Showing papers on "Consistent histories published in 2004"

Decoherence and the Appearance of a Classical World in Quantum Theory

Abstract: In the last decade decoherence has become a very popular topic mainly due to the progress in experimental techniques which allow monitoring of the process of decoherence for single microscopic or mesoscopic systems. The other motivation is the rapid development of quantum information and quantum computation theory where decoherence is the main obstacle in the implementation of bold theoretical ideas. All that makes the second improved and extended edition of this book very timely. Despite the enormous efforts of many authors decoherence with its consequences still remains a rather controversial subject. It touches on, namely, the notoriously confusing issues of quantum measurement theory and interpretation of quantum mechanics. The existence of different points of view is reflected by the structure and content of the book. The first three authors (Joos, Zeh and Kiefer) accept the standard formalism of quantum mechanics but seem to reject orthodox Copenhagen interpretation, Giulini and Kupsch stick to both while Stamatescu discusses models which go beyond the standard quantum theory. Fortunately, most of the presented results are independent of the interpretation and the mathematical formalism is common for the (meta)physically different approaches. After a short introduction by Joos followed by a more detailed review of the basic concepts by Zeh, chapter 3 (the longest chapter) by Joos is devoted to the environmental decoherence. Here the author considers mostly rather `down to earth' and well-motivated mechanisms of decoherence through collisions with atoms or molecules and the processes of emission, absorption and scattering of photons. The issues of decoherence induced superselection rules and localization of objects including the possible explanation of the molecular structure are discussed in details. Many other topics are also reviewed in this chapter, e.g., the so-called Zeno effect, relationships between quantum chaos and decoherence, the role of decoherence in quantum information processing and even decoherence in the brain. The next chapter, written by Kiefer, is devoted to decoherence in quantum field theory and quantum gravity which is a much more speculative and less explored topic. Two complementary aspects are studied in this approach: decoherence of particle states by the quantum fields and decoherence of field states by the particles. Cosmological issues related to decoherence are discussed, not only within the standard Friedmann cosmology, but also using the elements of the theory of black holes, wormholes and strings. The relations between the formalism of consistent histories defined in terms of decoherence functionals and the environmental decoherence are discussed in chapter 5, also written by Kiefer. The Feynman--Vernon influence functional for the quantum open system is presented in detail as the first example of decoherence functional. Then the general theory is outlined together with possible interpretations including cosmological aspects. The next chapter by Giulini presents an overview of the superselection rules arising from physical symmetries and gauge transformations both for nonrelativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. Critical discussion of kinematical superselection rules versus dynamical ones is illustrated by numerous examples like Galilei invariant quantum mechanics, quantum electrodynamics and quantum gravity. The introduction to the theory of quantum open systems and its applications to decoherence models is given in chapter 7 by Kupsch. Generalized master equations, Markovian approximation and a few Hamiltonian models relevant for decoherence are discussed. Some mathematical tools, e.g., complete positivity and entropy inequalities are also presented. The last chapter by Stamatescu is devoted to stochastic collapse models which can be interpreted either as certain representations of the dynamics of open quantum systems or as fundamental modifications of the Schr\"odinger equation. The final part of the book consists of remarks by Zeh on related concepts and methods and seven appendices. The broad spectrum, mathematically-friendly presentation, inclusion of the very recent developments and the extensive bibliography (about 550 references) make this book a valuable reference for all researchers, graduate and PhD students interested in the foundations of quantum mechanics, quantum open systems and quantum information. The relative independence of the chapters and numerous redundancies allow for selective reading, which is very helpful for newcomers to this field.

The Copenhagen Interpretation

Abstract: Scientists of the late 1920s, led by Bohr and Heisenberg, proposed a conception of nature radically different from that of their predecessors. The new conception, which grew out of efforts to comprehend the apparently irrational behavior of nature in the realm of quantum effects, was not simply a new catalog of the elementary spacetime realities and their modes of operation. It was essentially a rejection of the presumption that nature could be understood in terms of elementary spacetime realities. According to the new view, the complete description of nature at the atomic level was given by probability functions that referred not to underlying microscopic space-time realities but rather to the macroscopic objects of sense experience. The theoretical structure did not extend down and anchor itself on fundamental microscopic spacetime realities. Instead it turned back and anchored itself in the concrete sense realities that form the basis of social life.

