Showing papers on "Legislature published in 2013"

Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?

Abstract: During the past two generations, democratic forms have coexisted with massive increases in economic inequality in the United States and many other advanced democracies. Moreover, these new inequalities have primarily benefited the top 1 percent and even the top .01 percent. These groups seem sufficiently small that economic inequality could be held in check by political equality in the form of "one person, one vote." In this paper, we explore five possible reasons why the US political system has failed to counterbalance rising inequality. First, both Republicans and many Democrats have experienced an ideological shift toward acceptance of a form of free market capitalism that offers less support for government provision of transfers, lower marginal tax rates for those with high incomes, and deregulation of a number of industries. Second, immigration and low turnout of the poor have combined to make the distribution of voters more weighted to high incomes than is the distribution of households. Third, rising real income and wealth has made a larger fraction of the population less attracted to turning to government for social insurance. Fourth, the rich have been able to use their resources to influence electoral, legislative, and regulatory processes through campaign contributions, lobbying, and revolving door employment of politicians and bureaucrats. Fifth, the political process is distorted by institutions that reduce the accountability of elected officials to the majority and hampered by institutions that combine with political polarization to create policy gridlock.

Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities

Abstract: Little is known about the American public’s policy preferences at the level of Congressional districts, state legislative districts, and local municipalities. In this article, we overcome the limited sample sizes that have hindered previous research by jointly scaling the policy preferences of 275,000 Americans based on their responses to policy questions. We combine this large dataset of Americans’ policy preferences with recent advances in opinion estimation to estimate the preferences of every state, congressional district, state legislative district, and large city. We show that our estimates outperform previous measures of citizens’ policy preferences. These new estimates enable scholars to examine representation at a variety of geographic levels. We demonstrate the utility of these estimates through applications of our measures to examine representation in state legislatures and city governments.

The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia

Abstract: Many states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia lack the monopoly of violence, even though this was identified by Max Weber as the foundation of the state, and thus the capacity to govern effectively. In this paper we develop a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence. We build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate nonstate armed actors (paramilitaries) in a democracy. The model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can influence elections. Since paramilitaries have preferences over policies, this reduces the incentives of the politicians they favor to eliminate them. We then investigate these ideas using data from Colombia between 1991 and 2006. We first present regression and case study evidence supporting our postulate that paramilitary groups can have significant effects on elections for the legislature and the executive. Next, we show that the evidence is also broadly consistent with the implication of the model that paramilitaries tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes to candidates for the executive whose preferences are close to theirs and that this effect is larger in areas where the presidential candidate would have otherwise not done as well. Finally, we use roll-call votes to illustrate a possible "quid pro quo" between the executive and paramilitaries in Colombia. Language: en

Firearm Legislation and Firearm-Related Fatalities in the United States

Abstract: Importance: Over 30000 people die annually in the United States from injuries caused by firearms. Although most firearm laws are enacted by states, whether the laws are associated with rates of firearm deaths is uncertain. Objective: To evaluate whether more firearm laws in a state are associated with fewer firearm fatalities. Design:Usinganecologicalandcross-sectionalmethod, weretrospectivelyanalyzedallfirearm-relateddeathsreported to the Centers for Disease Control and PreventionWeb-basedInjuryStatisticsQueryandReportingSystemfrom2007through2010.Weusedstate-levelfirearm legislation across 5 categories of laws to create a “legislative strength score,” and measured the association of thescorewithstatemortalityratesusingaclusteredPoisson regression. States were divided into quartiles based on their score. Setting: Fifty US states.

Empowerment of the European Parliament

Abstract: One of the most remarkable democratic developments in Europe in recent decades has been the empowerment of the only directly elected supranational assembly in the world: the European Parliament (EP). We first review the development of the legislative powers of the EP vis-` a-vis the other European Union (EU) institutions, discussing the theoretical models of the power of the EP and the main empirical methods that have been used to evaluate these models. We then turn to the impact of the growing power of the EP on political organization and behavior inside the legislature. We demonstrate that the “electoral connection” is weak and discuss what this means for understanding legislative politics in the EP. The concluding section demonstrates differences in behavior across policy areas, which have received scant attention, and suggests avenues for further research.

Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving

Abstract: How do issues end up on the agenda? Why do lawmakers routinely invest in program oversight and broad policy development? What considerations drive legislative policy change? For many, Congress is an institution consumed by partisan bickering and gridlock. Yet the institution's long history of addressing significant societal problems - even in recent years - seems to contradict this view. Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving argues that the willingness of many voters to hold elected officials accountable for societal conditions is central to appreciating why Congress responds to problems despite the many reasons mustered for why it cannot. The authors show that, across decades of policy making, problem-solving motivations explain why bipartisanship is a common pattern of congressional behavior and offer the best explanation for legislative issue attention and policy change.

