Showing papers on "Remuneration published in 2005"

Managing People to Promote Innovation

Abstract: There is growing evidence available to suggest that Human Resource Management (HRM) practice is an important predictor of organizational performance. Drawing upon organizational learning perspectives, we argue that HRM systems also have the potential to promote organizational innovation. We present longitudinal data from thirty-five UK manufacturing organizations to suggest that effective HRM systems – incorporating sophisticated approaches to recruitment and selection, induction, appraisal and training – predict organizational innovation in products and production technology. We further show that organizational innovation is enhanced where there is a supportive learning climate, and inhibited (for innovation in production processes) where there is a link between appraisal and remuneration.

What makes a good job? Evidence from OECD countries

Abstract: In labour economics, consideration of the worker’s lot has overwhelmingly concentrated on remuneration. A recent body of literature, driven in part by the observed disparity between North American and European hours of work, has introduced an additional emphasis on the length of the working week; a related strand has looked at involuntary part-time work. This chapter extends this limited taxonomy using 1997 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data covering 14 000 workers across 19 OECD countries. The data contain 14 different measures, mostly rarely available, of job outcomes, which allows a broader view of job quality to be taken.

Top Executive Remuneration: A View from Europe*

Abstract:  We argue that the dominance of principal-agent theory as an approach to investigating executive pay has led to an overly narrow focus which may be unhelpful when considering cross-country differences and probably also hinders within-country analysis. The paper discusses the interlinked nature of three available theoretical lenses, namely principal-agent, executive power, and stewardship/stakeholder theories. It argues that institutional theory can provide a useful overarching framework within which appropriate variants of these approaches can be deployed to better comprehend developments in executive pay. We illustrate our approach with a discussion of executive pay in the UK and in Germany.

Understanding practice change in community pharmacy: A qualitative study in Australia

Abstract: Background Much of the research on cognitive pharmaceutical services has focused on understanding or changing community pharmacist behaviour, with few studies focusing on the pharmacy as the unit of analysis or considering the whole profession as an organisation. Objectives To investigate practice change and identify facilitators of this process in community pharmacy, with specific focus on the implementation of cognitive pharmaceutical services (CPS) and related programs. Methods Thirty-six in-depth, semistructured interviews were conducted with participants from 2 groups, community pharmacies and pharmacy "strategists," in Australia. The interview guide was based on a framework of organizational theory, with 5 subject areas: roles and goals of participants in relation to practice change; experiences with CPS; change strategies used; networks important to the change process; and business impacts of CPS. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and thematically content analyzed, using NVivo software for data management. Results Five key themes relating to the change process were derived from the interviews: change strategies (process- and behaviorally oriented); social networks (within and beyond the pharmacy); drivers of change (eg, government policy); motivators (eg, professional satisfaction); and facilitators of practice change (remuneration for implementation or service delivery, communication and teamwork, leadership, task delegation, external support or assistance, and reorganization of structure and function). Conclusion The use of an organizational perspective yielded rich data from which an understanding of the practice change process in relation to CPS implementation was gained. Current programs for the implementation and delivery of CPS have not taken into account all of the factors that have the ability to facilitate change in community pharmacy. Not only do future programs need to be underpinned by these elements, but policy makers must include them when planning remuneration and dissemination strategies.

Board Compensation and Firm Performance: The Role of 'Independent' Board Members

Abstract: This paper examines the link between firm performance, board structure and top executive pay. We use a panel of firms from the Portuguese Stock Market, where the institutional context differs markedly from the U.K. and U.S., but is very similar to most other European countries. The standard organizational structure is a single-tier board, which includes the CEO as well as executive and non-executive members. The results confirm a large effect of firm size on top executive compensation. However there is no relationship between the board remuneration and company performance. We examine whether the governance structure of companies is relevant in influencing top executive pay. Specifically, we consider the role of non-executive board members as mediators of the management and shareholders relationship. Our results suggest that firms with more non-executive board members pay higher wages to their executives. Furthermore, we find that firms with zero non-executive board members actually have less agency problems, and have a better alignment of shareholders' and managers' interests. These results cast some doubts on the effectiveness of independent board members incentive systems, and on their stated monitoring role.

