Short Signatures from the Weil Pairing
Dan Boneh,Ben Lynn,Hovav Shacham +2 more
- pp 514-532
TLDR
A short signature scheme based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption on certain elliptic and hyperelliptic curves is introduced, designed for systems where signatures are typed in by a human or signatures are sent over a low-bandwidth channel.Abstract:
We introduce a short signature scheme based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption on certain elliptic and hyperelliptic curves. The signature length is half the size of a DSA signature for a similar level of security. Our short signature scheme is designed for systems where signatures are typed in by a human or signatures are sent over a low-bandwidth channel.read more
Citations
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Book ChapterDOI
Identity-Based universal designated verifier signatures
TL;DR: This paper provides two constructions of ID-based UDVS schemes based on bilinear pairings that use the two methods that have been identified and provides the security proof based on the random oracle model.
Posted Content
Detecting Sybil Attacks using Proofs of Work and Location in VANETs
Mohamed Baza,Mahmoud Nabil,Niclas Bewermeier,Kemal Fidan,Mohamed E. Mahmoud,Mohamed Abdallah +5 more
TL;DR: A Sybil attack detection scheme using proofs of work and location that achieves high detection rate to Sybil attacks with low false negative and acceptable communication and computation overhead.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Separable and Anonymous Identity-Based Key Issuing
Ai Fen Sui,Sherman S. M. Chow,Lucas C. K. Hui,Siu-Ming Yiu,Kam-Pui Chow,Wai Wan Tsang,C.F. Chong,K.H. Pun,Ho-Leung Chan +8 more
TL;DR: A novel separable and anonymous ID-based key issuing scheme without secure channel is proposed that can be sent to the user in an encrypted form such that only the legitimate key requester authenticated by LRA can decrypt it.
Journal ArticleDOI
Efficient certificateless proxy signature scheme with provable security
TL;DR: A formal security model for the proxy signature scheme with implicit certificate is presented, where a receiver does not have to verify a certificate before verifying a signed message, yet only the original signer or the proxy signer who properly registered its public key and identity information is able to sign.
Book ChapterDOI
StealthGuard: Proofs of Retrievability with Hidden Watchdogs
TL;DR: StealthGuard makes use of a privacy-preserving word search (WS) algorithm to search, as part of a POR query, for randomly-valued blocks called watchdogs that are inserted in the file before outsourcing.
References
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Book
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
TL;DR: A valuable reference for the novice as well as for the expert who needs a wider scope of coverage within the area of cryptography, this book provides easy and rapid access of information and includes more than 200 algorithms and protocols.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
Mihir Bellare,Phillip Rogaway +1 more
TL;DR: It is argued that the random oracles model—where all parties have access to a public random oracle—provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice, and yields protocols much more efficient than standard ones while retaining many of the advantages of provable security.
Journal ArticleDOI
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
Dan Boneh,Matthew K. Franklin +1 more
TL;DR: This work proposes a fully functional identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme based on bilinear maps between groups and gives precise definitions for secure IBE schemes and gives several applications for such systems.
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The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves
TL;DR: It is shown here how Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields, Local Fields, and Global Fields affect the geometry of the elliptic curves.
Journal ArticleDOI
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
TL;DR: A digital signature scheme based on the computational difficulty of integer factorization possesses the novel property of being robust against an adaptive chosen-message attack: an adversary who receives signatures for messages of his choice cannot later forge the signature of even a single additional message.