policymaking.
Abstract: Bureaucratic discretion is a fundamental feature of social provision, one that presents enduring difficulties for management. In general, management reform has taken two, divergent paths. One, utilizing the familiar public bureaucratic model, seeks to control discretion through hierarchical command structures and standardization. The other, utilizing decentralization and privatization, regulates and relocates discretion, using incentive structures associated with market or quasi-market institutions. However, it may be that discretion will prove to be as problematic for the new public management (NPM) as it was for the old. This article offers a critical political history of management reformism, reviewing efforts to reorganize the public welfare provision by applying new public management models to old public bureaucracy problems. It considers the dynamics of bureaucratic discretion and reform not only as a problem of public management but as part of the contested politics of social policymaking.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the role of central and local government agencies in implementation of active labor market policy (ALMP) in Sweden based on new and unique quantitative data.
Abstract: How can the central state direct local public units to work effectively towards public sector goals? In an effort to understand the conditions for governance, the three self-contained essays housed in this thesis examine the role of central and local government agencies in implementation of active labor market policy (ALMP) in Sweden. The study is based on new and unique quantitative data.To understand steering possibilities, it is necessary to examine how local politics impinges on local actions. Thus, essay I concerns the following question: Does it matter for local government actions whether left wing or right wing parties govern at local level? I propose that the effect of political partisanship depend on entity size. I expect left-wing governments to be more engaged in ALMPs, but that the impact will be larger in sizeable entities. Empirical evidence supports the theoretical priors.It is also important to know how actors can be coordinated. Thus, essay II tries to explain cooperation between agencies. Trust, goal congruence, and resource interdependence are focused upon. The results indicate that there is no impact of trust on cooperation if goals diverge. Similarly, it does not matter that agencies trust one another if they have different agendas. But if both factors exist simultaneously, cooperation increases. On the other hand, resource interdependence boosts cooperation regardless of trust levels.But does cooperation really improve policy implementation? Essay III proposes that the impact is contingent on task complexity. I expect cooperation to be more valuable when the task is complex. In accordance with this hypothesis, the evidence suggests that only complex tasks can be carried out better through intense interorganizational cooperation.Taken together, the insights from the essays might help us find routes to better governance.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine how financial inducements in performance contracts shape the inner workings of a for-profit welfare-to-work training program serving long-term recipients.
Abstract: This article examines how financial inducements in performance contracts shape the inner workings of a for-profit welfare-to-work training program serving long-term recipients. Our work pays particular attention to how contract requirements shape relationships between manager and line staff and their treatment of clients. We argue that contract design, coupled with bottom-level management efforts to meet contractual obligations, leads to a performance paradox - the same actions taken to achieve contractual results ironically produce negative program practice and poor client outcomes. Thus, rigidly constructed legal agreements between the government and private service providers can distort incentive structures, causing programmatic conflicts between management and staff, and do little to reduce long-term welfare use and diminish recipients' poverty.
TL;DR: Moynihan et al. as mentioned in this paper examined the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) in the federal budgeting process and found that different individuals can examine the same program and come to different conclusions about performance and future funding requirements.
