On limiting the market for status signals
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In this paper, the impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered, and the benefits of a Pareto-improving tax policy are discussed. But the authors do not consider the impact of tax on the signaling equilibrium.About:
This article is published in Journal of Public Economics.The article was published on 1994-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 265 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Tax policy & Inefficiency.read more
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Satisfaction and comparison income
Andrew E. Clark,Andrew J. Oswald +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors tried to test the hypothesis that utility depends on income relative to a "comparison" or reference level using data on 5,000 British workers and found that workers' reported satisfaction levels are inversely related to their comparison wage rates.
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Relative Income, Happiness and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles
TL;DR: In this article, the authors review the evidence on relative income from the subjective well-being literature and discuss the relation (or not) between happiness and utility, and discuss some nonhappiness research (behavioral, experimental, neurological) related to income comparisons.
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Relative income, happiness, and utility : an explanation for the Easterlin paradox and other puzzles
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors review the evidence on relative income from the subjective well-being literature and discuss the relation (or not) between happiness and utility, and discuss some nonhappiness research (behavioral, experimental, neurological) related to income comparisons.
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A Theory of Conformity
TL;DR: In this paper, a model of social interaction in which individuals care about status as well as "intrinsic" utility (which refers to utility derived directly from consumption) is presented.
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Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption
TL;DR: This paper examined conditions under which "Veblen effects" arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption, and explored factors that induce Veblen effect and investigated policy implications.
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Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated second-best and third-best Pare to optima in a simple model were government lacks full information ab out consumer types (who is able, who is infirm).
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Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
TL;DR: In this article, deux resultats utiles for demontrer l'existence and caracteriser des equilibres de separation dans des jeux de signalement were presented.
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Understanding welfare stigma: Taxpayer resentment and statistical discrimination
Timothy Besley,Stephen Coate +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify two views: a statistical discrimination approach and a taxpayer resentment view, and examine what they imply about the relationship between stigma and program design, and derive their implications.
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Means testing versus universal provision in poverty alleviation programs
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare the use of means-tested and universal schemes in the alleviation of poverty using a class of poverty measures, and illustrate the trade-off from the fact that means testing is costly to both the government and the claimant, while universal provision entails a leakage to the nonpoor.
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A simple model for merit good arguments
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine a way of representing merit goods by allowing governments to apply a specific form of correction to consumers' preferences, based on an approach to the analysis of taste and quality change due to Fisher and Shell.