Showing papers on "Delegation published in 2005"

Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics

Abstract: Debates about globalization have centered on calls to improve accountability to limit abuses of power in world politics. How should we think about global accountability in the absence of global democracy? Who should hold whom to account and according to what standards? Thinking clearly about these questions requires recognizing a distinction, evident in theories of accountability at the nation-state level, between “participation” and “delegation” models of accountability. The distinction helps to explain why accountability is so problematic at the global level and to clarify alternative possibilities for pragmatic improvements in accountability mechanisms globally. We identify seven types of accountability mechanisms and consider their applicability to states, NGOs, multilateral organizations, multinational corporations, and transgovernmental networks. By disaggregating the problem in this way, we hope to identify opportunities for improving protections against abuses of power at the global level.

The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism

Abstract: This article analyzes the rise and diffusion of the new order of regulatory capitalism. It offers an analytical and historical analysis of relations between capitalism and regulation and suggests that change in the governance of capitalist economy is best captured by reference to (1) a new division of labor between state and society (e.g., privatization), (2) an increase in delegation, (3) proliferation of new technologies of regulation, (4) formalization of interinstitutional and intrainstitutional arrangements of regulation, and (5) growth in the influence of experts in general, and of international networks of experts in particular. Regulation, though not necessarily directly by the state, seems to be on the increase despite efforts to redraw the boundaries between state and society.

Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory regimes and the eu regulatory state

Abstract: This article investigates the allocation of regulatory authority in the EU. By introducing the concept of a ‘regulatory regime’, it criticizes not only earlier accounts of the EU ‘regulatory state’, but also current delegation approaches. As a starting point, it identifies a dilemma for the EU regulatory policy. Despite the rising need for uniform EU-level rules in the internal market, the bulk of formal powers and the institutional focus of regulatory activities continue to be located at the national level. This results in a supranational regulatory gap. Our thesis is that this gap is partly filled by transnational regulatory networks. Under certain conditions, regulatory networks offer a back road to the informal Europeanization of government regulation. However, the informalization of governance is vulnerable to strong distributive conflict, and, if effective, it raises unresolved problems of democratic legitimacy. Edgar Grande, Chair in Comparative Politics, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munchen, Ges...

Modeling security requirements through ownership, permission and delegation

Abstract: Security requirements engineering is emerging as a branch of software engineering, spurred by the realization that security must be dealt with early on during the requirements phase. Methodologies in this field are challenging, as they must take into account subtle notions such as trust (or lack thereof), delegation, and permission; they must also model entire organizations and not only systems-to-be. In our previous work we introduced Secure Tropos, a formal framework for modeling and analyzing security requirements. Secure Tropos is founded on three main notions: ownership, trust, and delegation. In this paper, we refine Secure Tropos introducing the notions of at-least delegation and trust of execution; also, at-most delegation and trust of permission. We also propose monitoring as a security design pattern intended to overcome the problem of lack of trust between actors. The paper presents a semantic for these notions, and describes an implemented formal reasoning tool based on Datalog.

Allocation of Decision-Making Authority

Abstract: We present a simple model to analyze the allocation of decision-making authority and use the model to characterize the conditions under which a superior will delegate the decision to her subordinate The model includes two managers, each of whom has private information regarding the outcome of a decision Because the preferences of the two managers differ, neither can communicate her information fully to the other We show that the probability of delegation increases with the importance of the subordinate's information and decreases with the importance of the superior's information We also show that, even if the agent is biased toward larger investments, under certain conditions, the average investment will be smaller when the decision is delegated These results help explain some findings in the empirical literature Finally, we show the somewhat counterintuitive result that, in some circumstances, increases in agency problems result in increased willingness of the superior to delegate the decision A number of empirical implications are developed

Allocation of Decision-making Authority

Abstract: This paper addresses the question of what determines where in a firm's hierarchy invest- ment decisions are made. We present a simple model of a CEO and a division manager to analyze when the CEO will choose to allocate decision-making authority over an investment decision to a division manager. Both the CEO and the division manager have private information regarding the profit maximizing investment level. Because the division manager is assumed to have a preference for "empire", neither manager will communicate her information fully to the other. We show that the probability of delegation increases with the importance of the division manager's information and decreases with the importance of the CEO's information. A somewhat counterintuitive result is that, in some circumstances, increases in agency problems result in increased willingness of the CEO to delegate the decision. We also characterize situations in which the CEO prefers to commit to an allocation of authority ex ante, instead of deciding based on her private information. Finally, even though the division manager is biased toward larger investments, we show that under certain conditions, the average investment will be smaller when the decision is delegated. These results help explain some findings in the empirical literature. A number of other empirical implications are developed.

