Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games
TLDR
This work examines decision making in two- person extensive form game trees using nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information to establish replicable principles of cooperative versus noncooperative behavior.Abstract:
We examine decision making in two-person extensive form game trees using nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to establish replicable principles of cooperative versus noncooperative behavior that involve the use of signaling, reciprocity, and backward induction strategies, depending on the availability of dominated direct punishing strategies and the probability of repeated interaction with the same partner. Contrary to the predictions of game theory, we find substantial support for cooperation under complete information even in various single-play treatments.read more
Citations
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Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms
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“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Joseph Henrich,Robert Boyd,Samuel Bowles,Colin F. Camerer,Ernst Fehr,Herbert Gintis,Richard McElreath,Michael Alvard,Abigail Barr,Jean Ensminger,Natalie Smith Henrich,Kim Hill,Francisco J. Gil-White,Michael Gurven,Frank W. Marlowe,John Q. Patton,David P. Tracer +16 more
TL;DR: A cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions found the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
A computational model of trust and reputation
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Journal ArticleDOI
How to identify trust and reciprocity
TL;DR: A three-games (or triadic) design is used to identify trusting and reciprocating behavior in single-game trust and reciprocity experiments based on the implicit assumption that subjects do not have altruistic or inequality-averse other-regarding preferences.
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Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
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References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
TL;DR: In this article, the authors designed an experiment to study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting and found that observed decisions suggest that reciprocity exists as a basic element of human behavior and that this is accounted for in the trust extended to an anonymous counterpart.
Journal ArticleDOI
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
TL;DR: The concept of perfect equilibrium point has been introduced in order to exclude the possibility that disequilibrium behavior is prescribed on unreached subgames [Selten 1965 and 1973]. Unfortunately this definition of perfectness does not remove all difficulties which may arise with respect to unreached parts of the game.
Journal ArticleDOI
Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
TL;DR: This paper found that if the right to be the first mover is "earned" by scoring high on a general knowledge quiz, then first movers behave in a more self-regarding manner.
Posted Content
End behavior in sequences of finite prisoner's dilemma supergames
Reinhard Selten,Rolf Stoecker +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a learning theory is proposed which models the influence of experience on end behavior in finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames, which explains shifts in the intended deviation period.
Journal ArticleDOI
End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach
Reinhard Selten,Rolf Stoecker +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a learning theory is proposed which models the influence of experience on end behavior in finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames, which explains shifts in the intended deviation period.