More Women Can Run: Gender and Pathways to the State Legislatures

Abstract: List of Tables List of Figures Acknowledgments Chapter 1 Rethinking Candidate Emergence Chapter 2 Can More Women Run? Reevaluating Pathways to Office Chapter 3 Gender and the Decision to Run for Office Chapter 4 Republican Women State Legislators: Falling Behind Chapter 5 Democratic Women State Legislators: On the Rise Chapter 6 The Future of Women's Officeholding Appendix Bibliography Index

The Informal Politics of Legislation Explaining Secluded Decision Making in the European Union

Abstract: This article investigates a widespread yet understudied trend in EU politics: the shift of legislative decision making from public inclusive to informal se- cluded arenas and the subsequent adoption of legislation as “early agree- ments.” Since its introduction in 1999, “fast-track legislation” has increased dramatically, accounting for 72% of codecision files in the Sixth European Parliament. Drawing from functionalist institutionalism, distributive bargain- ing theory, and sociological institutionalism, this article explains under what conditions informal decision making is likely to occur. The authors test their hypotheses on an original data set of all 797 codecision files negotiated between mid-1999 and mid-2009. Their analysis suggests that fast-track leg- islation is systematically related to the number of participants, legislative workload, and complexity. These findings back a functionalist argument, emphasizing the transaction costs of intraorganizational coordination and in- formation gathering. However, redistributive and salient acts are regularly decided informally, and the Council presidency’s priorities have no significant effect on fast-track legislation. Hence, the authors cannot confirm explana- tions based on issue properties or actors’ privileged institutional positions. Finally, they find a strong effect for the time fast-track legislation has been used, suggesting socialization into interorganizational norms of cooperation.

Representation and Rights: The Impact of LGBT Legislators in Comparative Perspective

Abstract: This article focuses on the link between the representation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in national legislatures and the existence of equality laws focused on sexual orientation. It addresses three interrelated questions: how many “out” LGBT legislators have served in national parliaments, what explains the cross-national variation in their legislative presence, and what is the relationship between the presence of gay legislators and the enactment of laws that treat gay and straight citizens equally? There is an established literature arguing that the representation of women and ethnic minorities “descriptively” in national legislatures improves the realization of their policy preferences and the position of the group within the society as a whole. This article draws on that literature and extends the analysis to LGBT communities. It finds that the presence of even a small number of openly gay legislators is associated significantly with the future passage of enhanced gay rights, even after including controls for social values, democracy, government ideology, and electoral system design. Once openly gay legislators are in office they have a transformative effect on the views and voting behavior of their straight colleagues. This “familiarity through presence” effect is echoed in studies of U.S. state legislatures and levels of social tolerance of homosexuality in the population at large.

Gender quotas, democracy, and women's representation in Africa: Some insights from democratic Botswana and autocratic Rwanda

Abstract: Synopsis The ‘fast track’ approach for increasing women's representation in politics through the adoption of electoral gender quotas has replaced the ‘incremental approach’ (waiting for cultural, political and socioeconomic developments over time) in recent years. Scholars have disagreed whether increasing women's representation in sub-Saharan Africa where legislatures are weak and executives are strong is meaningless or may even undermine democracy; or increasing women's representation results in significant substantive or symbolic representation effects. This article compares two divergent cases: Botswana, a stable multiparty democracy in southern Africa and Rwanda, an increasingly authoritarian single party dominant state in east Africa. In Botswana, gender quota campaigns have raised awareness but have been unsuccessful in achieving quotas, and women's parliamentary representation is low and continues to fall. In Rwanda, a constitutional gender quota, including reserved seats combined with voluntary party quotas for women have resulted in a majority female lower house of parliament—the only such parliament in the world. These cases suggest that a democratic state is not necessarily more likely to adopt gender quotas or have more women in parliament than a less democratic one and that there are other factors that are more important in determining both. Moreover, in single party dominant systems with limited democracy, like Rwanda, elected women are able to represent women's interests, and campaigns to adopt quotas, even when unsuccessful as in democratic Botswana, can contribute to substantive and symbolic representation effects even with only limited descriptive representation. Thus, the conditions under which and the ways in which women's interests are represented must be understood broadly.

Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract: A central claim of the new literature on authoritarianism is that legislatures extend the lifespan of authoritarian regimes. However, there are a wide range of possible mechanisms that might underpin this relationship. In this paper, we contribute both to the theory and the empirics of legislative cooptation under authoritarianism by exploring one such mechanism. We argue that legislative cooptation extends the longevity of authoritarian regimes by reducing anti-regime street protest. Legislatures reduce social protest by providing rent-seeking opportunities to key opposition elites who, in return, demobilize their supporters. Legislatures may also reduce protest by drawing mobilizational resources into the political system and away from anti-system groups. Using new data from 83 Russian regional legislatures, we look at how variation in the distribution of legislative leadership positions to opposition groups affects levels of opposition street protest.

Partisan representation in congress and the geographic distribution of federal funds

Abstract: EW researchers have examined whether a legislator’s party membership may influence the kind or amount of government funds her district receives. Party membership is known to have a strong effect on the voting behavior of U.S. members of Congress (Lee, Moretti, & Butler, 2004; Albouy, 2011), but it is unclear whether party membership influences actual funding, either because of ideological differences or because of power imbalances between parties. Existing theories of distributional politics give little theoretical guidance as to how or why funding might be influenced by party membership, and empirical studies have yet to establish that party membership does make a difference at the federal level. This article investigates both theoretically and empirically how party membership of legislators in Congress may influence the distribution of federal funds in the United States. The theoretical investigation introduces two political parties to the game-theoretic legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989, henceforth BF), enriching the model in a number of significant ways. First, majority status may confer greater proposal, or agenda-setting, power to legislators, increasing their access to federal funds. Second, if legislators prefer to form voting coalitions with members of the same party, members of the majority can procure additional funding through a party-coalition effect, which increases with the majority’s size. Beyond the effects due to imbalances in bargaining power, differences in ideology, or taste, between parties may mean that a district will receive a different assortment of funding types depending on the party membership of its representatives. These taste differences may also explain why members of the same party prefer forming coalitions with each other.

Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk

Abstract: A strong statistical association between legislative opposition in authoritarian regimes and investment has been interpreted as evidence that authoritarian legislatures constrain executive decisions and reduce the threat of expropriation. Although the empirical relationship is robust, scholars have not provided systematic evidence that authoritarian parliaments are able to restrain the actions of state leaders, reverse activities they disagree with, or remove authoritarian leaders who violate the implied power-sharing arrangement. This article shows that authoritarian legislatures, by providing a forum for horse trading between private actors, are better at generating corporate governance legislation that protects investors from corporate insiders than they are at preventing expropriation by governments. The statistical analysis reveals that the strength of authoritarian legislatures is associated with corporate governance rules and not expropriation risk.

Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence

Abstract: This Article identifies and analyzes the recent emergence of a “tiers of scrutiny” system in Supreme Court jurisprudence respecting the boundaries of Congress’s enumerated powers. The inquiry is motivated by the Court’s recent ruling on the federal healthcare law, which demonstrated that the national legislature’s election among its diverse textual sources of authority in Article I can have large, outcome-determinative consequences in constitutional challenges to federal laws. This is so because the Court not only delineates each power’s substantive boundaries differently but also applies distinct standards of review to the various legislative powers enumerated in Article I and elsewhere in the Constitution. Variation in the standard of review generates both synchronic and diachronic oscillation in the quantum of empirical justification and means-end rationality demanded of Congress. This observed heterogeneity in the judicial demand for legislative rationality and empirical evidence is quite distinct from questions of how broadly or narrowly the substance of each enumerated power is defined. This Article’s threshold contribution is a comprehensive documentation of variation in doctrinal formulae concerning the standard of review in enumerated powers cases. Having demonstrated the existence of tiers of scrutiny for enumerated powers, it then evaluates their use in enumerated powers jurisprudence. Drawing on political science scholarship, social choice theory, and public choice theory, it demonstrates that the Court’s use of tiers of scrutiny has deleterious effects on judicial and legislative incentives and behavior. This Article then identifies six potential justifications for the Court’s emergent practice of calibrating judicial review differentially by enumerated power. Closely examining each of those six justifications for stratified review, it finds all of them wanting. At the same time as it creates negative externalities, therefore, the practice of tiered review for enumerated powers lacks any compelling normative justification. By abandoning the emerging tiers of scrutiny and instead employing a lockstep approach to the review of enumerated powers, this Article suggests, federal courts would reduce opportunities for strategic behavior by judges and elected officials. The proposed doctrinal reformulation would also introduce clarity into a currently opaque, yet abidingly important, domain of public law.

Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism

Abstract: The presidential-parliamentary distinction is foundational to comparative politics and at the center of a large theoretical and empirical literature. However, an examination of constitutional texts suggests a fair degree of heterogeneity within these categories with respect to important institutional attributes. These observations lead us to suspect that the classic presidential-parliamentary distinction, as well as the semi-presidential category, is not a systemic one. This paper investigates whether the defining attributes that separate presidential and parliamentary constitutions predict other attributes that are stereotypically associated with these institutional models. The results lead us to be highly skeptical of the “systemic” nature of the classification. Indeed, the results imply that if one wanted to predict the powers of the executive and legislature, one would be better off knowing where and when the constitution was written than in knowing whether it was presidential or parliamentary.

You Can't Make Me Do It: State Implementation of Insurance Exchanges under the Affordable Care Act

Abstract: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 has been one of the most controversial laws in decades. The ACA relies extensively on the cooperation of states for its implementation, offering opportunities for both local adaptation and political roadblocks. Health insurance exchanges are one of the most important components of the ACA for achieving its goal of near-universal coverage. Despite significant financial support from the federal government, many governors and legislatures have taken actions that have blocked or delayed significant progress in developing their exchanges. However, many state commissioners of insurance have played constructive roles in moving states forward in exchange planning through their expertise, leadership, and pragmatism, sometimes in spite of strong political opposition to the ACA from governors and legislatures.

Accessing the Corridors of Power: Puzzles and Pathways to Understanding Minority Representation

Abstract: Three major constraints hinder cross-national comparisons: a lack of data on the immigrant origins of political candidates and elected representatives, incomplete public data on the immigrant origins of national populations or electorates, and cross-national differences in the definition of the minority population. This article addresses these methodological difficulties and the conceptual challenges of studying minority representation. Using public data for a number of West European countries and three ‘Anglo-settler’ immigration countries, it elaborates an index to evaluate representational equity and to compare women’s and minorities’ presence in national legislatures. The index reveals the limits of a ‘national models’ or simple ‘electoral rules’ framework. Future research should focus on dynamics of group mobilisation, ideological contexts and the recruitment practices of political parties.

Linking Agenda Setting to Coordination Structures: Bureaucratic Politics inside the European Commission

Abstract: This article provides a detailed study of how bureaucratic politics in the European Commission can systematically affect the substance of the legislative agenda that makes up European integration. Based on an encompassing description of the bureaucratic policy-formulation process within the Commission, it shows how the Commission’s different elements play off against each other and thereby systematically advantage the lead department and the Secretariat-General. Empirical case studies from a sample of 48 policy formulation processes in the Commission during 1999–2008 illustrate how these structural advantages actually change the political substance of policy proposals. Against additional evidence on an uneven distribution of procedural advantages across the Commission departments, it concludes that bureaucratic politics in the Commission may account for systematic biases on the European Union’s legislative agenda.

Legislative Organization and the Second Face of Power: Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures

Abstract: A vast literature argues that the majority party in most legislatures enjoys a policymaking advantage through its access to gatekeeping institutions that let it block bills from reaching the floor. However, agenda-setting institutions vary substantially across legislatures. We propose that this variation should have demonstrable consequences for the majority party’s influence. In this article, we develop hypotheses about the institutional features of legislatures that enable the majority party to block bills. Then, we canvass all 99 U.S. state legislative chambers to measure whether those institutions are present and test whether they lower the rate at which the majority party is rolled. We find that in legislatures where majority-appointed committees can decline to hear bills or decline to report them to the floor, or where the majority leadership can block bills from appearing on the calendar, majority roll rates are significantly lower than in legislatures where those veto points are absent.

Regional patrons and hegemonic party electoral performance in Russia

Abstract: A political scientist examines how regional elites shape the electoral fortunes of Russia's hegemonic party, United Russia (UR) Using original data on regional legislative elections from 2003 to 2011, we show that UR performs better in those regions where regional governors control strong political machines Russia's leadership undercut its own electoral strategy by replacing popular elected governors with colorless bureaucrats who struggled to mobilize votes on behalf of United Russia This is one of the reasons for United Russia's poor performance in recent elections

Business as usual: interest group access and representation across policy-making venues

Abstract: We provide the first comprehensive study of lobbying across venues by studying interest group registrations in both the legislative and administrative branches. We present four major findings based on Federal and state data. Firstly, groups engage in substantial administrative lobbying relative to legislative lobbying. Secondly, the vast majority of groups lobby the legislature, but a large proportion of groups also lobby the bureaucracy. Thirdly, representational biases in legislative lobbying are replicated across venues: business groups dominate administrative lobbying at least as much as they do legislative lobbying. Finally, the level of interest group activity in one venue for a given policy area is strongly related to its level in the other venue. The findings potentially have important implications for the impact of institutional design on both the form and promotion of broad participation in policy-making as well as the ultimate content of policies chosen by democratic governments, broadly construed.