Abstract: This article examines the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) in the federal budgeting process. The early evidence on PART prompts the search for a theory of budgeting that accepts that performance information will influence decisions but will not be used in the same way from decision to decision, as the espoused theory of performance budgeting suggests. Dialogue theory emphasizes the ambiguity of performance information and related resource allocation choices. An exploratory test of dialogue theory is undertaken through an experiment involving graduate students assessing PART evaluations. The results illustrate a variety of ways in which different individuals can examine the same program and, using logical warrants, come to different conclusions about performance and future funding requirements. INTRODUCTION: THE RETURN OF PERFORMANCE BUDGETING The President’s Management Agenda (PMA) of 2001 heralded the most recent effort to introduce performance budgeting to the federal government, based on the seemingly indisputable premise that ‘‘everyone agrees that scarce federal resources should be allocated to programs . . . that deliver results’’ (Office of Management and Budget [OMB] 2001, 27). The PMA called for the integration of financial and performance information by increasing the quality and range of data available to decision makers, assuming that greater technical and allocative efficiency would result (OMB 2001, 21). These basic propositions are shared with the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and other previous efforts to introduce some form of performance budgeting at the federal level (such as Program Planning Budgeting Systems under President Lyndon B. Johnson, Management by Objectives under President Richard Nixon, Zero-Based Budgeting under President Jimmy Carter) and, more recently, at the state level (Melkers and Willoughby 1998). But GPRA has failed to create a strong linkage between performance information and decision making (General Accounting Office [GAO] 2004a; Radin 2000). The PMA notes that ‘‘after eight years of experience, progress toward the use Address correspondence to the author at dmoynihan@lafollette.wisc.edu. doi:10.1093/jopart/muj003 Advance Access publication on December 9, 2005 a The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org. JPART 16:151–168
TL;DR: The authors explored the causal story behind previous aggregate level findings that suggest that female child support enforcement supervisors provide active representation to female clients, who directly benefit from increased child support collections, and found that female supervisors have different priorities and spend their time differently than their male counterparts, and these differences may lead to active representation.
Abstract: Using the theoretical framework posited by Keiser et al. (2002), researchers have found active representation for gender in several public organizations (Keiser et al. 2002; Nicholson-Crotty and Meier 2002; Wilkins and Keiser 2006). This article uses individual-level data to explore the causal story behind previous aggregate level findings that suggest that female child support enforcement supervisors provide active representation to female clients, who directly benefit from increased child support collections (Wilkins and Keiser 2006). This article tests whether female child support enforcement supervisors behave differently than their male counterparts. The findings suggest that female supervisors have different priorities and/or spend their time differently than their male counterparts, and these differences may lead to active representation. Using survey data, I examine the individual-level causal story behind the relationship between individuals and bureaucratic priorities.
TL;DR: In this article, a sociotechnical model for the relationship between intranet usage and bureaucratic red tape is proposed, which takes into account the complexities of causal linkages including bidirectional causal relationships and a range of internal and external influences.
Abstract: This article examines the interaction between bureaucratic red tape and intranet usage in state human service agencies. We propose a sociotechnical model for the relationship between intranet usage and bureaucratic red tape that takes into account the complexities of causal linkages including bidirectional causal relationships and a range of internal and external influences. This model is tested with data from the National Administrative Studies Project, Phase II. While we are not able to corroborate the “demand pull” hypothesis advanced by Bretschneider and colleagues, we do find support for its corollary (the “technology push” hypothesis) indicating that intranet usage is associated with reduction in red tape. This finding on the salutary effect of intranet usage holds for both a global measure of red tape and a more specific procurement red tape measure. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings.
TL;DR: The principal's moral hazard constraint as discussed by the authors is a generalization of the self-interest constraint in the sense that it is in the principal's interests to find a set of incentives that induce efficient levels of effort from the agent.
Abstract: Pure incentive schemes rely on the agent’s self-interest, rather than more coercive control, to motivate subordinates. Yet most organizations, and in particular public agencies, rely very little on pure incentive contracts and instead use coercive mechanisms of monitoring and sanctioning that many theorists find objectionable. We use principal-agency theory to investigate the problem. Principal-agency theory has tacitly assumed throughout that it is in the principal’s interests to find a set of incentives that induce efficient levels of effort from the agent. We show that this is not necessarily the case. We identify a problem we denote as ‘‘the principal’s moral hazard constraint’’ in which bonuses large enough to produce the efficient incentive effect are prohibitively expensive for the principal. Potential solutions to this problem—involving penalization or joint ownership—are unavailable in the public sphere. This means that for a large class of control problems in agencies, the principal’s self-interest will result in the inefficient use of monitoring and oversight rather than outcome-contingent incentives. Although monitoring is often thought of as resulting from the agent’s moral hazard, it can just as reasonably be seen as resulting from the principal’s moral hazard.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present hypotheses based on principal-agent theory concerning the potential impact of corporatization and compare the behavior and performance for 3 years prior to corporatisation to the 3 years subsequent to corporatonization.
