Showing papers on "Debt published in 2013"

The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S. net Debtors or net Creditors?

Abstract: This paper shows that official statistics substantially underestimate the net foreign asset positions of rich countries because they fail to capture most of the assets held by households in offshore tax havens. Drawing on systematic anomalies in portfolio investment positions and a unique Swiss dataset, I find that 8% of the global financial wealth of households is held in tax havens, 6% of which goes unrecorded. On the basis of plausible assumptions, accounting for unrecorded assets turns the eurozone, officially the world's second largest net debtor, into a net creditor. It also reduces the U.S. net debt significantly. The results shed new light on global imbalances and challenge the widespread view that, after a decade of poor-to-rich capital flows, external assets are now in poor countries and debts in rich countries. I provide concrete proposals to improve international investment statistics.

A Model of Shadow Banking

Abstract: We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry-ups when investors neglect tail risks. SHADOW BANKING TYPICALLY DESCRIBES financial activities occurring outside the regulated banking sector. In recent years, the most important such activities took the form of rapidly expanding provision of short-term safe debt to financial intermediaries through money market funds and other sources outside of the regulated banking sector (Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009a), Gorton and Metrick (2010, 2012), Pozsar et al. (2010), Shin (2009)). Much of that debt was collateralized through the process called securitization, which involves origination and acquisition of loans by financial intermediaries, the assembly of these loans into diversified pools, and the tranching of the pools to manufacture safe pieces. While regulated banks played a key role in securitization and held large amounts of securitized assets, a large share of the ultimate financing of securitized assets was provided by the shadow banking system. The collapse of shadow banking in 2007 to 2008 arguably played a critical role in undermining the regulated banking sector, and in bringing about the financial crisis. In this paper, we present a new model of shadow banking and securitization. In the model, a financial intermediary can originate or acquire both safe and risky loans, and can finance these loans from its own resources as well as by issuing debt. The risky loans are subject to both institution-specific idiosyncratic

Access to Collateral and Corporate Debt Structure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Abstract: We investigate how firms respond to strengthening of creditor rights by examining their financial decisions following a securitization reform in India. We find that the reform led to a reduction in secured debt, total debt, debt maturity, and asset growth, and an increase in liquidity hoarding by firms. Moreover, the effects are more pronounced for firms that have a higher proportion of tangible assets because these firms are more affected by the secured transactions law. These results suggest that strengthening of creditor rights introduces a liquidation bias and documents how firms alter their debt structures to contract around it.

Are Close Friends the Enemy? Online Social Networks, Self-Esteem, and Self-Control

Abstract: Online social networks are used by hundreds of millions of people every day, but little is known about their effect on behavior. In five experiments, the authors demonstrate that social network use enhances self-esteem in users who are focused on close friends (i.e., strong ties) while browsing their social network. This momentary increase in self-esteem reduces self-control, leading those focused on strong ties to display less self-control after browsing a social network. Additionally, the authors present evidence suggesting that greater social network use is associated with a higher body mass index and higher levels of credit card debt for individuals with strong ties to their social network. This research extends previous findings by demonstrating that social networks primarily enhance self-esteem for those focused on strong ties during social network use. Additionally, this research has implications for policy makers because self-control is an important mechanism for maintaining social order and well-being.

The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy

Abstract: The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 stands out in the history of sovereign defaults. It achieved very large debt relief – over 50 per cent of 2012 GDP – with minimal financial disruption, using a combination of new legal techniques, exceptionally large cash incentives, and official sector pressure on key creditors. But it did so at a cost. The timing and design of the restructuring left money on the table from the perspective of Greece, created a large risk for European taxpayers, and set precedents – particularly in its very generous treatment of holdout creditors – that are likely to make future debt restructurings in Europe more difficult.

Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts

Abstract: A main puzzle in the sovereign debt literature is that defaults have only minor effects on subsequent borrowing costs and access to credit. This paper questions this stylized fact by refining the proxy for country credit history used in the received literature. We construct the first complete set of investor loss (“haircut”) estimates in all debt restructurings between governments and foreign banks and bondholders since 1970, covering 178 cases in 68 countries. We then show that restructurings involving higher haircuts (lower recovery rates) are associated with significantly higher subsequent spreads (borrowing cost) and longer periods of capital market exclusion. The results give new support to reputational theories of sovereign borrowing and indicate punishment effects within credit markets.

Public Debt and Economic Growth in Advanced Economies: A Survey

Abstract: This paper surveys the recent literature on the links between public debt and economic growth in advanced economies. We find that theoretical models yield ambiguous results. Whether high levels of public debt have a negative effect on long-run growth is thus an empirical question. While many papers have found a negative correlation between debt and growth, our reading of the empirical literature is that there is no paper that can make a strong case for a causal relationship going from debt to economic growth. We also find that the presence of thresholds and, more in general, of a non-monotone relationship between debt and growth is not robust to small changes in data coverage and empirical techniques. We conclude with a discussion of the challenges involved in measuring and defining public debt and some suggestions for future research which, in our view, should emphasize cross-country heterogeneity.