Derivation of the Born rule from operational assumptions

Abstract: The Born rule is derived from operational assumptions, together with assumptions of quantum mechanics that concern only the deterministic development of the state. Unlike Gleason's theorem, the argument applies even if probabilities are defined for only a single resolution of the identity, so it applies to a variety of foundational approaches to quantum mechanics. It also provides a probability rule for state spaces that are not Hilbert spaces.

Quantum Mechanics and Reality

Abstract: We begin by discussing ``What exists?'', i.e. ontology, in Classical Physics which provided a description of physical phenomena at the macroscopic level. The microworld however necessitates a introduction of Quantum ideas for its understanding. It is almost certain that the world is quantum mechanical at both microscopic as well as at macroscopic level. The problem of ontology of a Quantum world is a difficult one. It also depends on which interpretation is used. We first discuss some interpretations in which Quantum Mechanics does not provide a complete framework but has to be supplemented by extra ingredients e.g. (i) Copenhagen group of interpretations associated with the names of Niels Bohr, Heisenberg, von-Neumann, and (ii) de-Broglie-Bohm interpretations. We then look at some interpretations in which Quantum mechanics is supposed to provide the entire framework such as (i) Everett-deWitt many world, (ii) quantum histories interpretations. We conclude with some remarks on the rigidity of the formalism of quantum mechanics, which is sharp contrast to it's ontological fluidity.

Linear positivity and virtual probability

Abstract: We investigate the quantum theory of closed systems based on the linear positivity decoherence condition of Goldstein and Page. The objective of any quantum theory of a closed system, most generally the universe, is the prediction of probabilities for the individual members of sets of alternative coarse-grained histories of the system. Quantum interference between members of a set of alternative histories is an obstacle to assigning probabilities that are consistent with the rules of probability theory. A quantum theory of closed systems therefore requires two elements: (1) a condition specifying which sets of histories may be assigned probabilities and (2) a rule for those probabilities. The linear positivity condition of Goldstein and Page is the weakest of the general conditions proposed so far. Its general properties relating to exact probability sum rules, time neutrality, and conservation laws are explored. Its inconsistency with the usual notion of independent subsystems in quantum mechanics is reviewed. Its relation to the stronger condition of medium decoherence necessary for classicality is discussed. The linear positivity of histories in a number of simple model systems is investigated with the aim of exhibiting linearly positive sets of histories that are not decoherent. The utility of extending themore » notion of probability to include values outside the range of 0-1 is described. Alternatives with such virtual probabilities cannot be measured or recorded, but can be used in the intermediate steps of calculations of real probabilities. Extended probabilities give a simple and general way of formulating quantum theory. The various decoherence conditions are compared in terms of their utility for characterizing classicality and the role they might play in further generalizations of quantum mechanics.« less

Spontaneous Collapse Models on a Lattice

Abstract: We present spontaneous collapse models of field theories on a 1+1 null lattice, in which the causal structure of the lattice plays a central role. Issues such as “locality,” “nonlocality,” and superluminal signaling are addressed in the context of the models which have the virtue of extreme simplicity. The formalism of the models is related to that of the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics.

Understanding Bohmian mechanics: A dialogue

Abstract: This paper is an introduction to the ideas of Bohmian mechanics, an interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the observer plays no fundamental role. Bohmian mechanics describes, instead of probabilities of measurement results, objective microscopic events. In recent years, Bohmian mechanics has attracted increasing attention by researchers. The form of a dialogue allows me to address questions about the Bohmian view that often arise.

Locality and Measurements Within the SR Model for an Objective Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Abstract: One of the authors has recently propounded an SR (semantic realism) model which shows, circumventing known no-go theorems, that an objective (noncontextual, hence local) interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) is possible We consider here compound physical systems and show why the proofs of nonlocality of QM do not hold within the SR model, which is slightly simplified in this paper We also discuss quantum measurement theory within this model, note that the objectification problem disappears since the measurement of any property simply reveals its unknown value, and show that the projection postulate can be considered as an approximate law, valid FAPP (for all practical purposes) Finally, we provide an intuitive picture that justifies some unusual features of the SR model and proves its consistency

It from Qubit

Abstract: Of John Wheeler’s ‘Really Big Questions’, the one on which the most progress has been made is It From Bit? – does information play a significant role at the foundations of physics? It is perhaps less ambitious than some of the other Questions, such as How Come Existence?, because it does not necessarily require a metaphysical answer. And unlike, say, Why The Quantum?, it does not require the discovery of new laws of nature: there was room for hope that it might be answered through a better understanding of the laws as we currently know them, particularly those of quantum physics. And this is what has happened: the better understanding is the quantum theory of information and computation.