Ordering Top Pay: Interpreting the Signals*

Abstract:  Boardroom reward continues to attract controversy, despite the structural changes in corporate governance arrangements over the past decade. This study responds to Pettigrew’s (1992) call to eschew over-ambitious attempts to demonstrate causality in the area of executive management and firm performance, in favour of redressing the overwhelmingly prescriptive bias in the literature. A simple but important task is to ‘begin to provide some basic descriptive findings about boards and their directors’, and open up ‘the black box of board behaviour’ ‐ in this case, that of board remuneration committees. Interpretations of comparative market signals play a part in deliberations between the leading actors responsible for determining executive directors’ salary, bonuses and other emoluments. But the position is more deeply textured than the reified influence of (global) market forces sometimes implied in the normative literature. The study reported, based on qualitative interviews, taps in to the nuances of decision taking in respect of boardroom reward management, including remuneration committee members’ reactions to corporate governance reforms. Such initiatives locate non-executive directors in the role of intermediaries in the principal-agent relationship, explicitly assigned to resolve the conflict of interest inherent in boardroom remuneration systems, while simultaneously they are expected to play a team role as board members responsible for the overall strategy and operation of the company. The study is indicative: an attempt to open up research questions around the context and process of boardroom reward management that earlier analyses may have ignored or overlooked.

Involving Young Service Users as Co-Researchers: Possibilities, Benefits and Costs

Abstract: This article seeks to contribute to the debate concerning the benefits and costs of involving young service users in research. The paper locates involvement within a continuum of consultation, collaboration and user-controlled research. The mandate for children and young people’s involvement is identified. In particular, the paper focuses on the benefits and costs in relation to: research and development, research dissemination and service development, service users and researchers. The paper does not suggest that these benefits and costs can be measured arithmetically but argues that if the costs in terms of resources, training, support, timescale and remuneration are not addressed, the research will be undermined and in danger of becoming tokenistic. The article argues that the involvement of young service users as co-researchers is worthwhile, but that it should not be entered into lightly and that further work needs to be undertaken on which parts of the process young service users can be included in and where their involvement results in change in service delivery or service outcomes.

From Shareholder Value to CEO Power: The Paradox of the 1990s:

Abstract: Why did CEO remuneration explode during the 1990s and persist at high levels, even after the Internet bubble burst? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given of this paradox, mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science, business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy and network analysis. It is argued that the diffusion of stock options and financial market-related incentives, supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at micro and macro level. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have exploited the long-run erosion of wage earners’ bargaining power. The article also discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability and the adverse consequences of CEO and top-manager opportunism: reputation, business ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or a shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder conception.

Models for financing dental services. A review.

Abstract: The aim of this review article is to give a brief description of the most important models for financing dental services, and then to describe the effects that the different models can have on patients' and dentists' behaviour. The advantages and disadvantages of the different models will be discussed. The first section focuses on the relationship between insured people and insurance providers. The justifications for a private insurance scheme and a public insurance scheme for dental treatment are discussed. A purely private insurance market for dental services will fail. This is because the benefits of a private dental insurance scheme are few in relation to the costs of having insurance, and because of the problem of adverse selection. There are also problems with public insurance schemes, for example, high transaction costs for collection of taxes and problems with cost containment as a result of moral hazard. The second section focuses on the relationship between the dentist and the patient, more specifically on how different remuneration schemes influence dentists' behaviour. The advantages and disadvantages of three types of remuneration scheme are discussed: fixed salary, per capita remuneration and pure fee-for-item remuneration. One important conclusion is that per capita payments secure effectiveness, while fee-for-item payments secure quality. With per capita payments there is a potential for patient-selection and undertreatment, while cost containment is a problem with fee-for-item payments. In order to counteract the adverse side-effects of each financing system, focus should be placed on the individual dentist in relation to ethics, norms and quality control.

Uniform marginal pricing for the remuneration of distribution networks

Abstract: A new method for distribution access via uniform pricing for the remuneration of distribution networks is presented. The proposed approach merges in a unified framework the investments, the optimal network operation requirements, the effect of the price elasticity of demand, and the application of hourly pricing for demand side management purposes. Hourly uniform marginal prices-understood as tariffs of use of the network-are obtained from maximum social welfare condition sending efficient signals to the utility and consumers, related to the optimal operation of the grid and use of the energy at peak and valley hours. This method is used in the context of a Performance Based Ratemaking regulation to get model companies from operational optimized real networks. Capital fees are integrated in the marginal tariff of use, by means of the New Replacement Value concept, broadly used in yardstick competition. The model is stated as a mixed-integer linear optimization problem suitable to be solved through well-known linear programming tools. The methodology has been successfully tested in a 42-bus test distribution network.

Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium

Abstract: We analyse the equilibrium consequences of performance-based contracts for fund managers. Managerial remuneration is tied to a fund's absolute and relative performance. Investors choose whether or not to delegate their investment to better-informed fund managers; if they delegate they choose the optimal contract subject to the fund manager's participation constraint. We find that the impact of relative performance evaluation on the equilibrium equity premium and on portfolio herding critically depends on whether the participation constraint is binding. Simple numerical examples suggest that the increased importance of delegation and relative performance evaluation may lower the equity premium.

Confronting the Challenges of Work Today: New Horizons and Perspectives:

Abstract: Introductory chapter to edited collection, setting out our perspective: The central aim of this publication is to initiate and develop an empirically grounded understanding of the nature, dimensions, and relations of different forms of work. Work is not assumed to be a discrete activity carried out in exchange for remuneration in institutions (although it can be) but, rather, is conceptualized as being embedded in other domains and entangled in other sorts of social relations. To be clear, it is not suggested that employment is no longer a relevant category. Indeed paid work and employment remain critical to debates within the sociology of work. However, we argue that these may be better illuminated when conceptualized in the context of a broader understanding of what constitutes work. A perception of the variety of ways that people engage in work in contemporary society could offer a more accurate depiction of the complex, messy, dynamic trajectories that encapsulate people’s working lives. From this perspective for example, life-stages not normally associated with work, such as time spent in education, retirement or unemployment, take on new interest for the sociologist of work. Most crucially, the project has far-reaching implications for how we understand social inequalities. A movement away from the ?xed boundaries of occupation, for example, raises new questions about the relationship between work and social class, and between work and gender relations, and ethnic and agebased differences. Occupation may indicate class position but class position also de?nes orientation to work in its broadest forms – from domestic labour to voluntary work. A New Sociology of Work? foregrounds the way in which inequalities manifested in one domain have a re-iterative relationship with behaviours and values in another domain.

Executive Remuneration in the EU: The Context for Reform

Abstract: This paper shows how clear divergences arise across the EU in how executive remuneration is structured. Sharp differences also occur in the adoption of best practices in pay-setting and in the disclosure of executive pay. These divergences are broadly in line, as agency theory predicts, with block-holding and dispersed ownership governance profiles. While the EU has recently adopted two important 2004 Recommendations on executive pay, the paper argues that EU-led reforms should be undertaken with care. Harmonization should be limited and only address disclosure. Disclosure is central to the adoption of effective incentive contracts in that it can manage the particular agency costs of executive pay, across dispersed and blockholding systems, without intervening in governance choices and structures. Any other interventions in the pay process carry the risk of distorting competition and interfering with the dynamics of different ownership structures and economic contexts.

Profit maximisation vs. agency: an analysis of charitable giving by UK firms

Abstract: The charitable giving of a large sample of publicly quoted UK firms is analysed within a model that explores the profit maximisation and managerial utility enhancement motives for giving. The empirical method draws a distinction between the decision to participate in giving and the determination of the amount of corporate contributions. Firm size and advertising intensity are found to be positively associated with the probability of participation in giving. Stricter corporate governance and the rate of directors’ remuneration are negatively related to the probability of participation. Among givers, the rate of giving is related positively to R&D intensity, the rate of directors’ remuneration, and corporate profitability and negatively to firm indebtedness.