Law, Stock Markets, and Innovation

Abstract: We study a broad sample of firms across 32 countries and find that strong shareholder protections and better access to stock market financing lead to substantially higher long-run rates of R&D investment, particularly in small firms, but are unimportant for fixed capital investment. Credit market development has a modest impact on fixed investment but no impact on R&D. These findings connect law and stock markets with innovative activities key to economic growth, and show that legal rules and financial developments affecting the availability of external equity financing are particularly important for risky, intangible investments not easily financed with debt.

Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship Among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India †

Abstract: Do the repayment requirements of the classic microfinance contract inhibit investment in high-return but illiquid business opportunities among the poor? Using a field experiment, we compare the classic contract which requires that repayment begin immediately after loan disbursement to a contract that includes a two-month grace period. The provision of a grace period increased short-run business investment and long-run profits but also default rates. The results, thus, indicate that debt contracts that require early repayment discourage illiquid risky investment and thereby limit the potential impact of microfinance on microenterprise growth and household poverty. (JEL A21, G32, I32, L25, L26, O15, O16)

Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Growth of Pakistan

Abstract: Given contrasting evidence in the literature pertaining to the impact of Foreign Direct Investment on the host country’s economy, we take the case of Pakistan and test the said association for this nation. The data used for this study has spanned over the period of 1981 till 2010. Besides FDI, four other variables including Debt, Trade, Inflation and Domestic Investment have been included in the study, to regress upon GDP of this country. The methodology to test the impact of these variables on Pakistan’s economy has been limited to the least squares method. The co-integration of the variables has been ascertained through application of Augmented Dickey Fuller Test and is found to hold in the long run. Our findings indicate that Pakistan’s economic performance is negatively affected by foreign investment while its domestic investment has benefitted its economy. Moreover, the nation’s debt, trade and inflation have found to have negative impact on its GDP.

Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Government Investments in Publicly Traded Firms

Abstract: We investigate the effect of government share ownership on the cost of corporate debt. Government ownership could carry an implicit debt guarantee reducing the chance of default and leading to a lower cost of debt. On the other hand, government ownership could lead to a higher cost of debt if this guarantee increases moral hazard for managers and if state owners impose social and political goals that reduce corporate profitability. Using a sample of 5,048 bond credit spreads from 43 countries over 1991-2010, we find that government ownership is associated with a higher cost of debt in non-crisis years (61 basis points (bp)) but with a lower cost of debt during the recent financial crisis (18 bp) and other banking crises (9 bp). We further show that the cost of debt associated with government ownership generally decreases as the size of the government stake increases. The impact of government ownership is stronger for non-investment-grade bonds and for bonds associated with highly-levered firms. Additionally, we document that the effect of government ownership differs by type of government entity; for instance, lower spreads are more often associated with central governments, and higher spreads with sovereign wealth funds. Finally, domestic government ownership is linked to a decrease in debt pricing, while foreign government ownership is tied to an increase. Our results indicate that government ownership generally leads to a higher cost of debt, consistent with investment distortion fostered by state influence, but in times of economic recession or firm distress, the dominant effect is a reduction in perceived default risk due to implicit government guarantees.

Capital Flows and Economic Growth in the Era of Financial Integration and Crisis, 1990-2010

Abstract: We investigate the relationship between economic growth and lagged international capital flows, disaggregated into FDI, portfolio investment, equity investment, and short-term debt. We follow about 100 countries during 1990–2010 when emerging markets became more integrated into the international financial system. We look at the relationship both before and after the global crisis. Our study reveals a complex and mixed picture. The relationship between growth and lagged capital flows depends on the type of flows, economic structure, and global growth patterns. We find a large and robust relationship between FDI – both inflows and outflows – and growth. The relationship between growth and equity flows is smaller and less stable. Finally, the relationship between growth and short-term debt is nil before the crisis, and negative during the crisis.

Household Leveraging and Deleveraging

Abstract: . U.S. households' debt skyrocketed between 2000 and 2007, and has been falling since. This leveraging (and deleveraging) cycle cannot be accounted for by the liberalization, and subsequent tightening, of credit standards in mortgage markets observed during the same period. We base this conclusion on a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated using macroeconomic aggregates and microeconomic data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. From the perspective of the model, the credit cycle is more likely due to factors that impacted house prices more directly, thus affecting the availability of credit through a collateral channel. In either case, the macroeconomic consequences of leveraging and deleveraging are relatively minor, because the responses of borrowers and lenders roughly wash out in the aggregate.

