Showing papers in "Mathematical Social Sciences in 2019"

TL;DR: This work investigates what can be learned about models of choice with default when the no-choice behavior of the decision-maker is unobservable, using Manzini and Mariotti’s independent random consideration model as a point of departure.

TL;DR: A weaker form of consistency is defined and the modified Boston mechanism is characterized by this weaker form and a new axiom called respect of priority of the top-ranking students.

TL;DR: In this paper, a polynomial-time algorithm was proposed to determine whether an envy-free assignment exists, and if so, computes one such assignment, with high probability if the number of houses exceeds the total number of agents by a logarithmic factor.

TL;DR: A large class of production functions can be written as a Cobb–Douglas function with non-constant output elasticity, providing a more general and more flexible framework compared to the traditional nested CES approach while facilitating the analyze of the substitution properties of nested CES functions.

TL;DR: In this paper, necessary and sufficient conditions for detecting local bifurcations of three and four-dimensional dynamical systems in continuous time were provided, and the added value of their methodology rests on its generality.

TL;DR: In this article, Schmeidler and Sonnenschein show that the presence of the Archimedean and mixture-continuity properties, both empirically non-falsifiable in principle, foreclose the possibility of consistency (transitivity) without decisiveness (completeness) without consistency, or in the case of a weak consistency condition, both indecisiveness and inconsistency altogether.

TL;DR: This paper presents a model of a multi-divisional firm to share the joint yet uncertain and fixed cost of running a central operational unit, and shows how the results generalize when egalitarianism is replaced by a more general fairness property.

TL;DR: In this article, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that for any non-dictatorial voting system there will exist an election where a voter, called a manipulator, can change the election outcome in their favour by voting strategically.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources and propose a cost allocation rule based on a painting procedure, where agents paint the edges on the paths connecting them to the sources.

TL;DR: In this paper, the United States Supreme Court is used as an illuminative context in which to discuss three different spatial voting preference models: an instance of the widely used single-peaked preferences, and two models that are more novel in which vote outcomes have a strength in addition to a location.

TL;DR: This disturbing result is qualified by applying the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) which suggests that mixed strategy equilibria are selected which support majorities in true preferences, for negligible costs almost with certainty.

TL;DR: It is shown that a version of the general framework can be used to establish in the class of problems considered by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) and Machina (1989) the equivalence between behavioral assumptions and the characteristics of the utility function, which are in turn necessary and sufficient for comparative statics results.

TL;DR: It is shown that resale increases (decreases) entry by the lower-(higher-)value bidder, inducing a “more symmetric” equilibrium, and generates higher revenue for the seller.

TL;DR: It is proved that if there is at least one partially honest agent and unanimity is satisfied, then “LY-condition” is necessary and sufficient for double implementability.

TL;DR: A model of computation for the cake cutting problem where the mediator can ask the same queries as in the Robertson-Webb model but he or she can only perform algebraic operations in the Blum-Shub-Smale model is suggested.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the existence of a delegated compromise is equivalent to the strong contractibility of the simplicial complex, i.e., it is possible to achieve a consensus in a conflictual situation.

TL;DR: In this paper, the Borda, Pareto, and Copeland rules are used to characterize the balancedness of top-only social choice correspondence, and they are shown to interact with other social choice properties.

TL;DR: The main theorems generalise a number of specialised results in the decision theory and survival analysis literatures and obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for mixtures of DI-ordered – but not necessarily DI-equivalent – functions to be uniformly more DI than the least DI component.

TL;DR: A necessary and sufficient condition for index-wise comparative statics is identified, which can establish comparativestatics of a single decision without solving the entire model and enable analysis in settings where substitutability among variables otherwise precludes the use of current comparative static methods.

TL;DR: Numerical evidence is provided suggesting that policies designed to reduce horizontal differentiation might be more effective than those designed to limit access charges; this result seems robust to the presence of different forms of price discrimination.

TL;DR: The result relies on Bell polynomials and states that an incometransfer principle of any order does not necessarily satisfy the utility transfer principle of the corresponding order.

TL;DR: It is proved that for any number of players if one of them has the highest effort constraint then, independent of the players’ values of winning, he is the only player with a positive expected payoff.

TL;DR: In this paper, a graph-theoretic approach to the character admissibility problem, using Hamiltonian paths to generate preference orderings, is presented, and two functions are defined to construct cubic preferences.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the possibility of axiomatic characterization of approval voting when the set of voters is fixed and each voter has a dichotomous preference over the alternatives.

TL;DR: A solution concept is developed that makes ex-ante predictions about the adaptation process following lock-in in a critical mass game, based on a Nash equilibrium of the strategies chosen by sophisticated players.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors survey a host of results from discrete geometry that have bearing on the analysis of geometric models of approval voting, and survey their implications for various classes of geometric constraints on voter approval sets.

TL;DR: This work introduces a non-dictatorship index based on the recent work (Bednay et al., 2017), and investigates the relationship between the manipulability and nondictatorship indices of some prominent social choice functions, putting them into a common framework.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine two aspects of the mathematical basis for two-tier voting systems, such as that of the Council of the European Union, and reach the conclusion that the choice of quota in the square-root system is an issue for politicians informed by theory.

TL;DR: In this paper, a fair division in the absence of full information is studied, where the preferences of one person are secret and the preference of another person is not known to the other agents.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a definition of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) for general signalling games nested by an updating rule according to the hypothesis testing model characterized by Ortoleva (2012).