Explaining the Marginalization of Women in Legislative Institutions

Abstract: Previous research suggests that women tend to be marginalized in legislatures or denied access to important agenda-setting resources that reduce their effectiveness as legislators after gaining office. However, previous studies have not been able to disentangle competing theoretical explanations for this marginalization. Some suggest it is due to explicit gender discrimination, while others suggest institutional norms such as incumbency are to blame. We address this puzzle with data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, an institution without incumbency, by examining gender differences in rates of bill sponsorship, bill passage rates, and committee assignments before and after the adoption of gender quotas. We find little evidence that female legislators are marginalized in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, tentatively suggesting incumbency, rather than discrimination, may explain evidence of marginalization in other legislatures. Furthermore, we find little evidence to support the notion that implementing...

Does Women's Presence Change Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Argentina, 1983-2007

Abstract: In scores of countries, the adoption of gender quotas has boosted the numbers of women elected to national legislatures. How does the growing presence of women affect legislative behavior regarding women’s rights? Using an original dataset of all the bills submitted to the Argentine Congress between 1983 and 2007, we analyze the relationship between women’s presence in Congress and the introduction and approval of bills related to women’s rights. Our dataset allows us to compare three periods with varying levels of women’s presence in both legislative chambers (the first without quotas, the second with a quota in one chamber, and the third with full quota implementation in both chambers). Our results confirm the necessity of distinguishing between the process of legislative behavior and its outcome. We show that many more women’s rights bills were introduced when women held a greater share of seats in both chambers. However, the approval rates of these bills actually declined. Despite their greater presence, women continue to be marginalized in the legislature and to suffer reduced political efficacy.

Partisan Polarization in American Politics: A Background Paper

Abstract: Acute partisan conflict arising from the ideological polarization of the national parties is now a dominant feature of American politics. The series of prominent showdowns over fiscal policy between Democratic president Barack Obama and the congressional Republicans that has followed the Republican takeover of the House in 2011 represent the tip of the iceberg. Partisan disputes over matters large and small, personnel as well as policy, occur almost daily. Polarized parties, combined with divided government, have made legislative gridlock the normal state of affairs in Washington, overcome only when dire necessity compels short-term compromises to stave off such disasters as default on the national debt or a government shutdown. Conflict and gridlock have damaged the public standing of everyone involved, for most Americans detest the partisan posturing, bickering, and stalemate that leave disputes unresolved and major problems unaddressed (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Congress's popular ratings have reached all time lows, with an average of 80% of respondents disapproving of its performance in polls taken over the past two years; barely half of Americans approve of even their own party's members and leaders. (1) Barack Obama's ratings sag with every showdown, and he has become the most polarizing president on record. (2) In polls taken since 2011, an average of more than three-quarters of respondents said they were dissatisfied with the nation's direction; dissatisfaction reached a record 88% during the summer of that year when House Republicans tried to force massive spending cuts by refusing to raise the nation's debt ceiling, thereby threatening global economic turmoil, before finally backing down. (3) "Ridiculous," "disgusting," and "stupid" topped the list of one-word descriptions of the goings-on collected by the July 28-31, 2011, Pew survey. (4) Such reactions have done little, however, to curb Republican enthusiasm for games of chicken on the edge of the fiscal cliff. America's governing institutions are inherently prone to stalemate and, according to James Madison's famous account in Federalist 10, designedly so. The bicameral legislature, presidential veto, and separate electoral bases and calendars of representatives, senators, and presidents were intended to thwart simple majority rule, and they always have. The Senate's requirement of a supermajority of 60 votes to overcome filibusters on most types of legislation imposes yet another barrier to action. Thus when the parties are deeply divided and neither enjoys full control of the levers of government, acrimonious stalemate or unsatisfactory short-term fixes to avoid pending disaster become the order of the day. To consider what, if anything, might alter this state of affairs, it is useful to have a clear idea of how it came to be. My purpose here is to provide a variety of summary data documenting what has happened and why. The evidence, in my view, shows that elite polarization is firmly rooted in electoral politics and is therefore likely to remain until electoral configurations somehow change. To begin, I review some well-known data confirming that the current partisan and ideological polarization of the Congress is the extension of a long-term trend. I then review the electoral underpinnings of this trend, reviewing the evolution of individual and aggregate voting patterns and showing how their interaction with the electoral system has contributed to divided government and partisan intransigence. Finally, I consider various scenarios for electoral shifts that might reduce partisan conflict and break the stalemate. Partisan Polarization in Congress The systematic evidence documenting the increasing partisan polarization in Congress is familiar to all congressional scholars. Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (joined later by Nolan McCarty) have been tracing this trend since the early 1980s through their analysis of members' first-dimension DW-Nominate scores, which are based on all nonunanimous roll call votes taken during each Congress and serve to locate each member for each Congress on a liberal-conservative scale that ranges from -1. …