Beyond proof-of-compliance: security analysis in trust management

Abstract: Trust management is a form of distributed access control that allows one principal to delegate some access decisions to other principals. While the use of delegation greatly enhances flexibility and scalability, it may also reduce the control that a principal has over the resources it owns. Security analysis asks whether safety, availability, and other properties can be maintained while delegating to partially trusted principals. We show that in contrast to the undecidability of classical Harrison--Ruzzo--Ullman safety properties, our primary security properties are decidable. In particular, most security properties we study are decidable in polynomial time. The computational complexity of containment analysis, the most complicated security property we study, varies according to the expressive power of the trust management language.

Performance Pay, Delegation and Multitasking under Uncertainty and Innovativeness: An Empirical Investigation

Abstract: It has been recently noted that the trade-off between risk and incentives that agency theory predicts turns out to be rather weak. We examine predictions from agency theory on the basis of data from a data set encompassing close to 1000 Danish firms. We find that the relation between performance pay and environmental uncertainty is indeed weak. We examine the relation between delegation and environmental uncertainty, and find that this relation is confirmed. We also examine the multi-tasking agency hypothesis that as risk increases, the flexibility of agents is restricted. We fail to find support for this hypothesis.

Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending Cartel Theory Beyond the U.S. Congress

Abstract: Cartel Theory (and partisan theory more generally) expertly explains the functioning of the U.S. Congress. However, as a theory originally developed to study a single legislature where the institutional context differs greatly from that found in other presidential democracies, its applicability to these democracies has been questioned. Between one extreme represented by the United States (where legislators control their own political future) and the other represented by centralized party systems (where the national party leadership controls legislators' future) exists an intermediate group of democracies where subparty bosses are the key actors, controlling the future of subsets of a party's legislative delegation. We analyze one of these intermediate democracies, Argentina, and demonstrate the general applicability of Cartel Theory to an institutional context that differs notably from that found in the United States. We highlight how the theory can be adapted to a political system where subparty bosses, not individual legislators, are the most relevant political actors.

Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule‐Making in the Public Interest

Abstract: Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals problem emerges that is qualitatively different from the one usually considered in the literature. An agent's action will be determined by the relative tightness of competing principal–agent relationships. This tightness is a function of the relative importance of each principal for the agent's financial and operational viability as well as its effectiveness in rule making. Further, the article posits that exogenous changes in the macro-political climate can deeply affect the nature of principal–agent relationships. The authors test their hypotheses about the politics of regulation in the postdelegation period through the study of accounting standards setting in the United States, a case of delegation of regulatory authority to a private agent that goes back to the New Deal era and has received renewed public attention in the wake of recent corporate financial scandals.

A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics

Abstract: We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policy-making in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between “policy rhetoric” and “policy reality” and introduces an important role for “party discipline” in the policy-making process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens. I. INTRODUCTION In a democracy, the majority rules. Often, this means that the policies enacted by elected governments reflect the preferences of some citizens more than those of others. This feature of democracy— commonly known as “tyranny of the majority”— arises in institutional settings in which elected officials represent disproportionately the interests of their own constituents and electees who represent the minority have limited means to influence policy. In this paper we argue that tyranny of the majority imparts a protectionist bias to democratic politics. This is so even when the average citizen covets free trade and when every citizen has an equal probability of being represented in the policy-making process. By “protection” we mean policies that favor quasi-fixed factors of production. Thus, protection in our parlance refers both to tariffs that shield import-competing industries from foreign competition and subsidies that promote exports. The bias refers to the average or expected policy outcome. We focus on majoritarian systems in which elected legislators represent geographic regions. The existence of a protectionist bias requires only that (i) national party leaders cannot fully commit their candidates to adopt particular policies if elected, (ii) mem

Determinants of accounting innovation implementation

Abstract: Accounting innovations are often not successfully implemented or diffused throughout the organization This study seeks to explain this phenomenon One of the major impediments to the successful implementation of accounting innovation is that management accounting systems are generally used to serve the decision control needs of top management while at the same time purportedly supporting the decision management needs of lower level managers To the extent that the accounting system is used for decision control, innovation creates the potential for wealth effects to occur This prompts managers, whose wealth will be negatively affected, to resist accounting innovation We present conditions where it is likely for negative wealth effects to occur Under these conditions the system will fail to achieve its intended objectives Our theoretical model examines how decentralization choices influence resistance to accounting innovation We argue that delegation of decision rights can limit the potential for resistance in two ways—(a) by creating the environment which allows managers to ensure that their subunits are able to adapt to the new signals provided by accounting innovations and (b) by enabling subunit managers to become involved in the design of these systems Our model also enables us to assess the consequences on organizational outcomes when subunit managers resist accounting innovations Based on data collected from production managers, our results demonstrate the importance of decentralization choices on the effective implementation of accounting innovations

