Journal ArticleDOI
The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
Avinash Dixit,John Londregan +1 more
Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
In this paper, the authors examine what determines whether an interest group will receive favors in pork-barrel politics, using a model of majority voting with two competing parties, where each group's membership is heterogeneous in its ideological affinity for the parties.Abstract:
We examine what determines whether an interest group will receive favors in pork-barrel politics, using a model of majority voting with two competing parties. Each group's membership is heterogeneous in its ideological affinity for the parties. Individuals face a trade-off between party affinity and their own transfer receipts. The model is general enough to yield two often-discussed but competing theories as special cases. If the parties are equally effective in delivering transfers to any group, then the outcome of the process conforms to the "swing voter" theory: both parties woo the groups that are politically central, and most willing to switch their votes in response to economic favors. If groups have party affinities, and each party is more effective in delivering favors to its own support group, then we can get the "machine politics" outcome, where each party favors its core support group. We derive these results theoretically, and illustrate their operation in particular examples.read more
Citations
More filters
Tax autonomy, lobbying, and welfare
TL;DR: In this article, the authors characterize the conditions under which social welfare can be increased by restricting the set of tax instruments available to the policy maker, i.e. the degree of tax autonomy.
Posted Content
Multi-Candidate Political Competition and the Industrial Organization of Politics
TL;DR: In this article, a microfounded theory of multi-candidate political competition taking an "industrial organization" perspective of politics is presented, which is shown to be exible enough to address several applications on the topics of special interest politics, coalition formation in the legislature in proportional elections, and redistribution under alternative electoral rules.
Book ChapterDOI
Anti-poverty programs and vote-buying strategies: Lessons from Northeast Brazil
TL;DR: In a context where personal relations play a central role in structuring political life, to what extent should a researcher differentiate "normal" from "deviant" political behavior? as mentioned in this paper addresses this question from a socio-anthropological point of view, analyzing the use of anti-poverty programs for vote-buying purposes.
Journal ArticleDOI
The role of ethnicity in the perception of pork barrel politics : Evidence from a survey experiment in Slovakia
TL;DR: In divided societies and new democracies, clientelism (in the form of pork barrel) and ethno-politics appear to go hand in hand as mentioned in this paper, and it is apparent that politicians are incentivized to compete for supp...
Journal Article
Burocracia y eficiencia en la provisión de bienes públicos: un modelo espacial de competencia política
Leonardo A. Gatica,Georgina Soto +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a modelo espacial de competencia politica was presented to analyze the efecto of politica politica on the desempeno gubernamental, eficiencia del nivel de empleo burocratico and the provision of bienes publicos.
References
More filters
Book
An Economic Theory of Democracy
TL;DR: Downs presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work on voting and turnout as discussed by the authors, particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote.
Journal ArticleDOI
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
Assar Lindbeck,Jörgen W. Weibull +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, balanced budget redistribution between socioeconomic groups is modeled as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties, and a sufficient condition for existence is given, requiring that there be enough heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate.
Journal ArticleDOI
Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game
Gary W. Cox,Mathew D. McCubbins +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the optimal strategy for risk-averse candidates will be to promise redistributions first and foremost to their reelection constituency and thereby to maintain existing political coalitions.
Journal ArticleDOI
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions, often approaching unanimous size, in the realm of distributive policies, i.e., policies which concentrate benefits in specific geographic areas (states, congressional districts) while spreading costs through general taxation.
Journal ArticleDOI
Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems
TL;DR: In this article, a simple game model is used to compare the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters, by making campaign promises that favor small groups, rather than appealing equally to all voters.
Related Papers (5)
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
Assar Lindbeck,Jörgen W. Weibull +1 more