Why People Vote: Ethical Motives and Social Incentives

Abstract: Some individuals vote because they are motivated by a civic duty to do so, whereas others may vote because they wish to appear prosocial to others. This paper proposes a simple framework that captures these motivations, and provides results consistent with findings on turnout, e.g.turnout is responsive to the expected closeness and importance of an election, to the observability of one’s choice to vote, and to social rewards and punishments associated with voting. We study various extensions of this framework in which community monitoring plays a role, and explore the implications that voter mobilization has for electoral competition. (JEL D03, D72)

The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting

Abstract: 1. Governments and Legislative Agenda Setting: An Introduction George Tsebelis and Bjorn Erik Rasch 2. Germany: Limited Government Agenda Control and Strong Minority Rights Christoph Hoennige and Ulrich Sieberer 3. France: Systematic Institutional Advantage of Government Sylvain Brouard 4. Italy: Government Alternation and Legislative Agenda Setting Francesco Zucchini 5. United Kingdom: Extreme Dominance by the Executive... Most of the Time Mads Qvortrup 6. Hungary: Changing Government Advantages Challenging a Dominant Executive Gabriella Ilonszki and Krisztina Jager 7. Netherlands: Legislative Agenda Setting and the Politics of Strategic Lock-Ins Arco Timmermans 8. Switzerland: Agenda-Setting Power of Government in a Separation-of-Powers Framework Daniel Schwarz, Andre Bachtiger and Georg Lutz 9. Greece: Government as the Dominant Player Aris Alexopoulos 10 Spain: Majoritarian Choices, Disciplined Party Government and Compliant Legislature Natalia Ajenjo and Ignatio Molina 11. Portugal: Active and Influential Parliament Eugenia da Conceicao-Heldt 12. Russia: The Executive in a Leading Role Iulia Shevchenko and Grigorii Golosov 13. Agenda Control and Veto Rights to Opposition Parties Robert Klemmensen 14. Norway: Institutionally Weak Governments and Parliamentary Voting on Bills Bjorn Erik Rasch 15. Japan: Decades of Partisan Advantages Impending Cabinet's Agenda Setting Power Silke Riemann 16.Conclusion Bjorn Erik Rasch and George Tsebelis

The Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria

Abstract: The two most significant approaches to redistricting to emerge in the last generation are both consequentialist. That is, they both urge authorities to design — and courts to evaluate — district plans on the basis of the plans’ likely electoral consequences. According to the partisan fairness approach, plans should treat the major parties symmetrically in terms of the conversion of votes to seats. According to the competitiveness approach, districts should be as electorally competitive as is feasible.Unnoticed by the literature, a substantial number of jurisdictions, in both America and Australia, have heeded these calls from the academy. In sum, consequentialist criteria have been used to shape the district plans for close to three hundred elections over the last four decades. In this paper, I provide an initial assessment of the record of these criteria. The record, for the most part, is mediocre. Controlling for other relevant factors, partisan fairness requirements have not made district plans more symmetric in their treatment of the major parties. Nor have competitiveness requirements made elections more competitive. The likely explanations are the poor drafting, low prioritization, and need for unrealistically accurate electoral forecasts of most consequentialist criteria.However, other common proposals for redistricting reform — in particular, the use of neutral institutions such as commissions — have performed much better. Elections in Australia, all of which rely on commissions, are much fairer and more competitive than their American counterparts. In the United States, commission usage increases both partisan fairness in state legislative elections and competitiveness in congressional elections, even controlling for an array of other variables. Ironically, it seems that consequentialist criteria cannot achieve their own desired consequences — but that non-consequentialist approaches can.