London Business School

About: London Business School is a education organization based out in London, England, United Kingdom. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Portfolio & Equity (finance). The organization has 1138 authors who have published 5118 publications receiving 437980 citations. The organization is also known as: LBS.

The Relevance of P-Star Analysis to UK Monetary Policy

Abstract: Recent articles have attempted to restore the use of a simple measure of the money supply as an indicator of future price levels, P[star], and to reestablish a causal link from money to prices. In this paper we argue that the P[star] approach is flawed. It is certainly more complex than traditional monetarist approaches but the fundamental questions of causality are in no way either affected or resolved. We argue that the P[star] relationship does not have a causal link with prices but rather the causality runs from prices to money. We also find that there is some causality running from money to real income, so that monetary conditions do seem to have some predictive power for future levels of activity. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.

The Role of Portfolio Constraints in the International Propagation of Shocks

Abstract: We study the comovement among stock prices and among exchange rates in a three-good three-country Center-Periphery dynamic equilibrium model in which the Center's agents face portfolio constraints. We characterize equilibrium in closed form for a broad class of portfolio constraints, solving for stock prices, terms of trade, and portfolio holdings. We show that portfolio constraints generate wealth transfers between the Periphery countries and the Center, which increase the comovement of the stock prices across the Periphery. We associate this excess comovement caused by portfolio constraints with the phenomenon known as contagion. The model generates predictions consistent with other important empirical results such as amplification and flight-to-quality effects.

Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable

Abstract: The merit of international convergence of bank capital requirements in the presence of divergent closure policies of diierent central banks is examined. The lack of a complementary variation between minimum bank capital requirements and regulatory forbearance leads to a spillover from more forbearing to less forbearing economies and reduces the competitive advantage of banks in less forbearing economies. Linking the central bank’s forbearance to its alignment with domestic bank owners, it is shown that in equilibrium, a regression toward the worst closure policy may result: The central banks of initially less forbearing economies also adopt greater forbearance. I ANALYZE THE JOINT DESIGN of two bank regulatory mechanisms: minimum capital requirements, which are an ex ante mechanism to prevent bank failures, and closure policy, which is an ex post mechanism to manage the cost of bank failures. At the heart of the paper is a simple but fundamental point: Ex post policies affect ex ante incentives, and, hence, the design of an ex ante mechanism must take into account any feedback from the ex post policies.The optimal design of capital requirements is thus tied to the extent of forbearance exercised by the central bank’s closure policy. This warrants a closer scrutiny of the merits of creating a ‘‘level playing ¢eld’’ in capital requirements across countries, as proposed and

Headquarters’ Attention and Its Effect on Subsidiary Performance

Abstract: Drawing on a sample of 283 subsidiaries in three countries, we investigate how headquarters’ attention affects subsidiary performance. Scholars have recently argued that top management’s attention is the most critical, scarce and sought-after resource in organizations (Haas and Hansen 2001; Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008). However, the question how headquarters’ attention affects subsidiary companies remains largely unexplored. Our study shows that subsidiaries which have a high level of strategic choice and receive attention from headquarters perform better than their peers. More specifically, we find that the interactions of subsidiaries’ autonomy, inter-unit power and initiatives with attention increase subsidiary performance.

Why do some Multinational Corporations Relocate their Headquarters Overseas

Abstract: This paper examines the decision by a multinational corporation (MNC) to relocate its business unit and/or corporate HQ overseas. We argue that business unit HQs move overseas in response to changes in the internal configuration of their unit's activities and the demands of the product markets in which they operate, whereas corporate HQs move overseas in response to the demands of external stakeholders, in particular global financial markets and shareholders. Using data on 125 business unit HQs and 35 corporate HQs, we test and find support for these arguments. The research highlights important differences between corporate- and business-level strategy, and it suggests ways in which the theory of the MNC needs to be reconsidered. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.