Science and Ultimate Reality: Why the quantum? “It” from “bit”? A participatory universe? Three far-reaching challenges from John Archibald Wheeler and their relation to experiment

Abstract: Introduction First a word of thanks. When I first came across the papers of John Archibald Wheeler on the foundations of quantum mechanics, most of them reprinted in Wheeler and Zurek (1983), I could not believe what I read. Finally here was a colleague of worldwide reputation, given his many contributions to theoretical physics, who was not afraid to discuss openly the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics. The outstanding feature of Professor Wheeler's viewpoint is his realization that the implications of quantum mechanics are so far-reaching that they require a completely novel approach in our view of reality and in the way we see our role in the universe. This distinguishes him from many others who in one way or another tried to save pre-quantum viewpoints, particularly the obviously wrong notion of a reality independent of us. Particularly remarkable is Professor Wheeler's austerity in thinking. He tries to use as few concepts as possible and to build on this the whole of physics. A fascinating case in point is the title of one of his papers “Law without law,” the attempt to arrive at the laws of nature without assuming any law a priori. For me personally his work on fundamental issues in quantum mechanics has been particularly inspiring. The questions he raises are exceptionally far-reaching and some of his concepts in the foundations of physics are so radical that calling them revolutionary would not do them justice.

What is Bohmian Mechanics

Abstract: Bohmian mechanics is a quantum theory with a clear ontology. To make clear what we mean by this, we shall proceed by recalling first what are the problems of quantum mechanics. We shall then briefly sketch the basics of Bohmian mechanics and indicate how Bohmian mechanics solves these problems and clarifies the status and the role of the quantum formalism.

Weak Values and Consistent Histories in Quantum Theory

Abstract: A relation is obtained between weak values of quantum observables and the consistency criterion for histories of quantum events. It is shown that ``strange'' weak values for projection operators (such as values less than zero) always correspond to inconsistent families of histories. It is argued that using the ABL rule to obtain probabilities for counterfactual measurements corresponding to those strange weak values gives inconsistent results. This problem is shown to be remedied by using the conditional weight, or pseudo-probability, obtained from the multiple-time application of Luders' Rule. It is argued that an assumption of reverse causality (a form of time symmetry) implies that weak values obtain, in a restricted sense, at the time of the weak measurement as well as at the time of post-selection. Finally, it is argued that weak values are more appropriately characterised as multiple-time amplitudes than expectation values, and as such can have little to say about counterfactual questions.

Composite systems and the role of the complex numbers in quantum mechanics

Abstract: An axiomatic approach to the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, based upon a certain concept of conditional probability, has been proposed in two recent papers by the author. It leads to Jordan operator algebras and thus comes rather close to the standard Hilbert space model of quantum mechanics, but still includes the so-called exceptional Jordan algebras, for which a Hilbert space representation does not exist. This approach is now extended by defining a mathematical model of composite systems. Such a model is required for the study of the joint distribution of two quantum observables. A very general type of observables (not only the real-valued observables corresponding to the self-adjoint operators) is considered. The joint distribution is defined, using the concept of conditional probability, and exhibits a certain dependence on the succession of the observations which is different from the classical case and unknown so far in quantum mechanics. Finally, it turns out that, at least in the finite-dimensional case, a really satisfying model of the composite system exists only if each single system is modeled by a complex Jordan matrix algebra (or a direct sum), and the model then becomes the tensor product. This provides some reasoning why the exceptional Jordan algebras can be ruled out, why quantum mechanics needs the complex numbers and the complex Hilbert space, and why the tensor product is the right choice for the model of a composite system.

