scispace - formally typeset
Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

On limiting the market for status signals

Norman J. Ireland
- 01 Jan 1994 - 
- Vol. 53, Iss: 1, pp 91-110
TLDR
In this paper, the impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered, and the benefits of a Pareto-improving tax policy are discussed. But the authors do not consider the impact of tax on the signaling equilibrium.
About
This article is published in Journal of Public Economics.The article was published on 1994-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 265 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Tax policy & Inefficiency.

read more

Citations
More filters

The demand for 'cleanliness' and energy conservation policies: the case of clothes washing

TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown how available consumption technologies and utilization patterns have interacted with income growth and changes in social conventions, so to generate rising standards of cleanliness, and the analysis suggests that social conventions may conflict with public policies aimed at energy conservation.
Dissertation

Essays in Behavioral and Experimental Economics

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the effect of procedural or contextual factors on human behavior in groups formed with quota-based selection rules and found that participants are significantly less cooperative in the quota treatment compared to a control treatment where all participants are treated symmetrically.

Bens de status: características, literatura e novos avanços

TL;DR: In this paper, the main reasons for this differentiation from regu- lar consumption goods are explained and a brief review of the literature to show the latest scientific developments in the area of status goods is presented.
Posted Content

Relative Consumption, Optimal Taxation and Public Provision of Private Goods

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that public provision of private goods may be justified on pure efficiency grounds in an environment where individuals have relative consumption concerns by providing private goods, thereby having an instrument to correct for the excessive consumption of positional goods.
Journal ArticleDOI

Costless Signaling with Costly Signals

TL;DR: It is proved that, ironically, a sufficiently large increase in the weight attached to signaling costs allows senders to signal their true types at arbitrarily low overall cost.
References
More filters
Posted Content

An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors model the negative self-characterizations of welfare recipients as a form of social stigma, and use a utility maximization model to predict the impact of welfare programs on the low-income population.
Posted Content

Are Workers Paid their Marginal Products

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm's internal wage structure and conclude that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products.