Pay for short-term performance : executive compensation in speculative markets

Abstract: We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with classical agency theory once one expands the framework to allow for speculative stock markets. I. INTRODUCTION In early September 2002 the news broke that "HealthSouth Corporation's chairman sold 94 percent of his company stock just weeks before the nation's biggest chain of rehabilitation hospitals revealed regulatory concerns that battered its stock price."1 By that date such announcements were hardly news, given that several major company failures had already been widely covered in the financial press, the high drama congressional hearings on Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom, and Adelphia had taken place, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had been signed into law. But, perhaps better than any previous headlines, this announcement epitomized what most commentators found so troubling about the reality of executive compensation: CEOs were able to secure high rewards early, in spite of their companies' subsequent dismal performances.2 As Bebchuk and Fried underline in the preface to their new book, Pay without Performance, [The] wave of corporate scandals that began in late 2001 shook confidence in the performance of public company boards and drew attention to potential flaws in their executive compensation practices. There is now recognition that many boards have employed compensation arrangements that do not serve shareholders' interests. But there is still substantial disagreement about the scope and source of such problems and, not surprisingly, about how to address them.3 Their well-informed and timely book deals with two broad and related corporate governance issues: (1) the flaws in the executive compensation process, and (2) the lack of accountability and excessive insulation of corporate boards. Our article deals only with the first issue. While we share many of their concerns about the deficiencies of boards of directors, we differ in our assessment of executive compensation: whether executives are overpaid, the role of managerial power, and why executive compensation has risen so much over the last 15 years. Bebchuk and Fried's main argument is that CEOs have essentially been able to set their own pay through captured boards and remuneration committees. One central regulatory and social constraint CEOs face, however, in setting their pay is mandatory disclosure of their remuneration and the potential "outrage" of outsiders upon the announcement of egregiously inflated compensation. CEOs, therefore, try to elude outsider wrath by "camouflaging" their high pay as highly complex and hard to value incentive pay. Another form of camouflage CEOs can engage in is to grant themselves inflated pension plans, life insurance contracts, and golden parachutes. Bebchuk and Fried argue that, upon closer inspection, what superficially looks like an optimal financial incentive contract is in reality just a sham. The "official view," which sees executive compensation contracts as optimal incentive contracts, has little basis in reality and can only be seen as a clever CEO sales pitch for their "rent extraction." As perspicacious as Bebchuk and Fried's observations may be, an obvious concern with their theory of camouflage of executive compensation is that it may not always live up to the basic Popperian test of falsifiability. Since they do not articulate precisely how to distinguish the reported forms of camouflaged compensation from forms of compensation that are consistent with optimal incentive contracting, it is not possible to determine which disclosed compensation contracts in reality might be inconsistent with their theory.4 But this is more of an academic quibble than our main critique to their theory. …

Pay for Corporate Performance or Pay as Social Division? Rethinking the Problem of Top Management Pay in Giant Corporations

Abstract: This article begins with the 1980s and 1990s business and public policy issue about pay for performance, which set executive pay in the United Kingdom and the United States into a problematic about value creation. In this context, it is not the absolute level of rewards that is the main concern, but rather the ways in which pay is connected with corporate performance. The article reviews evidence on long-term trends in remuneration and corporate performance. While the empirics on the growth of CEO pay in the United Kingdom and United States over twenty years show rates of increase that result in ever widening gaps between executive and average pay, the data on performance suggest that such pay increases have significantly outrun any sustained increase in value attributable to management effort. The article therefore argues that executive pay in giant corporations needs to be set in a new problematic of value skimming, which allows small elite groups to enrich themselves in ways that do not directly impoverish larger groups of shareholders or workers.

Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability Licensing in the EU Microsoft Case

Abstract: This paper provides an economic analysis of the European Commission's decision against Microsoft's refusal to supply information on interoperability. It surveys the exceptional circumstances examined by the Commission in applying the essential facility doctrine to the case. It analyses the Commission's reasoning on Microsoft's leveraging its market power from one market to another. It discusses the amount Microsoft can request as a reasonable remuneration for the licensing of its property rights on interface. According to the author, the analysis of incentives to innovate, as proposed by the Commission, provides a sounder test forordering compulsory licensing that the new product condition introduced in Magill. However, the author points out that the assessment of incentives to innovate in the whole industry cannotbe conclusive in absence of more guidance on what constitutes a reasonable, non discriminatory and non strategic license. Regarding leveraging, the author considers that the Commission proposes a convincing story. Prejudice to consumers remains however hypothetical.

Right on the money: What do Australian unions think of performance‐related pay?

Abstract: Purpose – The diffusion of performance related pay has attracted considerable academic attention over the past decade. While much contemporary debate has focussed on the excesses of executive remuneration at the “big end of town”, what is not so prominent are the views of unions representing employees at the other end of the remuneration spectrum: this is the purpose of this paper.Design/methodology/approach – Evidence was gathered at two levels using two sets of research instruments: in‐depth interviews with senior union officials, and primary documentation analysis with specific reference to performance appraisal and performance‐related pay clauses in union Enterprise Bargaining Agreements.Findings – Document analysis reveals that performance appraisal and performance‐related pay clauses range from mere stipulation of existence to detailed processes and principles of design and implementation. Specific clauses in the white‐collar unions’ agreements suggest that they are not totally opposed. However, the...