What is a state in quantum mechanics

Abstract: In quantum mechanics, states are supposed to be specified by vectors in Hilbert space. However, students become confused about the representation of states and the meaning of “state” itself. We discuss consequences of the fact that quantum mechanics is intrinsically a probabilistic theory, and the ubiquitous confusion over whether quantum states, when specified as well as nature permits, are described by state vectors or rays.

Incompleteness of trajectory-based interpretations of quantum mechanics

Abstract: Trajectory-based approaches to quantum mechanics include the de Broglie?Bohm interpretation and Nelson's stochastic interpretation. It is shown that the usual route to establishing the validity of such interpretations, via a decomposition of the Schr?dinger equation into a continuity equation and a modified Hamilton?Jacobi equation, fails for some quantum states. A very simple example is provided by a quantum particle in a box, described by a wavefunction that is initially uniform over the interior of the box. For this example, there is no corresponding continuity or modified Hamilton?Jacobi equation, and the space-time dependence of the wavefunction has a known fractal structure. Examples with finite average energies are also constructed.

Following Weyl on Quantum Mechanics: the contribution of Ettore Majorana

Abstract: After a quick historical account of the introduction of the group-theoretical description of quantum mechanics in terms of symmetries, as proposed by Weyl, we examine some unpublished papers by Ettore Majorana. Remarkable results achieved by him in frontier research topics as well as in physics teaching point out that the Italian physicist can be well considered as a follower of Weyl in his reformulation of quantum mechanics.

Holism, physical theories and quantum mechanics☆

Abstract: Motivated by the question what it is that makes quantum mechanics a holistic theory (if so), I try to define for general physical theories what we mean by `holism'. For this purpose I propose an epistemological criterion to decide whether or not a physical theory is holistic, namely: a physical theory is holistic if and only if it is impossible in principle to infer the global properties, as assigned in the theory, by local resources available to an agent. I propose that these resources include at least all local operations and classical communication. This approach is contrasted with the well-known approaches to holism in terms of supervenience. The criterion for holism proposed here involves a shift in emphasis from ontology to epistemology. I apply this epistemological criterion to classical physics and Bohmian mechanics as represented on a phase and configuration space respectively, and for quantum mechanics (in the orthodox interpretation) using the formalism of general quantum operations as completely positive trace non-increasing maps. Furthermore, I provide an interesting example from which one can conclude that quantum mechanics is holistic in the above mentioned sense, although, perhaps surprisingly, no entanglement is needed.

Noncommutative quantum mechanics and Bohm's ontological interpretation

Abstract: We carry out an investigation into the possibility of developing a Bohmian interpretation based on the continuous motion of point particles for noncommutative quantum mechanics. The conditions for such an interpretation to be consistent are determined, and the implications of its adoption for noncommutativity are discussed. A Bohmian analysis of the noncommutative harmonic oscillator is carried out in detail. By studying the particle motion in the oscillator orbits, we show that small-scale physics can have influence at large scales, something similar to the IR-UV mixing.

On Quantum Propensities: Two Arguments Revisited

Abstract: Peter Milne and Neal Grossman have argued against Popper's propensity interpretation of quantum mechanics, by appeal to the two-slit experiment and to the distinction between mixtures and superpositions, respectively. In this paper I show that a different propensity interpretation successfully meets their objections. According to this interpretation, the possession of a quantum propensity by a quantum system is independent of the experimental set-ups designed to test it, even though its manifestations are not.

This elusive objective existence

Abstract: Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. These compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications — the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world — which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified objective existence. Contrary to a widespread misconception, viewing the quantum formalism as being fundamentally a probability algorithm does not imply that quantum mechanics is concerned with states of knowledge rather than states of Nature. On the contrary, it makes possible a complete and strongly objective description of the physical world that requires no reference to observers. What objectively exists, in a sense that requires no qualification, is (i) the trajectories of macroscopic objects, whose fuzziness is empirically irrelevant, (ii) the properties and values of whose possession these trajectories provide indelible records, and (iii) the fuzzy and temporally undifferentiated states of affairs that obtain between measurements and are described by counterfactual probability assignments.

Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

Abstract: Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se, suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N-particle system in its 6N-dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrodinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Elementary propositions and essentially incomplete knowledge: A framework for the interpretation of quantum mechanics

Abstract: A central problem in the interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is to relate the conceptual structure of the theory to the classical idea of the state of a physical system. This paper approaches the problem by presenting an analysis of the notion of an elementary physical proposition. The notion is shown to be realized in standard formulations of the theory and to illuminate the significance of proofs of the impossibility of hidden variable extensions. In the interpretation of quantum mechanics that emerges from this analysis, the philosophically distinctive features of the theory derive from the fact that it seeks to represent a reality of which complete knowledge is essentially unattainable.

Towards a Neo-Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Abstract: The Copenhagen interpretation is critically considered. A number of ambiguities, inconsistencies and confusions are discussed. It is argued that it is possible to purge the interpretation so as to obtain a consistent and reasonable way to interpret the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, which is in agreement with the way this theory is dealt with in experimental practice. In particular, the essential role attributed by the Copenhagen interpretation to measurement is acknowledged. For this reason it is proposed to refer to it as a neo-Copenhagen interpretation.

On the Origin of Conceptual Difficulties of Quantum Mechanics

Abstract: It is the matter of fact that quantum mechanics operates with notions that are not determined in the frame of the mechanics' formalism. Among them we can call the notion of "wave-particle" (that, however, does not appear in both classical and high energy physics), the probabilistic interpretation of the Schroedinger wave \psi-function and hence the probability amplitude and its phase, long-range action, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, the passage to the so-called operators of physical values, etc. Orthodox quantum mechanics was constructed as a physical theory developed in the phase space of the mentioned notions. That is why the formalism of quantum mechanics is aimed only at detailed calculations of the stationary states of the energy of the quantum system studied and is not able to describe a real path running by the system in the real space; instead, the formalism gives an averaged probabilistic prediction. Thus, if we are able to develop quantum mechanics in the real space, an option to clarify all the difficulties associated with the above notions would appear. Such a theory of quantum mechanics developed in the real space in fact has recently been constructed by the author. The theory started from deeper first principles, namely, from the consideration of the notion of a 4D space-time. So, the notion of fundamental particle, the principles of the motion of a particle and other characteristics have been made clear. The theory, rather a submicroscopic one, is characterized by short-range action that automatically means the introduction of a new kind of carriers, i.e. carriers of the quantum mechanical force. The existence of the carriers called "inertons" (because they carry inert properties of matter) has indeed been verified in a number of experiments.

Foundations of Quantum Mechanics: The Connection between QM and the Central Limit Theorem

Abstract: In this paper we unravel the connection between the quantum mechanical formalism and the Central limit theorem (CLT). We proceed to connect the results coming from this theorem with the derivations of the Schrodinger equation from the Liouville equation, presented by ourselves in other papers. In those papers we had used the concept of an infinitesimal parameter δx that raised some controversy. The status of this infinitesimal parameter is then elucidated in the framework of the CLT. Finally, we use the formal apparatus developed in our previous papers and the results of the present one to advance an alternative objective interpretation of quantum mechanics in which its relations with the classical framework are made explicit. The relations between our approach and those using the Wigner–Moyal transformation are also addressed.

Is the Epistemic View of Quantum Mechanics Incomplete

Abstract: One of the most tantalizing questions about the interpretation of Quantum Theory is the objective vs. subjective meaning of quantum states. Here, by focusing on a typical EPR experiment upon which a selection procedure is performed on one side, we will confront the fully epistemic view of quantum states with its results. Our statement is that such a view cannot be considered complete, although the opposite attitude would also pose well-known problems of interpretation.

Quantum Brain oRules

Abstract: Quantum mechanics traditionally places the observer outside of the system being studied and employs the Born interpretation. In this and related papers the observer is placed inside the system. To accomplish this, special rules are required to engage and interpret the Schrodinger solutions in individual measurements. The rules in this paper (called the oRules) do not include the Born rule that connects probability with square modulus. It is required that the rules allow conscious observers to exist inside the system without empirical ambiguity, reflecting our own unambiguous experience in the universe. This requirement is satisfied by the oRules. These rules are restricted to observer measurements, so state reduction can only occur when an observer is present. Keywords: brain states, decoherence, epistemological model, ontological model, stochastic choice, state reduction, von Neumann, wave collapse.