Hands Off!: How Organizational Design Can Make Delegation Credible

Abstract: Credible delegation of discretion obtains when it is a rational strategy for managers not to overrule employee decisions that are based on delegated decision rights or renege on the level of delegated discretion (and this is common knowledge). Making delegation of discretion credible becomes a crucial issue when organizations want to sustain the advantages that may flow from delegation: Such advantages are dependent on motivated employees, and managerial overruling or reneging is harmful to motivation. However, little work has been done on how organizations can make delegation credible. We argue that key elements of organizations (i.e., organizational structure, coordination mechanisms, reward structures, and interdependencies between activities) and how these fit influence the credibility of delegation. Fit configurations of organizational elements reduce the probability of managerial intervention that may harm employee motivation. This introduces a neglected incentive dimension to the organizational design literature. Moreover, it is argued that harmful intervention may be reduced by increasing managers' costs of intervening. Refutable propositions are derived.

The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors

Abstract: This article seeks to explain the pattern of delegation to independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Two types of arguments are advanced to explain variations in the formal independence of regulators. Firstly, the need for governments to increase their credible commitment capacity may lead them to delegate regulation to an agency that is partly beyond their direct control. Secondly, delegation may be a response to the political uncertainty problem, which arises when governments are afraid of being replaced by another coalition with different preferences, which could decide to change existing policy choices. In addition, veto players may constitute a functional equivalent of delegation, since they influence policy stability and therefore tend to mitigate both the credibility and the political uncertainty problems. These arguments are consistent with the results of the empirical analysis of the formal independence of regulators in seventeen countries and seven sectors.

Constituency Interests and Delegation in European and American Trade Policy

Abstract: Trade policy in the EU and the United States is to a large extent delegated to executive agents. Existing explanations claim that legislators delegate because they wish to liberalize but are unable to achieve this on their own. The authors show that legislators delegate powers to obtain foreign market access for exporters and protection for import-competing interests. Confronted with heterogeneousdemands from both groups, principals delegate to two sets of agents to confer concentrated benefits on these constituencies, and install control to avoid concentrated losses, while maintaining the flow of resources from lobbying. The authors derive the empirically observable implication that with the increase in the share of tradables in the overall economy, delegation as well as control should steadily increase with time. They then test the validity of this proposition for U.S. trade policy since 1916 and for European trade policy since 1958.

Credible Commitment, Political Uncertainty or Policy Complexity? Explaining Variations in the Independence of Non-majoritarian Institutions in France

Abstract: A common feature of contemporary political systems is the increasing amount of delegation from governments to non-majoritarian institutions. Governments may decide to delegate authority to such institutions for reasons relating to credible commitments, political uncertainty and policy complexity. this article focuses on independent administrative authorities (autorites administratives independantes) in France. We demonstrate that these institutions enjoy varying degrees of independence. We find that the degree of independence varies as a function of two factors: the need to make a credible commitment in areas subject to market opening and the complexity of policy in particular areas.

Explaining the Gaps between Mandate and Performance: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform

Abstract: This article seeks to explain why the World Bank's environmental performance is so uneven despite numerous reform efforts. I argue that a principal-agent model offers a potentially powerful tool for analyzing gaps between the mandates and performance of international organizations (IOs) such as the World Bank. The model is particularly useful when it is calibrated to recognize problems of antinomic delegation and the dual role an IO may have as both agent and principal. Antinomic delegation occurs when states ask IOs to take on complex tasks that are difficult to institutionalize. Recognizing that many IOs may be principal and agent at different stages of the policy process reveals more opportunities for agency slack that are not well addressed by the IO literature. This article presents these modifications to the principal-agent model and applies the model to the case of the World Bank. The case study demonstrates that the nature of the tasks being delegated and the incentives shaping both sides of the p...