Financial Crises: Explanations, Types and Implications

Abstract: This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.

Public Debt, Economic Growth and Nonlinear Effects: Myth or Reality?

Abstract: This paper puts the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset to a formal econometric testing to see whether public debt has a negative nonlinear effect on growth if public debt exceeds 90% of GDP. Using nonlinear threshold models, we show that the negative nonlinear relationship between debt and growth is very sensitive to modelling choices. We also show that when nonlinearity is detected, the negative nonlinear effect kicks in at much lower levels of public debt (between 20% and 60% of GDP). These results, based on bivariate regressions on secular time series, are confirmed on a shorter dataset (1960-2010) using a multivariate growth framework.

Capital Structure Decisions Around the World: Which Factors are Reliably Important?

Abstract: This article examines the international determinants of capital structure using a large sample of firms drawn from 37 counties. The reliable determinants for leverage are firm size, tangibility, industry leverage, profits, and inflation. The quality of the countries’ institutions affects leverage and the speed of adjustment toward target leverage in significant ways. High-quality institutions lead to faster leverage adjustments, while laws and traditions that safeguard debt holders relative to stockholders (e.g., more effective bankruptcy procedures and stronger creditor protection) lead to higher leverage.

Corporate leverage, debt maturity, and credit supply: The role of credit default swaps

Abstract: Does the ability of suppliers of corporate debt capital to hedge risk through credit default swap (CDS) contracts impact firms' capital structures? We find that firms with traded CDS contracts on their debt are able to maintain higher leverage ratios and longer debt maturities. This is especially true during periods in which credit constraints become binding, as would be expected if the ability to hedge helps alleviate frictions on the supply side of credit markets. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

Value-chain Agriculture and Debt Relations: contradictory outcomes

Abstract: In the context of the world food crisis ‘value-chain agriculture’ is emerging as a new frontier of publicly subsidised corporate investment, incorporating smallholding farmers into commercial relations to redress apparent food shortages. This paper conceptualises value-chains as technologies of economic and ecological power, using cross-regional case studies to explore the impact of debt relations in extant value-chain relations. While the value-chain project envisioned by the development industry in partnership with the private sector is geared to ‘feeding the world’ the likely outcome is (differentiating) smallholders serving corporate markets at the expense of local food security. I argue that developmentalists seek to resolve the crisis through a ‘spatio-temporal fix’, enclosing smallholders in value-chain technologies financed through debt relations that appropriate value from smallholder communities. At the same time some farmers are seeking to avoid the debt trap by developing strategies t...

How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-Big-to-Fail Problem

Abstract: As bank regulatory reform tries to come to grips with the lessons of the financial crisis, several experts have proposed that some form of contingent convertible debt (CoCo) requirement be added to the prudential regulatory toolkit. In this article, the authors show how properly designed CoCos can be used not just to absorb losses, but more importantly to encourage banks to recognize losses and replace lost equity in a timely way, as well as to manage risk more effectively. Their proposed CoCos requirement strengthens management's incentives to promptly replace lost capital and enhance risk management by imposing major costs on the managers and existing shareholders of banks that fail to do so. Key elements of the proposal are that conversion of the CoCos into equity would be (1) triggered at a high trigger ratio of equity to assets (long before the bank is near an insolvency point), (2) determined by a market trigger (using a 90-day moving average market equity ratio) rather than by supervisory discretion, and (3) significantly dilutive to shareholders. The only clear way for bank managements to avoid such dilution would be to issue equity into the market. Under most circumstances�barring an extremely rapid plunge of a bank's financial condition�management should be able and eager to replace lost capital in a timely way; as a result, dilutive conversions should almost never occur. Banks would face strong incentives to maintain high ratios of true economic capital relative to risky assets, and to manage their risks effectively. This implies that �too-big-to-fail� financial institutions would not be permitted to approach the point of insolvency; they would face strong incentives to recapitalize long before that point. And if they should fail to issue new equity in a timely manner, the CoCos conversion would provide an alternative means of recapitalizing banks well before they reach the brink of insolvency. Thus, a CoCos requirement would go a long way to resolving the �too-big-to-fail� problem. Such a CoCos requirement would not only increase the effectiveness of regulation, but also reduce its cost. It would be less costly for banks to raise CoCos than equity, reflecting both the lower adverseselection costs of CoCos issuance and the potential tax advantages of debt. And precisely because of the low probability of CoCo conversion, the Cocos would be issued at relatively modest (if any) discounts to otherwise comparable but straight subordinated debt. Thus requiring a mix of equity and appropriately designed CoCos would be less costly to banks, and would entail less of a reduction in the supply of loans than would a much higher book equity requirement alone.

Financial Crises: Explanations, Types, and Implications

Abstract: This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises - —currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises - —and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.