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A comment on "School choice: An experimental study" [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]

Caterina Calsamiglia, +2 more
- 01 Jan 2011 - 
- Vol. 146, Iss: 1, pp 392-396
TLDR
It is shown that one of the main results in Chen and Sonmez (2006, 2008) does no longer hold when the number of recombinations is sufficiently increased to obtain reliable conclusions.
About: 
This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory.The article was published on 2011-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 15 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Robustness (economics).

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Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Guillaume Haeringer, +2 more
- 17 Jul 2009 - 
TL;DR: In this paper, a constrained list of schools is used to reduce the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy in a preference list, which reduces the number of subjects manipulating their preferentes.
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Blowing the whistle

Daniel A Meisel
- 30 Sep 2000 - 
Journal ArticleDOI

Constrained school choice: an experimental study

Caterina Calsamiglia, +2 more
- 01 Sep 2010 - 
TL;DR: In this paper, a trabajo publicado como articulo en American Economic Review 100(4): 1860-1874 (2010) was used for articulación.
Journal ArticleDOI

Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation

Clayton R. Featherstone, +1 more
- 01 Nov 2016 - 
TL;DR: This work shows that even in simple environments with ample feedback and repetition, agents fail to reach non-truthtelling equilibria, and offers another way forward: implementing truth-telling as an ordinal Bayes–Nash equilibrium rather than as a dominant strategy equilibrium, showing that this weaker solution concept can allow for more efficient mechanisms in theory and in practice.

From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms

Yan Chen, +1 more
TL;DR: The authors characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Demand reduction in multi-unit auctions with varying numbers of bidders: theory and evidence from a field experiment*

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, +4 more
- 01 Feb 2006 - 
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of varying the number of bidders in uniform-price auctions were investigated, and it was shown that demand reduction remains even in the asymptotic limit, although truthful bidding yields profits very close to those of equilibrium play.
Journal ArticleDOI

Recombinant estimation for normal-form games, with applications to auctions and bargaining

Charles H. Mullin, +1 more
- 01 Jan 2006 - 
TL;DR: An improved statistical estimator based on "recombinant estimation": recombining the strategies of individual players to compute what the outcomes would have been if players had been matched in different groups is presented.
Journal ArticleDOI

On recombinant estimation for experimental data

Jason Abrevaya
- 01 Mar 2008 - 
TL;DR: The recombinant estimator falls within a general category of statistics known as U-statistics as discussed by the authors, and is the optimal estimator among unbiased estimators for normal-form games.
Journal ArticleDOI

Corrigendum to “School choice: An experimental study” [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202–231]☆

Yan Chen, +1 more
- 01 Jan 2011 - 
TL;DR: The efficiency comparison of the three school choice mechanisms in this paper is based on recombinant estimation with an identical set of 10 tie-breakers, while the statistics reported in Table 7 is computed using 14,400 tie-breaks.
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Q1. What have the authors contributed in "A comment on: school choice: an experimental study" ?

The authors show that one of the main results in Chen and Sönmez ( 2006, 2008 ) does no longer hold when the number of recombinations is sufficiently increased to obtain reliable conclusions. 

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Is it possible that a person can only have one preferred course?

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