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Short Signatures from the Weil Pairing

TLDR
A short signature scheme based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption on certain elliptic and hyperelliptic curves is introduced, designed for systems where signatures are typed in by a human or signatures are sent over a low-bandwidth channel.
Abstract
We introduce a short signature scheme based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption on certain elliptic and hyperelliptic curves. The signature length is half the size of a DSA signature for a similar level of security. Our short signature scheme is designed for systems where signatures are typed in by a human or signatures are sent over a low-bandwidth channel.

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Citations
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A Survey of BGP Security Issues and Solutions The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) controls much of Internet traffic, but is vulnerable to communications interruptions and failures; finding suitable improved security measures with acceptable costs is difficult.

TL;DR: The limitations and advantages of proposed security extensions to BGP, and why no solution has yet struck an adequate balance betweencomprehensive security anddeployment cost as discussed by the authors.
Book ChapterDOI

1-out-of-n Signatures from a Variety of Keys

TL;DR: In this article, a 1-out-of-n signature scheme was proposed that allows mixture use of different flavors of keys at the same time, which is more efficient than previous schemes even if it is used only with a single type of keys.
Journal Article

Efficient identity-based signatures secure in the standard model

TL;DR: The only known construction of identity-based signatures that can be proven secure in the standard model is based on the approach of attaching certificates to non-identity based signatures, which leads to schemes that are somewhat inefficient and leaves open the problem of finding more efficient direct constructions.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Identity based authenticated key agreement protocols from pairings

TL;DR: A number of issues related to identity based authenticated key agreement protocols in the Diffie-Hellman family enabled by the Weil or Tate pairings are investigated and formal proofs of security for these protocols are given.
Journal ArticleDOI

Dynamic Provable Data Possession

TL;DR: A definitional framework and efficient constructions for Dynamic Provable Data Possession (DPDP), which extends the PDP model to support provable updates to stored data, and uses a new version of authenticated dictionaries based on rank information.
References
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Book

Handbook of Applied Cryptography

TL;DR: A valuable reference for the novice as well as for the expert who needs a wider scope of coverage within the area of cryptography, this book provides easy and rapid access of information and includes more than 200 algorithms and protocols.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols

TL;DR: It is argued that the random oracles model—where all parties have access to a public random oracle—provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice, and yields protocols much more efficient than standard ones while retaining many of the advantages of provable security.
Journal ArticleDOI

Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing

TL;DR: This work proposes a fully functional identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme based on bilinear maps between groups and gives precise definitions for secure IBE schemes and gives several applications for such systems.
Book

The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves

TL;DR: It is shown here how Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields, Local Fields, and Global Fields affect the geometry of the elliptic curves.
Journal ArticleDOI

A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks

TL;DR: A digital signature scheme based on the computational difficulty of integer factorization possesses the novel property of being robust against an adaptive chosen-message attack: an adversary who receives signatures for messages of his choice cannot later forge the signature of even a single additional message.