Journal ArticleDOI
An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers
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The authors designed two laboratory experiments to test popular hypotheses explaining the failure of subgame-perfect equilibrium models to explain behavior in ultimatum games and found that people sometimes reject "free" money (i.e., offers with no strings attached).Abstract:
We designed two laboratory experiments to test popular hypotheses explaining the failure of subgame-perfect equilibrium models to explain behavior in ultimatum games. The first experiment varied information available to respondents. When respondents did not know the amount being divided, offerers offered (and respondents accepted) significantly lower offers than when the respondents knew the amount being divided. The second experiment replicated this result and also showed that people occasionally reject “free” money (i.e., offers with no strings attached). This evidence does not support earlier explanations for ultimatum anomalies and identifies conditions where subgame-perfect models apply.read more
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Book ChapterDOI
The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors review 74 experiments with no, low, or high performance-based financial incentives and find that the modal result has no effect on mean performance, and that higher incentive does improve performance often, typically judgment tasks that are responsive to better effort.
Journal ArticleDOI
Raising the stakes in the ultimatum game: experimental evidence from indonesia
TL;DR: In this article, the ultimatum game has generated considerable interest because experimental evidence strongly rejects the standard game-theoretic predictions and the possibility that experimental results are an artifact of small stakes.
Journal ArticleDOI
Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
Robert Slonim,Alvin E. Roth +1 more
TL;DR: This paper reported an experiment involving an ultimatum bargaining game, played in the Slovak Republic and found that rejections were less frequent the higher the stakes, and proposals in the high stakes conditions declined slowly as subjects gained experience.
Posted Content
What Do People Value When They Negotiate? Mapping the Domain of Subjective Value in Negotiation
TL;DR: Four studies support the development and validation of a framework for understanding the range of social psychological outcomes valued subjectively as consequences of negotiations and suggest the SVI is a promising tool to systematize and encourage research on subjective outcomes of negotiation.
Journal ArticleDOI
What do people value when they negotiate? Mapping the domain of subjective value in negotiation.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed a subjective value inventory (SVI) for understanding the range of social psychological outcomes valued subjectively as consequences of negotiations, and found that subjective value was a better predictor than economic outcomes of future negotiation decisions.
References
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Book ChapterDOI
Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk
Daniel Kahneman,Amos Tversky +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develop an alternative model, called prospect theory, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights.
Journal ArticleDOI
Prospect theory: analysis of decision under risk
Daniel Kahneman,Amos Tversky +1 more
Journal ArticleDOI
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
TL;DR: In this paper, the ultimatum bargaining games with two players and two stages were investigated. But the authors focused on situations with two agents and two stage bargaining games and only one agent has to decide and the set of outcomes is restricted to two results.
Journal ArticleDOI
Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics
TL;DR: Kahneman and Thaler as mentioned in this paper showed that even profit-maximizing firms will have an incentive to act in a manner that is perceived as fair if the individuals with whom they deal are willing to resist unfair transactions and punish unfair firms at some cost to themselves.
Journal ArticleDOI
Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
TL;DR: This paper found that if the right to be the first mover is "earned" by scoring high on a general knowledge quiz, then first movers behave in a more self-regarding manner.