Abstract: The new public management includes a portfolio of prescriptions that involve reconfiguring the boundaries of government agencies. One form of reconfiguration is corporatization. Corporatization creates separate agencies that have a contractlike relationship with a ministry or oversight agencies. Corporatization usually comprises a portfolio of changes that attempt to make agencies more "businesslike." Although corporatization is now popular with governments around the world, there is little empirical evidence on its performance impact. This article analyzes 11 corporatizations in Canada by the federal and Quebec governments. We first present hypotheses based on principal-agent theory concerning the potential impact of corporatization. For each agency, we compare the behavior and performance for 3 years prior to corporatization to the 3 years subsequent to corporatization. The aggregate results suggest that the introduction of corporatization did alter behavior on a number of dimensions. The results show that output and revenues increased, the revenues-to-expenditures coverage gap narrowed, and cost-efficiency and employee productivity improved following corporatization. Most of these changes were statistically significant.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the extent to which the decentralization of authority to charter schools induces parents to become more involved in their children's schools and found that parents are indeed more involved with charter schools than in observationally similar public schools.
Abstract: Recent discussions of school choice have revived arguments that the decentralization of governing institutions can enhance the quality of public services by increasing the participation of intended beneficiaries in the production of those services. We use data from the Schools and Staffing Survey to examine the extent to which the decentralization of authority to charter schools induces parents to become more involved in their children's schools. We find that parents are indeed more involved in charter schools than in observationally similar public schools, especially in urban elementary and middle schools. Although we find that this difference is partly attributable to measurable institutional and organizational factors, we also find that charter schools tend to be established in areas with above-average proportions of involved parents, and we find suggestive evidence that, within those areas, it is the more involved parents who tend to select into charter schools. Thus, while the institutional characteristics of charter schools do appear to induce parents to become more involved in their children's schools, such characteristics are only part of the explanation for the greater parental involvement in charter schools than in traditional public schools.
TL;DR: In this paper, a proactive management perspective is brought to bear on the empirical analysis of managerial activity and program performance, when operating within a networked environment, and the goal is to enable researchers to see a clearer picture of how network management, particularly proactive management, influences organizational performance on a set of programmatic indicators.
Abstract: While current research in network management focuses on establishing, empirically, that network management contributes positively to organizational performance, theoretical work remains to answer how network management induces positive organizational outcomes. Similarly, although the classical intraorganizational management perspective may seem unsuitable for today's multiorganizational environment, researchers should not abandon what classic organizational theory can offer as the perspective continues to shift. This article represents a first step toward bringing a proactive management perspective to bear on the empirical analysis of managerial activity and program performance, when operating within a networked environment. The goal is to enable researchers to see a clearer picture of how network management, particularly proactive management, influences organizational performance on a set of programmatic indicators. Public education provides the context for the investigation.
TL;DR: The relevance of the concept of "bureaucratic responsiveness" has been questioned in recent years as mentioned in this paper, and it is suggested that calls for the abandonment of "responsiveness" as a central concept in public administration are premature and emerging research questions are offered.
Abstract: The relevance of the concept “bureaucratic responsiveness” has been questioned in recent years. One reason for the questioned relevance is the apparent environmental changes that are occurring in public administration. Globalization and devolution have infiltrated the halls of bureaucracies. Public agencies are being asked to collaborate with actors in other sectors of society, including, and especially, citizens and citizen associations. In addition to these environmental changes, administrators are being confronted with potentially competing ethical obligations that make decisions regarding responsiveness challenging. This article uses these evolving environments and competing ethical obligations to formulate a set of six variants of bureaucratic responsiveness: dictated, constrained, purposive, entrepreneurial, collaborative, and negotiated. It is argued that to be relevant, writers and researchers in public administration need to consider each of these variants and how they potentially collide with each other to shape administrator thought and behavior, particularly in the collaborative context. In conclusion, it is suggested that calls for the abandonment of “responsiveness” as a central concept in public administration are premature, and emerging research questions are offered.