How academics can make (extra) money out of their science

Abstract: This paper analyses how UK academics can make money from their expertise, other than through earning their salary. Using statistics from the success rate and likely remuneration from recent examples, four options are discussed: licensing their intellectual property through their institution's technology transfer office, owning shares in a 'spin-out' company, personal consulting and writing books. The case of the 'average' academic who does not actively pursue any of these goals, the 'active' academic who pursues any one of them, and the top tier academic who is in the top 10 per cent of their profession worldwide are examined. In all cases, consulting is the most economically rewarding option. For the 'average' academic, being involved in a venture-funded start-up is the worst.

System and method to strengthen advertiser and consumer affinity

Abstract: A system and method is provided for an on-demand advertising information vault so that advertisers may establish accounts for distributing advertisements on-line to potential subscribers. The on-demand information vault also provides for consumers to subscribe to advertisements from advertisers based on the consumer's preferences of categories of products or services. An advertiser may also establish rewards for viewing their advertisements for inducing consumers to subscribe to their advertising service. In this way, a consumer may agree to receive only certain types of advertisements and receive remuneration for viewing the advertisements. The vault mechanisms may also provide for protecting the identities of the consumer and advertiser and avoids misusing personal data by others by employing security measures.

Corporate Governance: An Assessment

Abstract: Corporate governance is one of the most topical and controversial areas of business and finance. This article provides an overview of the questions that it raises and proposed policy responses. It points to the diversity in systems of corporate governance around the world, the apparently paradoxical performance of different systems and an association with different forms of corporate-governance failures. The article discusses a range of proposed remedies including the restructuring of boards, regulation of markets in corporate control and limitations on executive remuneration. It also considers whether the need for harmonized corporate-governance rules can be diminished by freedom of mobility of corporations and competition between legal systems. © The Authors (2005). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

The Impact of Corporate Governance Reforms on the Remuneration of Executives in the UK

Abstract: Corporate governance reforms have been motivated to a considerable degree by concerns about the possible malfunctioning of the executive remuneration determination process in large firms It is not clear, however, how effective these reforms have been in altering pay-setting procedures in the direction of aligning executive and shareholder interests This paper reviews some initial evidence and suggests that a mixed picture emerges It appears that reforms have been more successful in reducing executive tenure - and hence pay-offs in the event of failure - than they have been in linking rewards to performance for continuing executives It is clear, however, that reforms have facilitated the role for institutional shareholders in approving remuneration packages

Code of ethics and employee governance

Abstract: Purpose – The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to add to the debate on governance and, second, to describe a value set theory of the firm.Design/methodology/approach – The methodology has centred on good governance amongst employees – management and workers alike.Findings – It is noted that committees are appointed in firms to ensure that good governance is practised across a range of issues to do with audit, remuneration and appointment. However, the debate on governance has largely overlooked the importance of good governance amongst all employees. It was found that governance at the employee level requires a code of ethics that is not just about right and wrong, but emphasises a contractual sense of duty to fellow employees as stakeholders in the firm. This defines the essence of obligation and duty within the stakeholder firm, the s‐firm.Practical implications/limitations – One practical implication of the paper is that the practice of good governance at the employee level should begin by aski...

Managing people in the new economy

Abstract: People management is central to the thinking and practice of management in today’s knowledge economy. Accordingly, all the HR practice areas need to revolve around the creation, sharing and utilisation of knowledge, which is central to a sustainable competitive advantage in the 21st century. However, the HR function has been slow to adapt to new realities and still clings to traditional HR concepts and practices. To create “actionable knowledge” in managing people, HR managers need to overhaul their present tools of the trade: HR planning and recruitment based on narrowly defined job analysis that ignore the changing world of work; performance assessment based on skills and seniority rather than competencies and customer satisfaction; training for immediate needs at scheduled intervals rather than life-long learning on the job with the help of mentors; remuneration based on monetary incentives with little emphasis on the larger work environment; and career management that suited organisational culture and convenience more than employee needs and expectations.The focus of the workshop is to strategically link the practice of HRM to knowledge management in a global environment. The workshop begins with an introduction by the co-ordinator during which he will share the result of his recent research culminating in his just released book, “Managing people in the new economy”, published by Sage. According to Prof. Dave Ulrich, “As the new economy becomes an accepted reality, insights from this book will form the foundation for managerial norms and expectations”. After the introduction, the coordinator will invite the participants to identify key themes for strategically positioning HRM in the new economy. Thereafter, the participants will be divided into groups to separately debate and discuss each key theme and at the end, come together to share their thoughts with other groups. Thus, the workshop would be conducted in an experiential environment with the active involvement of the participants.