Deliberate delegation or abdication? Government backbenchers, ministers and European Union legislation

Abstract: This paper analyses how key structural characteristics of the relationship between ministers and government backbenchers influence the extent to which national parliaments of European Union Member States are able to scrutinise and influence EU law-making. Two theoretical perspectives – a ‘parliamentary abdication’ and a ‘delegation’ perspective – will be used to test contrasting hypotheses. The empirical evidence presented is not unequivocal, but more in line with the ‘delegation’ than the ‘abdication perspective’: The extent to which national parliaments have institutional opportunities to scrutinise and influence the national government's position in EU affairs can indeed be shown to co-vary (a) with key structural characteristics of the relationship between government backbenchers and ministers and (b) with the electoral saliency of EU affairs in the respective country.

Supporting conditional delegation in secure workflow management systems

Abstract: Workflows model and control the execution of business processes in an organization. A workflow typically comprises of a set of coordinated activities, known as tasks. Typically, organizations establish a set of security policies, that regulate how the business process and resources should be managed. While a simple policy may specify which user (or role) can be assigned to execute a task, a complex policy may specify authorization constraints, such as separation of duties. Users may delegate the tasks assigned to them. Often such delegations are short-lived and come into play when certain conditions are satisfied. For example, a user may want to delegate his task of check approval only when going on vacation, when a check amount is less than a certain amount, or when his workload exceeds a certain limit.In this paper, we extend the notion of delegation to allow for such conditional delegation, where the delegation conditions can be based on time, workload and task attributes. When workflow systems entertain conditional delegation, different types of constraints come into play, which include authorization constraints, role activation constraints and workflow dependency requirements. We address the problem of assigning users to tasks in a consistent manner such that none of the constraints are violated.

A new delegation-based authentication protocol for use in portable communication systems

Abstract: Portable communication systems (PCSs) provide a convenient means of communication; however, many problems arise relating to data security, user privacy, computational load, and communicational efficiency. To provide solutions for these problems, we introduce the concept of delegation into the wireless communication system. This new model makes our scheme an especially valuable improvement to portable communication systems.

A fine-grained, controllable, user-to-user delegation method in RBAC

Abstract: This paper addresses the issues surrounding user-to-user delegation in RBAC. We show how delegations can be incorporated into the RBAC model in a simple and straightforward manner. A special feature of the model is that it allows fine-grained control over what rights a user wishes to delegate as opposed to delegation at the role level where all the rights of a role must be delegated. In addition, the model provides a rich set of controls regarding further delegations of a right, generic constraints that further control delegations, and an innovative model for revocations. Properties of both delegation and revocation are discussed, and our work is compared with other related research.

Central Bank Reputation in a Forward-Looking Model

Abstract: This paper examines whether reputation concerns can induce the central bank to implement the time-inconsistent optimal monetary policy in a standard New Keynesian model. The forward-looking nature of this model is in this respect interesting on two accounts: first, it worsens the time-inconsistency problem of optimal monetary policy by adding a stabilization bias to the possible inflation bias; second, it enables us to model more satisfactorily the reputation of the central bank by accounting for the coordination of the private agents on the punishment length. Our results suggest that the inflation bias and the stabilization bias can be overcome for the calibrations used in the literature. These results enable us to endogenize Woodford's timeless perspective and weaken the case for monetary policy delegation.

Extending the security assertion markup language to support delegation for Web services and grid services

Abstract: Users of Web and grid services often must temporarily delegate some or all of their rights to a software entity to perform actions on their behalf. The problem with the typical grid services approach (X. 509 proxy certificates) is that commercial Web services tooling fails to recognize these certificates or process them properly. The security assertion markup language (SAML) is a standardized XML-based framework for exchanging authentication, authorization and attribute information. SAML has broadening commercial support but lacks delegation capabilities. To address this shortcoming, we exploit SAML's inherent extensibility to create a delegation framework for Web and grid services that supports both direct and indirect delegation. We develop a set of verification rules for delegation tokens that rely on WS-Security X.509 signatures, but do not force any trust relationship between the delegatee and the target service. We have implemented the framework on two common Web service hosting environments: Java/Tomcat and .NET. By leveraging existing Web services standards, we make it easier for Grid practitioners to build and consume Web and grid services without resorting to grid-specific protocols.

