Showing papers in "Journal of Public Economics in 1992"

TL;DR: In this article, tax compliance occurs because some individuals overweight the low probability of audit, although such overweighting is not universal, since subject behavior is unchanged by the use of either neutral or loaded terms.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly, with and without free entry, and show that in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on Ad valorem taxation.

TL;DR: In this article, students' views on the meaning of inequality comparisons were elicited by means of a questionnaire involving both numerical and verbal questions, and the responses suggest that two important axioms -the principle of transfers and decomposability -were not universally accepted.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify two views: a statistical discrimination approach and a taxpayer resentment view, and examine what they imply about the relationship between stigma and program design, and derive their implications.

TL;DR: This paper developed a model that recognizes interdepence between individuals' charitable cash donations and volunteer labor, and showed that the complementarity between volunteer labor and cash donations suggests that the effect of tax policy on philanthropy is understated by considering monetary donations alone.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors applied the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to a sample of public (government-owned) and not-for-profit hospitals operating in Michigan in 1982.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a simple model for capturing the recursive problem of corruption from the other side, and analyse some conditions for the control of corruption, which turn out to be different from what conventional wisdom suggests.

TL;DR: In this article, the simple pressure group model of political redistribution can predict more with less restrictive assumptions, instead of ready-made pressure groups composed of individuals who vote their pocketbooks, the authors posit heterogeneous agents each of whom decides which group to join and how much effort to expend on political activity.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend the game-theoretic model of Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) to allow for corruption in tax administration and show that in the presence of corruption audit rates are generally higher than in its absence.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied the solvency of Indian public sector and the eventual monetization and inflation that would be implied by stabilization of the debt-GNP ratio in the absence of changes in the primary deficit.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated Mirrlees' model of optimal income taxation and provided a concrete example of utility and density functions for which the solution to the usual (first-order) model is not implementable, i.e. and example where the first-order approach does not work.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors derived and estimated models of nonresidential investment behavior in which current and future tax conditions directly affect the incentive to invest, and developed a method for assessing the impact of tax policy on the volatility of investment when such policy is endogenous.

TL;DR: In this article, an empirical model that directly tests the dividend clientele hypothesis using data on individual portfolios from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances is described and estimates, and the results provide evidence that investors are sensitive to tax rates when choosing portfolio dividend yields, and thus support a number of indirect tests that use security price data.

TL;DR: It is shown that gifts to the old, which can be viewed as social security contributions, are always positive in the steady state and an optimal stationary allocation is sustainable if savings are zero and fertility is exogenous.

TL;DR: This article used voting data to shed light on the extent to which referenda constrain spending and found that large school districts behave more like "budget maximizers" than do small districts, where proposals appear more in line with median voter demands.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors report the results of a series of experiments designed to test the predictions of a model of voluntary provision of public goods through private contributions, and the behavioral question is whether the agents adopt strategies which support this refinement to the Nash equilibrium.

TL;DR: The authors analyzes income tax integration in a small open economy when agents exploit all legal tax arbitrage opportunities and shows that integration does not accomplish the objectives that have been attributed to it, instead of eliminating the double taxation of equity income, it simply removes the primary taxation of savings done through the corporation.

TL;DR: The authors show that a party can credibly establish a platform more moderate than the ideology of its members and thereby raise the probability that the party's nominee wins the election, if candidates are sufficiently impatient and their policies are bounded away from one another.

TL;DR: In this paper, a simple dynamic model of tax compliance in which people may face binding borrowing constraints is considered and the model leads to much different conclusions and policy recommendations than static models, in particular, the government cannot generate full compliance by setting the expected value of cheating to be negative.

TL;DR: In this article, the problem of using taxes to induce a monopolist supplier of a non-renewable resource to extract efficiently has been solved under the assumption that the government has perfect information about the monopolist's cost function and reserves and is able to precommit to an entire sequence of taxes over time.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors model jurisdictions that compete for an industry by building infrastructure more rapidly than their identical neighbors, and suggest a cautious approach toward federal subsidies of local expenditures on infrastructure.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors specify a two-sector general equilibrium model with fair wages and involuntary unemployment and show that any tax policy that raises the wage-rental rate, like a general capital tax, lowers unemployment.

TL;DR: This article developed an alternative framework in which rational voters recognize marginal tax prices but must make tax and expenditure plans under imperfect information or uncertainty, and various sources of uncertainty are analyzed and related to the flypaper effect.

TL;DR: In this article, the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods is shown to be unduly opaque, and a more transparent proof is presented, which explains a step of the argument that was far from obvious in the original proof.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors extend the literature on post-injury duration of absence from work by developing a model that incorporates substitution between unemployment insurance benefits and workers' compensation, which is tested empirically using pooled cross-section and time-series data at the two-digit industry level.

TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of social security when individuals can take hidden actions to affect their longevity, that is when there is moral hazard in annuity markets, were investigated. And they showed that social security never raises welfare in a pure moral hazard economy.

TL;DR: This paper provided an alternative proof of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian's well-known result on the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the private provision of a public good when all goods are normal.

TL;DR: In this article, the effectiveness of the tax credit for research and experimentation (R&E) expenditures was examined using a panel of firm data for the period 1975 through 1988 using a structural model, the results generally indicate that the credit resulted in increased R&E spending.

TL;DR: In this paper, the social value of agents having access to additional hidden knowledge before contracts are implemented is shown to be positive to the extent that incentive-constrained agents are sorted more finely.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a model in which the location of a single public facility is fixed in an urban area, and two firms choose locations; the locations of households, competing for space in the land market, are also endogenous.