Corporate governance: an assessment

Abstract: Corporate governance is one of the most topical and controversial areas of business and finance. This article provides an overview of the questions that it raises and proposed policy responses. It points to the diversity in systems of corporate governance around the world, the apparently paradoxical performance of different systems and an association with different forms of corporate-governance failures. The article discusses a range of proposed remedies including the restructuring of boards, regulation of markets in corporate control and limitations on executive remuneration. It also considers whether the need for harmonized corporate-governance rules can be diminished by freedom of mobility of corporations and competition between legal systems. © The Authors (2005). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

China's Human Resource Management Strategies: The Role of Enterprise and Government

Abstract: In the context of transition from a command to a market economy and the increasing globalization of business, China's leaders have emphasized the role of human resource management strategies as the key to international competitiveness. In addition, as the Chinese economy matures, a greater premium is being placed on the service sector, which in turn demands focus on knowledge and innovation, crucial factors in the recruitment and retention of qualified manpower in China's enterprises, whether state-controlled, privately owned by Chinese entrepreneurs or foreign-invested. It is the purpose of this paper to measure the progress of such reforms. Attention will focus on a number of key features: (1) recruitment, (2) assessment and evaluation, (3) training, (4) promotion and (5) remuneration and reward. Traditionally, Chinese enterprises have taken the form of a familial-type community, and one focus is how that solidarity may be transformed into Western-style corporate culture, with two-way communication between management and workforce to enhance employee motivation. Salaries and other material rewards, in addition to welfare provision by companies, nevertheless remain the major inducement to employee loyalty. It is concluded, however, that China's business leaders will not replicate, but adapt foreign human resource management strategies to cultural conditions in China, giving them a uniquely Chinese cast.

Corporate governance : mastering business in Asia

Abstract: The importance of Corporate Governance in today's increasingly complex business environment cannot be undermined This timely and insightful book not only explain the principlies of good governance but provides different perspectives from numerous companies that deliver effective corporate governance This book deals with three aspects of Corporate Governance - the interest of the shareholder and how corporate governance links to creating shareholder value ; the interests of the Regulators and why they are bothered about corporate governance in the battle for foreign direct investment; and the interests of the Directors and the Board in their attempts to run the business effectively and adhere to the principles of good governance Some unique feature include : * Combining regulators' perspective with that of the Shareholder/Investor and the Director who has to deliver effective corporate governance * Comparing practices in the key different jurisdictions in Asia * Discussing the key markets of Southeast Asia, all of which currently undergoing major changes in this area Sensible, engaging and pragmatic, Corporate Governance assembles the collected wisdom, views and opinions of Peter wallace and John Zinkin's vast experience, offering an insider's view on successful corporate directorship in Asia It is a refreshing collection of observations and comments on the many facets of this crucial topic Table of Contents Part 1: Corporate Governance The Investors? Perspective 1 The evolution of the modern investor 2 Institutional vs retail investment 3 What is corporate governance? Part 2: Corporate Governance The Regulators? Perspective 4 Why all the fuss about corporate governance? 5 Comparison between the Malaysian, Hong Kong and Singaporean governance codes and the UK?s code Part 3: Corporate Governance The Directors? Perspective 6 Why be a director? 7 Achieving the remuneration balance 8 Assessing CEO performance 9 Assessing director performance Part 4: The View within the Boardroom 10 Why have boards? 11 Reporting to the board 12 Understanding committees 13 The audit committee 14 The remuneration committee 15 The nominating committee 16 Assessing board performance Part 5: Corporate Governance Steering the Ship 17 Enterprise-wide risk management 18 Managing risk to protect and grow shareholder value 19 Evolving your organization?s risk management 20 Measures that matter 21 Maintaining the balance 22 Communicating progress Part 6: What is coming next?

Executive Remuneration in the EU: The Context for Reform

Abstract: This paper shows how clear divergences arise across the EU in how executive remuneration is structured. Sharp differences also occur in the adoption of best practices in pay-setting and in the disclosure of executive pay. These divergences are broadly in line, as agency theory predicts, with blockholding and dispersed-ownership governance profiles. While the EU has recently adopted two important 2004 recommendations on executive pay, the paper argues that EU-led reforms should be undertaken with care. Harmonization should be limited and only address disclosure. Disclosure is central to the adoption of effective incentive contracts in that it can manage the particular agency costs of executive pay, across dispersed and blockholding systems, without intervening in governance choices and structures. Any other interventions in the pay process carry the risk of distorting competition and interfering with the dynamics of different ownership structures and economic contexts.