Journal ArticleDOI
The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
Avinash Dixit,John Londregan +1 more
Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
In this paper, the authors examine what determines whether an interest group will receive favors in pork-barrel politics, using a model of majority voting with two competing parties, where each group's membership is heterogeneous in its ideological affinity for the parties.Abstract:
We examine what determines whether an interest group will receive favors in pork-barrel politics, using a model of majority voting with two competing parties. Each group's membership is heterogeneous in its ideological affinity for the parties. Individuals face a trade-off between party affinity and their own transfer receipts. The model is general enough to yield two often-discussed but competing theories as special cases. If the parties are equally effective in delivering transfers to any group, then the outcome of the process conforms to the "swing voter" theory: both parties woo the groups that are politically central, and most willing to switch their votes in response to economic favors. If groups have party affinities, and each party is more effective in delivering favors to its own support group, then we can get the "machine politics" outcome, where each party favors its core support group. We derive these results theoretically, and illustrate their operation in particular examples.read more
Citations
More filters
Vote Buying and Accountability in Democratic Africa
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a new theory to explain why politicians in new democracies distribute money to potential voters, namely, vote buying is effective because they convey information to voters about the extent to which a candidate will protect and serve their interests in the future, especially with respect to the provision of patronage resources.
Journal ArticleDOI
When Does Information Influence Voters? The Joint Importance of Salience and Coordination:
TL;DR: The authors argue that access to information about a politician's programmatic performance helps voters reward good performers and punish poor ones. But in places where resources are made conditional, they argue that voters reward the good performer and punish the poor one.
Journal ArticleDOI
Intimidating voters with violence and mobilizing them with clientelism
Mascha Rauschenbach,Katrin Paula +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors suggest that intimidating voters and electoral clientelism are two strategies on the menu of manipulation, often used in conjunction, and they do not know much, however, about who is tar...
Dissertation
Political economy of intergovernmental grants
TL;DR: In this paper, a tesis of politica politica de transferencias intergubernamentales is presented, focusing on the factores politicos that determinan the asignación de funds bajo control of gobiernos centrales a las diversas regiones.
Journal ArticleDOI
Determinantes do comportamento particularista de legisladores estaduais brasileiros
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the behavior of legislators in twelve States of Brazil and analyze the effects produced by the degree of electoral and legislative competition, the ideological position of the state legislators' parties, the types of voter constituency, and the consistent supporters of state legislators in relation to their particularist behavior.
References
More filters
Book
An Economic Theory of Democracy
TL;DR: Downs presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work on voting and turnout as discussed by the authors, particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote.
Journal ArticleDOI
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
Assar Lindbeck,Jörgen W. Weibull +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, balanced budget redistribution between socioeconomic groups is modeled as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties, and a sufficient condition for existence is given, requiring that there be enough heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate.
Journal ArticleDOI
Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game
Gary W. Cox,Mathew D. McCubbins +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the optimal strategy for risk-averse candidates will be to promise redistributions first and foremost to their reelection constituency and thereby to maintain existing political coalitions.
Journal ArticleDOI
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions, often approaching unanimous size, in the realm of distributive policies, i.e., policies which concentrate benefits in specific geographic areas (states, congressional districts) while spreading costs through general taxation.
Journal ArticleDOI
Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems
TL;DR: In this article, a simple game model is used to compare the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters, by making campaign promises that favor small groups, rather than appealing equally to all voters.
Related Papers (5)
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
Assar Lindbeck,Jörgen W. Weibull +1 more