Working in the Service Sector

Abstract: List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgments 1. Introduction: Service Economies Part I: Different Service Societies in Europe 2. Measuring Economic Tertiarisation 3. The Incidence of New Forms of Employment in Service Activities 4. Why Do Countries Have Such Different Service-Sector Employment Rates? 5. Services and the Employment Prospects for Women Part 2: The Organization of Service Work 6. The Family, The State, and Now The Market 7. The Reluctant Nurses 8. Work Hard, Play Hard? 9. Work Organisation and The Importance of Labour Markets in The European Retail Trade 10. Lean Banking Part 3: Common Challenges 11. The Shaping of Work and Working Time in The Service Sector 12. The Delegation of Uncertainty 13. Can Trade Unions Meet The Challenge? 14. Diversity and Regulation of Markets for Services

Business–Regulatory Relations: Learning to Play Regulatory Games in European Utility Markets

Abstract: Although regulation is on the rise in the European Union, the liberalization of the telecommunication and energy markets has not created a uniform European Regulatory model. The principle focus of this article is to examine the interaction and regulatory learning between national regulatory authorities and business in the U.K. and German utility markets to assess the degree of convergence and demonstrate how the regulatory relationship has evolved beyond that envisaged in the initial delegation of powers to the regulator. The article shows that independent regulatory authorities have moved from distant and often confrontational relationships with business to strategic working relationships driven by exchanges of information and reputation building and that regulatory learning and trust have evolved at distinct speeds in sectors and countries depending on the number of regulatory authorities in a market place, the degree to which there are concurrent powers between authorities, their discretion in the consultation process, and the length of time that regulatory authorities had existed. Consequently, significant variance is continuously seen in the business—regulator relationships in comparing the young legalist German regulatory authorities with the established independent and discretion-based regulators in the U.K.

Managing workforce diversity at IBM: A global HR topic that has arrived

Abstract: To be successful, global companies must continue to look toward the future, and CEOs, senior line and HR management, and diversity leaders play a key role in that process. Workforce diversity cannot be delegated; it must be a partnership. Although the HR team plays the key staff role, total delegation from the top, without active involvement, is a recipe for failure. IBM considers diversity a business imperative as fundamental as delivering superior technologies in the marketplace. To ensure that talented people can contribute at the highest possible level, the company insists on a workplace that is free of discrimination and harassment and full of opportunity for all people. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Delegation to EU Non-Majoritarian Agencies and Emerging Practices of Public Accountability

Abstract: In recent years both the Commission and the Council have been establishing and de facto delegating (executive and administrative) powers and tasks to what are formally termed the ‘decentralised agencies’ of the European Union. Such bodies are non-majoritarian in nature and are established in order to perform defined tasks in a relatively autonomous fashion at the European level. How does this affect the underlying principles of balance of powers among the institutions according to the original Treaty design? And how do the Commission and the Council as principals ensure that their agents do not drift away from the principals ? To what extent can one speak of mechanisms of accountability (political, administrative and public) in the institutional design and subsequent practices of non-majoritarian decentralised European Union agencies? This paper examine the ‘practices’ with regard to a number of fairly exemplary and/or new agencies with a view to shedding some light on the type of measures that are adopted in practice in order to enable principals to retain some degree of control over the exercise of discretion by the agency in question.

The Making of Cultural Policy: A European Perspective

Abstract: No good comparable data on sizes of cultural sectors of the countries of Europe exist. Still, local and national governments of Europe spend substantial resources on culture and cultural sectors contribute significantly to employment and national income. After briefly describing special features of cultural goods and clarifying some misconceptions about the value of culture, valid and invalid arguments for subsidising culture are discussed. Although it is easy to justify government support for the preservation of heritage, this is more difficult for the performing arts. Due to changing technologies and the advent of E-culture, classic public-good arguments for government intervention in broadcasting and other cultural activities become less relevant. Different institutions, varying from selection by arts councils, bureaucrats or politicians to less directed tax incentives, lead to different cultural landscapes. Theories of delegation suggest delegating the judgement on artistic qualities and execution of cultural policy to an independent Arts Fund. The Minister of Culture should concentrate on formulating a mission for cultural policy and make sure it is implemented properly. The insights of the theories of local public goods and federalism are applied to the making of cultural policy in Europe. Different approaches to international cultural policy in Europe are discussed. The overview concludes with lessons for the making of cultural policy in Europe.

Bridging the quality chasm: integrating professional and organizational approaches to quality.

Abstract: Current Western health care practices face the challenge to improve their quality on multiple dimensions simultaneously. This requires new ways to think about how to deliver health care services. A careful and 'flexible' standardization of care into 'care programs', we argue, is central. Yet such standardization is powerless without the application of four additional design principles: a thorough restructuring and delegation of tasks, the application of integrated planning, the use of indicators about the functioning of the care programs, and implementing process-supporting information technology. Vice versa, these additional principles can only function properly when integrated with care programs. We will only be able to improve the safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, and timeliness of health care, while reducing costs and improving equity, by integrating professional and organizational approaches to quality. This paper describes a series of interrelated design principles that together depict how future health care delivery could be organized.